If free will was not real

[Edwardo Piet]

Still free will thread besties, right?  

No way Rhythm! Get your own phenomelogically sexy free will thread bestie! She's mine!

[The Grand Nudger]

I think I can sum it up:

The experience of making a decision.

What we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't have.

Decision made by a mentally healthy agent free from coercion/duress.

Neural process unfolding in the frontal lobes.

I wouldn't say that my requirements haven't alter, but I have refined them in light of your input, and that's to your credit. I really am not meaning to shift goalposts--just to get better at making my case for compatibilism.

The existence of the experience is not informative as regards any freedom.  A ll other things being equal...we would experience decision making even if it were not free..and we do experience decision making regardless of whether or not it is free.

What we have that people with frontal lobe damage don;t have is an undamagd frontal lobe.  Again, a human will, but what is free about it, by reference to that?

Your e are filled with coercion/duress/compulsion -even when "mentally healthy" - at a fundamental level this is how we conceptualize the brains very -operation-.  It has to respond a particular way to chemical x y or z..and this is -why- chemical x y or z is useful for creating brain function.  If it could go any old way, it's hard to see how it might work.  It;s not just the addicts, the junkies, the ill, or the disordered that have to toil under this burden.

Hey now...that's my ass you're holding a chunk of...bring it up 6 inches.   

You're quite right that it's not an reference to causal freedom, because I don't believe we have that kind of freedom. I'm noting that the kind of causal process that mentally healthy humans engage in is qualitatively different from that of a thermostat. Whether thermostats are causally constrained or not is irrelevant. They don't have a will, so a fortiori they don't have free will, compatibilist or otherwise.

You're asserting that they are...and by reference to -quantitative, not qualitative, objections.  The nest thermostat makes decisions, free from duress or coercion in every way that you have described yourself as being free from duress or coercion (and importantly, in many ways that you cannot even remotely lay claim to).  Why does it not have a will...and are you sure that your own will isn't qualitatively (rather than quantitatively) similar to what the nest thermostat is doing....because that's a current working hypothesis of mind...btw.  

I'm actually just noting that the irresistable urge of the heroin addict is, per the dictionary definition, not duress, but compulsion.

The urge is ultimately produced by neural peptides and synaptic impulse..which themselves exert a force and indeed are..so far as we can tell...your -actual- decisions...and do so even in the case of a healthy or "normal" brain.  

As it pertains to my argument, the causal processes that constitute my will do not in any way compel or force my will, in the way that a coercive agent or an extreme physical addiction does. My point is that "causally determined" is not synonymous with duress, coercion, or force.

Except that they do.  It's your own process that's being subverted in addiction.  The substance itself isn't creating anything qualitatively new or novel in you, it's the manner in which you normally operate that provides the very pathway for how addiction plays out.  Your "non-addictions" are running those same processes.  They are compelling you, forcing your will..in exactly the same -way-...just to a disparate effect.  You seek out happiness and cake for the same reasons and in the same way that the addict seeks out heroin.  In his case, you probably consider that an abrogation of free will as you define it...but in your case...you don;t.  You aren't describing a free will..even in your own context, your describing a will that is seeking out a substance other than heroin and is percieved, by you, to be "normal".  A normal will.  

Then don't we need a vocabulary to use when we do what we do based on the legal definition of autonomy? What's wrong with the vocabulary already in place?

Other than the nagging suspicion and, indeed, mounting body of evidence that it is based on folklore...which we then reference to -execute- people pursuant to...gee, idk, you tell me.  

I, for one, would like to live in a world where...should I find myself in front of a firing squad...the charges read won't amount to being convicted of witchcraft.

[Gemini]

It certainly could mean that... that's the sense Dan Dennett uses...

Oh, I'm a total Dan Dennnett fangirl. Except for the appeal to consequences in his arguments for compatibilism.

And brights. Not really on board with calling myself a "bright."

Yummy. That works. It was sexy. It reminds me of me but I think you're more intelligent than I. Which again, feels good in my balls.

That's why I love arguing about free will with you, Hammy. It's so...stimulating

Rawr! You said monads! Gottfried would be proud.

You called him Gottfried... I am hungry for your mind.

This is the most interesting thing you've said to me because this not only further confirms to me that our disagreement is indeed nothing but semantics and a different approach... but we both feel the same way about the damage that the incorrect belief of free will that most people believe in does.

Our approach is different, you take the Dennett approach: "Free will is real but it just isn't what you think it is." Since I take the approach "Free will isn't real but you don''t need free will and you don't have to lapse into fatalism. There is no reason to do that. You have free agency. You are a free agent with normal human willpower and although you are not philosophically responsible for your actions you ought to hold yourself to be a responsible human adult and discarding free will will give you a greater understanding of yourself (and your self) and paradoxically give you more freedom therefore."

The risk for me is that I find even after I have defined compatabilist free will to someone they still very easily start thinking that although they have free will in a deterministic world because compatabilist free will is completely different -- they very easily also start thinking and behaving as if this freedom extends to the illogical contra-causal sense of 'could have done otherwise' provided their will is not under coeertion. People conflate definitions all the time and this is a problem I think. Rather than separate out different definitions and analyse them people are generally more intuitive than myself but less analytical (generally) so in my experience most people are master equivocators. Rather than analysing different senses of a concept they synthesise them. They have strong common sense but they lapse into equivocation.

You know...I'm considering changing my mind about compatibilism in light of your post. Ours really is a semantic difference, and my primary concern has been that people tend to conflate determinism with fatalism. And that's a problem, but is it worse than believing in contra-causal free will? If compatibilism denies both, then it's strictly better than determinism, but as you point out, people are going to conflate compatibilism with libertarianism. I've got to think about this...

[Gemini]

Because that's the legal definition of coercion--it's just stipulated as being made by an agent.

If you define all deterministic causal processes as agents, then we need a new word to describe organisms that interact with their environments via complex information processing systems, with the ability to prevision the outcomes of multiple different courses of action and select between them based on which outcome best supports the values within their motivational framework.

Isn't organisms that interact with their environments via complex information processing systems, with the ability to prevision the outcomes of multiple different courses of action and select between them based on which outcome best supports the values within their motivational framework merely the result of neurons interacting? Aren't neurons made of particles and aren't particles causal? Doesn't that make every single thought, decision, movement, every complex evaluation (you get the point) already determined? It isn't free if it's already determined. You can dream and think of all kinds of capabilities and "possibilities" but only one of them will happen and the one that happens was bound to happen, it isn't free in that case. That's what they call the illusion of free will. And don't tell me it's trivial, whether it's trivial or not, it's true. And it isn't trivial.

Compatibilists have no problem with the determinism you describe. The way Sean Carroll puts it is that the fundamental laws of physics don't have anything to say about baseball. Yet baseball is real. Free will is real in the same way. Not fundamental, and not real as a physical/metaphysical thesis, but real as a social/legal/cultural construct.

[The Grand Nudger]

That;s a strange way to put it...since the fundamental laws of physics have -everything- to do with and say about baseball.  There;s a reason, for example, that the ball travels on it;s particular trajectory.  That it reacts the way it does when it comes into contact with the bat. Physics, in both cases, being that reason. No fundamental laws of physics, no baseball..nothing to talk -about-.

this, though...

but real as a social/legal/cultural construct.

-totally onboard there. Hell, I even throw shit like god into that category.

[Edwardo Piet]

Oh, I'm a total Dan Dennnett fangirl. Except for the appeal to consequences in his arguments for compatibilism.

What appeal to consequence argument is that? I'd love to hear about it!

And brights. Not really on board with calling myself a "bright."

Yeah that makes my balls cringe. I don't like it when they cringe.

That's why I love arguing about free will with you, Hammy. It's so...stimulating

I also enjoy it. It's a yummy argument.

You called him Gottfried... I am hungry for your mind.

Please feast on it. I certainly enjoy feasting on yours. It's only fair to share.

You know...I'm considering changing my mind about compatibilism in light of your post.

The fact you allow me to influence your sexy brain makes me feel powerful. I like feeling powerful.

Ours really is a semantic difference, and my primary concern has been that people tend to conflate determinism with fatalism. And that's a problem, but is it worse than believing in contra-causal free will?

Those are my exact two concerns too! I feel like explaining the difference between fatalism and not having free will is easier. I try to explain how our intentions are part of the causal stream, that we are part of the universe and just because I don't believe in free will doesn't mean I can just sit around and let life happen. I still have to be motivated to get things done.

If compatibilism denies both, then it's strictly better than determinism, but as you point out, people are going to conflate compatibilism with libertarianism. I've got to think about this...

I make you think? But you're so smart! That makes me feel good

I agree with Dan Dennett that compatabilist free will is a version of free will worth wanting... but most people don't just want that. They want contra-causal free will. They know when people are coerced they don't have absolute omnipotent magical free will, but they like to believe that they do have absolute magical freedom when they are not cooerced. They may indeed have a identity crisis or even go into a depression when they learn they are not as free as they think they are: but the truth sometimes does hurt but they should still face it.

They do not however need to despair completely or resign themselves to fatalism.

[Edwardo Piet]

That;s a strange way to put it...since the fundamental laws of physics have -everything- to do with and say about baseball.  There;s a reason, for example, that the ball travels on it;s particular trajectory.  That it reacts the way it does when it comes into contact with the bat.  Physics, in both cases, being that reason.  No fundamental laws of physics, no baseball..nothing to talk -about-.

But the game itself is not the mere movements of the ball or players or baseball bat because a game is a set of rules that meet a certain definition that constitute a 'game'.

[Gemini]

The existence of the experience is not informative as regards any freedom.

Agreed.

A ll other things being equal...we would experience decision making even if it were not free..and we do experience decision making regardless of whether or not it is free.

Agreed.

What we have that people with frontal lobe damage don;t have is an undamagd frontal lobe.  Again, a human will, but what is free about it, by reference to that?

Nothing is free about it in the sense of being indeterministic. It's free in the legal/social sense.

Your e are filled with coercion/duress/compulsion -even when "mentally healthy"

Again, you're using coercion/duress/compulsion to mean "constraint," as in the causal constraints of determinism.

Hey now...that's my ass you're holding a chunk of...bring it up 6 inches.   

LOL I'm in danger of making a turtle jealous!

You're asserting that they are...and by reference to -quantitative, not qualitative, objections.  The nest thermostat makes decisions, free from duress or coercion in every way that you have described yourself as being free from duress or coercion (and importantly, in many ways that you cannot even remotely lay claim to).  Why does it not have a will...and are you sure that your own will isn't qualitatively (rather than quantitatively) similar to what the nest thermostat is doing....because that's a current working hypothesis of mind...btw.  

Alright, you asked for it.

*grabs nest thermometer and stomps on it*



According to you, I just destroyed a moral agent! Try and prosecute me for it. Just try.

The urge is ultimately produced by neural peptides and synaptic impulse..which themselves exert a force and indeed are..so far as we can tell...your -actual- decisions...and do so even in the case of a healthy or "normal" brain.  

Health is notoriously difficult to define. At the end of the day I'd say it's a Wittgensteinian family resemblance concept, so I think I'm just going to go with definition of mental health given by professionals in the field, and let you wallow in the weeds of causal philosophizing.

Other than the nagging suspicion and, indeed, mounting body of evidence that it is based on folklore...which we then reference to -execute- people pursuant to...gee, idk, you tell me.  

I, for one, would like to live in a world where...should I find myself in front of a firing squad...the charges read won't amount to being convicted of witchcraft.  

I hope you'll agree that I don't believe the folklore. But you might be right. It might be best to leave "free will" in the dust of history. Gonna go agonize about that for a while

[RozKek]

Isn't organisms that interact with their environments via complex information processing systems, with the ability to prevision the outcomes of multiple different courses of action and select between them based on which outcome best supports the values within their motivational framework merely the result of neurons interacting? Aren't neurons made of particles and aren't particles causal? Doesn't that make every single thought, decision, movement, every complex evaluation (you get the point) already determined? It isn't free if it's already determined. You can dream and think of all kinds of capabilities and "possibilities" but only one of them will happen and the one that happens was bound to happen, it isn't free in that case. That's what they call the illusion of free will. And don't tell me it's trivial, whether it's trivial or not, it's true. And it isn't trivial.

Compatibilists have no problem with the determinism you describe. The way Sean Carroll puts it is that the fundamental laws of physics don't have anything to say about baseball. Yet baseball is real. Free will is real in the same way. Not fundamental, and not real as a physical/metaphysical thesis, but real as a social/legal/cultural construct.

Compatibilists have no good reason to exclude determinism, they just do it so they can keep their precious free will. The baseball example makes no sense. Baseball itself isn't something unique or something that exists on its own. Baseball is just a word used to describe a particular game/set of actions that make up the game.

[The Grand Nudger]

Now we're just talking about law....but I had hoped that we were actually trying to describe a property of human beings...an ability that we had...and not just a useful legal framework for prosecuting undesirables.
-sadface-


That's not, btw, compatibilism...........it's legal pragmatism.

(when the machines take over...just know that you're going to be on a short list of early executions....poor thermostat. BTW, "according to me" a nest thermostat is not a moral agent...according to me..it meets your criteria for having a free will - as you describe it. It's not my fault that your ridiculous semantic game forces -you- to that conclusion, if your metrics are consistently and objectively applied. )