Van Tillian/Clarkian Presuppositional Apologetics.

[DeistPaladin]

Science assumes the principle of induction is valid, so you can’t use science to justify the principle of induction, to do so would be begging the question.

Oh, I get it. Forgive my newness to this whole philoso-babble defense of Christianity. This is another variation on the "why use reason" argument. I'm seeing a pattern in all these apologies:

• "You can't account for morality but we can because GodWillsIt"
  
• "You can't account for why you use logic but we can because GodWillIt"
  
• "You can't account for how life began but we can because GodDidIt"
  
• "You can't account for induction but we can because GodDoesIt"
  

Same crap packaged in a slightly different way.

1. Ask an abstract question with no easy answer
   
2. Invent a contrived definition of your god, regardless of what scripture says
   
3. Use the contrived definition to answer your own question
   

I've already been all over why this is crap philosophy specially designed to work toward the preconceived conclusion that Jesus is Lord because you need to logically justify a belief that supposedly eschews the need for logical justification.

That’s not burden of proof, that’s an argument from ignorance. You contradicted yourself here, you said that we will assume the uniformity of nature exists until we see otherwise, and then here you said that something is assumed to not exist (so no uniformity in nature) until we have evidence that it does. Which is it?

Yes.

Other yet unknown factors are what must be proven to exist. Not that other yet unknown factors don't exist. You are playing the game of shifting the burden of proof and demanding your opponent prove a negative.

[Statler Waldorf]

Oh, I get it. Forgive my newness to this whole philoso-babble defense of Christianity.

I forgive your philosophical ignorance for the time being.

"You can't account for morality but we can because GodWillsIt"

Not quite, you can’t account for the universal and transcendent form of morality that you always appeal to, Christians can.

"You can't account for why you use logic but we can because GodWillIt"

Not quite, given your naturalism you can’t account for the universal, unchanging, and abstract laws of logic that you appeal to, Christians can though because logic is a reflection of the way God thinks.

"You can't account for how life began but we can because GodDidIt"

Not part of the argument here.

"You can't account for induction but we can because GodDoesIt"

Not quite, you can’t account for the uniformity of nature given your naturalism; it is this uniformity that the principle of induction works off of. It is the principle of induction that is the foundation for all science. Christians can account for the uniformity of nature, induction, and science because God upholds His creation in a predictable and consistent manner.

Same crap packaged in a slightly different way.

Calling something you seem completely unable to even accurately characterize much less refute “crap” seems a bit childish and silly.

Ask an abstract question with no easy answer

They all have very easy answers, if you are a believer. If you are not, then I am afraid they don’t have any correct answers.

I've already been all over why this is crap philosophy specially designed to work toward the preconceived conclusion that Jesus is Lord because you need to logically justify a belief that supposedly eschews the need for logical justification.

If you had only one ultimate presupposition that you had left unjustified then you’d be on pretty solid ground with the Christian, unfortunately you have over half a dozen you can’t justify.

Other yet unknown factors are what must be proven to exist.

No, the uniformity of nature is what you have to prove exists. You assume it exists but I have seen no proof provided by you that it actually does.

[DeistPaladin]

Calling something you seem completely unable to even accurately characterize much less refute “crap” seems a bit childish and silly.

Actually, I think I pretty accurately stated what you rephrased. You can put all the flowery language on it you like but all these "arguments" still boil down to the same formula:

"You can't account for X but I can because GodWillsWantsDoesDidIt. And it just so happens that I've come up with a contrived definition of God or some unproven assertion about God specially suited to this argument. You see, it turns out that logic is a reflection of how God thinks or it turns out that moral goodness is bound in the very nature of God etc and I know all this because I just got through pulling it all out of my ass."

Pure philoso-babble crap. All this posited because you have not a shred of hard evidence to back up your extraordinary claims.

[Captain Scarlet]

...theological terms logic is a "communicable attribute" of God, which is distinguished from his "incommunicable attributes" (e.g., aseity); thus it is a divine attribute with which creation has an analogical relationship (as distinct from an identical relationship). ..........
This is why we see Van Til say things like, "The law of contradiction cannot be thought of as operating anywhere except against the background of the nature of God."

As for your argument on why logic is not arbitrary but necessary. It does not refute the arbitrary nature of logic (assuming TAG is true), but instead merely replaces it by specifying the detail of the associated subjectivity (in this case the xtian god). Protesting that god is necessary and so is logic, is an ad hoc rationalisation. Furthermore your argument demonstrates logic is not intrinsic at all to the natural world, because it requires a personal being to instantiate it. As a naturalist I cannot accept that.

Thank you for taking the time to explain your perspective. I probably didn't explain well enough why I cannot grasp the meaning of that phrase. Again I think what you have done is clearly explain why you believe logic is necessary and that you believe it comes from the nature of the xtian god. What I cannot grasp is what the nature is that would give rise to logic in the first place. It is a form of words with no meaning. Some reasons I have trouble with this approach:

1) it lacks specificity. The words grounding and nature convey something more tangible than, 'it comes with god/as god/as part of god'. Those terms expressly suggest a relationship between an attribute (logic in this case) and a cause of that attributes existence which you describe as nature (but what is that in this case). A trivial but specific example: the webbing of the space between your thumb and index finger on your right hand is a direct result of the human genome expressed through your personal DNA. This would describe a grounded reality (the webbing) and a cause in your own 'nature' (your biological humanity). What 'nature' within god which would give rise to logic?, it appears to me to be merely asserted as one of his attributes and just left there as a mysterious property.
2) the concept of god seems so far from our experience that to comprehend the nature of such a 'thing', let alone what could spring forth from that nature, is impossible. Yet we are told we are in the image of that god. I can't reconcile that.
3) you have no grounds to posit the nature and properties of a being which is sovereign and beyond your comprehension
4) the method of transmission through this nature of logic into the universe from the supernatural realm is problematic. You cannot just argue that it is transmitted through us as the image of god, as that implies no us, no logic (at least in the natural realm). But that is a ridiculous state of affairs (and I can avoid this as a naturalist), but you are unable to provide ANY rough sketch of how it gets here, ie radiation, imposition, command, just in time delivery, woven into space time.

There are some further problems nothing about a god suggests they are necessarily rational/logical:
5) Humans are not always logical so it seems odd that a more powerful being cannot at least ape humans, let alone beat them. The theist notion appears to me to be ad-hoc again.
6) TAG is arguing that logic is part of gods nature but also created by him. It cannot be both.
7) you cannot demonstrate that this being is not misleading you into thinking that he is logical and is the source of logic

That is exactly the problem, though. That the universe could sustain itself apart from God is NOT logically possible from my arguments. For example, your thought experiment works only if God is "separate from his creation," which is precisely antithetical to my argument...

This is a surprising argument, I'll come to why in a moment. But, it is also part of your argument that the same god is omnipotent and whilst he may not be separate from his creation now and everything may be dependent on him now and also in the past, it doesn't follow that he cannot be separated from it and leave it self sustaining. He has that power and that doesn't contradict his being, it is therefore logically possible and you have not addressed this.

But for the sake of this argument lets move the discussion forward and say that this is indeed logically impossible. It is also part of your argument that god is immutable and omnipresent. If god is not separate from the universe AND also cannot be separated from it AND also sustains it; god must undergo change, as the universe itself changes.

Consider an example, god is omnipresent and is currently at the centre of a star (as he is everywhere else in the universe) and is sustaining his creation. He is sustaining, in this case, 2 hydrogen atoms which are about to fuse to form one helium atom. God now has a trilemma:
- god must either separate/withdraw from this part of the universe and allow them to fuse, or
- change his attitude wrt currently sustaining those 2 atoms and fuse them himself, or
- continue to sustain those 2 atoms and prevent the fusion.

Now the last position won't give rise to a contradiction nor any problems wrt to withdrawing his influence. Even though it is a tremendously improbable event (given what we know about fusion), we also know fusion happens at the centre of every star (billions of them in each of the billions of galaxies) a fantastically high number of times per second, so if this god exists he must be taking one of the other 2 routes regularly.

It gets worse, in addition an omnipresent, omniscient, all observing, god bound into his creation as his creation is bound into him, must be able to observe everything. We know from quantum mechanics that observation collapses the wave function of photons (or other particle/waves) leading to no superposition. But we know superposition exists. Therefore this god with those attributes cannot.

God it seems goes out of his way to make himself unavailable to most acts of cognition.

And it seems to me that you are conflating logically impossible and metaphysically impossible. In order for that statement to be recognizable to my view, I would reword it thus: "It is metaphysically impossible for the nature of God not to include logic." As an attribute of God coterminus with his being, the issue is thus metaphysical.

Yes I see that may be a problem for pursuing this argument, if given your argument you could separate the metaphysically impossible from the logically impossible. But given your position how can you do that? You have to antecedently assume that logic exists to discuss metaphysical issues about logic/god, else you could not have a discussion about whether it/they exist or not. Rephrasing your sentence above:

"It is metaphysically impossible [and also logically impossible because god is a simple being who is by definition logic itself and his thoughts, actions and being are entirely logical] for the nature of God not to include logic." As an attribute of God coterminus with his being, the issue is thus metaphysical [and also a logical problem because god is a simple being who is by definition logic itself and his thoughts, actions and being are entirely logical]"

Although we presuppose a host of things (typically arguendo), none of them are axiomatic save one: the truth of God as revealed in Scripture. That is our sole axiomatic presupposition. Anything else that we assume arguendo, whether theological, Christological, soteriological or what have you, is not axiomatic but rather deduced from the sole presupposition that is. I will not prevent you from demonstrating how it is not axiomatic, unless your attempt commits an error in reasoning (such as begging the question).

I have not heard you argue for this. It seems to me you need to. How does "the truth of God as revealed in Scripture" qualify as axiomatic? At the moment it is asserted but not argued for as an axiom.

Also if I claim that 1) god is not self evident to my acts of cognition 2) I can deny the existence of god without violating any rational axioms (such as existence, consciousness, logic). I think you are saying I am begging the question, because under your view even to reason at all we must assume god?[hope I have that right?]. If you are to argue that I do need to assume god to challenge your axioms, you would have to prove it, and you have not.

Jesus is not reducible to the Godhead; that is the modalist heresy of Sabellius. Nor is the Godhead reducible to Jesus; God is three persons and Jesus is not. While I can appreciate that you struggle to see how the Trinity works, what I cannot overlook is the persistent appearance of an error after it has been identified as one. No, he is not; that is the monist heresy of Arius.

So lets assume my ignorance of the trinity renders my point obsolete. It seems a small concession to make. Outside the questions of the trinity you have not answered why Jesus/ god cannot be reduced to an immaterial mind, thus this point still stands. Also Ryft I am not asking you to overlook anything. I was restating my position. If (and I take your word for it) Jesus does not reduce to the godhead, then my assumption was that it could work in reverse, ie that the godhead can be reduced to Jesus, then Jesus to man, ie it was a different point. As for heresy, they are also another mans truth.

Except I did; namely, it follows by necessity from God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility.

This seems to be swapping one bare assertion for another. What you appear to be arguing for here is that in order to have this or any discussion at all we must assume the existence of god. This seems to me to be clearly false for a number of reasons, notably:

1) An example: An Atlanteanist could state that we have good grounds to know of the existence of Atlantis, from the works of Plato. Using such an argument says nothing about Atlantis' metaphysical status, but it still argues that its potential existence should be taken seriously. But if I was to assert the only way to come to know Atlantis exists, is to know Atlantis exists, I would probably be pulled up for circular reasoning and confusing metaphysics and epistemology. In a similar manner arguing that one must presume god, to make an argument for god commits similar errors. It means you are excluding the classical theistic and [atheistic] arguments. But these classical arguments, argue there is a way to know/[know there is no] god, outside of the metaphysics of the matter. And if any of these arguments are true, it says nothing amiss about whether a god actually exists.
2) As a non-believer my lack of cognition of the god of scripture could be said to render me less able to interpret the world around me correctly. But it would be hard for you to argue that I cannot interpret anything correctly. Even an athiest must have some grip on the realities of the universe. You as a theist would have to concede that you lack omniscience. The difference between us then is a matter of degree and not of truth or falsity. It is at this point your system seems to break down as you would need to establish that it is by ONLY believing in the xtian god of scripture, that you can know anything of the universe at all.
3) We managed before the [I would say invention] of the Judeo-Christian faith to comprehend the world around enough to advance humanity from its state 200k years ago to 198k years ago. The reasoning skills of early humans did not seem to need an assumption of a pre-existing Jesus.

Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that those arguments succeed (and they do not), they commit the fallacy of stolen concept by using induction as a valid epistemic heuristic device while denying the very thing upon which it logically and genetically depends, God as the necessary precondition of intelligibility.

Well we'll not agree on whether those arguments succeed. I have criticised the precondition of intelligibility above, I don't think its true and I beleive from my naturalist standpoint there are still powerful inductive reasons which are at odds with presuppositionalism.

On the contrary, the mere fact that we can argue over God's existence proves that I am right, as the whole enterprise presupposes the existence of God (apart from whom nothing is intelligible). It is akin to trying to "invalidate logic," as invalidating is a logical function (i.e., the attempt itself uses logic). This is why Frame responded to Martin, "To deny that such a necessary condition exists while engaging in supposedly meaningful discourse is to contradict oneself."

See above comments.

That God is undeniable follows by necessity from God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility. In this discussion—wherein the truth of presuppositionalism is the question—the burden of proof falls upon whoever seeks to deny, for example, that logic depends on the nature and character of God, which requires demonstrating that it cannot. You attempted to do this by arguing that if logic depends on God then such things as the law of contradiction would be contingently true rather than necessarily true. I have shown how that fails because logic depends on God in the sense that it is grounded in his very nature and character (thus it cannot be arbitrary and cannot fail to be necessarily true, as God himself is necessary being). The only recourse you have left is showing that the nature of God cannot be necessary being.

And I have challenged the assertion that they are grounded in the nature of god. You have asserted this and offered no rough sketch as to the meaning of this phrase nor how this is known. You have in detailed re-iterated the argument that it is necessarily the case that both god and logic exists, but how does that in anyway demonstrate that its true?

[Statler Waldorf]

Actually, I think I pretty accurately stated what you rephrased.

Go ahead and think what you want, but you didn’t.

"You can't account for X but I can because GodWillsWantsDoesDidIt.

Well I have demonstrated how I can account for these things and you have demonstrated that you cannot, so I see no issue with this statement.

And it just so happens that I've come up with a contrived definition of God or some unproven assertion about God specially suited to this argument.

I have appealed to the God of scripture, I have used scripture to back up my conception of this God, you can call it contrived if you like but that just shows that you understand the meaning of the word contrived about as well as you do the word contradiction.

You see, it turns out that logic is a reflection of how God thinks or it turns out that moral goodness is bound in the very nature of God etc and I know all this because I just got through pulling it all out of my ass."

My ass has nothing to do with it, you do realize you are doing nothing to refute the argument with this silliness and in doing so you are wasting both of our time right? I am still the one holding onto an un-refuted argument though, so I guess it is slightly more of a waste of your time than it is mine.

Pure philoso-babble crap.

You can call sophisticated logical argumentation whatever you like, but that does not make it anything other than what it is, sophisticated logical argumentation.

All this posited because you have not a shred of hard evidence to back up your extraordinary claims.

We are talking about logical proof here, not evidence. As I pointed out earlier though, by definition naturalism is the extraordinary claim because a majority of people reject it; I have not seen any evidence presented by you to back up naturalism much less any extraordinary evidence.

[The Grand Nudger]

The only thing you're holding onto is your absurd faith. No proof, no evidence. You, like Ryft, worship an argument. As far as gods go, in the greater arena of human thought, yours is small and unimpressive. Able only to do what is logically possible, constrained by both myth and whatever demonstrable science you believe is not anathema to the concept itself. Defined and ruled over by fuzzy thinking. A powerless dictator of susceptible minds. I remain unconvinced.

[DeistPaladin]

I have appealed to the God of scripture, I have used scripture to back up my conception of this God, you can call it contrived if you like but that just shows that you understand the meaning of the word contrived about as well as you do the word contradiction.

You can make scripture say whatever you want to believe. It's just a matter of finding the right passages and interpreting them in the right manner.

This is why there are thousands of different Christian churches today, each of which claim to be the real deal.

I've not met a Christian yet who didn't see God as a being who always wants what they want, hates what they hate and thinks what they think. God is always on their side. Jesus is a socialist, a capitalist, a liberal, a conservative, a Jew, a Muslim, white, black, gay, straight, bi, asexual or whatever you want him to be.

This is one reason why GodWillsIt is a lame answer.

[Statler Waldorf]

The only thing you're holding onto is your absurd faith. No proof, no evidence.

No proof? Do you know what that word even means? A valid argument has been presented, it has yet to be refuted; that is proof silly boy.

You, like Ryft, worship an argument.

Wait, so you say no arguments have been presented but now you say that Ryft and I worship the argument we presented? The day you are anything more than consistently inconsistent will be a great day in your growth towards being a rational person.

As far as gods go, in the greater arena of human thought, yours is small and unimpressive.

Opinions don’t matter much in these parts there Tex.

I remain unconvinced.

Sounds like a personal problem. Romans 1.

You can make scripture say whatever you want to believe. It's just a matter of finding the right passages and interpreting them in the right manner.

Really? Can you back this up? Can you make scripture say that there is no God and that everything has occurred through natural means since the beginning of time?

This is why there are thousands of different Christian churches today, each of which claim to be the real deal.

*cringes at your complete misunderstanding of Christian denominationalism* People disagreeing on scripture has nothing to do with its truthfulness.

I've not met a Christian yet who didn't see God as a being who always wants what they want, hates what they hate and thinks what they think.

Anecdotal evidences are meaningless. I have never met a rational atheist, so what?

God is always on their side.

God works all things out for the good of the believer, yes. Romans 8.

Jesus is a socialist, a capitalist, a liberal, a conservative, a Jew, a Muslim, white, black, gay, straight, bi, asexual or whatever you want him to be.

I am not sure what you are trying to prove with all of this, people’s misinterpretation of something is irrelevant to its truthfulness.

This is one reason why GodWillsIt is a lame answer.

So since there are thousands of different interpretations of Darwinism, is evolution therefore also a “lame” answer?

[Ryft]

As for your argument on why logic is not arbitrary but necessary, it does not refute the arbitrary nature of logic (assuming the TAG is true) ...

Actually that is precisely what it does. But you admit to not seeing the connection so let us try a different approach. Given the biblical theology of divine necessity and simplicity, please explain how logic as an attribute of God could fail to obtain in all possible worlds. That is prima facie an untenable contradiction.

And it is not "an ad hoc rationalization," for the doctrine of divine necessity was not proposed in order to explain logic.

Furthermore, your argument demonstrates that logic is not intrinsic at all to the natural world because it requires a personal being to instantiate it.

On the contrary, logical order certainly is intrinsic to the natural world. But the fact that reality is non contra se (not contrary to itself) is an a-priori assumption we bring to scientific inquiry, not a conclusion we draw from it (for without it we cannot even do science), so what explains this fact that we intuitively grasp about reality? It follows from the aseity and necessity of the transcendent God who creates and sustains it—without whom we have no explanation for it. Every sane person recognizes the nature of reality as non contra se, including naturalists like yourself and Dillahunty (cf. his debate with Slick); yet it is only biblical Christianity which can explain that fact of nature. (To confess "I don't know" is to admit not having an explanation.)

Thank you for taking the time to explain your perspective. I probably didn't explain well enough why I cannot grasp the meaning of that phrase. Again, I think what you have done is clearly explain why you believe logic is necessary and that you believe it comes from the nature of the Christian God. What I cannot grasp is what the [divine] nature is that would give rise to logic in the first place.

Let me try this, then. What do you mean by "logic" in your question here?

The concept of God seems so far from our experience that to comprehend the nature of such a thing, let alone what could spring forth from that nature, is impossible. Yet we are told that we are in the image of that God. I can't reconcile that.

That is why Van Til and others in the Reformed tradition speak of our knowledge of God as analogical; i.e., it is impossible to comprehend the literal nature of God for it defies our categories and language, but we can comprehend what God is like because he has revealed himself in Scripture, in creation, in mankind as imago Dei, in history, and ultimately in the incarnation of the Son—but always analogically and covenantally. "God's understanding of himself and the creation is independent, but man's knowledge is dependent. ... Men do actually think; yet true knowledge is dependent on and derived from God's knowledge as it has been revealed to man" (Pratt 1979, p. 17).

You have no grounds to posit the nature and properties of a being which is sovereign and beyond your comprehension.

Actually I do—God's self-disclosure in Scripture.

The method of transmission through this nature of logic into the universe from the supernatural realm is problematic. You cannot just argue that it is transmitted through us as the image of God, as that implies "no us, no logic" (at least in the natural realm). But that is a ridiculous state of affairs (which I can avoid as a naturalist). But you are unable to provide any rough sketch of how it gets here (e.g., radiation, imposition, command, just-in-time delivery, woven into space time).

It is not problematic. And this is a conversation we started to have once before but never got to finish so I am glad it has resurfaced.

First, your objection fails to account for the doctrine of divine immanence; that is, your objection presupposes a dichotomy of natural and supernatural, as if there is a natural realm which exists and operates apart from God unless and until he intervenes supernaturally in this or that case (which perhaps explains your notion that it is logically possible for the universe to sustain itself). Such a dichotomy is foreign to biblical theology, or cannot be found in Scripture, as I have indicated previously when I said the universe would not exist but for the providential sustaining power of this covenant God. It is in fact a contemporary invention, arising in 18th century Europe and manifest in deist thought, and is therefore inapplicable in a critique of the biblical worldview, under which this dichotomy is utterly foreign. This divine immanence, the fact that all of creation exists by him, through him, and for him—that by his word all things were created and have their being, that all things are held together in him and so forth—must be kept in mind if the critique is to be reasonable.

Second, that ridiculous notion, as you called it—namely, "no us, no logic (at least in the natural realm)"—does not follow from the biblical worldview (and is thus avoided), which holds that logical order is intrinsic to God's creation, which existed for billions of years before any humans or even imago Dei were around. To borrow one of your terms, but understood in a biblical context, such logical order is woven into the very fabric of reality by the power of God's covenantal and sustaining providence; thus for example, "But I, the LORD, make the following promise: I have made a covenant governing the coming of day and night. I have established the fixed laws governing heaven and earth. Just as surely as I have done this, so surely will I never reject the descendants of Jacob" (Jer 33:25-26).

Third, your naturalism fails to avoid it by virtue of reducing itself to self-referential incoherence. As such, naturalism fails to commend itself on both fronts: it is false under the terms of my view, and is self-referentially incoherent under its own terms. (1) If metaphysical naturalism is true, then all beliefs are fully explainable in terms of non-rational causes. (2) If all beliefs are fully explainable in terms of non-rational causes, then they are not rationally inferred. (3) Therefore, if metaphysical naturalism is true then no belief is rationally inferred. (4) Metaphysical naturalism is true. (5) Therefore, no belief is rationally inferred (including the belief that metaphysical naturalism is true).

Humans are not always logical, so it seems odd that a more powerful being cannot at least ape humans, let alone beat them. The theist notion appears to me to be ad hoc again.

I am unsure of what you are saying here. What does it mean for God to ape or beat inconsistently logical humans? Are you suggesting that God is logical less often than humans are? If so, then how does that follow from anything we have discussed? Or are you suggesting that a being as powerful as God should be able to produce humans that are more consistently logical? If so, then it is fallacious to reason from the fact that God has not done so to the conclusion that he cannot do so. In either case, it is unclear how anything ad hoc has arisen.

The TAG is arguing that logic is part of God's nature but also created by him. It cannot be both.

No, the TAG is arguing that the logical order of creation and our apprehension thereof expressed in the laws of thought are created by God, in whom the nature of reality as non contra se and our ability to reason logically are grounded, given his nature as a se, necessary, and covenantal. The term "logic" is shorthand which, I readily admit, apologists have been sloppy with, failing to make the distinctions needed (e.g., Slick was rightly challenged by Dillahunty on this point for trading on equivocation in his transcendental argument).

You cannot demonstrate that this being is not misleading you into thinking that he is logical and is the source of logic.

Indeed I cannot justify an axiomatic presupposition—by definition! (If I could, then it would not be axiomatic.) I am not sure how pointing to the fact that my presupposition is axiomatic (which I had already revealed) is supposed to represent any sort of challenge. The truth of God and his self-revelation in Scripture is my fundamental and non-negotiable starting point, from which everything else is derived—including the criteria used for evaluating metaphysical, logical, epistemological, and ethical questions. This is simply what it means for God to be the final reference point in all predication, an ultimate presupposition with which this worldview is self-consistent. As Michael Butler so brilliantly put it, "If Scripture is the final authority, and if one proves the authority of Scripture on the basis of something else other than Scripture, then one proves that Scripture is not the final authority. In other words, to prove the authority of Scripture on something other than Scripture is to disprove Scripture" (1997, p.3). It is definitional; to justify an axiomatic presupposition is to concede that it is not axiomatic.

This is a surprising argument. I'll come to why in a moment. But it is also part of your argument that the same God is omnipotent, and whilst he may not be separate from his creation now and everything may be dependent on him now and also in the past, it doesn't follow that he cannot be separated from it and leave it self-sustaining. He has that power and that doesn't contradict his being. It is therefore logically possible and you have not addressed this.

I actually have addressed this, by pointing to divine necessity and providing the scriptures which show that God is necessary to the nature and existence of everything. For whatever reason it has gone unnoticed, so let me be explicit. It is a contradiction for there to be a possible world where a necessary being (that which must exist in order for anything else to exist) is not necessary, for an immutable being to be mutable, for purus actus to possess potentia. It also creates a logical contradiction with respect to the universe, viz. contingent being having of itself its own necessity.

But for the sake of this argument let's move the discussion forward and say that this is indeed logically impossible. It is also part of your argument that God is immutable and omnipresent. If God is not separate from the universe, AND also cannot be separated from it, AND also sustains it, then God must undergo change, as the universe itself changes.

A minor but important correction: God can be separated from the universe—obviously, as his existence is necessarily antecedent to that which he creates. However, God separating himself from the universe would render it non-existent, which is the force of my point. As Van Til notes, "We know that sin is an attempt on the part of man to cut himself loose from God. But this breaking loose from God could not, in the nature of the case, be metaphysical; if it were, man himself would be destroyed, and God's purpose with man would be frustrated. Sin is therefore a breaking loose from God ethically and not metaphysically. Sin is the creature's enmity and rebellion against God but is not an escape from creaturehood" (1967, pp.69-70). And the fact that the universe is mutable does not lead to God being mutable, for the universe is not God nor vice-versa. Moreover, his sustaining the fusion of hydrogen into helium does not lead to him being mutable, given that he is not temporally bounded (omnipresent); he is present at every stage of the event simultaneously, at this and every other star likewise simultaneously; that is, events for God are not a matter of linear temporal succession (observes first t1 then t2) but of an ever-present now (observes both t1 and t2 at once).

It gets worse. In addition, an omnipresent and omniscient (all-observing) God, as bound into his creation as his creation is bound into him, must be able to observe everything. We know from quantum mechanics that observation collapses the wave-function of photons ... leading to no superposition. But we know superposition exists, therefore this God with those attributes cannot.

Since I speak English and not mathematics I tend to avoid delving into quantum mechanics. This subject loses its precision when translated into English, and I am simply not fluent in mathematics. But I will indulge your point briefly in order to show how it fails to achieve the ends to which you put it.

First, we do not "know" that the wave-function collapses, much less due to observation. Although that is consistent with the familiar Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, it does not feature in the many-worlds interpretation, for example, nor the de Broglie-Bohm theory (in which the universal wave-function never collapses, only the conditional wave-function of a subsystem and is strictly an epiphenomenon) and so forth. Unless you are unfamiliar with epistemology, which is possible, it is disingenuous of you to pretend we "know" something that is theoretical, especially when it does not exist in competing theories. Second, even granting you the Copenhagen interpretation, the observer effect in quantum mechanics is predicated on the "observer" being constituted by matter—even if it is only a single electron. Thus the God of Scripture necessarily fails to represent the problem your point attempted to construct, for he is transcendent and immaterial.

Yes I see that may be a problem for pursuing this argument, if given your argument you could separate the metaphysically impossible from the logically impossible.

Of course they are separate. The proposition "David is a married bachelor" is logically impossible, whereas the proposition "water is not dihydrogen monoxide" is metaphysically impossible but logically possible. My only point was that (a) there are different types of subjunctive modality and (b) your accusation of circularity had employed an incorrect one. (Since we were discussing an attribute of God's being, it is metaphysical possibility that is relevant). Ergo, "It is metaphysically impossible for the nature of God not to include logic." While I see you raising the issue of divine simplicity, I would remind you that that is also an attribute of his being and is thus metaphysical.

You have to antecedently assume that logic exists in order to discuss metaphysical issues about logic vis-a-vis God ...

Incorrect. As I have previously said, I do not argue from logic to God, but rather from God to logic (i.e., I do not start with logic, I start with God). The existence of logic is a given; what the presuppositionalism of Reformed theology and Van Til et al. does is expose the necessary preconditions thereof, providing an account of the nature and intelligibility of logic, the fundamental principles of which express our intuition of reality as non contra se.

How does "the truth of God as revealed in Scripture" qualify as axiomatic?

By being the fundamental, self-attesting, non-negotiable starting point upon which everything else is built. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, an axiom is "a proposition laid down as one from which we may begin; an assertion that is taken as fundamental, at least for the purposes of the branch of inquiry in hand" (Oxford University Press, 2005). It is a proposition that is neither proven nor demonstrated but considered either to be self-evident or to define and delimit the realm of analysis; that is, an axiom is a proposition whose truth is assumed and serves as a starting point for deducing and inferring all other dependent truths.

An axiomatic presupposition "is an elementary assumption in one's reasoning or in the process by which opinions are formed. As used here, a presupposition refers not to just any assumption in an argument, but to a personal commitment which is at the most basic level of one's network of beliefs. Presuppositions form a wide-ranging, foundational perspective or starting point in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated" (Bahnsen 1998, p. 2, footnote 4). "A presupposition is therefore an 'elementary' (i.e., basic, foundational, starting point) assumption about reality as a whole. An elementary presupposition serves as an essential condition necessary to one's outlook on the world and life. ... Presuppositions are often hidden assumptions that you reflexively depend upon for such foundation issues of human experience as the nature and structure of reality, the possibility and method of knowledge, and the standards and universality of morality. These basic presuppositions about the world ... provide the very standards for interpreting all of life. They govern the way you think and act, all the way down to how you select and employ specific facts from the countless number of facts ceaselessly flowing through your senses and into your mind each and every moment of the day. They form the very basis of your world and life view" (Bahnsen 2007, pp. 44–45).

In other words, of course "it is asserted but not argued for"—precisely because it is axiomatic! That is to say, it is argued from, not for. "The fact that the apologist presupposes the word of God in order to carry on a discussion or to debate about the veracity of that word does not nullify his argument, but rather illustrates it" (Bahnsen 1996, p. 75).

Also, if I claim that God is not self-evident to my acts of cognition, I can deny the existence of God without violating any rational axioms (such as existence, consciousness, logic).

Again, as I already pointed out (and you acknowledged), such a claim simply begs the question. You can deny the existence of God without reducing to unintelligibility such things as reality, logic, knowledge, etc. only if God is not the necessary precondition of intelligibility (and thus self-evident to all acts of cognition), which simply begs the question at issue. I will not deny you this recourse but I will highlight it for what it is, a rationally illegitimate move. Begging the question does not undercut or defeat an opposing view; it simply ignores it.

You must assume God in order to deny him precisely because he is self-evident to all acts of cognition as the necessary precondition of intelligibility. Have I proven this here? Of course not, because that is not what this thread is about. It is about the presuppositional arguments put forward by such gentlemen as Van Til which do prove it, and in a prior post I offered a recommended reading list where those may be found. This thread is about interacting with their arguments, not learning about them; I am not going to reproduce here what they have already produced in their works.

So let's assume that my ignorance of the Trinity renders my point obsolete. It seems a small concession to make. Outside the questions of the Trinity you have not answered why Jesus/God cannot be reduced to an immaterial mind, thus this point still stands.

You said that God, whether the Godhead as a whole or any of the three persons thereof, are prima facie reducible into one another; and that, further, Jesus is reducible to man (Msg. 211). Given the biblical doctrine of the Trinity, none of those statements hold; the former is the unbiblical teaching of Sabellius, the latter is that of Arius. Any attempts to reduce the Godhead to a singular personhood or vice-versa, or reducing Christ to a single nature, is doomed to commit any number of unbiblical errors exposed centuries ago. Nevertheless, this is all irrelevant to the point I think you were trying to make so it is a fruitless avenue. What cannot be further reduced is the axiomatic presupposition of "the truth of God as revealed in Scripture," for that is the most fundamental starting point for deducing and inferring all other dependent truths. The trinitarian nature of God is simply one of those truths argued from that axiomatic presupposition. Can the Trinity be spoken of as "an immaterial mind"? Certainly. But that cannot be thought of in terms of human mind, for human mind is analogical, the divine mind being original.

[God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility] seems to be swapping one bare assertion for another.

No, it is an argument which follows from the axiomatic presupposition of the Christian worldview. Again, to review that argument please see the recommended reading list I had provided.

What you appear to be arguing for here is that in order to have this or any discussion at all we must assume the existence of God.

Bingo.

[But] this seems to be clearly false to me, for a number of reasons, notably ... [snip rest]

It is not our assertion that the only way to come to know God exists is to know God exists, as if one starts without knowledge of God. Nor is it our assertion that one must presuppose God in order to make an argument for God, as if one does not already presuppose God to begin with.

On the contrary, mankind already knows God (Rom 1:18–28): what can be known about God is manifest in them, for God has revealed it to them, but they suppress that knowledge in ungodliness and unrighteousness. Since the nature and power of God is clearly seen and understood through what has been made, such people are without excuse, for although they knew God they did not glorify him as God or give him thanks, instead exchanging the truth of God for a lie, honoring and serving the creation rather than the Creator.

In other words, one comes to know God by developing and cultivating the knowledge of God that one already possesses. (Creaturely knowledge of God is distinct from salvific knowledge of God.) Nobody starts from a position of not knowing that God is there. As Van Til succinctly observes, "Antitheism presupposes theism" (1969a, p. xii). The unbeliever is able to enjoy the fruit of intellectual achievement only because he is "borrowing, without recognizing it, the Christian ideas of creation and providence" (1967, p. 354), which grounds the intelligibility and validity of such things as induction. Thus the non-Christian "makes positive contributions to science in spite of his principles" (1969b, p. 22), not because of them. Such is the non-Christian's inconsistency. "The first objection that suggests itself may be expressed in the rhetorical question, 'Do you mean to assert that non-Christians do not discover truth by the methods they employ?' [To this we reply] that we mean nothing so absurd as that. The implication of the method here advocated is simply that non-Christians are never able, and therefore never do, employ their own method consistently" (1967, p. 126).

Furthermore, the fact that one must presuppose God in order to make sense of and argue for anything whatsoever is precisely the argument for God. That is to say, presupposing God is not something we can choose to do but something we cannot escape doing. "But the universe is not what the non-Christian assumes it to be. And it is precisely for this reason that even those who work with false assumptions can discover much truth about the facts of the world. No created mind can function in any field, even for the fraction of a second, without taking for granted the fundamental rationality of the universe and of the coherence of the human mind in relation to it. But the universe has no rationality and the human mind has no coherence within itself or in relation to the world except upon the presupposition of the truth of Christianity [i.e., the biblical view of creation and providence]. So then the non-Christian scientist must live on borrowed capital. If he had to live by his own capital he would choke forthwith even as a scientist. To be sure, the non-Christian does not self-consciously borrow the Christian’s principles. Like the prodigal son, he lives on the father’s substance without owning this to be the case" (1978, p. 243). The non-Christian must "presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own accomplishments" (1967, p. 260).

It is true that we consequently exclude the classical theistic (and atheistic) arguments, but in the presuppositionalism of Reformed theology is the explanation of why we do so. The problem with the classical arguments is that their evidentialism begs the very question vis-a-vis the intelligibility of reality and the validity of induction and so forth. They appeal to logical principles or epistemic criteria or experience or facts as such when it is these categories themselves that are in dispute. What they do in their handling of the evidence is set themselves in the place of God, making the reach of their intellect the standard of what is possible or not possible, thereby virtually determining that they intend never to meet a fact that points to God as revealed in Scripture.

As a non-believer, it is not as though your acts of cognition exclude God; you might not consciously presuppose God, but your very act of reasoning and every meaningful discourse necessarily presupposes God. And your every argument against God commits the fallacy of stolen concept, for your worldview and its presuppositions cannot produce the very categories and criteria by which you reason; although you recognize and utilize these categories and criteria, it is despite your worldview not because of it, as they originate from somewhere other than your worldview. As such it is the fact that you possess faculties as imago Dei indelibly impressed by a knowledge of God (despite refusing to acknowledge or recognize this) that you are able to interpret the world around you with any accuracy. I would never argue that you cannot interpret anything correctly: that would contradict what my worldview attests.

The difference between us is not one of truth or falsity, but of the very intelligibility of truth or falsity. We both speak of truth as though it is meaningful. The difference is this: my worldview acounts for the intelligibility of truth, whereas the self-referential incoherence of yours shipwrecks it. Thus my worldview is self-consistent and coherent whereas you cannot, and thus do not, engage yours consistently and must continue borrowing intellectual capital from without—like the intelligibility of truth.

---

References:

Greg Bahnsen, Always Ready (Covenant Media Foundation, 1996).
_____, Van Til's Apologetic (Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1998).
_____, Pushing the Antithesis (American Vision, 2007).
Michael Butler, "A truly Reformed epistemology," in Penpoint Newsletter, Vol. 8, No. 5 (Southern California Center for Christian Studies, May 1997).
Richard Pratt, Every Thought Captive (Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1979).
Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1967).
_____, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, Vol. 2 of the series In Defense of Biblical Christianity (den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1969).
_____, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1969)
_____, The God of Hope: Sermons and Addresses (Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1978).

[The Grand Nudger]

More of this borrowing nonsense.

If I presuppose cosmic creator teacups that absolutely would not mean that christians were borrowing from my doctrine of teafulness to even contemplate the concept of their god. This is idiocy. I'm hoping that you're misrepresenting Van Tils argument here because if you aren't the man was a fucking moron.