Justification Theory: Preliminary Questions

[Nimzo]

theVoid has asked me to respond to a "challenge" he posted back in November last year:

Here I propose an Epistemology that I argue is entirely coherent and suffers none of the normal epistemic problems for Justification, such as the lottery problem, the new evil demon problem etc. I will argue that this epistemology is entirely consistent with reality and that no examples to the contrary can fault it.

I challenge the theists (or atheists) to either 1) refute my epistemology OR 2) come up with an epistemology that is coherent, consistent and demonstrates that your beliefs are justified.

He then went on to explain his view (which was a hybrid of reliabilism and evidentialism), though his signature now states that his view is "Epistemic Bayesian" - whether that means he has modified his view since his original post will hopefully become clear. In any case, I want to ask a few preliminary questions to understand the nature and purpose of the challenge.

First, why should a theist take this challenge seriously? What are the implications if a theist (or anyone) is not able to give a definition of justification that satisfies theVoid? If theVoid means to imply that if a theist cannot meet this challenge, then his theistic belief is either unjustified or irrational, then he is assuming a form of epistemic methodism. Methodism, broadly speaking, is the view that the question of what justification is should be asked before the question of which beliefs we hold are justified. On the other hand, particularism says the reverse, that our understanding of what justification is should be based on our answer to which beliefs we understand to be justified. If particularism is correct, then it seems that theVoid's challenge is rather vacuous.

Second, what are the criteria by which theVoid wishes to judge between competing justification theories? If we wish to apply the criterion of "consistency with reality" there is an inevitable circularity about the whole project - after all, the central question that makes the question of justification in any way interesting is "What are we justified to believe about reality?"

Third, there is an implicit assumption in the search for a universal theory of justification that we are talking about a normative standard that applies to all people and to all beliefs. The implication is that, if we are not justified in believing something, we are somehow failing to be intellectually responsible, dare I say intellectually virtuous (to use an old-fashioned term). If theVOID does not hold that justification is in some sense normative, then the theist is under no obligation to hold justified beliefs. And if he does, then the theist has to wonder how theVOID, as a metaphysical naturalist, accounts for such a strange thing as a normative standard on his worldview. For the theist it is simple: God, Who is Wisdom itself, is the standard, and He holds everyone accountable to reflecting His nature as the bearers of His image, and so the obligation to be responsible believers is part of our duty towards Him and our world.

EDIT: Few minor typos.

[theVOID]

First, why should a theist take this challenge seriously? What are the implications if a theist (or anyone) is not able to give a definition of justification that satisfies theVoid? If theVoid means to imply that if a theist cannot meet this challenge, then his theistic belief is either unjustified or irrational, then he is assuming a form of epistemic methodism. Methodism, broadly speaking, is the view that the question of what justification is should be asked before the question of which beliefs we hold are justified. On the other hand, particularism says the reverse, that our understanding of what justification should be based on our answer to which beliefs we know to be justified. If particularism is correct, then it seems that theVoid's challenge is rather vacuous.

Thanks for the response

I am essentially of the position that a theory of justification should be at the core of our worldview, we must first establish what it means for a belief to be justified and then go about evaluating various propositions to determine whether or not they are permitted by this theory of justification - If they are we should believe them and if not we should not - If it turns out that another theory of justification is superior then we must reformulate our beliefs based on this new standard.

Second, what are the criteria by which theVoid wishes to judge between competing justification theories? If we wish to apply the criterion of "consistency with reality" there is an inevitable circularity about the whole project - after all, the central question that makes the question of justification in any way interesting is "What are we justified to believe about reality?"

By consistency I mean the theory should be consistent in it's formulation and conclusions. An example would be the 'personal revelation' claimed by many theists, it is a proposed standard of evidence that leads to innumerable contradictory conclusions, thus it is not consistent in it's conclusions and cannot be considered sufficient for justification - This does not imply that the revelation is necessarily false, only that it is not alone sufficient for justification. You could not have within the theory of justification something along the lines of "S is justified in belief that P if S has a personal revelation that P"

Third, there is an implicit assumption in the search for a universal theory of justification that we are talking about a normative standard that applies to all people and to all beliefs.

The implication is that, if we are not justified in believing something, we are somehow failing to be intellectually responsible, dare I say intellectually virtuous (to use an old-fashioned term). If theVOID does not hold that justification is in some sense normative, then the theist is under no obligation to hold justified beliefs. And if he does, then the theist has to wonder how theVOID, as a metaphysical naturalism, accounts for such a strange thing as a normative standard on his worldview. For the theist it is simple: God, Who is Wisdom itself, is the standard, and He holds everyone accountable to reflecting His nature as the bearers of His image, and so the obligation to be responsible believers is part of our duty towards Him and our world.

I would say that if we desire to be as rational as possible, to have the map as accurate as possible in describing the territory, then we ought to have the best theory of justification possible so as to form as many true beliefs and as few false beliefs as possible - Failure to have justified beliefs is failure to be as rational as possible.

I do believe we have an intellectual responsibility to have justified beliefs, a responsibility to other beings and their values, for instance: If someone only cared about having beliefs that were subjectively appealing, such as 'vaccines caused my child's autism' (for possible reasons such as emotional duress at the thought that god allowed their child to be born disabled, or that blaming someone is more emotionally satisfying) then they are more likely to act as to fulfill their desire to keep children safe in a way that ultimately undermines that desire, by promoting anti-vaccination attitudes, and in doing so thwarting the desires of others.

I believe that a desire that tends to promote more/stronger desires than it thwarts is a morally good desire, having a desire that tends to thwart more/stronger desires than they promote is morally bad, a desire to have justified beliefs is one that leads to us having a map that better represents the territory which leads to a greater understanding of the implications of our actions as we seek to fulfill our own desires which in turn leads to us being less likely to unintentionally thwart and more likely to intentionally promote the desires of others - The reverse is that not caring about having justified beliefs leads to thwarting more/stronger desires and is thus morally bad.

[Nimzo]

Thanks for the response

I am essentially of the position that a theory of justification should be at the core of our worldview, we must first establish what it means for a belief to be justified and then go about evaluating various propositions to determine whether or not they are permitted by this theory of justification - If they are we should believe them and if not we should not - If it turns out that another theory of justification is superior then we must reformulate our beliefs based on this new standard.

OK, but you haven't answered my question of why the theist, or anyone, should take your methodist view rather than a particularist one.

By consistency I mean the theory should be consistent in it's formulation and conclusions.

Well, presumably any theory of justification with a "no defeaters" clause is going to satisfy that condition. The condition also has nothing to do with whether the theory is actually a correct description of justification.

I would say that if we desire to be as rational as possible, to have the map as accurate as possible in describing the territory, then we ought to have the best theory of justification possible so as to form as many true beliefs and as few false beliefs as possible - Failure to have justified beliefs is failure to be as rational as possible.

Right, but the whole question is whether we should have the desire to be "rational" according to your standard. A conditional "ought" isn't going to get you a normative standard.

I do believe we have an intellectual responsibility to have justified beliefs, a responsibility to other beings and their values, for instance: If someone only cared about having beliefs that were subjectively appealing, such as 'vaccines caused my child's autism' (for possible reasons such as emotional duress at the thought that god allowed their child to be born disabled, or that blaming someone is more emotionally satisfying) then they are more likely to act as to fulfill their desire to keep children safe in a way that ultimately undermines that desire, by promoting anti-vaccination attitudes, and in doing so thwarting the desires of others.

I don't think you've given a reason here why there exists intellectual (which you set up as a subset of moral) responsibility. You've said you believe that we have one (and I agree), but being a methodist you need to show that you are justified in believing in one.

I believe that a desire that tends to promote more/stronger desires than it thwarts is a morally good desire,

I don't think you really mean this - I can have a desire that promotes lots of very strong desires to do morally wrong things. That I have a desire to do something says nothing about the moral status of the action I desire to do. I presume I am misunderstanding what you mean here.

[theVOID]

OK, but you haven't answered my question of why the theist, or anyone, should take your methodist view rather than a particularist one.

You said it yourself: "our understanding of what justification is should be based on our answer to which beliefs we understand to be justified".

This approach is completely circular and uncritical in that what we consider justification is based on what we already believe to be justified, such as believing that we have a sensus divinitatis and then saying we are justified believing in god because of the sensus divinitatis with no examination of whether or not the presumed innate knowledge is true.

If you wanted to examine whether or not the sensus divinitatis was in fact real, as a particularist you would have to rely on other things you perceive to intuitively know in order to decide whether or not you were justified in believing in the sensus divinitatis, but these propositions that you perceived you intuitively knew could also only be examined in light of other propositions you perceived you intuitively knew and so on and so forth, ultimately one would run out of things they intuitively knew and have to resort to methodism regardless.

There are also a great many flaws in our 'intuitions' or common sense, if you wanted a purely empirical reason why the idea that we "just know" some things is an entirely useless basis for a theory of justification a quick trip down neuroscience lane would suffice - We are surprisingly terrible at intuiting things.

Well, presumably any theory of justification with a "no defeaters" clause is going to satisfy that condition. The condition also has nothing to do with whether the theory is actually a correct description of justification.

A no defeaters clause such as?

And I disagree that it has nothing to do with it. If a standard of evidence yields contradictory conclusions then dismissing it as sufficient for justification is very much relevant.

Right, but the whole question is whether we should have the desire to be "rational" according to your standard. A conditional "ought" isn't going to get you a normative standard.

Hypothetical oughts are the only ones that exist.

I couldn't say you simply should desire to be rational and I have no reason to, I can however say that people have a reason for action to promote a desire to be rational and people who care about others have a reason for action to themselves be rational as irrational beliefs tend to do more harm, people who want to achieve their goals have a desire to be instrumentally rational etc.

Normativity is natural and exists in the cognitive systems of beings.

I don't think you've given a reason here why there exists intellectual (which you set up as a subset of moral) responsibility. You've said you believe that we have one (and I agree), but being a methodist you need to show that you are justified in believing in one.

This is a bit of a side issue as I never intended to get into why it is morally good or bad to desire to be rational, I was more dealing with people who already claim that they are rational and already care about being rational (or claim to) but none the less:

Forget responsibility and obligation for a now, I tend to see them as rather confused terms, instead lets talk about it being morally good.

I believe it is morally good to desire to be rational as a desire to be rational is one that tends to promote more and/or stronger desires than it thwarts - People who are rational tend to make less decisions that cause unintended harm, amongst other things. If everyone were to desire to be justified in their beliefs there would be no people promoting anti-vaccination movements that, despite their intentions, do far more harm than good.

I do not believe that they are "obligated" to be rational in the sense that they are breaking some social or divine contract by failing to do so and should be reprimanded, only in the sense that people who do not desire to be rational tend to give other people reason for action to promote a desire to be rational. People who promote anti-vaccination give us reason for action to condemn irrationality and promote rationality.

I don't think you really mean this - I can have a desire that promotes lots of very strong desires to do morally wrong things. That I have a desire to do something says nothing about the moral status of the action I desire to do. I presume I am misunderstanding what you mean here.

You are only considering the 1st generation or 'direct' desires, that is your main fault in understanding me it seems, you need to consider the totality of the impact in my moral evaluation. If you have a desire that tends to promote desires that thwart more desires then you have a desire that tends to thwart desires.

For instance; You could have a desire for satisfaction and a belief that Jihad achieves this satisfaction, so you have reason for action to promote a desire to commit jihad, but a desire to commit Jihad is one that tends to thwart far more and stronger desires than it promotes, so in totality a desire to commit Jihad is one that thwarts more/stronger desires and is morally wrong.

[Nimzo]

You said it yourself: "our understanding of what justification is should be based on our answer to which beliefs we understand to be justified".

This approach is completely circular and uncritical in that what we consider justification is based on what we already believe to be justified, such as believing that we have a sensus divinitatis and then saying we are justified believing in god because of the sensus divinitatis with no examination of whether or not the presumed innate knowledge is true.

If you wanted to examine whether or not the sensus divinitatis was in fact real, as a particularist you would have to rely on other things you perceive to intuitively know in order to decide whether or not you were justified in believing in the sensus divinitatis, but these propositions that you perceived you intuitively knew could also only be examined in light of other propositions you perceived you intuitively knew and so on and so forth, ultimately one would run out of things they intuitively knew and have to resort to methodism regardless.

(1) Simply arguing that particularism is false is not an argument for methodism; there is a third alternative, namely skepticism.
(2) Your argument that particularism is “circular” is not an argument against the truth of particularism. Circularity does not entail falsity.
(3) You have not actually demonstrated that particularism is circular at all. Particularism simply is the view that one can know that one holds a justified belief without knowing how it is justified. Your slippery slope argument assumes that the particularist has to explain how his beliefs are justified, but that is the assumption of methodism! A theistic particularist would not say that “we are justified to believe in God because of the sensus divinitatis” – at least not until she has developed criteria for justification. A theistic particularist might say “belief in God is an instance of justified belief”. The methodist can cry all she likes that the theist doesn’t know how theism is a justified belief, but the obvious response is “So what? – I am not a methodist.”

Well, presumably any theory of justification with a "no defeaters" clause is going to satisfy that condition. The condition also has nothing to do with whether the theory is actually a correct description of justification.

A no defeaters clause such as?

And I disagree that it has nothing to do with it. If a standard of evidence yields contradictory conclusions then dismissing it as sufficient for justification is very much relevant.

A no defeaters clause looks like this:

• S is justified (J) in believing p if S and p satisfy [some set of justification criteria] provided that S has no defeaters for p (i.e. provided S does not hold some other justified belief q which entails ¬p or ¬Jp).

Given such a clause, no matter what the set of justification criteria, the set of justified beliefs held by S will be consistent. So, consistency is not a strong enough criterion to come to a conclusion about what the correct justification criteria are.

Hypothetical oughts are the only ones that exist.

I couldn't say you simply should desire to be rational and I have no reason to, I can however say that people have a reason for action to promote a desire to be rational and people who care about others have a reason for action to themselves be rational as irrational beliefs tend to do more harm, people who want to achieve their goals have a desire to be instrumentally rational etc.

In which case, I can’t see why a theist should take your epistemological challenge seriously, given that there is no obligation on your view to meet the challenge. The claim that unless someone meets your particular view of rationality they will cause harm is only relevant if there is a real obligation not to cause harm – in which case, your view is contradictory.

Normativity is natural and exists in the cognitive systems of beings.

I am using normativity in terms of there being a real standard of rationality that intelligent beings ought to meet. You are using normativity in a different sense, unless you care to retract your view that there are only “hypothetical oughts”.

This is a bit of a side issue as I never intended to get into why it is morally good or bad to desire to be rational, I was more dealing with people who already claim that they are rational and already care about being rational (or claim to) but none the less:

Forget responsibility and obligation for a now, I tend to see them as rather confused terms, instead lets talk about it being morally good.

You are applying justification in a normative fashion; this necessarily entails that we must deal with the notions of responsibility and obligation. Our whole discussion is about a confused term, so that is not a reason not to use the words (which to me are less confused than justification). Moral goodness is also a normative property anyway, so it equally involves notions of responsibility and obligation.

I believe it is morally good to desire to be rational as a desire to be rational is one that tends to promote more and/or stronger desires than it thwarts - People who are rational tend to make less decisions that cause unintended harm, amongst other things. If everyone were to desire to be justified in their beliefs there would be no people promoting anti-vaccination movements that, despite their intentions, do far more harm than good.

I do not believe that they are "obligated" to be rational in the sense that they are breaking some social or divine contract by failing to do so and should be reprimanded, only in the sense that people who do not desire to be rational tend to give other people reason for action to promote a desire to be rational. People who promote anti-vaccination give us reason for action to condemn irrationality and promote rationality.

Again you are talking about “more” and “stronger” desires – what is it about the quantity and strength of desires that has anything to do with morality? What is it about harm that makes it something that we should avoid. And what do you mean by “thwarting” them? I really struggle to see how your “desirism” has anything to do with how we should or should not act. (Obligation need not have anything to do with reprimand by the way, though I agree that it only makes sense within the context of relationships between persons, be they human or divine.)

EDIT: Some important ¬ symbols didn't make it first time round, and typos abounded.