(June 10, 2019 at 3:17 pm)SenseMaker007 Wrote: Error Theory is a form of cognitivism ... and that's why I don't think it can be truly nihilistic. I think that all forms of nihilism about X must necessarily be noncognitivist about X otherwise it's not empty enough to be nihilistic.

So, okay. Error theory is cognitivist. We're on the same page there. But I don't get why nihilists must be noncognitivists in your conception. It seems arbitrary really.

Error theorists think that

1) moral statements express beliefs (cognitivism)

and

2) all such beliefs are necessarily false (nihilism)

We must not be defining nihilism differently.

My definition of moral nihilism: belief that there are no moral features in the world. To me noncognitivists and error theorists fit under this umbrella.

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So weird... my last post isn't showing.

Quote:So, okay. Error theory is cognitivist. We're on the same page there. But I don't get why nihilists must be noncognitivists in your conception. It seems arbitrary really.

Error Theory says all statements about morality are wrong but according to Wikipedia:

Wikipedia Wrote:Moral nihilism (also known as ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or wrong.

(my emphasis)

You see, I agree with Wikipedia's definition of moral nihilism and that's exactly why I don't think Error Theory is a form of nihilism.

Now, a response would be if you were to say something like "Error Theory doesn't deem all statements to be morally wrong, so it can still be nihilistic, it just says that they are logically wrong from a metaethical standpoint." But then I'd just respond with "That's exactly why it isn't expressing anything normative." This is where I think the confusion resides.

Quote:Error theorists think that

1) moral statements express beliefs (cognitivism)

and

2) all such beliefs are necessarily false (nihilism)

Well, I've explained why I don't think evaluating something to be false, rather than meaningless, is nihilistic. But I think it would be helpful if we got past this purely semantic disagreement, do you agree?

Instead, I have two follow-up questions:

(1) How exactly can a noncognitivist metaethical theory express normative function?
(2) How exactly does saying that all statements about morality are false (Error Theory) express normative function?

I don't see how saying X is meaningless implies that you ought to do or not do X and I don't see how saying that all statements about morality are false means that you ought to do or not do anything at all. Whether everything is permissible because nothing is objectionable, in the case of Error Theory, or whether nothing can be deemed to be permissible or not because the whole thing is meaningless, in the case of noncognitivism, I don't see how either implies that we should or ought to do anything, or should or ought to avoid doing anything, from a normative standpoint.

Normative semantics aren't limited to cognitivism, and should you believe untrue things? You see, you could still deem things permissible (or not), but for some reason you've decided that you ought not do that, can't affirm that, if nihilism as you see it is true.

(June 10, 2019 at 3:32 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: So weird... my last post isn't showing.

I also saw something weird, too. For hours yesterday, it kept saying that the user Gae Bolga had the last post in this thread but every time I checked the last post was mine.

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(June 11, 2019 at 5:55 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Normative semantics aren't limited to cognitivism, and should you believe untrue things?  You see, you could still deem things permissible (or not), but for some reason you've decided that you ought not do that, can't affirm that, if nihilism as you see it is true.

If you deem all statements about morality to be without meaning then how exactly are you saying that you ought to do or avoid doing anything, from a normative standpoint?

I'm not a nihilist. I think that nihilism and noncognitivism are incoherent.

You just did. You just announced it impermissible to label things permissible. As mentioned before and mistaken for some argument for moral realism, we may not be able to extricate moral comments from normative functions.

(June 11, 2019 at 6:02 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: You just did.  You just announced it impermissible to label things permissible.

I never stated nor implied any such thing.

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(June 11, 2019 at 6:02 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: As mentioned before and mistaken for some argument for moral realism, we may not be able to extricate moral comments from normative functions.

Well, on that particular matter, could you answer my question, please?

Can a nihilist coherently label things as permissible and impermissible?

(June 11, 2019 at 5:55 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: and should you believe untrue things?  

Not if you're correctly an Error Theorist or noncognitivst.

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(June 11, 2019 at 6:09 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Can a nihilist coherently label things as permissible and impermissible?

No, which is why nihilism and noncognitivism are incoherent. But now that I've answered many of your questions, could you answer mine?

Then, properly understood and held to be true, the positions do force a normative semantics about what you can and can't do.  Should and shouldn't do.  It may be relatively minimal, but if you believe x to be true,  then you ought not affirm y.  This isn;t the only implication available to demonstrate the ubiquity of normative semantics bundled in moral comments, even metaethical comments, but it would be enough if it were to make us wonder whether we can ever discuss morality without creating normative statements by default.

I can't personally say that this is a good argument for the incoherence of the positions, particularly if it's something shared by every position. If all comments on morality carry a normative structure, then a normative structure to nihilism wouldn't be any more an issue for that position than the next. It may all be meaningless (in some meaningful way, lol), but even meaninglessness can present a normative structure. This might be down to the semantics of moral comments themselves - not a problm with the positions, but in how we communicate or conceive of them. Might be our problem, not the positions problems, properly. Maybe human beings can't coherently hold to nihilism as a s9imple matter of constantly importing meaningfulness and normativity, even if nihilism is coherent and true.

(June 11, 2019 at 6:16 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Then, properly understood and held to be true, the positions do force a normative semantics about what you can and can't do.  Should and shouldn't do. 

This is a non-sequitur.

What's more, how can an incoherent position express normative function (or any function for that matter)?

Quote: It may be relatively minimal, but if you believe x to be true,  then you ought not affirm y.

Here you're merely making a normative statement that you haven't backed up.

Not everybody agrees that true beliefs are morally good. And, even if they did, it wouldn't make them objectively right just because they all agreed with each other.

 

Quote:This isn;t the only implication available to demonstrate the ubiquity of normative semantics bundled in moral comments, even metaethical comments, but it would be enough if it were to make us wonder whether we can ever discuss morality without creating normative statements by default.

It isn't an example of it.

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(June 11, 2019 at 6:16 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: If all comments on morality carry a normative structure, then a normative structure

You haven't shown how noncognitivist theories of nihilism, nor Error Theory, are expressing anything normative. I asked you directly how and requested, more than once, for you to answer that direct question, but you have still, so far, completely ignored it.