(April 21, 2016 at 8:45 am)robvalue Wrote: If you're going to say there isn't allowed to be an infinite number of things, then there can't be an infinite contingency in the first place. But you can still have circular ones.

I didn't say there couldn't be an infinite number of things. I said that it doesn't seem possible that an infinite number of things can synchronously exist as a finite thing.

OK well, an infinite series with each element's existence dependent on the next. What's your objection to that?

Wait, as a finite thing? Where did that come from?

It's up to you to show the premises are true, not up to me to show they are not. As it happens, I believe I have shown they are not anyway.

(Edited to add the bold part above, I was sounding rather arrogant there. Sorry!)

By the way, stating that something is true unless someone can show it isn't true is called the argument from ignorance fallacy, please see my video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BzxMXzdaxtI

(April 21, 2016 at 1:35 am)Ignorant Wrote:

(April 20, 2016 at 5:08 pm)Whateverist the White Wrote: Maybe they're (we're) all in it together.  Mutual contingency.

In a certain sense, we are certainly all in it together, mutually dependent on each other. However, in a different, more precise and formal sense, it does not seem to me that mutual contingency is actually possible. Consider and example:

Helium exists on the condition that two protons exist bound together. Mutual contingency would mean: Two protons bound together exist on the condition that helium exists. <= Doesn't this one seem logically backwards/circular?

But we aren't really comparing two 'things' here.  One statement is the defining condition for Helium .. something about the world.  The other is the statement anything meeting the condition is called Helium .. something as much about how language is assigned as about the world.  

Mutual contingency should involve two or more aspects of the world.  For example the presence of atoms with two or more protons requires an earlier existence getting cooked in a very large but less stable star.  But also the presence of atoms with two or more protons requires that the underlying material be structured in such a way as to allow atoms with more than one proton to form.  Admittedly this sure looks like a one way contingency doesn't it?  Earlier larger stars -> heavier atoms, describes which gives rise to which.  So maybe mutual contingency needs to be re-examined.  Can't let lumpers always win out over the splitters.

Further, it's assuming everything behaves in a "building block" manner like this. Contingency just means if one thing goes, so does the other. It doesn't tell you how. To just assume all things work like atoms is this extrapolation error I keep referring to.

This reality could be one tiny pin prick in an infinite series of nested realities, each one contingent on the next.

Could be. I'm making it up. But you can't just say "no it can't be that way because of what helium is like". I don't have to show things are this way, just that it is a logical possibility the premises don't account for.

(April 21, 2016 at 8:58 am)robvalue Wrote: OK well, an infinite series with each element's existence dependent on the next. What's your objection to that?

Wait, as a finite thing? Where did that come from?...

My objection is that, it seems, that you are suggesting that it is possible for a finite thing (e.g. helium) to be the satisfaction of an infinity of conditions (i.e. other things). I think that is logically self-contradictory. In other words:

When I say helium exists on the condition that at least two protons are existing, I do not suggest that I have just described all of the conditions of a thing existing as helium. By identifying at least one condition, I have merely derived my 1st premise. As to the second:

Now, if two protons exist, they need to exist in a particular way to satisfy more of the conditions for helium's existence. 

Consider two hydrogen atoms (each with a single proton) existing side by side: this is not the same as helium. The thing called helium exists on the condition that a particular relationship is synchronously existing between two synchronously existing protons. 

The individual protons' existences each have their own additional conditions (e.g. perhaps the synchronous existence of quarks provides for the existence of protons). Also, the existence of a particular sort of relationship (whatever that may be) between two protons has its own conditions in addition to those others. I imagine there are many more fundamental conditions, and I don't know how many there are. Whether there is a finite number, or an infinity of conditions, it must be the case that, TOGETHER, all of these synchronously existing and satisfied conditions (however many there are and whatever they are) exist as helium.

Either things (e.g. helium) are finite things are not.

If they are finite things, they exist on the condition that another thing exists, or not.

If some finite things exist on the condition that another thing exists, it either has an infinity of such conditions, or not.

Now, consider the possibility of an infinity of conditions for a finite thing:

a) "An infinity of synchronously existing things is a finite existing thing", or in other words
b) "The satisfaction of an infinity of conditionally and synchronously existing things exist as a finite thing"
c) any other formulation expressing the same idea

Those statements are either meaningless, or logically self-contradictory. It is like saying "This existing proton is not existing"

Now consider the possibility of a finite number of conditions for a finite thing:

a) "A finite number of synchronously existing things is a finite existing thing"
b) "The satisfaction of an finite number of conditionally and synchronously existing things exist as a finite thing"
c) any other formulation expressing the same idea

Those statements are not self-contradictory. It is like saying "These atoms together exist as glucose" or "Glucose exists when these atoms exist in a certain way"

Erm, OK. Why are we just talking about one helium atom?

I was talking about an infinite number of distinct things, all contingent on the next thing.

For example, all of our reality and everything in it being contingent on the existence of its parent reality, which is in turn contingent on its parent reality, and so on, infinitely many times.

You can't just insist realities themselves behave like helium atoms.

(April 21, 2016 at 10:48 am)robvalue Wrote: Further, it's assuming everything behaves in a "building block" manner like this. Contingency just means if one thing goes, so does the other.

Yes, but the fuller meaning includes an existential and unidirectional dependence between the two. Helium depends on the existence of protons, but protons do not depend on the existence of helium: therefore, protons ARE NOT contingent upon helium.

Quote:To just assume all things work like atoms is this extrapolation error I keep referring to.

I don't assume that all things work like atoms. If I did, my premise would read "ALL things exist on the condition that another thing exists synchronously". Instead, I use "some" rather than "all"

Quote:This reality could be one tiny pin prick in an infinite series of nested realities, each one contingent on the next.

Yes it could. Above, I consider that possibility, and find it logically contradictory. Can you point out why the apparent contradiction is not in fact one?

Quote:But you can't just say "no it can't be that way because of what helium is like". I don't have to show things are this way, just that it is a logical possibility the premises don't account for.

I recognize the logical possibility in the sense: either there are an infinity of conditions or not for a finite thing's existence.

When I consider that possibility in the affirmative, I find it logically contradictory. You don't have to show me an infinity of conditions, but I would like to know how an infinity of conditions are possible in a finite thing.

What is contradictory about infinite nested realities? I can't assess the objection until you say what it is.

(April 21, 2016 at 11:59 am)robvalue Wrote: Erm, OK. Why are we just talking about one helium atom? 

Because it is a clear example of a contingent thing. It is something that does not require speculation. It is something readily observable, and science has already been able to tell us several things about it.

Quote:I was talking about an infinite number of distinct things, all contingent on the next thing.

I know, but, as conditions, can that infinite number of distinct things synchronously exist as a finite distinct thing? I'm not sure they can. I think they can only exist as an infinity.

Quote:For example, all of our reality and everything in it being contingent on the existence of its parent reality, which is in turn contingent on its parent reality, and so on, infinitely many times.

Ya sure, that is interesting in its own way, but that is not exactly my consideration. I want to know how things are existing, here and now.