(January 24, 2019 at 6:45 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: I could quote myself again...but....?

If there's something specific that you find unclear, just ask.  That's how this works.

Did you provide yes or no answers to my questions somewhere that I missed?

Apparently so.

No you didn’t. I’ll ask you the two simples questions again:

So we'll simply if for, with Yes or No, which you can elaborate on if you choose: 

Calling the holocaust morally bad, is a value judgement. Yes or No?

Values judgements are evaluative proposition, Yes or No?

Ultimately, you wondered how moral realism deals with moral disagreement.  Simply, it accepts the existence of moral disagreement.  

Within that, you wondered how a realist would make their moral case.  The same way that they would make any other case about any other thing.  

Beneath that, how one could be in posession of a moral fact.  Observation.

Contained by that "aren't those all like, just their subjective opinions" - Not at all.

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(January 24, 2019 at 6:54 pm)Acrobat Wrote: No you didn’t. I’ll ask you the two simples questions again:

So we'll simply if for, with Yes or No, which you can elaborate on if you choose: 

Calling the holocaust morally bad, is a value judgement. Yes or No?

Values judgements are evaluative proposition, Yes or No?

You already asked for clarification here, and already got it.  Engage with the answer you've been given or fuck off, lol.

(January 24, 2019 at 6:55 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: Ultimately, you wondered how moral realism deals with moral disagreement.  Simply, it accepts the existence of moral disagreement.  

Within that, you wondered how a realist would make their moral case.  The same way that they would make any other case about any other thing.  

Beneath that, how one could be in posession of a moral fact.  Observation.

Contained by that "aren't those all like, just their subjective opinions" - Not at all.

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(January 24, 2019 at 6:54 pm)Acrobat Wrote: No you didn’t. I’ll ask you the two simples questions again:

So we'll simply if for, with Yes or No, which you can elaborate on if you choose: 

Calling the holocaust morally bad, is a value judgement. Yes or No?

Values judgements are evaluative proposition, Yes or No?

You already asked for clarification here, and already got it.  Engage with the answer you've been given or fuck off, lol.

See, there you go refusing to answer two simple yes or no questions, for like the 20th time, lol.

I reduced the problem with your claims into two simple questions, that are basically designed to bring your contradictions front and center.

You think by refusing to answer them, that this won’t be obvious, but your refusal does the same thing.

Never seen someone so scared to answer yes or no questions, unless he was worried about incriminating himself, lol.

We've decided to call the holocaust being bad a moral fact, remember? Not a value judgement, or an evaluative proposition.

Do I need to quote our convo again?

If thats a moral fact, then, no, in a realists moral description it is neither a value judgement or an evaluative proposition.

IOW, for the third and final time...not...at....all.

If, however, we decided that the statement -were- a value judgement or evaluative proposition..then it would pose no particular difficulty to moral realism by being so...also for the third and final time.

(January 24, 2019 at 10:48 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Not at all, which is why I've been trying to familiarize you with moral realism.  


To a non natural realist, the badness of the thing is directly apprehended by the intellect.  It's a non empirical fact which is only coincidentally informed by the empirical facts of the matter (say, harm).  A property that some object has, that many otherwise disparate objects -can- have. 

To a natural realist, the badness of the thing is shorthand for observing a grab bag of empirical properties.  Harm is used illustratively as an umbrella term for these...but it can get needlingly specific depending on which variant of natural realism one refers to.  

So, on the one hand, it's not actually true that a moral fact is an evaluative premise or proposition on it's face..but, if it were..that poses no more difficulty than certifying any other list of empirical premises or propositions.

Do you find that objection difficult to handle in your own divine morality, and how do you address it?

(January 24, 2019 at 9:30 am)Acrobat Wrote:

(January 24, 2019 at 8:26 am)DLJ Wrote: What base do we use for x = wrong?

Don’t know.

Give it some thought.

Once you’ve worked it out, you are well on your way to discovering what morality actually is.

Then we can discuss the biochemical processes, the algorithms (which is my interest/profession) and the political ramifications.

(January 24, 2019 at 7:08 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: We've decided to call the holocaust being bad a moral fact, remember?

What you and I might mean by this are two different things, you don’t subscribe to my form of realism. In an external reality that posses moral aims, or a transcendent moral law.

Or as the Buddhist scholar Bodhi puts it:

“. If morality is to function as an efficient guide to conduct, it cannot be propounded as a self-justifying scheme but must be embedded in a more comprehensive spiritual system which grounds morality in a transpersonal order. Religion must affirm, in the clearest terms, that morality and ethical values are not mere decorative frills of personal opinion, not subjective superstructure, but intrinsic laws of the cosmos built into the heart of reality."

You don’t believe in such a moral reality.

Quote:Not a value judgement, or an evaluative proposition.

If thats a moral fact, then, no, in a realists moral description it is neither a value judgement or an evaluative proposition.

It as an evaluative proposition, bad is a value judgement, as a result holocaust being bad is an evaluative judgement. Now for me evaluative propositions can be facts, but you on the other had reject this. As result your position contradicts itself, if evaluative proposition can’t be facts, then the holocaust being bad can’t be a fact.

You expect us to close our eyes and deny that that attaching a moral value of bad to the holocaust, isn’t an evaluative judgement. It’s like saying “it’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it.”

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(January 25, 2019 at 2:34 am)DLJ Wrote:

(January 24, 2019 at 9:30 am)Acrobat Wrote: Don’t know.

Give it some thought.

Once you’ve worked it out, you are well on your way to discovering what morality actually is.

Then we can discuss the biochemical processes, the algorithms (which is my interest/profession) and the political ramifications.

Sorry DLJ, these aren’t areas that i’m all that familiar with beyond your basic math courses.

If you want to draw a parallel with it and morality, by all means please draw that out for us. Playing a game where someone wants me to guess what they mean here, is not interesting to me.

(January 25, 2019 at 8:12 am)Acrobat Wrote:

(January 24, 2019 at 7:08 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: We've decided to call the holocaust being bad a moral fact, remember?  

What you and I might mean by this are two different things, you don’t subscribe to my form of realism. In an external reality that posses moral aims, or a transcendent moral law.

Or as the Buddhist scholar Bodhi puts it:

“. If morality is to function as an efficient guide to conduct, it cannot be propounded as a self-justifying scheme but must be embedded in a more comprehensive spiritual system which grounds morality in a transpersonal order. Religion must affirm, in the clearest terms, that morality and ethical values are not mere decorative frills of personal opinion, not subjective superstructure, but intrinsic laws of the cosmos built into the heart of reality."

You don’t believe in such a moral reality.

You mean I don't believe in such a -spiritual- reality.  No, I don't.  I'm a moral realist, not a moral spiritualist.  Thing is, the empirical fact of a spiritual world is irrelevant to my moral positions anyway. They don't have anything to do with the empirical fact of a spiritual world. Only whether there are moral facts of a matter x..what they are, and what valid conclusions can be drawn from them.

Quote:

Quote:Not a value judgement, or an evaluative proposition.

If thats a moral fact, then, no, in a realists moral description it is neither a value judgement or an evaluative proposition.

It as an evaluative proposition, bad is a value judgement, as a result holocaust being bad is an evaluative judgement.  Now for me evaluative propositions  can be facts, but you on the other had reject this. As  result  your position contradicts itself, if evaluative proposition can’t be facts, then the holocaust being bad can’t be a fact.

You expect us to close our eyes and deny that that attaching a moral value of bad to the holocaust, isn’t an evaluative judgement. It’s like saying “it’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it.”

I think that our evaluative premises are not moral facts...that doesn't mean that evaluative propositions can't be facts. So nothing above is relevant to what I think.

Here's what I think. I think you should stop looking for ways that moral realism is somehow incoherent or contradictory. It's simply not. It may be wrong, that case can always be made, but it's coherence is not novel or based upon any novel thing.

It posits that there are moral facts of a matter x. It derives deontological obligations by applying an evaluative premise (at least one) to a purported moral fact. So, in simplified form....

If x is bad
-and if y contains x
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do y.

For this statement above to be incoherent..rather than just wrong...we would be discussing a situation in which a much more dire problem faces us than the ontological status of morality.

To use our example.

If holocaust is bad
-and if the course of action in front of us includes holocaust
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not pursue the course of action in front of us.

We can reformulate this to include holocaust being bad as the conclusion of an evaluative premise, but we will then need some distinct moral fact..so

If X is bad
-and if holocaust contains x
-and we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do holocaust.

In this second case, we can see that the statement "and if holocaust contains x" is potentially a factual statement, but it's not the moral fact, which is that x is bad.

So....now....I'm going to include your empirical fact of a spiritual world..just so you can see why it doesn't concern me.

There is a spiritual world.
If x is bad
-and if y contains x
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do y.

There is no spiritual world.
If x is bad
-and if y contains x
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do y.

Can you identify any moral or deontological difference in the statements above on account of the empirical fact of a spiritual worlds existence being posited in either direction?

(January 25, 2019 at 11:27 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: You mean I don't believe in such a -spiritual- reality.  No, I don't.  I'm a moral realist, not a moral spiritualist.  

I don’t know what moral spiritualism is, since this appears to be a term you invented, since it didn’t correspond to any moral theories I could find online. I’m a moral realist. Our differences is in regards to the ontology of morality here.

Quote:Here's what I think. I think you should stop looking for ways that moral realism is somehow incoherent or contradictory. It's simply not. It may be wrong, that case can always be made, but it's coherence is not novel or based upon any novel thing.

Why would i stop focusing on incoherency and contradictions of the moral realism you’re advocating for? That the central focus, of what I am arguing about.

Quote:There is a spiritual world.
If x is bad
-and if y contains x
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do y.

There is no spiritual world.
If x is bad
-and if y contains x
-and if we want to avoid the bad
Then we should not do y.

Can you identify any moral or deontological difference in the statements above on account of the empirical fact of a spiritual worlds existence being posited in either direction?

The problem with your equation, is that it can just as easily apply to moral subjectivism, moral relativism, or moral realism mines or yours. So yes there is no differences, across the moral perspectives.

But the point of my arguments is exactly about the distinctions, that your equation doesn’t account for, which is about the nature of x is bad. The ontology of badness or goodness.

The relativist, the subjectivist, as well as I can agree that x is bad, is an evaluative proposition. You on the other hand deny it’s an evaluative judgement all together. You refuse to acknowledge that calling the holocaust bad, is attaching a moral judgment to the holocaust, and this is by definition is an evaluative proposition. For you to deny this, is like sayings “It’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it”

The subjectivist would say its personal value judgment we individually attach to x, the relativist would say it’s cultural, social value judgment we attach to x. And it seems to me that your own views are along the lines of relativist here. You haven’t particularly made any real distinction between moral relativism, and the moral realism you seem to be advocating for, as evident in the equation you settled on, that lacks such a distinction.