(August 15, 2019 at 5:19 am)Belaqua Wrote:

(August 15, 2019 at 4:07 am)Grandizer Wrote: It's not a consensus, it's nature.

There is a current consensus about the best way to achieve wellbeing, more or less. This can change quite a bit. The consensus in different times and places can be pretty different. Maybe it's nature that we aim for wellbeing, but concepts of what that consists of and how to get there vary.

That's what I meant. Behaviors aimed for wellbeing would've generally been favored by natural selection.

As for the specifics, agreed, it's different variations (based on varying circumstances) but still boils down to something to do with wellbeing and such.

Quote:

Quote:People aim for good because that's how we've evolved via natural selection. 

This begs the question that what is good is the same as what natural selection made us consider that we want. If you say that the contingent preferences we have due to natural selection is exactly equal to what's good, then what you say is true. But I think that's awfully close to the appeal to nature fallacy. It's possible that natural selection gave us all kinds of preferences that we find it more moral to suppress. 

It would be safer to say that practical steps toward our evolutionarily decided preference are expedient, given that goal. Whether they are good or not is a separate question.

But if good is linked to wellbeing, then natural selection would've ensured that over time we (as a species, not individually) would be motivated enough to do what's good, even if in a tribalistic manner whereby we are selective of who we generally do good to. Need to go now, I'll see if I need to elaborate more later.

(August 14, 2019 at 9:23 am)LadyForCamus Wrote:

(August 13, 2019 at 9:12 pm)Belaqua Wrote: I wonder if any of us can justify these things. 

Why shouldn't we hurt people? Because it works against the wellbeing of them and our society. 

Why is it bad to work against that wellbeing? Because we want wellbeing.

Why is it good to want wellbeing? Because we just want it.....

If these ethical principles ultimately come down to habit, or preferences, then they may just change.

I dunno, Bel. I don’t think it’s ever going change that most beings want to be. It’s kind of that thing unique to us, lol. As long as that fact remains true, “goods” and “bads” with reference to well-being, can be objective. I mean, what are we even talking about if we aren’t talking about well-being? What does “morally good” or “morally bad” even mean outside of the context of living beings? Acro refuses to consider these facts, and as a result he’s left with the only other explanation available to him regarding ‘what is good’:

“It just is.”

Who decides that it “is”? A god? How can we know what a god thinks is good? Does he have to justify his morality with reference to well-being, or do we just do as told; no questions asked? That’s not a superior alternative to moral realism, lol. Further, if we don’t have to justify our morality using any facts about reality, it’s far more susceptible to whim and preference. “I just know”, and “it just is”, can be used by anyone in defense of literally anything. How reliable is a method that can lead to mutually exclusive conclusions?

I'm not offering an alternative to moral realism, a non-natural moralist whether you're an atheist or not, could just as well acknowledge what I am getting it. What I am rejecting is natural realism.

We recognize that Good is something objective, something that exists outside of our minds. What I am rejecting is the naturalist suggestion that Good exists somewhere within the scientific and historical facts (natural facts) of reality. But it doesn't. It objectiveness, it existence is in some non-natural reality. We see the color, the light it cast on things like "increasing well being". But it's not increasing well being in and of itself.

I'll try and demonstrate this with G.E. Moore's (an atheist non-natural realist) Open Question Arguement:
X= Increasing Wellbeing. 

Quote:Premise 1: If X is (analytically equivalent to) good, then the question "Is it true that X is good?" is meaningless.
Premise 2: The question "Is it true that X is good?" is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open question).

Conclusion: X is not (analytically equivalent to) good.

"The type of question Moore refers to in this argument is an identity question, "Is it true that X is Y?" Such a question is an open question if a conceptually competent speaker can question this; otherwise the question is closed. For example, "I know he is a vegan, but does he eat meat?" would be a closed question. However, "I know that it is pleasurable, but is it good?" is an open question; the question cannot be deduced from the conceptual terms alone.

The open-question argument claims that any attempt to identify morality with some set of observable, natural properties will always be an open question (unlike, say, a horse, which can be defined in terms of observable properties). Moore further argued that if this is true, then moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties and that therefore ethical naturalism is false. Put another way, what Moore is saying is that any attempt to define good in terms of a naturalistic property fails because all definitions can be transformed into closed questions (the subject and predicate being conceptually identical; it is given in language itself that the two terms mean the same thing); however, all purported naturalistic definitions of good are transformable into open questions. It is still controversial whether good is the same thing as pleasure, etc. Shortly before (in section §11), Moore said if good is defined as pleasure (or any other naturalistic property) "good" may be substituted for "pleasure" anywhere it occurs. However, "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement; but "good is good" (after making the substitution) is an empty, non-informative tautology."

Good as indefinable[edit]

Moore contended that goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other property. In Principia Ethica, he writes:
It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not "other," but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. 

Therefore, we cannot define "good" by explaining it in other words. We can only point to an action or a thing and say "That is good." Similarly, we cannot describe to a person born totally blind exactly what yellow is. We can only show a sighted person a piece of yellow paper or a yellow scrap of cloth and say "That is yellow."
Good as a non-natural property"

In addition to categorising "good" as indefinable, Moore also emphasized that it is a non-natural property. This means that it cannot be empirically or scientifically tested or verified - it is not within the bounds of "natural science"."

-Wikipedia.

(August 15, 2019 at 7:15 am)Grandizer Wrote: But if good is linked to wellbeing, then natural selection would've ensured that over time we (as a species, not individually) would be motivated enough to do what's good, even if in a tribalistic manner whereby we are selective of who we generally do good to.

Well, it's all in that "if," isn't it? 

Natural selection selects for survival. Not truth, not goodness, not sophistication, not wonderfulness. 

To say that what causes us to survive is necessarily good is to beg the question. I guess you could make an argument that "good" only and always means "that which helps us survive." But that's a big job.

---

Just to show that what we desire isn't simple, this is from Peirce's Theory of Signs, by T.L. Short:

Most remarkable of all, we have learned to take pleasure in signs and
sign interpretation for their own sakes, independently of any practical
purpose. Practical discourse has been made poetry and story and history;
diagrams have been made mathematics and scientific theory and pictorial
art; auditory signals, music. Truth and beauty have become human purposes.
Immense wealth and power have been devoted to science and art,
sometimes knowingly at the expense of life. Our capacity to depict unactualized
possibilities, fearful or attractive, and to define nonbiological
purposes and rules of behavior subordinate thereto, has transformed
structures that came into being initially as means to biological survival.
Thus the influence of religion and morality on politics, for example. In
Aristotle’s words, the polis originated to secure life, but continued for the
sake of a good life. Once again, whence that judgment ‘good’?

It is often supposed that pleasure and avoidance of pain are the ultimate
purposes for which these other purposes are adopted as means. But
that is to overlook a fact we have been at pains to establish: that a purpose
formed is independent of the conditions that explain its formation.
Aging Don Juans pursue pleasant ends beyond the point at which they
cease to be pleasurable. Dogs chase rabbits even when they are fed well at
home. We want to know the truth even when it is painful – quite beyond
any practical purpose knowledge of the truth might serve. Besides, pleasure
and pain have turned out to be highly malleable. We learn to take
pleasure in things – caviar, alcohol, hard work – initially unpleasant. Art
appreciation is taught. We have a moral duty to learn to take pleasure
in doing our duty and in exercising self-restraint. But most importantly,
our capacity to diagram and symbolize means that we can formulate possible
purposes independently of any motive to adopt them. Sometimes,
we then adopt them, arbitrarily or for reasons not well considered.
Human culture and irrational purpose would each seem to be an ultimate
emancipation of purpose from biology. However, there is one further
step to take. Purposes adopted irrationally tend not to endure. By
contrast, some possibilities seem fated to become purposes and, once
adopted, to persist and to gradually strengthen their hold. Among the
latter are those that dominate human cultures: not only the arts but certain
genres of art especially, not only religion but certain forms of religion
especially, not only politics but certain political ideals especially seem to
have staying power and a power to spread from one nation to another.
In Peirce’s words (in which ‘idea’ stands indifferently for a content of
consciousness and a general type or possibility):

it is the idea which will create its defenders, and render them powerful. (1.217)
every general idea has more or less power of working itself out into fact; some
more so, some less so. (2.149)
Again, ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the contrary have a
power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having found them, of conferring
upon them the ability to transform the face of the earth. (1.217)
This last passage is particularly telling. Just as life, the first form that purpose
took, transformed the physical surface of the Earth, so also human
culture, the last embodiment of purpose with which we are acquainted,
has transformed the biosphere, making grasslands into pastures, rivers
into electrical power, forests into libraries, and stones into cathedrals.
Peirce’s conception of final causation turns out to be more Platonic
than Aristotelian: it attributes a power to the type itself, independently of
that type’s being the nature of any existing individual or being otherwise
embodied.

[T]he idea does not belong to the soul; it is the soul that belongs to the idea. The
soul does for the idea just what the cellulose does for the beauty of the rose; that
is to say, it affords it opportunity. (1.216)

Platonism of this sort is presupposed in Peirce’s theory of the normative
sciences (chapter 3, section 1). Aesthetics discovers ultimate ends by their
appeal to our unqualified admiration. Ultimate ends, then, are those
possibilities that create in us a desire for them, causing us to adopt them
as our purposes. As ethics establishes the rules that must be followed in
order to attain the ends that are ultimate, we are here given a Platonic
path to ethics, in place of the Aristotelian foundation denied.

I'll pull out two pictures from my pocket.

The first is a child who starved to death.

The second is a child who was starving but received help from a human adult who exists, who cares and who has the ability to help the starving child.

The first child who starved to death didn't have anyone who existed, who cared or had the ability to help a starving child.

(August 13, 2019 at 7:55 pm)Belaqua Wrote: Thank you for the passage from Wittgenstein. I've found and read a couple of essays on this topic this morning, and I'll try to read his Lecture on Ethics today. It's only 8 pages!

I'm beginning to understand your argument better, from this and from skimming more of this thread. 

In a way, people are agreeing with you on the main point, I think. There is clearly nothing quantifiable in the material world which can be identified as good or bad. It's not something we can see in a microscope. But people here seem to agree that there are obvious moral facts. For example, if you cut the head off a baby, it's clearly bad. And if they demand "why?" we can say "because it deprives the baby of life, liberty, and happiness." And we can respond, "but why is it bad to do that?" And eventually the argument is just "because it just is." So in a sense people are agreeing with you. It's not something material, but it's clear and true. 

Let's think of three types of questions, to see the distinction between them.

I had a slice of pizza the other night, and it was good.

A.) If someone ask me why was it good?

It seems perfectly adequate to respond with certain physical characteristics of the pizza, the crispiness of the crust, the balance of the topping, the cheese to sauce ratio, etc....

B.) What if someone asked why is it subjectively good?

I can respond because I liked it, i like the taste of pizza cooked and made a certain way.

B.)What if someone asked why is it objectively good?

Answer: ???????

I couldn't just repeat the response I provided in A, just because it contains objective facts about the pizza. Because such answers don't actually answer the question, for the same reason that A isn't a satisfactory answer to B either.

Quote: if you cut the head off a baby, it's clearly bad. And if they demand "why?" we can say "because it deprives the baby of life, liberty, and happiness."

Such an answer is acceptable for the question, why is it bad?

But it's not acceptable for the question of why it's objectively bad? Repeating a series of scientific and historical facts about cutting off the head of the baby, while it may sound to us likes it's answering the question but it's not.

In my view, what's taking place, is that we see a non-natural/immaterial Good, and it's through this that we see things like cutting a babies head off as bad, or doing things conducive to wellbeing as good.

Those naturalist who acknowledge the objectiveness of goodness, see this as well, but attempt to reject this perception, and try to place it within the natural and scientific facts about x, and hence the problem.

But let's say no non-natural reality like this exists. What could be a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenon here?

That would perhaps be the position of Alex Rosenberg. While he acknowledge the perception of objectiveness of morality, he views it as just an illusion, an illusion of objectivity caused by our biology, like free-will. We think we see something objective about the goodness and badness of morality, but it's just a mirage. But this view seems more driven by a desire to protect naturalism, than the truth.

(August 15, 2019 at 7:23 am)Belaqua Wrote:

(August 15, 2019 at 7:15 am)Grandizer Wrote: But if good is linked to wellbeing, then natural selection would've ensured that over time we (as a species, not individually) would be motivated enough to do what's good, even if in a tribalistic manner whereby we are selective of who we generally do good to.

Well, it's all in that "if," isn't it?

Natural selection selects for survival. Not truth, not goodness, not sophistication, not wonderfulness.

Yes, and as a means to ensure survival, natural selection has primed the human species to care about select others to one extent or another.

Selfish behavior is also conditioned if it ensures survival, true. Same with tribalism. Doesn't change the fact, though, that humans have learned to help each other out due mainly to the favorability of cooperation for continued survival. And this is good (helping people is a good thing after all). What's also good is that the species has thus a basic foundation upon which to further develop good. This is all contingent of course, but it's actual.

Not to anthropomorphize nature, but I think we tend to give millions of years of evolution + natural selection a lot less credit than it deserves for shaping the way we behave socially towards others, and we end up giving that credit to something that is instead deemed beyond nature. And that, to me, is unwarranted.

Quote:To say that what causes us to survive is necessarily good is to beg the question. I guess you could make an argument that "good" only and always means "that which helps us survive." But that's a big job.

Nah, I'm not taking up that job because I didn't say it like that.

Moral reasoning helps us determine what is right or wrong. Pro-social moral sentiments help us care what's right or wrong.

(August 15, 2019 at 9:11 am)Acrobat Wrote: But let's say no non-natural reality like this exists. What could be a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenon here?

As already shown, you see “non natural” and cream your pants thinking that it means pixies.

It doesn’t, it actively reject pixies, no less. It’s just a description of “badness” by reference to an idea and whether or not the natural facts of a matter are bad-alike.

Moral non naturalism is just as natural as moral naturalism is, in the broader scope. The difference isn’t that one fits in naturalism and the other doesn’t, lol. They both fit that framework. One simply states that moral facts can’t be reduced to non moral facts. It’s reference, rather than reduction, theory of realism.

All that’s required to account for it in the absence of pixies, is having an idea in your head. Do you have ideas in your head?

(August 15, 2019 at 11:00 am)Gae Bolga Wrote:

(August 15, 2019 at 9:11 am)Acrobat Wrote: But let's say no non-natural reality like this exists. What could be a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenon here?

As already shown, you see “non natural” and cream your pants thinking that it means pixies.  

It doesn’t, it’s just a description of “badness” by reference to an idea and whether or not the natural facts of a matter are bad-alike.

Moral non naturalism is just as natural as moral naturalism is, in the broader scope.  The difference isn’t that one fits in naturalism and the other doesn’t, lol.  They both fit that framework.  One simply states that moral facts can’t be reduced to non moral facts.  It’s reference,  rather than reduction, theory of realism.  

""In addition to categorising "good" as indefinable, Moore also emphasized that it is a non-natural property. This means that it cannot be empirically or scientifically tested or verified - it is not within the bounds of "natural science""


An idea in our head is not a non-natural property, it's reducible to a natural property of the mind. 

Non-Naturalism, posits posses a non-natural reality/property outside of our minds, and outside of natural facts of science. 

Quote: As already shown, you see “non natural” and cream your pants thinking that it means pixies.

I think it's the exact opposite. As advocate of naturalism, you hear the term "non-naturalism" uttered by an atheists, and you shit your pants. I'm not phased one way or the other if an atheists subscribe to such a view. I think you engaged in some weird sort of projecting.

Take it up with Moore? Or, perhaps, do a little research.

He used the term “non natural” to refer to non empirical facts. Like an axiom. Not pixies, as you so hilariously surmised with your doomed “therefore supernatural” comment. To a non natural realist the supernatural is just the super-wrong explanation. There’s no distinction, in the schema, between the natural and the supernatural.

I don’t have a problem with non naturalism, it’s just as likely to be true or false as naturalism, lol.