I agree it's not meaningful. The two terms have no intrinsic meaning in themselves and depend on each other for definition.

DOCTOR: "If the Thraskin puts his fingers in his ears, it is polite to shout!" That's an old venusian proverb.

JO: Well, what's Thraskin?

DOCTOR: Thraskin? Oh, it's an archaic word, seldom used since the twenty-fifth dynasty, the modern equivalent is "plinge".

JO: What does plinge mean?

DOCTOR: Oh, for heaven's sake, Jo. I've just told you - it means Thraskin.

(December 15, 2015 at 3:07 pm)ChadWooters Wrote:

(December 15, 2015 at 2:44 pm)Stimbo Wrote: No, evil is not the absence of good. Evil is the opposite of whatever we define as good. If it is good to give someone life, taking it away would be evil.

While that may be how you think about evil it really isn't a meaningful way of discussing the relationship between the two.

If evil is the opposite of good that precisely because it good's negation. If it is good have a virtue like, temperance or fortitude, then not having that virtue is not good (i.e. evil), like intemperance and cowardice. Virtue, in Scholasticism, refers to the degree to which something actualizes its Ideal. So for example, a spanikopita (sp) is not as good as a yield sign with respect to the Idea of Triangularity.

Whoah, hold on. Lacking a virtue is NOT evil. It may not be good but it's not evil.

Obviously the "maximally great" being is an anthropomorphic sky diddy cuz my ape brain can't imagine anything better!!

(December 15, 2015 at 2:51 pm)ChadWooters Wrote:

(December 15, 2015 at 11:31 am)Jenny A Wrote: We conceive of things that do not and even cannot exist all the time.

The Scholastics also distinguished between what can be imagined and what can be conceived. The nomenclature of the argument, like maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility and necessity, have highly specific applications. I don't mean to disparage anyone not familiar with that philosophical tradition nor am I saying that the ontological argument is correct. I just think there really isn't much point discussing the merits of this particular argument without a contextual understanding of the terms used.

The way I see it, many of their useful and important distinctions have been lost because of general ignorance and modern misunderstandings about the Scholastic tradition. As far as that goes, I too am ignorant about so much about Medieval philosophy and its hard to hold on to the specific meanings of related terms that in everyday life are generally interchangeable. There is so much to learn and everything I have learned has been profoundly illuminating, if only because it provides important context for much of what gets discussed in contemporary philosophy.

I see no sense in announcing that we don't get medieval philosophical definitions, if you don't go further and provide definitions. What do you think the difference between conceive and imagine is in this context?   I think of conceiving as concretely imaging a possible thing.  But maximally great is neither imaginable, nor conceivable.  So, if you wouldn't mind, could we have the definitions of maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility, and necessity?

It's been 35 years since I read Thomas Aquainus, or Anselm, and I really have no interest in going back to the oringinals, but given your definitions, I'd be happy to discuss the ontological proof.   My 19 year old self was unimpressed.  So, provide definitions and impress my 50 year old self.

This is why I lost patience with Marvel comic books as a teenager. Almost every page cross-referenced some other issue from some other series going back years, meaning if you didn't buy everything they ever published you had no chance of keeping up.

If there is anything pertaining to the discussion required to follow it, it needs to be brought to the table or else rendered irrelevant so we can get on with better things.

(December 15, 2015 at 3:58 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Whoah, hold on.  Lacking a virtue is NOT evil.  It may not be good but it's not evil.

I see your perspective as one of making a value judgement about the kind of moral disposition whereas mine as a judgement concerning the degree of privation. Are you indeed suggesting that good is different in kind from evil? Or do you also think that good and evil are matters of degree with respect to some standard?

(December 12, 2015 at 1:37 pm)athrock Wrote: I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

That sounds like an older formulation. It's been formulated to be even stronger in a modal version called the modal ontological argument.

(December 15, 2015 at 2:02 pm)athrock Wrote: Evil is the absence of good. It does not actually exist as a "thing" itself.  Consequently, "not existing in all possible worlds" is simply the absence of "existing in all possible worlds" and that is an evil thing - not a good thing - for a maximally supreme being which must, by definition, be "good".

And no, "maximally great" is not another way of saying "omnipotent". We can conceive of a god who is all-powerful but NOT omniscient and thus unable to prevent all evil. But a maximally great god must be both omnipresent and omnipresent along with a bunch of other stuff. 

Which is why the skeptic's problem of evil objection fails, btw.

If there is no good in a universe, then 'good' would be defined as the 'lesser' of the evils. so there would still exist 'good' and 'evil' in that world and who is to say that this is not that universe? It is all relative subjectivity.

(December 15, 2015 at 5:51 pm)Delicate Wrote:

(December 12, 2015 at 1:37 pm)athrock Wrote: I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

That sounds like an older formulation. It's been formulated to be even stronger in a modal version called the modal ontological argument.

 Oh goody! 

Seriously, if there is a better formulation, let see it.  Please provide definitions for any words not used in a colloquial way.

(December 15, 2015 at 6:08 pm)Jenny A Wrote:

(December 15, 2015 at 5:51 pm)Delicate Wrote: That sounds like an older formulation. It's been formulated to be even stronger in a modal version called the modal ontological argument.

 Oh goody! 

Seriously, if there is a better formulation, let see it.  Please provide definitions for any words not used in a colloquial way.

Actually it is a little technical because it relies on modal logic concepts like possibility and necessity, as well as the S5 axiom.

Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
4. If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

From a formal-logical analysis, everything is consistent. There aren't any "holes" in the argument.

Instead, most atheists who have a problem with it question P4 because it reliexs on the S5 modal axiom. Which, oddly enough, is something atheist philosophers are quite comfortable with outside this context.