(September 26, 2019 at 6:37 pm)Simon Moon Wrote:

(September 26, 2019 at 5:29 pm)Grandizer Wrote: Hence why it's a useless argument. At best it's valid, nothing more.

I don't even think it's valid, though.

It seems to treat existence as if it's an attribute. As in:

This maximally great being has all the following attributes: A, B, C, D, etc.
But this maximally great being has all those same attributes, except it has one more attribute, it exists.

Doesn't something need to exist, before it can have any attributes?

Just saying...

I think with the modal ontological argument, it's more like if you concede the first premise then God exists in at least one possible world and yet, God being maximally great means he is a necessary entity. So if God exists in even one possible world he has to exist in all possible worlds, including the actual. S5 modal logic allows this to happen, but ultimately it's just a trick with words.

At work.

(September 26, 2019 at 6:55 pm)Grandizer Wrote:

(September 26, 2019 at 6:37 pm)Simon Moon Wrote: I don't even think it's valid, though.

It seems to treat existence as if it's an attribute. As in:

This maximally great being has all the following attributes: A, B, C, D, etc.
But this maximally great being has all those same attributes, except it has one more attribute, it exists.

Doesn't something need to exist, before it can have any attributes?

Just saying...

I think with the modal ontological argument, it's more like if you concede the first premise then God exists in at least one possible world and yet, God being maximally great means he is a necessary entity. So if God exists in even one possible world he has to exist in all possible worlds, including the actual. S5 modal logic allows this to happen, but ultimately it's just a trick with words.

Isn't the modal ontological just trying to 'Define' somthing into existance?

After all, some of the attributes ascribed to dieties defy/break/are fundamentally impossible within reality.

Cheers.

(September 26, 2019 at 8:20 pm)Peebo-Thuhlu Wrote: At work.

(September 26, 2019 at 6:55 pm)Grandizer Wrote: I think with the modal ontological argument, it's more like if you concede the first premise then God exists in at least one possible world and yet, God being maximally great means he is a necessary entity. So if God exists in even one possible world he has to exist in all possible worlds, including the actual. S5 modal logic allows this to happen, but ultimately it's just a trick with words.

Isn't the modal ontological just trying to 'Define' somthing into existance?

After all, some of the attributes ascribed to dieties defy/break/are fundamentally impossible within reality.

Cheers.

It presumes the possible existence of that which is eventually concluded in the argument. Yes there's a definition beforehand for maximally great being but I don't know if it's really defining something into existence. It's more like it's a trick of logic to get from logical possibility to metaphysically necessary.

But I do agree some of the attributes do seem to be logic defying and you can therefore use that to argue against first premise I guess. That or just challenge the theist making the argument to prove the premise.

(September 26, 2019 at 6:55 pm)Grandizer Wrote:

(September 26, 2019 at 6:37 pm)Simon Moon Wrote: I don't even think it's valid, though.

It seems to treat existence as if it's an attribute. As in:

This maximally great being has all the following attributes: A, B, C, D, etc.
But this maximally great being has all those same attributes, except it has one more attribute, it exists.

Doesn't something need to exist, before it can have any attributes?

Just saying...

I think with the modal ontological argument, it's more like if you concede the first premise then God exists in at least one possible world and yet, God being maximally great means he is a necessary entity. So if God exists in even one possible world he has to exist in all possible worlds, including the actual. S5 modal logic allows this to happen, but ultimately it's just a trick with words.

Exactly.  The points in the argument to be considered are 1) If God exists, then God is maximally great and 2) a maximally great being would have necessary existence (otherwise it would not be maximally great).

Linguistically, this is precisely the same thing as saying, 'If God exists, then God exists'. It doesn't matter how we define 'maximally great' or 'possible worlds' or any of the rest of it.  We are asked to imagine something that, definitionally, we cannot imagine.

Another, slightly snarkier, way to restate the argument is, 'I think, therefore God exists.'

Ontology is just silly.

Boru

If I can imagine it, then it must exist ?

I imagine a maximally God devouring entity that consumes any and all gods.

It must exist.
My evidence for it's existence is that no gods exist.
It makes perfect sense

(September 27, 2019 at 8:15 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote:

(September 26, 2019 at 6:55 pm)Grandizer Wrote: I think with the modal ontological argument, it's more like if you concede the first premise then God exists in at least one possible world and yet, God being maximally great means he is a necessary entity. So if God exists in even one possible world he has to exist in all possible worlds, including the actual. S5 modal logic allows this to happen, but ultimately it's just a trick with words.

Exactly.  The points in the argument to be considered are 1) If God exists, then God is maximally great and 2) a maximally great being would have necessary existence (otherwise it would not be maximally great).

Linguistically, this is precisely the same thing as saying, 'If God exists, then God exists'. It doesn't matter how we define 'maximally great' or 'possible worlds' or any of the rest of it.  We are asked to imagine something that, definitionally, we cannot imagine.

Another, slightly snarkier, way to restate the argument is, 'I think, therefore God exists.'

Ontology is just silly.

Boru

I liken the argument to someone trying to prove an unprovable mathematical conjecture by arguing it's true because it's possibly true and if possible true, necessarily true.

It's a very bad way of proving in other words.

(September 27, 2019 at 6:49 pm)Grandizer Wrote:

(September 27, 2019 at 8:15 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote: Exactly.  The points in the argument to be considered are 1) If God exists, then God is maximally great and 2) a maximally great being would have necessary existence (otherwise it would not be maximally great).

Linguistically, this is precisely the same thing as saying, 'If God exists, then God exists'. It doesn't matter how we define 'maximally great' or 'possible worlds' or any of the rest of it.  We are asked to imagine something that, definitionally, we cannot imagine.

Another, slightly snarkier, way to restate the argument is, 'I think, therefore God exists.'

Ontology is just silly.

Boru

I liken the argument to someone trying to prove an unprovable mathematical conjecture by arguing it's true because it's possibly true and if possible true, necessarily true.

It's a very bad way of proving in other words.

I liken it to hollowing out a gourd and filling it with hot sauce and marbles - kind of intriguing, but essentially pointless.

Boru

(September 27, 2019 at 6:49 pm)Grandizer Wrote:

(September 27, 2019 at 8:15 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote: Exactly.  The points in the argument to be considered are 1) If God exists, then God is maximally great and 2) a maximally great being would have necessary existence (otherwise it would not be maximally great).

Linguistically, this is precisely the same thing as saying, 'If God exists, then God exists'. It doesn't matter how we define 'maximally great' or 'possible worlds' or any of the rest of it.  We are asked to imagine something that, definitionally, we cannot imagine.

Another, slightly snarkier, way to restate the argument is, 'I think, therefore God exists.'

Ontology is just silly.

Boru

I liken the argument to someone trying to prove an unprovable mathematical conjecture by arguing it's true because it's possibly true and if possible true, necessarily true.

It's a very bad way of proving in other words.

What is it proving, exactly? What does "God exists" even mean, really (devoid of faith)? That seems like saying, "existence exists." If "God" is simply the absolute ontological ground of all logically possible existence. In that case, that might be the only thing we can really know.

(September 30, 2019 at 2:29 am)Inqwizitor Wrote:

(September 27, 2019 at 6:49 pm)Grandizer Wrote: I liken the argument to someone trying to prove an unprovable mathematical conjecture by arguing it's true because it's possibly true and if possible true, necessarily true.

It's a very bad way of proving in other words.

What is it proving, exactly? What does "God exists" even mean, really (devoid of faith)? That seems like saying, "existence exists." If "God" is simply the absolute ontological ground of all logically possible existence. In that case, that might be the only thing we can really know.

"God exists" in this context means a maximally great being exists, one that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and necessarily so in all possible worlds. God is not simply the ground of all existence here.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

Visit the link above and scroll down to the bit about Platinga and his MOA.

(September 30, 2019 at 3:34 am)Grandizer Wrote:

(September 30, 2019 at 2:29 am)Inqwizitor Wrote: What is it proving, exactly? What does "God exists" even mean, really (devoid of faith)? That seems like saying, "existence exists." If "God" is simply the absolute ontological ground of all logically possible existence. In that case, that might be the only thing we can really know.

"God exists" in this context means a maximally great being exists, one that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and necessarily so in all possible worlds. God is not simply the ground of all existence here.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

Visit the link above and scroll down to the bit about Platinga and his MOA.

OK so you would agree then that omniscience and omnipotence are logically incompatible properties? The self-contradiction may be inherent and assumed by dividing an unlimited being into these properties, which is then delimiting, and not, unlimited. Unlimited being is unlimited being, simply, no parts, no separation into knowledge, power or goodness. Pure act, as Aristotle put it (I think). On second glance I might be conflating Malcolm and Plantinga.