(April 23, 2014 at 5:43 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: And for Hume the knowing subject itself can NOT be deconstructed into descrite parts, I.e. personal identity is also induced.

Assuming you meant to say "not" as I bolded ..

.. that's not a problem. That's just a fact.

At one time it was things like lightening, volcanos, rain, tides, etc. I find it rather telling that theists now have to go all the way back to first cause.

(April 23, 2014 at 10:21 pm)Godlesspanther Wrote: At one time it was things like lightening, volcanos, rain, tides, etc. I find it rather telling that theists now have to go all the way back to first cause.

To be fair to the OP, St Thomas was writing about the first cause in the thirteenth century. The concept of first cause (or prime mover as Aquinas called it) has been conflated into the more recent debate about the origins of the Universe by the latest pernicious breed of creationists in an attempt to give their argument more weight. It hasn't worked.

I can only assume they feel unloved by their god and are filling the void by choking-up all corners of the web with badly researched, poorly understood pseudoscience in an attempt to get his attention.

MM

(April 23, 2014 at 10:21 pm)Godlesspanther Wrote: At one time it was things like lightening, volcanos, rain, tides, etc. I find it rather telling that theists now have to go all the way back to first cause.

Which always seems to be explained by insisting that the law of causality explains the necessity for an arbitrary special exception to the law of causality.

(April 23, 2014 at 5:43 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: If causation becomes a matter of pure induction then a knowing subject is needed to recognize the pattern.

Not according to Deleuze who claims 'experience exceeds our concepts by presenting novelty, and this raw experience of difference actualises an idea.'

Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism' (his own words) would seem to suggest an alternative to the Kantian philosophy of transcendental idealism which relies on a 'knowing subject'.

MM

(April 23, 2014 at 9:35 pm)whateverist Wrote:

(April 23, 2014 at 5:43 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: And for Hume the knowing subject itself can NOT be deconstructed into descrite parts, I.e. personal identity is also induced.

Assuming you meant to say "not" as I bolded ..

.. that's not a problem. That's just a fact.

I don't mind you editing my posts so long as you try to be more clear about having done so. My understanding is that Hume denies that personal identity has any essential aspect. He views it as a collection of experiences without any binding principle i.e. self is an illusion.

(April 24, 2014 at 9:28 am)ChadWooters Wrote:

(April 23, 2014 at 9:35 pm)whateverist Wrote: Assuming you meant to say "not" as I inserted and bolded ..

.. that's not a problem. That's just a fact.

I don't mind you editing my posts so long as you try to be more clear about having done so. My understanding is that Hume denies that personal identity has any essential aspect. He views it as a collection of experiences without any binding principle i.e. self is an illusion.

Oops, sorry about that. The above would have been better.

Well then I wouldn't be able to agree with Hume entirely. We don't have ready the language and conventions for making all the points that need to be made here. I was responding to what I assumed was a point regarding the primacy of the conscious mind. IMO our autonomy and conscious control are contingent on something we are that is more than that and which is not up to us to decide consciously. Perhaps identity does have essential aspects but we're never -or at least rarely- in a position consciously to be entirely certain what they are.