Mind is the brain?

[Mystic]

So let's consider what conclusion should be reached, using the OP's linked argument. We have brains, and all of the evidence available suggests an inextricable correlation between them. No evidence at all exists that suggests that the mind is separate from the brain, can exist without a brain, or is in any way supernatural, and in many cases the available evidence directly contradicts these claims.

Let us also accept that yes, correlation does not uniformly map to identity. While this is true, it also fails to take into account the state of the evidence at our disposal: given what we know about the brain and minds, would it be rational to throw all that away because it's possible (yet unevidenced) that it's only a correlation and not a case of the two being identical? Should we reverse the burden of proof and say that because we haven't proven that possibility wrong, it's anywhere near as valid as the other conclusion, that fits with all the evidence? Should we conclude that the two are separate, at all?

The answer, on all counts, is no. We must follow where the evidence leads, not ignore the evidence because it's not yet complete and perfect.

The author wasn't arguing that we should accept dualism. He wasn't arguing even that materialism shouldn't believed in. He was simply saying the arguments against dualism are all fallacious and baseless.

As I said, he is an Atheist, and he use to rely on some of the fallacious arguments.

[bennyboy]

*Someone called my name?*

The problem for a material monism is this: it completely disregards, and has no capacity for discussing or explaining, qualia. Qualia are the "what it's like" of experience-- what it's like to taste pineapple, for example, cannot be explained by any observations outside the direct experience of tasting pineapple.

When we talk about mind, 99% of people are talking about what it's like to think and feel. Materialists are more likely to frame this in terms of information input, processing and output, and will define mind without regard to what it's like to think and feel. The reason for this is obvious: we cannot see qualia, touch them, measure them, or even demonstrate that they exist. In fact, I can only assume that other sentient beings exist at all-- I cannot really know whether my wife experiences qualia.

In other words, all so-called "evidence" depends on assumptions which beg the question. First, that what seems to be must be: my desk seems to be solid, so it must be. However, the current state of science is NOT, in fact, consistent with that idea. Science itself demonstrates that there is a massive disconnect between how we experience things and what they "really" are. In other words, we have evidence that evidence is unreliable in establishing an accurate view of reality.

It's fine to shout (literally, in little_monkey's case) that mind is the functioning of the brain. However, I'd like to see any method for establishing whether any physical system does or does not experience qualia. Does a robot, for example, know "what it's like" to encounter an orange cone? What, EXACTLY, is it about the brain that makes it capable of experiencing qualia? Other than the assumption that things basically are what they seem (which is obviously busted thanks to Science), what reason do I have to think that ANY physical system, including people's brains, experience qualia?

And if I can't even establish that others even HAVE minds, then what, exactly, is all the evidence about? Nothing real-- just philosophical assumptions.

[Chas]

*Someone called my name?*

The problem for a material monism is this: it completely disregards, and has no capacity for discussing or explaining, qualia.  Qualia are the "what it's like" of experience-- what it's like to taste pineapple, for example, cannot be explained by any observations outside the direct experience of tasting pineapple.

When we talk about mind, 99% of people are talking about what it's like to think and feel.  Materialists are more likely to frame this in terms of information input, processing and output, and will define mind without regard to what it's like to think and feel.  The reason for this is obvious: we cannot see qualia, touch them, measure them, or even demonstrate that they exist.  In fact, I can only assume that other sentient beings exist at all-- I cannot really know whether my wife experiences qualia.

In other words, all so-called "evidence" depends on assumptions which beg the question.  First, that what seems to be must be: my desk seems to be solid, so it must be.  However, the current state of science is NOT, in fact, consistent with that idea.  Science itself demonstrates that there is a massive disconnect between how we experience things and what they "really" are.  In other words, we have evidence that evidence is unreliable in establishing an accurate view of reality.

It's fine to shout (literally, in little_monkey's case) that mind is the functioning of the brain.  However, I'd like to see any method for establishing whether any physical system does or does not experience qualia.  Does a robot, for example, know "what it's like" to encounter an orange cone?  What, EXACTLY, is it about the brain that makes it capable of experiencing qualia?  Other than the assumption that things basically are what they seem (which is obviously busted thanks to Science), what reason do I have to think that ANY physical system, including people's brains, experience qualia?

And if I can't even establish that others even HAVE minds, then what, exactly, is all the evidence about?  Nothing real-- just philosophical assumptions.

'Qualia' is not a coherently defined concept.  Why is the experience not simply the sum of the inputs?

[bennyboy]

'Qualia' is not a coherently defined concept.  Why is the experience not simply the sum of the inputs?

I'm not sure what's incoherent about the definition of qualia: it's what it's like to experience things.

And what do you mean by inputs? A rock "inputs" light in the sense that rock molecules can absorb photons, and "inputs" sound in the sense that vibrations in air cause vibrations in the rock, but I do not really believe that a rock experiences Led Zeppelin in any meaningful way. I'm pretty sure your view of mind is more complex than that.

Let's say that I "input" light and sound information into a robot. Can you, then, explain to me what it's like for that robot to experience the information? Would it experience cocoa as I do?

[Chas]

'Qualia' is not a coherently defined concept.  Why is the experience not simply the sum of the inputs?

I'm not sure what's incoherent about the definition of qualia: it's what it's like to experience things.

And what do you mean by inputs?  A rock "inputs" light in the sense that rock molecules can absorb photons, and "inputs" sound in the sense that vibrations in air cause vibrations in the rock, but I do not really believe that a rock experiences Led Zeppelin in any meaningful way.  I'm pretty sure your view of mind is more complex than that.

Let's say that I "input" light and sound information into a robot.  Can you, then, explain to me what it's like for that robot to experience the information?  Would it experience cocoa as I do?

Rocks are not conscious, that's a silly analogy.

The inputs to the mind are the physical ones that we are conscious of and our perception of our reaction to those.
That is what the experience is, that is what it is 'like'.

Other people don't even experience cocoa the same as you.  None of us have had identical experiences so that our reactions to things can't be identical.
Might my experience of cocoa be similar to yours? Sure, we are both humans.

If you use "the internal and subjective component of sense perceptions, arising from stimulation of the senses by phenomena" as your definition of qualia, what is in need of explanation?

[Angrboda]

tl;dr The correlation not identity problem applies throughout science. Applying it only to consciousness studies as if it were unique is dishonest. We don't think this way in the rest of science. Arguing that we should here is special pleading.

[robvalue]

Minds have never been shown to exist without brains. This is evidence (not proof, science doesn't deal with proof) that minds require a brain. As soon as someone finds a mind without a brain, we will have a reason to reconsider.

All evidence is observational, and conclusions can change based on new evidence. Every time I drop a ball, it falls down. It is reasonable to conclude, based on this evidence, that (at least in my local area) this will continue to be the case. I can never know for sure that it will actually continue to be the case.

All we can do is model as best we can. Maybe somewhere out there, in our reality or otherwise, gravity doesn't apply. Maybe out there somewhere, there are minds without brains. But until we have any evidence to suggest that this is actually the case, it is not logical or useful to jump to that conclusion.

Science keeps all possibilities open, it does not make statements of certainty. So demanding science (or scientists) to admit to not being certain is asking for what you already have.

[ErGingerbreadMandude]

WTF is this shit. There is no such thing as mind. There is no evidence for what they call mind. I don't have a mind. If I damage my brain it doesn't damage my mind, it damages my brain.

[IATIA]

So you lost your mind?

[bennyboy]

If you use "the internal and subjective component of sense perceptions, arising from stimulation of the senses by phenomena" as your definition of qualia, what is in need of explanation?

Well, first of all, ideas do not meet that definition. Second, this is like saying God is "whatever made the universe able to exist:" it means nothing. Third, qualia are what it's like to experience something-- the mechanism of experience is irrelevant to the meaning of the word.