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May 30, 2021 at 3:58 pm (This post was last modified: May 30, 2021 at 4:23 pm by The Grand Nudger.)
Objectivist metrics and objective metrics are not the same thing. Relativists have use of every fact a realist does to make whatever case they choose to make. Perhaps fuzziness is a component of your view of relativism, not a consequence of relativism?
That, for example, somethings harmfulness or misery is the reason that a culture has a prohibition against it - the contents of harm, the contents of misery. Why do you and I see harm where others do not, and why do we fail to see the harm that others do? Or, to put it more specifically in a limited context, if it's not realism, and it's not nihilism - do we think that our tendencies to see X can truly be explained by individual preference, and what sense, then, do we make of the sheer existence of cultural agreement?
-and all of that, premised on the notion only that fuzziness would be an issue - it's all moot if fuzziness is the true state of affairs. Not a problem, just an accurate description.
I am the Infantry. I am my country’s strength in war, her deterrent in peace. I am the heart of the fight… wherever, whenever. I carry America’s faith and honor against her enemies. I am the Queen of Battle. I am what my country expects me to be, the best trained Soldier in the world. In the race for victory, I am swift, determined, and courageous, armed with a fierce will to win. Never will I fail my country’s trust. Always I fight on…through the foe, to the objective, to triumph overall. If necessary, I will fight to my death. By my steadfast courage, I have won more than 200 years of freedom. I yield not to weakness, to hunger, to cowardice, to fatigue, to superior odds, For I am mentally tough, physically strong, and morally straight. I forsake not, my country, my mission, my comrades, my sacred duty. I am relentless. I am always there, now and forever. I AM THE INFANTRY! FOLLOW ME!
Vulcan, I would like to suggest a pragmatic compromise of sorts. In the same way that anyone can know that something is without knowing what the thing is, people can have objective moral theories (in the sense that such hypotheses are derived from experience, properly basic beliefs*, and objective facts) but because uncertainty is part of the human condition the best we can do is make moral systems (in the the same way we devise systems to perform complex processes with greater reliability)...and most so-called moral systems are basically heuristics of various accuracy and helpfulness.
I say helpfulness because, as I see it, the value of a heuristic comes from its reliability and fittingness for various intellectual tasks, not necessarily its veracity or insight into fundamental reality. For example, it seems right and proper for policy makers and public servants to adopt Utilitarianism and Rawlsian "veils of ignorance", whereas, a captain of industry may attribute his or her success to steadfast adherence to "common sense" principles summarized by catchy aphorisms and traditional proverbs. Or as another example, the dramatic testimonies of people whose turn to Christ turned their lives. The truth is everyone navigates the moral landscape using multiple heuristics everyday. My driving behavior during the morning commute reflects the Kantian approach of "what if everyone drove like that?" - keep up with the pace of traffic, share the road, etc. My work opinions are often informed by utilitarian considerations within the limits of inviolate guidelines. That vacillation between various ethic systems could be considered a limited form of moral relativism. I.e. there are moral facts that are easy to discern but creating a system that readily and infallibly produces morally acceptable outcomes for all circumstance is IMHO impossible. The best to which we can aspire for any system is to make morally acceptable choices most of the time under most circumstances.
But doesn't my use of value-laden terms like "best" and "acceptable" imply a meta-moral system to decide between moral systems. A skeptic might say that I am just pushing the problem back. To this I say, our common humanity adequately serves as an objective moral standard. It means something to be human. And because it means something to be human, there is an empirical data set to which everyone can refer. When we try to convince others to "do the right thing" we generally appeal to their humanity. I suspect if there actually were Klingons, we would fully expect their morality would reflect something of what it essentially means to be Klingon.
In summary, I could consider myself a moral relativist in the sense that no one system is sufficient to cover all the nuance of a truly human life experience but...that does not mean that all moral systems are equal...So deciding which moral system to apply, in my estimation, is more like cultivating a discernment of one's own humanity and that of others. Wisdom. Here I'd like to speak to you, vulcanlogic, because the Ephesians quote you hate tacitly accepts the institution of slavery, it plants a idea that once acknowledged makes slavery abhorrent and that idea is that slaves and masters share a common humanity.
* which are many such as the belief in the following: 1) independent physical reality, 2) other minds, 3) the efficacy of reason, etc.
June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am (This post was last modified: June 14, 2021 at 3:53 am by vulcanlogician.)
So I stepped away from the debate because I was thinking too hard about it. And, in such a state, I rarely have any valuable thoughts to contribute. I think my central point got lost somewhere, as I never wanted to argue that relativism wasn't internally consistent.
I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about whether there can be any truth value in a normative claim.
Or put better:
Quote:Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”
The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.
The article addresses many facets of the argument better than I do, so, please, I encourage any of my interlocutors to check it out. It may serve as a better jumping off point for the debate than my OP.
June 14, 2021 at 1:40 am (This post was last modified: June 14, 2021 at 1:42 am by Belacqua.)
(June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: So I stepped away from the debate because I was thinking to hard about it. And, in such a state, I rarely have any valuable thoughts to contribute. I think my central point got lost somewhere, as I never wanted to argue that relativism wasn't internally consistent.
I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about normative claims.
Or put better:
Quote:Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”
The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.
The article addresses many facets of the argument better than I do, so, please, I encourage any of my interlocutors to check it out. It may serve as a better jumping off point for the debate than my OP.
When I follow the link I hit a paywall, I'm afraid. Maybe it's just me?
Do you know if it's cached somewhere? Or maybe you could copy/paste the gist of it?
June 14, 2021 at 1:46 am (This post was last modified: June 14, 2021 at 1:47 am by vulcanlogician.)
(June 14, 2021 at 1:40 am)Belacqua Wrote:
(June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: So I stepped away from the debate because I was thinking to hard about it. And, in such a state, I rarely have any valuable thoughts to contribute. I think my central point got lost somewhere, as I never wanted to argue that relativism wasn't internally consistent.
I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about normative claims.
The article addresses many facets of the argument better than I do, so, please, I encourage any of my interlocutors to check it out. It may serve as a better jumping off point for the debate than my OP.
When I follow the link I hit a paywall, I'm afraid. Maybe it's just me?
Do you know if it's cached somewhere? Or maybe you could copy/paste the gist of it?
The Maze of Moral Relativism
BY PAUL BOGHOSSIAN
Relativism about morality has come to play an increasingly important role in contemporary culture. To many thoughtful people, and especially to those who are unwilling to derive their morality from a religion, it appears unavoidable. Where would absolute facts about right and wrong come from, they reason, if there is no supreme being to decree them? We should reject moral absolutes, even as we keep our moral convictions, allowing that there can be right and wrong relative to this or that moral code, but no right and wrong per se. (See, for example, Stanley Fish’s 2001 op-ed, “Condemnation Without Absolutes.”) [1]
Is it plausible to respond to the rejection of absolute moral facts with a relativistic view of morality? Why should our response not be a more extreme, nihilistic one, according to which we stop using normative terms like “right” and “wrong” altogether, be it in their absolutist or relativist guises?
Relativism is not always a coherent way of responding to the rejection of a certain class of facts. When we decided that there were no such things as witches, we didn’t become relativists about witches. Rather, we just gave up witch talk altogether, except by way of characterizing the attitudes of people (such as those in Salem) who mistakenly believed that the world contained witches, or by way of characterizing what it is that children find it fun to pretend to be on Halloween. We became what we may call “eliminativists” about witches.
On the other hand, when Einstein taught us, in his Special Theory of Relativity, that there was no such thing as the absolute simultaneity of two events, the recommended outcome was that we become relativists about simultaneity, allowing that there is such a thing as “simultaneity relative to a (spatio-temporal) frame of reference,” but not simultaneity as such.
What’s the difference between the witch case and the simultaneity case? Why did the latter rejection lead to relativism, but the former to eliminativism?
In the simultaneity case, Einstein showed that while the world does not contain simultaneity as such, it does contain its relativistic cousin — simultaneity relative to a frame of reference — a property that plays something like the same sort of role as classical simultaneity did in our theory of the world.
By contrast, in the witch case, once we give up on witches, there is no relativistic cousin that plays anything like the role that witches were supposed to play. The property, that two events may have, of “being simultaneous relative to frame of reference F” is recognizably a kind of simultaneity. But the property of “being a witch according to a belief system T” is not a kind of witch, but a kind of content (the content of belief system T): it’s a way of characterizing what belief system T says, not a way of characterizing the world.
Now, the question is whether the moral case is more like that of simultaneity or more like that of witches? When we reject absolute moral facts is moral relativism the correct outcome or is it moral eliminativism (nihilism)?
The answer, as we have seen, depends on whether there are relativistic cousins of “right” and “wrong” that can play something like the same role that absolute “right” and “wrong” play.
It is hard to see what those could be.
What’s essential to “right” and “wrong” is that they are normative terms, terms that are used to say how things ought to be, in contrast with how things actually are. But what relativistic cousin of “right” and “wrong” could play anything like such a normative role?
Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”
The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.
So, it looks as though the moral case is more like the witch case than the simultaneity case: there are no relativistic cousins of “right” and “wrong.” Denial of moral absolutism leads not to relativism, but to nihilism.[2]
There is no half-way house called “moral relativism,” in which we continue to use normative vocabulary with the stipulation that it is to be understood as relativized to particular moral codes. If there are no absolute facts about morality, “right” and “wrong” would have to join “witch” in the dustbin of failed concepts.
The argument is significant because it shows that we should not rush to give up on absolute moral facts, mysterious as they can sometimes seem, for the world might seem even more mysterious without any normative vocabulary whatsoever.
One might be suspicious of my argument against moral relativism. Aren’t we familiar with some normative domains — such as that of etiquette — about which we are all relativists? Surely, no one in their right minds would think that there is some absolute fact of the matter about whether we ought to slurp our noodles while eating.
If we are dining at Buckingham Palace, we ought not to slurp, since our hosts would consider it offensive, and we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts. On the other hand, if we are dining in Xian, China, we ought to slurp, since in Xian slurping is considered to be a sign that we are enjoying our meal, and our hosts would consider it offensive if we didn’t slurp, and we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts.
But if relativism is coherent in the case of etiquette why couldn’t we claim that morality is relative in the same way?
The reason is that our relativism about etiquette does not actually dispense with all absolute moral facts. Rather, we are relativists about etiquette in the sense that, with respect to a restricted range of issues (such as table manners and greetings), we take the correct absolute norm to be “we ought not, other things being equal, offend our hosts.”
This norm is absolute and applies to everyone and at all times. Its relativistic flavor comes from the fact that, with respect to that limited range of behaviors (table manners and greetings, but not, say, the abuse of children for fun), it advocates varying one’s behavior with local convention.
In other words, the relativism of etiquette depends on the existence of absolute moral norms. Since etiquette does not dispense with absolute moral facts, one cannot hope to use it as a model for moral relativism.
Suppose we take this point on board, though, and admit that there have to be some absolute moral facts. Why couldn’t they all be like the facts involved in etiquette? Why couldn’t they all say that, with respect to any morally relevant question, what we ought to do depends on what the local conventions are?
The trouble with this approach is that once we have admitted that there are some absolute moral facts, it is hard to see why we shouldn’t think that there are many — as many as common sense and ordinary reasoning appear to warrant. Having given up on the purity of a thoroughgoing anti-absolutism, we would now be in the business of trying to figure out what absolute moral facts there are. To do that, we would need to employ our usual mix of argument, intuition and experience. And what argument, intuition and experience tell us is that whether we should slurp our noodles depends on what the local conventions are, but whether we should abuse children for fun does not.
A would-be relativist about morality needs to decide whether his view grants the existence of some absolute moral facts, or whether it is to be a pure relativism, free of any commitment to absolutes. The latter position, I have argued, is mere nihilism; whereas the former leads us straight out of relativism and back into the quest for the moral absolutes.
None of this is to deny that there are hard cases, where it is not easy to see what the correct answer to a moral question is. It is merely to emphasize that there appears to be no good alternative to thinking that, when we are in a muddle about what the answer to a hard moral question is, we are in a muddle about what the absolutely correct answer is.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Pinning a precise philosophical position on someone, especially a non-philosopher, is always tricky, because people tend to give non-equivalent formulations of what they take to be the same view. Fish, for example, after saying that his view is that “there can be no independent standards for determining which of many rival interpretations of an event is the true one,” which sounds appropriately relativistic, ends up claiming that all he means to defend is “the practice of putting yourself in your adversary’s shoes, not in order to wear them as your own but in order to have some understanding (far short of approval) of why someone else might want to wear them.” The latter, though, is just the recommendation of empathetic understanding and is, of course, both good counsel and perfectly consistent with the endorsement of moral absolutes.
Another view with which moral relativism is sometimes conflated is the view that the right thing to do can depend on the circumstances. There is no question that the right thing to do can depend on the circumstances, even on an absolutist view. Whether you should help someone in need can depend on what your circumstances are, what their circumstances are, and so forth. What makes a view relativistic is its holding that the right thing to do depends not just on the circumstances, but on what the person (or his community) takes to be the right thing to do, on their moral code.
In this column, I am only concerned with those who wish to deny that there are any absolute moral truths in this sense. If that is not your view, then you are not the target of this particular discussion.
[2] Some philosophers may think that they can evade this problem by casting the relativism in terms of a relativized truth predicate rather than a relativized moral predicate. But as I have explained elsewhere, the problem of the loss of normative content recurs in that setting.
Here is the entire article for anyone experiencing issues.
June 14, 2021 at 9:10 am (This post was last modified: June 14, 2021 at 9:26 am by The Grand Nudger.)
(June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about whether there can be any truth value in a normative claim.
Relativism accepts this claim, as a cognitive theory. Affirmatively stating that moral utterances are statements which can be true or false, and at least some of which are true, of a given subjects societal arrangement. They could conceivably get it wrong. Mistake the disposition of their society or another's toward a given act or state of affairs, and so, be morally mistaken.
Quote:Or put better:
Quote:Most moral relativists say that moral right and wrong are to be relativized to a community’s “moral code.” According to some such codes, eating beef is permissible; according to others, it is an abomination and must never be allowed. The relativist proposal is that we must never talk simply about what’s right or wrong, but only about what’s “right or wrong relative to a particular moral code.”
The trouble is that while “Eating beef is wrong” is clearly a normative statement, “Eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus” is just a descriptive remark that carries no normative import whatsoever. It’s just a way of characterizing what is claimed by a particular moral code, that of the Hindus. We can see this from the fact that anyone, regardless of their views about eating beef, can agree that eating beef is wrong relative to the moral code of the Hindus.
It's manifestly clear, even in the statement above, that eating beef carries normative import in hindu society. If we drilled a little deeper, we might find a generalizable statement that applies more broadly and beyond hindu society. Eating beef is a threat to the good order of hindu society, and threats to the good order of society are routinely taboo in moral systems.
These objections all seem to boil down to the idea that relativistic utterances carry no normative import and are in some sense fact free, but only fact free in the novel sense of the term which excludes those sets of facts the critic deems unworthy or insufficient. Facts of a society may not be facts of an act, but relativism is not objectivism.
I can't stress enough that there is no disagreement between any cognitivist position as to whether or not there is or at least can be truth or moral import to a statement. Cognitive theories are distinguished by their referents. I get that these objections express the dispute between objectivism and relativism, but again suggest that they can be reduced to something like "relativism is not objectivism, therefore relativism is false" - "or "relativism refers to the wrong set of facts, therefore is false". That it is a form of psuedo realism. In command of some body of true statements, but not the proper one - and perhaps this is why we believe (or some of us believe) that morality is objective. It presents itself that way, in subtle error.
-and I want to point out, that the essay above is arguing for absolute moral facts, which is a bigger lift than bog standard realism. OFC no contingent fact will satisfy a person looking for absolutes. Most of the positions under realism wouldn't satisfy that criteria.
I am the Infantry. I am my country’s strength in war, her deterrent in peace. I am the heart of the fight… wherever, whenever. I carry America’s faith and honor against her enemies. I am the Queen of Battle. I am what my country expects me to be, the best trained Soldier in the world. In the race for victory, I am swift, determined, and courageous, armed with a fierce will to win. Never will I fail my country’s trust. Always I fight on…through the foe, to the objective, to triumph overall. If necessary, I will fight to my death. By my steadfast courage, I have won more than 200 years of freedom. I yield not to weakness, to hunger, to cowardice, to fatigue, to superior odds, For I am mentally tough, physically strong, and morally straight. I forsake not, my country, my mission, my comrades, my sacred duty. I am relentless. I am always there, now and forever. I AM THE INFANTRY! FOLLOW ME!
June 14, 2021 at 8:14 pm (This post was last modified: June 14, 2021 at 8:20 pm by HappySkeptic.)
(June 14, 2021 at 1:40 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about normative claims.
If there are absolute moral truths, then one of two things must also be true
1) There is a reason for that truth that cannot be determined by humans (i.e. God-given and God-understood only)
or
2) There is a reason for that truth that can be determined.
If 1) is true, then we simply have to accept the moral truths given by gods. If 2) is true, then we must be able to reason why the moral truth is "true". It must either be a scientific statement that can be tested, or it must follow from some higher-level values.
I have yet to find many statements of morality that can be scientifically or logically tested beyond Sam Harris' "maximal unhappiness is bad" - and that even assumes that unhappiness is bad (a value statement, linked to biology).
Moral "truths" must be inferred from human nature, and societal interaction. Human-nature comes with a wide variance, so that can only rarely used as some sort of objective argument for moral truth. Cultural interaction has some similarities among cultures, but also has a wide variance. Again, culture cannot provide objective moral truth.
Unless we defer to gods, the only things we have for judging morality is values. Sometimes we can agree on values, owing to our common nature. Sometimes we can't. Either way "common agreement" is not the same as objective morality.
June 14, 2021 at 11:49 pm (This post was last modified: June 15, 2021 at 12:09 am by The Grand Nudger.)
Well, no to one. Absolute moral facts are a contention that stands alone. There could be gods, and absolute moral facts..or no gods...and still absolute moral facts. I don't think that there are any, but finding or not finding a god would have no effect on finding or not finding such facts. If we found no gods, we could not rationally conclude, on that basis, that there were no or could be no moral absolutes.
It's unclear, btw, how god morals could amount to absolute morals. They're pretty much the opposite thing. Contingent vs non contingent facts.
I think that a more promising question or comment is not whether shared opinions amount to an objective morality, but whether or not were capable..and if, in that event, some portion, however small..of our shared moralizing..is an objective apprehension. Not absolute, perhaps, but objective.
I am the Infantry. I am my country’s strength in war, her deterrent in peace. I am the heart of the fight… wherever, whenever. I carry America’s faith and honor against her enemies. I am the Queen of Battle. I am what my country expects me to be, the best trained Soldier in the world. In the race for victory, I am swift, determined, and courageous, armed with a fierce will to win. Never will I fail my country’s trust. Always I fight on…through the foe, to the objective, to triumph overall. If necessary, I will fight to my death. By my steadfast courage, I have won more than 200 years of freedom. I yield not to weakness, to hunger, to cowardice, to fatigue, to superior odds, For I am mentally tough, physically strong, and morally straight. I forsake not, my country, my mission, my comrades, my sacred duty. I am relentless. I am always there, now and forever. I AM THE INFANTRY! FOLLOW ME!
June 15, 2021 at 9:43 pm (This post was last modified: June 15, 2021 at 11:53 pm by vulcanlogician.)
(June 14, 2021 at 9:10 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote:
(June 14, 2021 at 1:20 am)vulcanlogician Wrote: I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about whether there can be any truth value in a normative claim.
Relativism accepts this claim, as a cognitive theory. Affirmatively stating that moral utterances are statements which can be true or false, and at least some of which are true, of a given subjects societal arrangement. They could conceivably get it wrong. Mistake the disposition of their society or another's toward a given act or state of affairs, and so, be morally mistaken.
Quote:Or put better:
It's manifestly clear, even in the statement above, that eating beef carries normative import in hindu society. If we drilled a little deeper, we might find a generalizable statement that applies more broadly and beyond hindu society. Eating beef is a threat to the good order of hindu society, and threats to the good order of society are routinely taboo in moral systems.
These objections all seem to boil down to the idea that relativistic utterances carry no normative import and are in some sense fact free, but only fact free in the novel sense of the term which excludes those sets of facts the critic deems unworthy or insufficient. Facts of a society may not be facts of an act, but relativism is not objectivism.
I can't stress enough that there is no disagreement between any cognitivist position as to whether or not there is or at least can be truth or moral import to a statement. Cognitive theories are distinguished by their referents. I get that these objections express the dispute between objectivism and relativism, but again suggest that they can be reduced to something like "relativism is not objectivism, therefore relativism is false" - "or "relativism refers to the wrong set of facts, therefore is false". That it is a form of psuedo realism. In command of some body of true statements, but not the proper one - and perhaps this is why we believe (or some of us believe) that morality is objective. It presents itself that way, in subtle error.
-and I want to point out, that the essay above is arguing for absolute moral facts, which is a bigger lift than bog standard realism. OFC no contingent fact will satisfy a person looking for absolutes. Most of the positions under realism wouldn't satisfy that criteria.
He doesn't really argue for absolutism so much as say that absolutism is worth a second look. From the little I've read elsewhere of the author's work, he is very careful in his exploration of possible moral absolutes... for instance, brute statements "Punching babies is wrong." Are not worth consideration. The underlying imperative "Why is it normally wrong to punch babies?" is where the essence of the possible moral absolute may lie. (Essence is my word, not his.)
But that's beside the point. The issue here is: is it problematic to look at morality in a relativistic way? Boghossian thinks it is. He gives two examples: witches and Einstein's theory of relativity. He argues that in one case (Einstein) it makes perfect sense to look at simultinatiety from a relativistic standpoint. For witches, he implies that we all agree that an "eliminativist" standpoint is more reasonable.
But we COULD be relativists about witches, right? You and I don't think witchcraft is real, but some Baptist minister may think witchcraft is very real and something we should spend time worrying about. So perhaps witchcraft is only false in relation to our assessment of the world? According to the Baptist minister (and maybe his "church culture") witchcraft is real. But the problem here is: being a relativist about witchcraft is NOT a theory about witchcraft. It's a theory about beliefs. Moral relativism has the same problem.
What I'd be more apt to do with the case of Hinduism and eating beef is say, "What is wrong (generally) with eating beef?" What reasoning do the Hindus give for such a prohibition? Is it because it offends some god? In that case the existence of such a god and whether we'd choose to obey such an entity weigh heavily on whether it is reasonable to consider the Hindus' prohibition.
But what if the reasoning given by some Hindus is, "The cow is a conscious being and killing it or exploiting it creates needless suffering.".... ? In that case, we'd want to examine whether creating needless suffering in a cow is wrong. Or if it even CAN BE wrong. In any case, what the Hindus believe about the matter does not relate to what really is (or isn't) the case.
Long story short, I don't want to die on this hill. But I DO think the author's criticism of relativism makes sense. There either ARE moral facts or there aren't. What cultures (or people) believe doesn't relate to the reality of moral facts one way or another.
Moral relativism sounds appealing because buried in it is the notion that "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view."
Let me repeat that: "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view." The irony is: that's a realist statement. Many cultures the world over do not believe such a thing. But if such a thing is true, then the opinion of any culture isn't going to change that.
THAT is where I'm coming from. Maybe "incoherent" is too strong a word, but that is my main issue with relativism, and I think it's reasonable to have this issue with it. Realist and nihilistic claims BOTH say something tangible about the possible existence of moral facts. Relativism does not.
(June 14, 2021 at 8:14 pm)HappySkeptic Wrote: If there are absolute moral truths, then one of two things must also be true
1) There is a reason for that truth that cannot be determined by humans (i.e. God-given and God-understood only)
or
2) There is a reason for that truth that can be determined.
I'll take option 2 all day. Accepting option 1 gives you the choice to either obey or not obey. It says nothing about what is actually right or wrong. So, to me, it has nothing to do with ethics. Even if it were the case that only God could comprehend moral truth, I'd have no way of knowing that. For all I know, I'd be blindly obeying a malevolent god because (if 1 is true) I have no access to moral facts.
Anyway Plato (or maybe even Socrates himself) produced an argument that put this matter to rest centuries ago. We can't "get" morality from the dictates of a divine being, even if such a being were to exist. The fact that such a being does NOT exist is merely the final nail in the coffin.
For anyone who prefers to sit back and listen to Boghossian's arguments in lecture form, here is a YouTube video. (It says basically the same things as he does in the article I posted earlier.)
June 15, 2021 at 11:38 pm (This post was last modified: June 15, 2021 at 11:40 pm by The Grand Nudger.)
(June 15, 2021 at 9:43 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: Moral relativism sounds appealing because buried in it is the notion that "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view."
Let me repeat that: "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view." The irony is: that's a realist statement. Many cultures the world over do not believe such a thing. But if such a thing is true, then the opinion of any culture isn't going to change that.
THAT is where I'm coming from. Maybe "incoherent" is too strong a word, but that is my main issue with relativism, and I think it's reasonable to have this issue with it. Realist and nihilistic claims BOTH say something tangible about the possible existence of moral facts. Relativism does not.
A cultural relativist can make any criticism of any moral system that a realist might, and, like a realist, believe that a person can be morally incorrect. Relativism is a position on the referent of those facts, just as any other moral position. That being said, suppose we found a relativist who gave us that advice. It's good advice, isn't it? To be mindful of the judgements we make. A realist would have the same problems with a judgement specifically dependent on an individual pov that a cultural relativist would. Relativists and realists agree, together, that subjectivism is wrong.
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