I'm not saying it's not a reflex. I'm not saying stepping on a nail means I always with zero exceptions, feel pain from it. I'm saying it being a reflex doesn't mean I don't feel pain.

I agree. My point isn't that these behaviors contradict consciousness, but that we can't infer consciousness from these behaviors. We know that in humans these behaviors can occur without consciousness.

We can infer pain when an animal behaves as though it is hurt, and the inference is further justified by examining its brain activity and seeing that it is similar to ours when we feel pain. The same mechanisms are in play. Also, we can infer that an animal can't feel pain when, say, it's neural activity is indicative of reflex action but it doesn't have the 'wiring' necessary to feel pain in the same way we do.

It's an inference justified enough for me to avoid stepping on my dog's foot in order to avoid abusing and hurting him; not just because I want to avoid prompting a reflex. Are you only concerned for the reflexes of animals and otherwise proceed on the presumption that they can't feel pain because we can't prove it to a mathematical certainty? If animals can't feel pain or suffer, it is impossible to be cruel to them. How far do you take your position?

You say we can't infer from the behavior of animals that their experiences are similar to ours, and that we can't infer from the brain-states of animals that their experiences are similar to ours. It sounds like you are reject inference altogether.

If animals can't feel pain and suffer..then neither can we. We're animals.

..................unless there's some Other Thing™ doing the feeling......lol

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In context of mind, to keep rolling with this, a stolen concept arises when a person refers to asserted facts of cognitive science in order to reject the genetic validity of cognitive science.

I don't need an organism to experience pain and suffering to avoid harming it. Perhaps for the same reason I would be against killing people just because they're momentarily unconscious or in a coma; or even breaking someone's car because it's not alive.

I don't need mathematical certainty; but the evidence you're giving is insufficient. There's a gap that you're making these observations jump over in order to conclude consciousness. I'm not comfortable with that leap.

We can agree that if an animal consciously experiences pain, then it has mechanisms and possibly receptors for transmitting and processing that experience. That's akin to saying that if I live in Orlando, then I live in Florida. However, we know that having such mechanisms and receptors doesn't always means it's entering consciousness; all of it can be processed outside consciousness. That's akin to saying that if I live in Florida, then I live in Orlando. Which is what it seems you're doing.

Perhaps in philosophy terms such as justified mean something different; you're certainly using it in a way I wouldn't.

In your opinion it's insufficient. Are you against allowing someone who is brain-dead to die?

And again, if animals are incapable of pain and suffering, there's no such thing as cruelty to animals.

Science would be a lot easier if we were allowed to make such leaps I'll tell you that.

Reflexivity isn't a problem for cognitive science. It's an observation derived from it.

It's a problem for how you view your conscious apparatus, John. Cognitive science is only insufficient insomuch as it is not compelling enough for you to choose it, over whatever that is.

(February 14, 2020 at 11:32 am)Mister Agenda Wrote: In your opinion it's insufficient. Are you against allowing someone who is brain-dead to die?

And again, if animals are incapable of pain and suffering, there's no such thing as cruelty to animals.

I'm not against letting someone whose brain-dead die.

It seems to me you are very biased towards needing animals to have consciousness. The absence of consciousness seems to affect the way you look at your dog, the way you view cruelty to animals, etc. Why does cruelty to animals matter here? Consciousness doesn't become real just because you've build other concepts on top of it.

Affirming the consequent. That seems to be the logical fallacy that most closely resembles why your conclusion is wrong. If you're consciously doing something, then a behavior is occurring. But just because a behavior is occurring doesn't mean you're consciously doing it.