A question about Thomism

[LinuxGal]

For Augustine, the Universe began to exist at a certain point, and time began at the same moment. But the universe is essentially prior to time, even though there was never a time when the former existed and the latter didn't.

The use of the word "prior" becomes a category mistake in the absence of time.  It's like asking what is the weight of Catholicism in grams.

[Belacqua]

For Augustine, the Universe began to exist at a certain point, and time began at the same moment. But the universe is essentially prior to time, even though there was never a time when the former existed and the latter didn't.

The use of the word "prior" becomes a category mistake in the absence of time.  It's like asking what is the weight of Catholicism in grams.

There are two kinds of priority: temporal and essential. The essential type is sometimes called ontological.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontologica...reference.

[The Grand Nudger]

In gods case, at least in thomism, they mesh. It's a missed opportunity. A temporally prior universe with an essentially prior god would be more interesting. The shipwreck scenario.

[LinuxGal]

The use of the word "prior" becomes a category mistake in the absence of time.  It's like asking what is the weight of Catholicism in grams.

There are two kinds of priority: temporal and essential. The essential type is sometimes called ontological.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontologica...reference.

This view is not compatible with modern physics, which has space and time unified in a single field, identical with the gravitational field, where a "prior" event is defined as a point on or within the past light-code of any given event. Thus the red flag of category mistake.

[Belacqua]

There are two kinds of priority: temporal and essential. The essential type is sometimes called ontological.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontologica...reference.

This view is not compatible with modern physics, which has space and time unified in a single field, identical with the gravitational field, where a "prior" event is defined as a point on or within the past light-code of any given event. Thus the red flag of category mistake.

No, it's entirely compatible with modern physics.

Did you read the Wikipedia page? It has some examples. 

The most ubiquitous model is the dependence model of ontological priority which states that "A is prior to B" is true just in case B depends on A for its existence, as in the case where the color of a particular being depends on that being existing for the color-quality inhering in it to exist. An entity ontologically depends on another entity if the first entity cannot exist without the second entity. Ontologically independent entities, on the other hand, can exist all by themselves.[1] For example, the surface of an apple cannot exist without the apple and so depends on it ontologically.[2] Entities often characterized as ontologically dependent include properties, which depend on their bearers, and boundaries, which depend on the entity they demarcate from its surroundings.[3]

Our sun is ontologically dependent on hydrogen. (In other words, hydrogen is ontologically prior -- this is nothing to do with time.) If our sun disappeared, hydrogen would still exist. If hydrogen disappeared, our sun would disappear too.

A T-shirt is ontologically prior to its color. If its color stopped existing (e.g. if you dyed it) the T-shirt would still exist. But if the T-shirt stopped existing (e.g. if you burned it) its color would also stop existing.

[LinuxGal]

A T-shirt is ontologically prior to its color. If its color stopped existing (e.g. if you dyed it) the T-shirt would still exist. But if the T-shirt stopped existing (e.g. if you burned it) its color would also stop existing.

Yet red is prior to the t-shirt. When you first see the t-shirt, you judge it to have the attribute of red on the basis of having previously seen other red things.

[Belacqua]

A T-shirt is ontologically prior to its color. If its color stopped existing (e.g. if you dyed it) the T-shirt would still exist. But if the T-shirt stopped existing (e.g. if you burned it) its color would also stop existing.

Yet red is prior to the t-shirt. When you first see the t-shirt, you judge it to have the attribute of red on the basis of having previously seen other red things.

We're talking about a quality of the shirt. Not the existence of red itself. 

Did you read the Wikipedia article?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/depen...tological/

[LinuxGal]

Yet red is prior to the t-shirt. When you first see the t-shirt, you judge it to have the attribute of red on the basis of having previously seen other red things.

We're talking about a quality of the shirt. Not the existence of red itself. 

You've elevated a property to a form to demonstrate a dependency relationship.  If "red" and "shirt" are not in the same metaphysical class then speaking of one or the other as having priority is incoherent. It's like claiming an actual god is greater than the mere idea of a god.

[Belacqua]

You've elevated a property to a form to demonstrate a dependency relationship.  If "red" and "shirt" are not in the same metaphysical class then speaking of one or the other as having priority is incoherent. 

No, it simply shows that the existence of the quality depends on the existence of something else. 

(And what do you mean by "form" here? A shape? One of Plato's Forms? Is a shirt a form, or a material object?)

Here's another example. 

Let's imagine that Socrates is pale. Then he goes out in the sun for a while and gets a suntan. 

The suntan depends for its existence on Socrates. Even though other people had tans before him, Socrates's suntan depends for its existence on him. 

If the suntan goes away, Socrates continues to exist. If Socrates goes away, then his suntan disappears also. Therefore Socrates is ontologically prior to his suntan. 

It's like claiming an actual god is greater than the mere idea of a god.

I see no relation of this claim to the idea of ontological dependency.

[LinuxGal]

Let's imagine that Socrates is pale. Then he goes out in the sun for a while and gets a suntan. 

The suntan depends for its existence on Socrates. Even though other people had tans before him, Socrates's suntan depends for its existence on him. 

If the suntan goes away, Socrates continues to exist. If Socrates goes away, then his suntan disappears also. Therefore Socrates is ontologically prior to his suntan. 

As you rightly point out, a suntan cannot have existence independent of a human being (it would be like a grinning cat disappearing and leaving a grin behind) but that is also precisely why one oughtn't make a comparison of the two. They don't fit in the same class of being.

LinuxGal

It's like claiming an actual god is greater than the mere idea of a god.

I see no relation of this claim to the idea of ontological dependency.

Anselm's Ontological Argument argues that since God is, by definition, the greatest there is, and since the concept of God in fact exists, one is obliged to assign existence to an actual God, because an actual God is greater than a mere concept of one. Setting aside the absurdity of making existence an attribute, the argument relies on treating an actual God and human thoughts of God in the same ontological class (which to an atheist is true, but for the purpose at hand, they are apples and oranges).