(April 6, 2016 at 5:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The strawman is that you keep talking about physical objects and sayng they don't have mind.  I've never said they do.

????  With matter-mind as the point of conjecture it's pointless to describe any physical object as not having mind.  All have matter-mind, it's fundamental.  That's not straw, that's an inescapable consequence of the concept.  It doesn't matter whether you say they do or not, the conjecture itself demands that they -must-.  

Quote:As for the rest: look, if I ask how an engine converts chemical energy to motion, you won't just wave at the engine, and say "There it is."  You'll explain about the burning process, show how fuel is regulated, show how the pistons work.  You'll show how the sparkplugs ignite the fuel, and how a feedback loop continually charges the battery to allow the process to continue, for the most part, indefinitely.  You'll identify what part of the engine does exactly what role in the process, and will do so happily and with ease.

Which is what comp mind would be.  An explanation of how the thing could work, and how that description provides a compelling description of our experience as "mindful" things, -if you will. 

Quote:My question for you is very simple: what brain systems and functions are you calling "comp mind," and how do they work, even vaguely?  How do they allow for mind?  And, specifically, do parts of the brain not really involved in processing, like the blood in the veins or the cerebral spinal fluide, get called part of "mind" or not?

Comp mind would be those portions of the architecture capable of achieving comp functions analogous to our experience.  Comp mind is only interested in the comp portion (the rest would be biology, spinal fluid, for example - as the powerplant and powerlines are infrastructure to your pc).   Nothing needs to allow for mind.  The basis of this entire conversation is that mind exists.  I'm not interested in tumbling down the rabbit hole to show that mind is somehow possible.  Comp mind attempts to describe a computational system that would be indistinguishable from those minds that we have already allowed for in even discussing the subject.

Very vaguely-  A comp mind is a system that creates representations of sense data in it's own machine language, and manipulates them.  It does logic.  It does math.  It has memory.  It can be programmed.

(April 11, 2016 at 11:06 am)Rhythm Wrote:

(April 6, 2016 at 5:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The strawman is that you keep talking about physical objects and sayng they don't have mind.  I've never said they do.

????  With matter-mind as the point of conjecture it's pointless to describe any physical object as not having mind.  All have matter-mind, it's fundamental.  That's not straw, that's an inescapable consequence of the concept.  It doesn't matter whether you say they do or not, the conjecture itself demands that they -must-.

That's like saying I'm an electrical being because the atoms in my body have electrons. I wouldn't say that a rock has "a mind," though I'd say that in the QM-mind idea (and remember, it was just one of half a dozen options that I said we had to choose from), there certainly are a gazillion little sparks of elemental mind.

A QM particle is very different from a table, and I'd say a QM elemental mind would be very different from a human mind. The issue is at what level of organization the ability for something in the universe to experience qualia supervenes. I don't think there IS such a level-- I think it's turtles, all the way down.

Quote: 
Comp mind would be those portions of the architecture capable of achieving comp functions analogous to our experience.  Comp mind is only interested in the comp portion (the rest would be biology, spinal fluid, for example - as the powerplant and powerlines are infrastructure to your pc).   Nothing needs to allow for mind.  The basis of this entire conversation is that mind exists.

And then we want to ask why.

Quote:Very vaguely-  A comp mind is a system that creates representations of sense data in it's own machine language, and manipulates them.  It does logic.  It does math.  It has memory.  It can be programmed.

I get that. My problem is that while you can identify a region in space where this stuff goes on, if you examine it under a microscope, it disappears, much as a table disappears when you start zooming in on QM particles. We know that such processing goes on in the brain, but not all of it. It also goes on in my bedroom, but not all of it. But when you try to identify those very specific regions which you think do the processing stuff, you'll find that even there, you could pull an arbitrary amount of material out of the system and still have it work-- which implies that that extra material in fact wasn't an integral part of the system after all.

Your position, it seems to me, implies that at some point, you'll pull out one more atom, and you'll hit a critical mass, at which comp mind no longer exists because the system cannot carry out one or more of the functions you're describing. My position is that there will NEVER be such a point, and that there will be something like mind no matter how many particles you pull out; in other words, that saying "here is mind" and "here is not mind" is an arbitrary division, not a real one.

(April 11, 2016 at 5:01 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I wouldn't say that a rock has "a mind," though I'd say that in the QM-mind idea (and remember, it was just one of half a dozen options that I said we had to choose from), there certainly are a gazillion little sparks of elemental mind.

Let's remember this moment.  Clearly, to you, "spark of mind" and mind are different things.  You can draw a very fine line here, and the line seems to be that mind isn't fundamental after all, spark of mind is, whatever that is.

Quote:A QM particle is very different from a table, and I'd say a QM elemental mind would be very different from a human mind.

-based upon what, and what relevance is there to the table and particle comparison?

Quote:The issue is at what level of organization the ability for something in the universe to experience qualia supervenes.  I don't think there IS such a level-- I think it's turtles, all the way down.

Turtles all the way down as in the ability to experience qualia all the way down?

Quote:And then we want to ask why.

I can never distinguish between your why and my how.  I suspect that they're interchangeable.  

Quote:My problem is that while you can identify a region in space where this stuff goes on, if you examine it under a microscope, it disappears, much as a table disappears when you start zooming in on QM particles.

I'm not sure what you mean by "it disappears", nuerons -do not- disappear under a microscope...and the table doesn't disappear either.  Resolution or scale and existence are not the same thing.  If you "zoom in" on the qm particles of the table you are still looking at the table. ....?

Quote:We know that such processing goes on in the brain, but not all of it.

We actually don't know that.  We suspect it, it's a working hypothesis, remember?  We've designed our experiments to show results if that were the case because it provides an explicable mechanism for the function of the brain.  

Quote:It also goes on in my bedroom, but not all of it.  But when you try to identify those very specific regions which you think do the processing stuff, you'll find that even there, you could pull an arbitrary amount of material out of the system and still have it work-- which implies that that extra material in fact wasn't an integral part of the system after all.

Recall that moment above, wherein you drew such a subtle distinction between mind and spark of mind.  Guess what, what;s "going on" in your bedroom is not, at all, what I'm discussing...unless you're talking about your pc.  At which point, ofc, because I'm discussing the Comp Theory of Mind.  You most certainly -cannot- pull out an arbitrary amount of your pc and have it "still work".  The same seems to apply to our brain.  

Quote:Your position, it seems to me, implies that at some point, you'll pull out one more atom, and you'll hit a critical mass, at which comp mind no longer exists because the system cannot carry out one or more of the functions you're describing.  My position is that there will NEVER be such a point, and that there will be something like mind no matter how many particles you pull out; in other words, that saying "here is mind" and "here is not mind" is an arbitrary division, not a real one.

If one of those atoms was holding together the structure of the comp system then this would happen, ofc.  In the same way that if some atom was the last thing between your brain and dissolution...and it were removed, I would expect your brain to cease to be.  Whether something is a comp system is a pass/fail proposition, and a candidate comp mind has further benchmarks to cross.  It's pointless to continue referring to these increasingly specific conditions as arbitrary. Your position is that there will -never- be such a point where there is no mind? What about that bit above, where things don't have a mind, but a gazillion spark of mind? Clearly you allow for precisely what you have objected to. I simply use more descriptive (and less fanciful) terms. Your bedroom is full of material interactions, but not all material interactions are comp systems.

(April 12, 2016 at 12:29 pm)Rhythm Wrote:

(April 11, 2016 at 5:01 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I wouldn't say that a rock has "a mind," though I'd say that in the QM-mind idea (and remember, it was just one of half a dozen options that I said we had to choose from), there certainly are a gazillion little sparks of elemental mind.

Let's remember this moment.  Clearly, to you, "spark of mind" and mind are different things.  You can draw a very fine line here, and the line seems to be that mind isn't fundamental after all, spark of mind is, whatever that is.  

They're different in the same way that QM particles and the objects that are composed of them are called "stuff" or "matter." However, I'd say that a spark of mind is still mind-- just a maximally simplistic one.

Quote:Turtles all the way down as in the ability to experience qualia all the way down?

That's right. Down to the most minimal possible exchanges of energy or changes of state.

Quote:I can never distinguish between your why and my how.  I suspect that they're interchangeable.  

Sometimes I think we're not that far off, but the subtle differences are those of great philosophical import.

Quote:I'm not sure what you mean by "it disappears", nuerons -do not- disappear under a microscope...and the table doesn't disappear either.  Resolution or scale and existence are not the same thing.  If you "zoom in" on the qm particles of the table you are still looking at the table. ....?

There is nothing of "table" to be found in any of the QM particles of which it is composed. If you are observing QM particles, you cannot know whether you are looking at part of a table, a chair, or an apple. I'd say that at that scale, the table doesn't exist, since it cannot be found to exist at that level.

Quote:We actually don't know that.  We suspect it, it's a working hypothesis, remember?  We've designed our experiments to show results if that were the case because it provides an explicable mechanism for the function of the brain.  

I'd say in the context of your view, we know it because it's given: processing happens in the brain.

Quote:Recall that moment above, wherein you drew such a subtle distinction between mind and spark of mind.  Guess what, what;s "going on" in your bedroom is not, at all, what I'm discussing...unless you're talking about your pc.  At which point, ofc, because I'm discussing the Comp Theory of Mind.  You most certainly -cannot- pull out an arbitrary amount of your pc and have it "still work".  The same seems to apply to our brain.  

As I said, this is your view: that there's a critical mass at which since the functions you call mind will fail, you'd say there's no mind at all.

Let's put it this way with a thought experiment. Let's say you've identified a physical system that processes data in certain ways that you call "mind," and then you pull out a QM particle. Is it still "mind"?

Your position is that at a certain point, one more QM particle pulled will break the system-- it will be the straw that broke the camel's back so to speak. My position is that this is not the case-- that at some point, you will give up on using the system in useful ways-- but that under the hood, there's never a discrete separation between "mind" and "not mind," only a gradually degradation in the nature of the mind until it is traced down to the simplest possible interactions available to the physical universe.

Quote:If one of those atoms was holding together the structure of the comp system then this would happen, ofc.  In the same way that if some atom was the last thing between your brain and dissolution...and it were removed, I would expect your brain to cease to be.  Whether something is a comp system is a pass/fail proposition, and a candidate comp mind has further benchmarks to cross.  It's pointless to continue referring to these increasingly specific conditions as arbitrary.  Your position is that there will -never- be such a point where there is no mind?  What about that bit above, where things don't have a mind, but a gazillion spark of mind?  Clearly you allow for precisely what you have objected to.  I simply use more descriptive (and less fanciful) terms.  Your bedroom is full of material interactions, but not all material interactions are comp systems.

My position is that there will be a point at which a system won't meet your definition of a mind, but at which the kind of physical interactions and processes which are the real essence of mind continue on perfectly contentedly.

Daniel Dennett Wrote:There is no single, definitive "stream of consciousness," because there is no central Headquarters, no Cartesian Theatre where "it all comes together" for the perusal of a Central Meaner. Instead of such a single stream (however wide), there are multiple channels in which specialist circuits try, in parallel pandemoniums, to do their various things, creating Multiple Drafts as they go. Most of these fragmentary drafts of "narrative" play short-lived roles in the modulation of current activity but some get promoted to further functional roles, in swift succession, by the activity of a virtual machine in the brain. The seriality of this machine (its "von Neumannesque" character) is not a "hard-wired" design feature, but rather the upshot of a succession of coalitions of these specialists.

The basic specialists are part of our animal heritage. They were not developed to perform peculiarly human actions, such as reading and writing, but ducking, predator-avoiding, face-recognizing, grasping, throwing, berry-picking, and other essential tasks. They are often opportunistically enlisted in new roles, for which their talents may more or less suit them. The result is not bedlam only because the trends that are imposed on all this activity are themselves part of the design. Some of this design is innate, and is shared with other animals. But it is augmented, and sometimes even overwhelmed in importance, by microhabits of thought that are developed in the individual, partly idiosyncratic results of self-exploration and partly the predesigned gifts of culture. Thousands of memes, mostly borne by language, but also by wordless "images" and other data structures, take up residence in an individual brain, shaping its tendencies and thereby turning it into a mind.

(April 12, 2016 at 5:55 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(April 12, 2016 at 12:29 pm)Rhythm Wrote: If one of those atoms was holding together the structure of the comp system then this would happen, ofc.  In the same way that if some atom was the last thing between your brain and dissolution...and it were removed, I would expect your brain to cease to be.  Whether something is a comp system is a pass/fail proposition, and a candidate comp mind has further benchmarks to cross.  It's pointless to continue referring to these increasingly specific conditions as arbitrary.  Your position is that there will -never- be such a point where there is no mind?  What about that bit above, where things don't have a mind, but a gazillion spark of mind?  Clearly you allow for precisely what you have objected to.  I simply use more descriptive (and less fanciful) terms.  Your bedroom is full of material interactions, but not all material interactions are comp systems.

My position is that there will be a point at which a system won't meet your definition of a mind, but at which the kind of physical interactions and processes which are the real essence of mind continue on perfectly contentedly.

And those would be precisely which?

(April 12, 2016 at 6:54 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(April 12, 2016 at 5:55 pm)bennyboy Wrote: My position is that there will be a point at which a system won't meet your definition of a mind, but at which the kind of physical interactions and processes which are the real essence of mind continue on perfectly contentedly.

And those would be precisely which?

The transmission (propagation?) of state via photon exchange and electrical bonding, and by the entanglement of collections of particles.

(April 12, 2016 at 8:11 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(April 12, 2016 at 6:54 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: And those would be precisely which?

The transmission (propagation?) of state via photon exchange and electrical bonding, and by the entanglement of collections of particles.

Those are the real essence of mind? I thought the real essence of mind was qualia. Regardless, this seems to have little if anything to do with the essence of mind. It appears little more than an equivocation.

(April 12, 2016 at 5:55 pm)bennyboy Wrote: They're different in the same way that QM particles and the objects that are composed of them are called "stuff" or "matter."  However, I'd say that a spark of mind is still mind-- just a maximally simplistic one.

Then rocks -do- have a mind, a gazillion maximally simplistic ones, in fact.  

Quote:That's right.  Down to the most minimal possible exchanges of energy or changes of state.

I wonder what qualia would be to a mind with no sensory, for example?  I'm not even sure we'd be talking about the same thing at the point that rocks or photons experience, I don't think the same term would be suitable for a rocks experience, and a human being's. I think I'll stick with calling what happens in the rock material interaction, and what happens in us, mind. I promise I'll reassess when a rock gives me reason to suspect otherwise (or when you decide to help the poor rock out on that count).

Quote:There is nothing of "table" to be found in any of the QM particles of which it is composed.  If you are observing QM particles, you cannot know whether you are looking at part of a table, a chair, or an apple.  I'd say that at that scale, the table doesn't exist, since it cannot be found to exist at that level.

You zoomed in, in the thought experiment, to look at the particles of the table.  You know you're looking at the particles of the table, end of.   It won't matter, in the end, as there's no reason to think the quantum scale is relevant when we discuss comp systems, nor would it change comp theory if it were. A comp system is a comp system - regardless of scale, architecture, or composition.

Quote:I'd say in the context of your view, we know it because it's given: processing happens in the brain.

-and again, we don't know that.  It's a given that processing occurs in comp systems, and a specific type of processing.  Representation.  Our mind/brain, however, might achieve "x" -some other way™-.  To use the term processing so generally is to miss out on a world of possibility.

Quote:As I said, this is your view: that there's a critical mass at which since the functions you call mind will fail, you'd say there's no mind at all.

I don't actually think mind is a function, but yeah, ofc I think there's a point where mind fails.  There are plenty of seemingly mindless human beings, who once very much seemed to have a mind - by all accounts, laid in the ground.  Something clearly happened there.  

Quote:Let's put it this way with a thought experiment.  Let's say you've identified a physical system that processes data in certain ways that you call "mind," and then  you pull out a QM particle.  Is it still "mind"?

So long as the system continues to function, I don't see why it wouldn't be.  If, for whatever circumstance, the loss of that qm particle caused the system to fail, then no.  

Quote:Your position is that at a certain point, one more QM particle pulled will break the system-- it will be the straw that broke the camel's back so to speak.  My position is that this is not the case-- that at some point, you will give up on using the system in useful ways-- but that under the hood, there's never a discrete separation between "mind" and "not mind," only a gradually degradation in the nature of the mind until it is traced down to the simplest possible interactions available to the physical universe.

You seemed to make -just- such a separation for rocks and many other objects.  I bring them up from time to time, if you'll recall (lol).  In CTM, if some qualitative change to the system strips it of it's descriptor as a comp system, it loses it's status as a candidate for comp mind.  

Quote:My position is that there will be a point at which a system won't meet your definition of a mind, but at which the kind of physical interactions and processes which are the real essence of mind continue on perfectly contentedly.

Not even wrong, still insufficient.  Physical interactions continue regardless of whether some system fits the definition of a comp system, sure, and? I'm not talking about -all- physical interactions. If I were, it would be the Physical Interaction theory of Mind, eh? Neither of us are particularly interested in -all- physical interactions or processes when we discuss an explanation of mind. Plenty of physical interactions and processes occur, we have no reason to suspect that there is mind wherever there is physical interaction or process.

(April 13, 2016 at 9:26 am)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(April 12, 2016 at 8:11 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The transmission (propagation?) of state via photon exchange and electrical bonding, and by the entanglement of collections of particles.

Those are the real essence of mind?  I thought the real essence of mind was qualia.  Regardless, this seems to have little if anything to do with the essence of mind.  It appears little more than an equivocation.

If mind isn't elemental, then how do non-mental systems when put together allow for mind?  How does the universe "know" that system X is just stuff happening, and system Y is a mind?