(May 25, 2016 at 6:55 pm)IATIA Wrote: The same goes for anything.  You have a choice, the red pill or the blue pill.  If god knows that you will pick the blue pill (even I know you would pick the blue pill) then it is impossible for you to choose the red pill, ergo, no choice.

[Please see previous page for a response to your other comments]

Yes of course, I much prefers my blissful ignorance of reality. Blue pill every time! I need my sky-god and free-will! Life is too scary without them! =)

Again, I agree that it would be impossible for me to choose the red pill given those conditions. But the fact that there are any conditions at all, and that different conditions (e.g. god knowing that I will pick the red pill) could make it impossible for me to choose the blue pill, mean that the impossibility is not due to necessity. If different conditions can exist which provide for a different outcome, the impossibility is not due to lack of actually possible outcomes, but due to the infallible determination made among possibilities.

So, until you can distinguish between determination, necessity and contingency, why even attempt to discuss choice?

(May 26, 2016 at 3:15 am)Ignorant Wrote: Yes, if some other outcome occurred which differed from the outcome determined and known by god, then it would in fact disprove god's infallibility. Determination does not equal necessity

The word has been consistently used to refer to the status of the outcome of a choice, not the method by which that outcome is arrived upon. In this thread, by reference to it's repeated use - and in context of the requirements for a true claim of foreknowledge, it does equal necessity. Things -must- go the way of the foreknowledge claim. If they don't, the foreknowledge claim is false. There are things that I must do, no matter what, or the claim to foreknowledge is false.

[EDIT: I posted an unfinished post by mistake, there was heavy editing]

(May 26, 2016 at 6:38 am)Rhythm Wrote: The word [determined] has been consistently used to refer to the status of the outcome of a choice, not the method by which that outcome is arrived upon.

Great to get your thoughts, rob.

Right, I am aware the word has been used in this way. This isn't exactly wrong either, but it does ignore something important about the term "determine". A determination is certainly the outcome of a choice, but if it is the outcome of a choice, then choice occurred. If an all-knowing god has a choice of outcomes, then there are more than one possible outcomes. Hence, my desire to properly and helpfully distinguish it from necessity.

Quote:In this thread, by reference to it's repeated use - and in context of the requirements for a true claim of foreknowledge, it does equal necessity.  

This claim is true, but it uses "necessary" equivocally. Here is why:

Consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) which depends on the conditions X, Y, Z.

We can say:

    Suppose T
     If  all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does A.
     If not all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does not A

This ^ is how you are using "necessary" in the above claim. Given certain conditions, there is no way A will not happen. The determination (and therefore knowledge) of god is made in respect to the conditional AND the relationship between the conditional and the consequent. 

Now consider the same T and some act (An) occurring unconditionally.

We can say:
 
      Suppose T
      An (of necessity)

This ^ is how I am using "necessary". In this case, there are no conditions according to which T would not do An. Supposing the thing T, there is no possible way An does not occur. (e.g. a tree which makes fruit necessarily will make fruit anywhere (e.g. complete darkness, the moon, mars, saturn, etc.) and as long as T exists). 

Now, if an all-knowing god determines that certain actions occur according to conditions, it must be the case that those actions occur exactly according to those exact conditions. If they happen according  to conditions, then they can't be said to be happening necessarily (i.e. according to the meaning I wish to distinguish)

Can the action "not happen"? 

In one sense, No. Why? Because all of the conditions for its happening are present and fulfilled. Being present and fulfilled, the conditions necessarily provide for the action. Fruit trees necessarily make fruit under certain conditions.

In another sense, Yes. Why? Because, as determined to be conditional, it is equally possible that god does not create the conditions for the action to obtain, while still creating the thing. Fruit trees necessarily don't make fruit under certain conditions.

(May 26, 2016 at 7:04 am)Ignorant Wrote: Great to get your thoughts, rob.

Right, I am aware the word has been used in this way. This isn't exactly wrong either, but it does ignore something important about the term "determine". A determination is certainly the outcome of a choice, but if it is the [i]outcome of a choice, then choice occurred. If an all-knowing god has a choice of outcomes, then there are more than one possible outcomes. Hence, my desire to properly and helpfully distinguish it from necessity.
[/i]

Choices? We're talking free will aren't we?  Similarly, it doesn't matter how many possible outcomes there are, a true claim to foreknowledge precludes -all- but the one to which it refers by necessity of the truth of the claim.  That the road forks in front of me, does not demonstrate that I choose, let alone freely will - anything-.   If x knows, prior to my choice, prior even to my birth, that I will go left..then my meeting that fork can only end in one outcome.  I will go left.  There is no freedom here, to go right.  There is a simply a road that goes right.

Quote:This claim is true, but it uses "necessary" equivocally. Here is why:

Consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) which depends on the conditions X, Y, Z.

We can say:
     If  all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does A.


Now consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) unconditionally.

There may be no "if" in a true claim to foreknowledge (fatalism, absurdism, etc) - and in case of a true claim to foreknowledge and it;s relationship to free will, the "if" is irrelevant.  No "if he freely wills a, then a". Only, "he will freely will a".

(May 26, 2016 at 7:26 am)Rhythm Wrote:

(May 26, 2016 at 7:04 am)Ignorant Wrote: Great to get your thoughts, rob.

Right, I am aware the word has been used in this way. This isn't exactly wrong either, but it does ignore something important about the term "determine". A determination is certainly the outcome of a choice, but if it is the [i]outcome of a choice, then choice occurred. If an all-knowing god has a choice of outcomes, then there are more than one possible outcomes. Hence, my desire to properly and helpfully distinguish it from necessity.
[/i]

Choices? We're talking free will aren't we?  Similarly, it doesn't matter how many possible outcomes there are, a true claim to foreknowledge precludes -all- but the one to which it refers by necessity of the truth of the claim.  That the road forks in front of me, does not demonstrate that I choose, let alone freely will - anything-.   If x knows, prior to my choice, prior even to my birth, that I will go left..then my meeting that fork can only end in one outcome.  I will go left.  There is no freedom here, to go right.  There is a simply a road that goes right.

Quote:This claim is true, but it uses "necessary" equivocally. Here is why:

Consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) which depends on the conditions X, Y, Z.

We can say:
     If  all X, Y and Z, then T necessarily does A.


Now consider some thing (T) (e.g. a fruit tree) doing some action (A) (e.g. making fruit) unconditionally.

There may be no "if" in a true claim to foreknowledge (fatalism, absurdism, etc) - and in case of a true claim to foreknowledge and it;s relationship to free will, the "if" is irrelevant.  No "if he freely wills a, then a".  Only, "he will freely will a".

I heavily edited the original version, you might take a look at it first, and tell me if you would like a response to these thoughts anyway.

(May 26, 2016 at 7:04 am)Ignorant Wrote: Can the action "not happen"? 

Meatiest part of the edit.

Quote:In one sense, No. Why? Because all of the conditions for its happening are present and fulfilled. Being present and fulfilled, the conditions necessarily provide for the action. Fruit trees necessarily make fruit under certain conditions.

The conditions are irrelevant.  In an absurdist universe where there is no cause or condition..a true claim to foreknowledge is still true.  In a fatalist universe where the only cause or condition is that outcomes are fatalistic, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true.  In a closed loop of causal determinism, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true.  This is a demand of the claim regardless of the circumstances which led to it, even if there -are- no circumstances which led to it...which is why discussing those circumstances is an irrelevancy with regards to the claims being considered for compatibility.

Quote:In another sense, Yes. Why? Because, as determined to be conditional, it is equally possible that god does not create the conditions for the action to obtain, while still creating the thing. Fruit trees necessarily don't make fruit under certain conditions.

You're still focusing on what god does, but it's irrelevant.  If god made a claim to foreknowledge of the tree making fruit..it must make fruit...regardless of the circumstance, or the claim to foreknowledge is false.  This includes the unlikely possibility that no conditions of fruit set are met. It doesn't matter that the conditions are not met (and I;d be careful turning gods foreknowledge into conditional, temporal, causally deterministic knowledge, btw). If god said fruit will set, fruit will set. This is a necessity of the truth of the claim to foreknowledge without any regard for condition, cause, the state of the universe, what makes what happen, what god does or doesn't do, or will..free or otherwise. The necessity of the fruit setting may not be determined -by- gods knowledge or by any puppeteering on his part, but it is -still- determined and still necessary for the truth of the foreknowledge claim.


But in even proposing that there are two senses, such that a claim can be simultaneously true and false...we have flatly -demonstrated- the incompatibility of the claims made. In proposing conditional, temporal, and causally deterministic knowledge as a defense of their compatibility we are sacrificing -both- foreknowledge and free will at the altar of their defense. In proposing causally deterministic outcomes for a foundation or mechanism, we are sacrificing free will at the altar of foreknowledge. In proposing the possibility of some other outcome we are sacrificing foreknowledge at the altar of free will. There is -no way- this works together unless we change the "sense" of what were talking about between subjects - which is a massive logical chasm that no amount of scrambling will ever get us out of. Something is wrong with our concept of god's knowledge, our concept of our own free will, -or both-.

(May 26, 2016 at 7:52 am)Rhythm Wrote:

(May 26, 2016 at 7:04 am)Ignorant Wrote: Can the action "not happen"? 

Meatiest part of the edit.  

I already responded to you about this several pages back, here, and I will do it again in this new context.

Quote:The conditions are irrelevant.  In an absurdist universe where there is no cause or condition..a true claim to foreknowledge is still true.  

Well of course.

Quote:In a fatalist universe where the only cause or condition is that outcomes are fatalistic, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true.  

Yup. Got it. True things are true.

Quote:In a closed loop of causal determinism, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true. 

Still yes.

Quote: This is a demand of the claim regardless of the circumstances which led to it, even if there -are- no circumstances which led to it...which is why discussing those circumstances is an irrelevancy with regards to the claims being considered for compatibility.  

It is certainly not irrelevant. It is evident that things occur according to conditions (e.g. a fruit tree making fruit). I hope that is not something you would like to dispute. That is merely evidence, data. Fruit trees either make fruit or they don't depending on certain conditions. That is just the way a fruit tree exists. <= If you deny that, please just let me know so I can bow out of the conversation.

If we suppose that God infallibly knows that tomorrow, this fruit tree will make fruit, there is no way that it won't make fruit tomorrow. 

From this, you can either conclude, as you seem to do, that the fruit tree makes fruit tomorrow independently from the conditions upon which it depends for making fruit (which is a non-sequitur), -OR- you can conclude, as I do, that the fruit tree makes fruit tomorrow according to the conditions upon which it depends for making fruit. It's that simple.

Quote:You're still focusing on what god does, but it's irrelevant. 

In a discussion about an all-knowing god and human action, you think discussing what god does is irrelevant? Weird.

Quote:If god made a claim to foreknowledge of the tree making fruit..it must make fruit...regardless of the circumstance, or the claim to foreknowledge is false. 

OR, his knowledge INCLUDES knowledge of the circumstances within which the tree makes fruit. See above, that conclusion does not follow.

Quote:This includes the unlikely possibility that no conditions of fruit set are met. It doesn't matter that the conditions are not met (and I;d be careful turning gods foreknowledge into condition, temporal, causally deterministic knowledge, btw). If god said fruit will set, fruit will set. This is a necessity of the truth of the claim to foreknowledge without any regard for condition, cause, the state of the universe, what makes what happen, what god does or doesn't do, or will..free or otherwise. 

Here is the problem. See above. God knows that fruit will set because he makes the tree as making fruit according to the conditions he is making. It is almost as if you are having trouble distinguishing between determination, necessity and contingency =)

If god knows that the tree-which-makes-fruit-according-to-conditions WILL make fruit tomorrow according to conditions, then there is no way that the tree-which-makes-fruit-according-to-conditions will not make fruit according to conditions. <= My perspective

If god knows that the tree-which-makes-fruit-according-to-conditions WILL make fruit tomorrow, then there is no way that the tree-which-makes-fruit-according-to-conditions will not make fruit tomorrow unconditionally <= Your perspective

Do you see the questionable reasoning in your perspective?

(May 26, 2016 at 7:52 am)Rhythm Wrote: But in even proposing that there are two senses, such that a claim can be simultaneously true and false...we have flatly -demonstrated- the incompatibility of the claims made. 

Hardly. There are two senses because there are at least two senses in which the "terms" can be understood (i.e. equivocation is easy in this area). In both cases it is BOTH true that god infallibly foreknows AND true that contingent events happen contingently.

Quote:In proposing conditional, temporal, and causally deterministic knowledge as a defense of their compatibility we are sacrificing -both- foreknowledge and free will at the altar of their defense.  In proposing causally deterministic outcomes for a foundation or mechanism, we are sacrificing free will at the altar of foreknowledge.  In proposing the possibility of some other outcome we are sacrificing foreknowledge at the altar of free will.

Hardly. I don't know how many times I can say this, but free-will is not the same as contingency/conditional events. You can't talk about freedom if you don't even accept contingency as compatible with foreknowledge.

If you can't distinguish between a determination and necessity, then you will have a difficult time discussing this intelligently. If you conflate necessity with determinism, then it is as you say, and conditions are irrelevant (in fact, conditions wouldn't even exist) and "illusory".

Quote:There is -no way- this works together unless we change the "sense" of what were talking about between subjects - which is a massive logical chasm that no amount of scrambling will ever get us out of.  Something is wrong with our concept of god's knowledge, our concept of our own free will, -or both-.

Ya, it is definitely both, but I would also add to the list of inadequate understanding of concepts determination, necessity and contingency, all of which are logically more fundamental than god's knowledge and freedom.

Regardless of whether events happen contingently, just because, magic, or for no particular reason, I must choose whatever is described or the claim to foreknowledge is false.  I cannot choose b, if the foreknowledge claims a -and- is true. This is a freedom my "free will" does not have.  This is a necessity of a true claim to foreknowledge. Do we disagree?

-as to comments of contigency, not at all relevant to my opinion of free will, foreknowledge, and the things people say to maintain their beliefs in either/both...this contigency business turns gods omnscience, in context, into an issue of running stats before football games. If they put in x yards rushing, and hold the team to x yards passing - then they win. I don't think that passes for knowledge, let alone foreknowledge with human beings, and I doubt that it's your intention to reduce god to a cosmic bookie......just to establish some "sense" in which foreknowledge and free will are compatible. Remember, that you've been softballed here in being allowed to simply assume that either exist in the first place. If you can't come up with f'ing concepts for them both that don't rely on equivocation in order to keep them from crumbling under each other's respective weight...I think the whole thing is DOA.

(May 26, 2016 at 12:31 pm)Rhythm Wrote: Regardless of whether events happen contingently, just because, magic, or for no particular reason, I must choose whatever is described or the claim to foreknowledge is false.  I cannot choose b, if the foreknowledge claims a -and- is true.  This is a freedom my "free will" does not have.  This is a necessity of a true claim to foreknowledge.   Do we disagree?

Yes we disagree. You wrote "I must choose whatever is described ["regardless of whether events happen contingently"]". <= This doesn't make ANY sense.

I disagree that it is "regardless of whether events happen contingently". Choice requires contingency. If you must choose b, it MUST mean that you MUST choose b contingently. I don't see any other way choice is possible

Is this the same thing as saying you MUST choose b freely? NO!

Quote:-as to comments of contingency, not at all relevant to my opinion of free will, foreknowledge, and the things people say to maintain their beliefs in either/both...

Right, the more you write it, the less convincing it becomes for me. Tell me again how the concept of possible options is irrelevant to your opinion of free will?

Quote:this contigency business turns gods omnscience, in context, into an issue of running stats before football games.  If they put in x yards rushing, and hold the team to x yards passing - then they win.  I don't think that passes for knowledge, let alone foreknowledge with human beings, and I doubt that it's your intention to reduce god to a cosmic bookie......just to establish some "sense" in which foreknowledge and free will are compatible.

You're right, that isn't my intention AT ALL. Clearly, you are struggling to distinguish contingency from choice and freedom. That is ok, I did too.

You are confusing my suggestion that some actions (like fruit trees making fruit) are conditional with the idea that god's knowledge is conditional. God's knowledge of conditional things is not itself conditional (in the sense of uncertain). Your analogy to the football stats demonstrates the confusion well:

According to your analogy:

God knows: 
     1) IF team A rushes for x yards (condition 1) and team A holds team B to y yards passing (condition 2), THEN team A will win the game.

God does not know: 
     1) Whether or not conditions 1 and/or 2 will actually obtain, and therefore whether or not team A will win the game.\

The above is conditional knowledge, in which case God's knowledge is just like our knowledge. YOU ARE RIGHT TO REJECT THIS AS DUMB

HERE IS A BETTER ANALOGY:

God knows: 
     1) IF team A rushes for x yards (condition 1) and team A holds team B to y yards passing (condition 2), THEN team A will win the game. 
     2) Team A will rush for x yards (condition 1)
     3) Team A will hold team B to y yards passing (condition 2)
     4) Team A will win the game because of condition 1 and 2

God does not know: N/A

It's not that complicated.

Quote:Remember, that you've been softballed here in being allowed to simply assume that either exist in the first place. 

Assume? Would you mind quoting me where I assume either free will or god's foreknowledge as actually existing?

Quote:If you can't come up with f'ing concepts for them both that don't rely on equivocation in order to keep them from crumbling under each other's respective weight...I think the whole thing is DOA.

HA! Is this real life? I have been, repeatedly, pointing out equivocations and requesting time and time again that we DISTINGUISH between determine, necessity and contingency. How does that "rely on equivocation"?