Consciousness Trilemma

[Angrboda]

More philosobabble that doesn't mean anything.  Ontologically subjective?  Wtf does that even mean?

You don't know what ontologically subjective means? How is that my problem?

Ontological subjectivity

Searle has argued[48] that critics like Daniel Dennett, who (he claims) insist that discussing subjectivity is unscientific because science presupposes objectivity, are making a category error. Perhaps the goal of science is to establish and validate statements which are epistemically objective, (i.e., whose truth can be discovered and evaluated by any interested party), but are not necessarily ontologically objective.

Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective. Thus, "McKinley is prettier than Everest" is "epistemically subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective." In other words, the latter statement is evaluable (in fact, falsifiable) by an understood ('background') criterion for mountain height, like 'the summit is so many meters above sea level'. No such criteria exist for prettiness.

Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena (including all conscious experiences) that are ontologically subjective, i.e. can only exist as subjective experience. For example, although it might be subjective or objective in the epistemic sense, a doctor's note that a patient suffers from back pain is an ontologically objective claim: it counts as a medical diagnosis only because the existence of back pain is "an objective fact of medical science".[49] But the pain itself is ontologically subjective: it is only experienced by the person having it.

Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality".[50] His view that the epistemic and ontological senses of objective/subjective are cleanly separable is crucial to his self-proclaimed biological naturalism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle

So it's a nonsensical neologism coined by John Searle.  Try thinking about shit for a change instead of blindly regurgitating bullshit.  It isn't a sensible definition because it endorses the conclusion that ontologically subjective phenomena are not also ontologically objective.  In other words, it's nothing more than the mysterians' claim that consciousness has no third hand objective description.  That's begging the question on Searle's part and being stupid about philosophy on your part.

Well, ignoring the straw man for the moment, you've yet to give any reason why this might be so.  When you step beyond your empty predicates, it turns out you're not saying anything at all about consciousness and its character.

I don't have to say anything about consciousness to know that I am experiencing something. I have direct first person awareness of my own subjective experience. I can be completely wrong about what I am experiencing but I can't be wrong about the fact that I am experiencing.

And the reason you can't be wrong is what?  Stop bleating and start backing up some of these statements.  

Completely ignoring all my arguments about how it makes zero sense to say that consciousness itself is an illusion regardless of the fact that what we are conscious of may not be what we think we are conscious of. Once again, the fact that we are conscious is not an illusion even if what we are conscious of is not what we think we are conscious of.

Being conscious of something else is still really being conscious of something. Even being conscious of an illusion is really being conscious ofa n illusion.

And the misrepresentations just keep on coming.  You have presented no argument.  You've claimed consciousness itself, not the thing in its intentionality, cannot be an illusion.  But your entire argument is nothing more than bare assertion and an appeal to incredulity.  You can't imagine how consciousness itself could be an illusion.  I get that.  That fact in and of itself is not an argument.  

Searle did no such thing, he merely unveiled his prejudice against third hand knowledge of subjective experiencing.

He is the one making a distinction between first and third hand knowledge whereas Dennett acts as if first hand experience isn't real and that all that matters is third person knowledge.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.  The point that Dennett makes in the video is telling in that regard.  Consciousness must take both time and space inside the brain to develop.  It makes no sense to talk of a 'now' in which you are experiencing something.  There is no imaginary finish line in the brain where things pass from being perceived to being phenomenologically experienced.  Consciousness is spread out in space and time in the brain.  That spreading out matters.  Therefore any naive supposition that consciousness is 'experiencing' the moment must be an illusion.  You can bleat all you want about how it's not an illusion, but unless you're advocating something other than a material basis for consciousness, you are wrong.

Far from the subject being too subtle for me: no wonder you don't understand the category error in question if you ask me what ontologically subjective "even means". That's the category error I'm addressing and you are insiting Searle is wrong when you don't even know what it means? Talk about the argument from ignorance, Jor. It's got your name on it right now.

Don't ask me what something "even means" and yet at the same time tell me it's not a category error. Is it not an error to you because you don't understand it?

Basing your position on absurd neologisms isn't helping your case any.  Searle has buried his real objection in nonsensical terminology, and you fall for it hook, line, and sinker.

This is unsubstantiated nonsense.  We've already discussed ways in which it appears that cannot be the way in which it is.

You're asking for a third-person substantiation of first-person expereince. So it's your position that's nonsense. This is the category error I'm talking about.

The reality of subjective experience doesn't need to be and cannot be substantiated objectively. That's the whole point. You're not going to substantiate it by addressing something else and giving it the same label.

Cannot be substantiated objectively?  Your claim is nothing but a claim.  Like I said, unsubstantiated.

No we haven't discussed ways in which the reality that we expereince things is an illusion. We have only discussed ways in which the reality of what things we experience can be an illusion in the sense that we can be experiencing other things. You prove my point here:

It would mean that the model by which the brain represents its own process to itself is accurate.  Since it isn't and cannot be, then the 'what' of conscious experience is an illusion.  It's that simple.

This is what I have been saying all along. The WHAT is an illusion but not the THAT.

You're playing word games.  The what referred back to "the model by which the brain represents its own process to itself."  That is the that of consciousness.

You're seriously misrepresenting what Dennett was saying.  I watched until the 30 minute mark, and he hadn't yet finished the point he started making at 13:13.  You took an isolated segment out of a longer explanation and declared your misquote as his meaning.  You're being unfair to Dennett and terribly dishonest.  If that is what you think he said, in context, I can only conclude that you're incompetent to interpret anything Dennett says.

This is very pathetic of you. Once again you just tell me I need to watch more and I don't understand rather than bother to explain anything like I have. I've watched that whole talk and you merely assert that I do not understand it.

You misquoted him as supporting Quining the problem when that clearly wasn't what he was supporting.  Your continued dishonesty is what's pathetic.

Either you intentionally misquoted him, or you simply misunderstood him.  Either way, that's on you, asshole.

That isn't even close to conflating the two, as he's talking about different levels of description of the experience.  The red stripe does not in fact exist in the world at large.

Wrong he said it doesn't exist in your brain either. Obviously the illusion of the red stripe exists in the form of neurons.

I was mistaken,  Your confusion began earlier than the 13:13 mark which you directed me towards.

This is all in the context of responding to the anti-reductionist argument based upon Liebniz' law.  There is nothing in the brain that is literally a red stripe.  He makes clear the literal nature of the comparison by talking about striations in the brain, etc.  He isn't saying that the red stripe does not exist as a representation of a red stripe in the brain, but that it does not literally occur there.  I think you've misunderstood the point he was trying to make there and its limited applicability.  The line on the slide says, "If A is a red stripe, and nothing in the brain is a red stripe, then nothing in the brain is identical to A."  That's as far as that particular point goes.  You've mushed together quining and a limited response to the Liebniz'ian argument until they're the same thing in your mind.  He goes on to state the materialist's response that, "it only seems to you that there is a red stripe that you are experiencing."  No conflation, just your misunderstanding a classic argument in the literature for something that Dennett was advancing.

You don't even know what "ontological subjectivity" means and yet you still claim Dennett isn't making an error you don't even understand.

That's because ontologically subjective doesn't mean anything.  It's a stand-in for Searle's assertions about consciousness.

If you can't grasp modal logic and the absoluteness of the logical absolutes being true in all universes, and you can't grasp the fact that the real/illusory distinction between real appearances and illusory appearances can't be applied to subjective appearance itself...

There's that assertion again that experience can't be illusory.  Shame you've got nothing to back it with.

[Edwardo Piet]

So it's a nonsensical neologism coined by John Searle.

No it's not. The fact you don't understand what "ontologically subjective" means and I give you John Searle's explanation of it doesn't mean he "coined it".

Obviously ontological subjectivity isn't defined as one separate term. Each of those words mean things seperately and make sense put together. You don't need Searle for that. I used his explanation because he explains it well and instead you just pretend he "coined it" and ignore what ontological subjectivity obviously is.

Ontology is about being. About entities, about something that exists. Something that exists either has subjectivity or it doesn't. Its ontology is either subjective or it isn't. It either has conscousness or it doesn't. Obviously the ontology of consciousness is subjective. What is your problem with things that are just true by definition? Next you'll be asking me to prove that consciousness is subjective. You literally repeatedly do the equivalent of asking me to prove that all squares have four sides.

Try thinking about shit for a change instead of blindly regurgitating bullshit.

Try understanding that words fucking mean things.

 It isn't a sensible definition because it endorses the conclusion that ontologically subjective phenomena are not also ontologically objective.

No it doesn't. Nowhere does he say that something can't both be ontologically objective and subjective.

All ontology is objective but some of it is also subjective. There are conscious objects and unconscious objects. Consciousness is by definition a conscious object. It has subjective ontology. It's ontologically subjective.

In other words, it's nothing more than the mysterians' claim that consciousness has no third hand objective description.  That's begging the question on Searle's part and being stupid about philosophy on your part.

No this is your own misrepresentation. Nowhere does Searle say that something can't  both be ontologically objective and ontologically subjective. And if he did say that, he'd be wrong.

And the reason you can't be wrong is what?  Stop bleating and start backing up some of these statements.

I can't be wrong because I'm stating tautologies or following logical lines with premises that are tautologically true.

You are asking me to prove something true by definition is true. Like I said you may as well ask me to prove that all squares have four sides.

And the misrepresentations just keep on coming.  You have presented no argument.  You've claimed consciousness itself, not the thing in its intentionality, cannot be an illusion.

I have repeatedly explained why that position is tautologically true. Let me spell it out for you again. For something to be illusory it has to be the case that something is not what it appears to be. But consciousness is by definition subjective appearance to the self. Consciousness is what something seems to be to someone, so that itself cannot be an illusion. You can't say that the reality of the appearance of something to someone isn't what it is when what it is is the appearance of something to someone. You're literally arguing that illusions themselves aren't really experienced which makes the illusion itself an illusion of an illusion and thereby not really an illusion. If you're telling me that something isn't really not real you're telling me it's real. A double negative equates to a positive.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

I don't think you understand what I am saying. I have tried to explain it many times... I am not saying that the first hand experiences aren't mistaken about external reality, and I am not saying that they aren't mistaken about the nature of internal subjective reality either... I'm saying that that however our experiences really seem to be that's how they really seem to be. Do you spot the tautology yet?! Saying that they don't really seem how they really seem and that what you really seem to be conscious of is not what you really seem to be conscious of is just akin to saying that a square doesn't really have four sides.
........................

 

The point that Dennett makes in the video is telling in that regard.  Consciousness must take both time and space inside the brain to develop.  It makes no sense to talk of a 'now' in which you are experiencing something.

It doesn't matter what the mechanics or the structure of it is. See above. I'm merely being a realist about the fact that however consciousnes does appear to be that is how it appears to be. And however it seems to us that is indeed how it seems to us. We can't be mistaken about however it appears to us, we can only be mistaken about our memories of how it did appear, or our expectation about how it will appear or other details like that. If consciousness is however things appear to us then it is however things appear to us.

Yes I agree that consciousness takes both time and space to develop. But all that exists in the present is now. Once again that's something else true by definition that you will have a problem with (do you have a problem with the notion of squares having four sides too?)... the fact that consciousness takes time and space to develop doesn't address the fact that consciousness is happening now. We are experiencing it now. You may think it's absurd to speak of consciousness 'now' but it's just as absurd to speak of it existing in the future or past but not in the present. Obviously consciousness takes many steps to develop but each step is very real and can be divided into smaller steps. Every pulsing moment is relevant. Consciousness is happening now. It will happen in the future and it has happened in the past. This is all true by definition provided that you assume that consciousness isn't going to disappear forever everywhere in the future and that the fact it existed in the past is not merely a false memory. But even if the past is all false memories and never happened, and even if the future never arrives... one thing we do know is that consciousness is happening now. And now. And now. In the present moment. We are experiencing it now. It is ongoing.

It doesn't matter how mistaken we are about the details. I will repeat it again. However consciousness really seems to us that is how it really seems to us. That's just a tautology but have fun banging your head against the equivalent of the fact that a square has four sides.

 There is no imaginary finish line in the brain where things pass from being perceived to being phenomenologically experienced.

More shit that Dennett discusses that is irrelevant to my point.  We could be completely deluded about consciousness but the way things really seemed to us would by definition be how they really seemed to us. You have a problem with things being true by definition though... you talk of me parroting the same babble. Despite the fact that truths of definition are the only truths we can know to be true with 100% certainty.

Consciousness is spread out in space and time in the brain.  That spreading out matters.

Obviously the fact that time is made up of instants and that you can't have a past and a future without a present and the very fact that it takes time just further demonstrates my point that consciousness is happening now if it is right now taking time to develop.

 

Therefore any naive supposition that consciousness is 'experiencing' the moment must be an illusion.

Nope. You've once against conflated A) being mistaken about when we think consciousness is happening or how or why we think it is happening  with B) The very fact that we really are consciously aware of whatever we really are conscious aware of. We can't "Not really" be consciously aware of whatever we're really consciously aware of.

 You can bleat all you want about how it's not an illusion,

I've already repeatedly admitted that those details can be illusory. You still haven't explained how the way things really do subjectively appear to us can't be how they really subjectively appear to us. And do you see how you're never going to do that? You may as well be saying that objects that really have four sides don't really have four sides.

but unless you're advocating something other than a material basis for consciousness, you are wrong.

No I'm not. I'm advocating that consciousness is physical.

You make the silly mistake that because everything real is physical and consciousness itself is mental instead of physical then consciousness can't be real. But obviously it's the equivocation fallacy to think that consciousness itself cannot be physical.

Basing your position on absurd neologisms isn't helping your case any.  Searle has buried his real objection in nonsensical terminology, and you fall for it hook, line, and sinker.

He didn't invent it. It's not a "neologism". He merely popularized it and explained it.

Ontological subjectivity is obviously ontology that is subjective. Everything is by definition ontology, some things (i.e. minds) have subjectivity.

You ought to know what the term means simply by understanding the words separately, putting them together grammatically and reading them.... I mean... that's what I do

Cannot be substantiated objectively?  Your claim is nothing but a claim.  Like I said, unsubstantiated.

You're asking me to substantiate the first person subjective fact of my consciousnes via third person evidence objectively. What do you want me to do telepathically send my consciousness into you?

As I have said... however consciousness really appears to us that is how it really appears to us. Consciousness experience itself cannot be illusory regardless of us being wrong about any specific details. We KNOW we are experiencing SOMETHING WHEN we DO EXPERIENCE SOMETHING.

You're playing word games.  The what referred back to "the model by which the brain represents its own process to itself."  That is the that of consciousness.

Well, that model is certainly conscious subjective experience if that's what we're consciously experiencing subjectively. But you wish to tell me that we're not really experiencing subjectively whatever we really are experiencing subjectively.

To say that EVERYTHING we're experiencing we're not really experiencing... is just a complete failure to make a distinction between real/not real at all. It's the same effect as saying everything we experience is real.

This is all in the context of responding to the anti-reductionist argument based upon Liebniz' law.  There is nothing in the brain that is literally a red stripe.  He makes clear the literal nature of the comparison by talking about striations in the brain, etc.  He isn't saying that the red stripe does not exist as a representation of a red stripe in the brain, but that it does not literally occur there.  I think you've misunderstood the point he was trying to make there and its limited applicability.  The line on the slide says, "If A is a red stripe, and nothing in the brain is a red stripe, then nothing in the brain is identical to A."  That's as far as that particular point goes.  You've mushed together quining and a limited response to the Liebniz'ian argument until they're the same thing in your mind.  He goes on to state the materialist's response that, "it only seems to you that there is a red stripe that you are experiencing."  No conflation, just your misunderstanding a classic argument in the literature for something that Dennett was advancing.

Well OBVIOUSLY the illusion of the red stripe doesn't literally exist in the brain as a red stripe. But he already pointed out that the red stripe was just an afterimage and an illusion and then he said that that red stripe (i.e. the illusory afterimage of the red stripe) didn't exist in the brain. Obviously the illusion of the red stripe exists in the brain in the form of neurons otherwise such a cognitive illusion wouldn't even be experienced. He's saying it's an illusion so it doesn't really exist. He's conflating illusoriness with nonexistence.

Why on earth would he say that a red stripe didn't literally exist in the brain as a literal physical red stripe when that's beyond obvious and he had already started talking about the appearance of an illusory afterimage of a red stripe?

He said that a red stripe is being experienced but there is no red stripe that we are experiencing. That is logically contradictory. You can't experience something that isn't there at least as an illusion or an appearance.

That's because ontologically subjective doesn't mean anything.  It's a stand-in for Searle's assertions about consciousness.

Doesn't mean anything?



You're bascically saying that the ontology of consciousness isn't subjective because the very idea of any ontology being subjective "doesn't mean anything". You're saying that no one is conscious.



Jor... words mean things. What you are trying to say is not the same thing as what you are actually saying.

Let me quote back something of yours I already quoted in this post... and enbolden your most epic fail of all in this thread, which completely betrays your undervaluing of tautological truths and your failure to recognize that words actually mean things... and this really does just show what nonsense you're talking about.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

My bold.

I don't... I don't even.

It isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory? You do realize that an illusory experience is an experience that isn't real and an experience that isn't real is an illusory experience? That's what an illusion means: an experience that isn't real. And yet you say I play word games.....





You don't know WHAT the fuck you're talking about do you?

Oh I see Jor! I see! You're not saying subjective experience isn't real you're saying it's illusory! (!) I understand (!) Makes perfect sense (!) /sarcasm

Words mean things.

So you and Dennett can redefine your ass off as much as you like and pretend you're being scientific... but pretending words mean things that they don't mean isn't what science is about. Sure, if it gets the science done. It doesn't change the matter of philosophical truths. Science isn't about philosophical truths. Just because atoms in the scientific sense are splittable doesn't mean atoms in the original sense of the word aren't unsplittable. So if the objective of the study of atoms was to try and prove that atoms in the original sense of the word were splittable... science would fail by definition. The difference between science and the elimativists, is science actually recognizes when it's changing the subject and actually knows its limits and what it can test and can't test. Unlike yourself and Dennett.

There's that assertion again that experience can't be illusory.  Shame you've got nothing to back it with.

We can experience illusions, yes. But that is not the same thing as all experiences being illusory... because that would include even illusory experiences being illusory. Take note of that. If no experiences are real then experiences that are unreal aren't really unreal. Which makes them real. But keep trying to have your cake and eat it too.

---

I was going to say that I think consciousness is an illusion but then Hammy blew my mind.
Thanks Hammy. :-)

^^^This guy gets it^^^

Happy to blow your mind.

You're welcome, LL.

---

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.

In this context, how would you call conscious experience an illusion?  Usually an illusion IS an experience-- of a physical object or property that is not there, or is there in a form radically different than you perceive it.

Yeah it's utter nonsense. Your real perception as it seems to you can't be not how you really perceive it as it seems to you.

But some people really like to make their non-sequiturs and category errors.

It's as though many people think something can't be both physical and mental, and they also believe that all that really exists is the physical... therefore the mental doesn't really exist and its existence is illusory. It's a serious equivocation fallacy. There's absolutely no reason that something can't be both physical and mental. In fact, ironically, it's dualism to think otherwise. Dualism being what most materialists and physicalists are afraid of. And the standard cop-out by the elimativists is to simply say that the other side of the coin, the mental, isn't real. Thereby they can stick to their monism and avoid dualism because only the physical is REAL.

Yes, only the physical is real. Including the mental which is also physical and real. There is no contradiction there unless you're making a serious category error. No need to say that what you're really conscious experiencing isn't really being consciously experienced. That's retarded. But I understand that those who are intellectually inferior who aren't able to avoid the category errors have to fall back on logically inchogerent cop-outs. It's what Dennett is referring to when he says that materialists have to bite the bullet otherwise dualism follows. No they don't. Consciousness is both real and physical. There's no contradiction.

And their cop-out doesn't even work. By saying that there are two types of stuff: real physical things and imaginary mental things... they're still failing to avoid dualism.

The correct answer to the problem is that there's one type of stuff, it's all physical, it's all existent and some of it gives rise to consciousness. Even the cognitive illusions exist within the physical brain in the form of neurons. They just don't represent something real in external objective reality. Cognition itself cannot be an illusion... because cognition itself has to at least seem to be something and it really does seem however it really seems to seem.

[bennyboy]

The correct answer to the problem is that there's one type of stuff, it's all physical, it's all existent and some of it gives rise to consciousness. Even the cognitive illusions exist within the physical brain in the form of neurons. They just don't represent something real in external objective reality. Cognition itself cannot be an illusion... because cognition itself has to at least seem to be something and it really does seem however it really seems to seem.

It sounds like you are almost quoting Khemical, based on my past conversations with him. I'm surprised you've ended on opposite sides of this discussion (though tbh I haven't read much of it yet).

I'm not so sure about the physical monism. It seems to me that since 100% of my knowledge comes through my personal experiences, I must be agnostic on anything outside that experience-- for example about the nature of what entities or system might be behind it.

Furthermore, given a physical monism, I'd also say that not only are there no THINGS in a physical monism which are not allowed for by the nature of the universe, there are no PROPERTIES which are not specifically allowed for, either, including the capacity for physical systems to be aware. Mind didn't "just happen" as a byproduct of material interactions. If there were no photons, there couldn't be the properties of light frequency or any sense of color. And if there were no (fill in the blank), there couldn't be the capacity for awareness, in the brain or anywhere else.

In short, the brain might be the proximate cause of awareness, but there is something more ingrained into our reality that is the ultimate cause, and that is a non-trivial issue considering that we have absolutely no ability to determine whether a given physical system has awareness or not.

[Silver]

I have never had a problem with consciousness.

[Angrboda]

So it's a nonsensical neologism coined by John Searle.

No it's not. The fact you don't understand what "ontologically subjective" means and I give you John Searle's explanation of it doesn't mean he "coined it".

Obviously ontological subjectivity isn't defined as one separate term. Each of those words mean things seperately and make sense put together. You don't need Searle for that. I used his explanation because he explains it well and instead you just pretend he "coined it" and ignore what ontological subjectivity obviously is.

Ontology is about being. About entities, about something that exists. Something that exists either has subjectivity or it doesn't. Its ontology is either subjective or it isn't. It either has conscousness or it doesn't. Obviously the ontology of consciousness is subjective. What is your problem with things that are just true by definition? Next you'll be asking me to prove that consciousness is subjective. You literally repeatedly do the equivalent of asking me to prove that all squares have four sides.

You're full of crap.  It's a composite term whose meaning is not encapsulated by the individual terms.  Simply combining the terms leaves you with "a being that exists dependent upon the attitudes and opinions of a subject," which is complete gibberish.  No, it's got Searle's fingerprints all over it.  Cite another philosopher using the term who isn't explaining some aspect of Searle's meaning.

 It isn't a sensible definition because it endorses the conclusion that ontologically subjective phenomena are not also ontologically objective.

No it doesn't. Nowhere does he say that something can't both be ontologically objective and subjective.

All ontology is objective but some of it is also subjective. There are conscious objects and unconscious objects. Consciousness is by definition a conscious object. It has subjective ontology. It's ontologically subjective.

Bull balls.  If something is both an objective and a subjective fact, there is no distinction in terms of its ontology.  The distinction only occurs in Searle's contention that first person subjective experience is not accessible by third person inspection.  I'm not enough of a stranger to Searle's absurd locutions to fall for this.

In other words, it's nothing more than the mysterians' claim that consciousness has no third hand objective description.  That's begging the question on Searle's part and being stupid about philosophy on your part.

No this is your own misrepresentation. Nowhere does Searle say that something can't  both be ontologically objective and ontologically subjective. And if he did say that, he'd be wrong.

Some entities, such as pains, tickles, and itches, have a subjective mode of existence, in the sense that they exist only as experienced by a conscious subject. Others, such as mountains, molecules and tectonic plates have an objective mode of existence, in the sense that their existence does not depend on any consciousness.

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~pa...e/csc1.pdf [emphasis mine; you do know what the word 'only' means, don't you?]

And the reason you can't be wrong is what?  Stop bleating and start backing up some of these statements.

I can't be wrong because I'm stating tautologies or following logical lines with premises that are tautologically true.

You are asking me to prove something true by definition is true. Like I said you may as well ask me to prove that all squares have four sides.

It's neither tautological nor a definition of consciousness that it cannot be other than what it appears.  Consciousness is an appearing to be, of sorts, so obviously there is a something which it appears to be which is left undisturbed by your talking about 'experience' and 'consciousness'.  There is nothing tautological about claiming that this 'appearing to be' can't be other than what it appears to be.  That's your lack of imagination combined with fuzzy thinking about what consciousness appears as that makes you think there's anything tautological or definitional here.  It is not an analytical truth by any stretch of the imagination.  Consciousness has an appearance, and that appearance may be wrong, that's what you're disputing.  There is no tautology which says that the appearance of consciousness reflects what it really is.  That's just an absurd claim on your part.  Until you back that up, you're just making noise with empty predicates.  Or are you suggesting something other than that "consciousness is what it appears to be?"

And the misrepresentations just keep on coming.  You have presented no argument.  You've claimed consciousness itself, not the thing in its intentionality, cannot be an illusion.

I have repeatedly explained why that position is tautologically true. Let me spell it out for you again. For something to be illusory it has to be the case that something is not what it appears to be. But consciousness is by definition subjective appearance to the self. Consciousness is what something seems to be to someone, so that itself cannot be an illusion. You can't say that the reality of the appearance of something to someone isn't what it is when what it is is the appearance of something to someone.

The bolded part is almost correct, consciousness is an appearance, and appearances have particulars.  The particulars of that appearing may be other than what they appear to be.  That's the illusory part.  If all that you're saying is that "appearing to" is "appearing to", you haven't touched upon the subject of consciousness in any way.  You're just mouthing empty predicates.  The part in blue simply doesn't follow and is thus a non sequitur.

You're literally arguing that illusions themselves aren't really experienced which makes the illusion itself an illusion of an illusion and thereby not really an illusion. If you're telling me that something isn't really not real you're telling me it's real. A double negative equates to a positive.

No, you're misunderstanding what I am saying, and resorting to the typical straw man that eliminative materialism, by saying that consciousness is an illusion is saying that it isn't "real" -- whatever the fuck that means in context.  Since 'real' doesn't pick out the distinction between being and appearing to be, it's a term best avoided.  And more word games.  What is it with you and semantic arguments?  I'm not telling you "that something isn't really not real".  That's your own locution which incorporates a straw man.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

I don't think you understand what I am saying. I have tried to explain it many times... I am not saying that the first hand experiences aren't mistaken about external reality, and I am not saying that they aren't mistaken about the nature of internal subjective reality either... I'm saying that that however our experiences really seem to be that's how they really seem to be. Do you spot the tautology yet?! Saying that they don't really seem how they really seem and that what you really seem to be conscious of is not what you really seem to be conscious of is just akin to saying that a square doesn't really have four sides.
........................

And you wonder why I claim you're spouting empty predicates?  Really seem to be.  Let's unpack that.  First, we have the word 'really' which is once again implying that there is a real seeming to appear and an unreal seeming to appear.  As noted, this is unhelpful as what's in dispute is the contours of that seeming, not any ontological claim about its reality.  Seem.  Can you have a seeming to be without that seeming to be having a distinct appearance?  Consciousness feels unified, as if it occurs in the moment, as if it is a point phenomena occurring in a sort of non-space.  These are all characteristics of what this appearing "seems to be."  Is your claim is that none of the properties of this seeming can be illusory? because it is not tautological or definitional that these properties are backed by anything 'real'.

 

The point that Dennett makes in the video is telling in that regard.  Consciousness must take both time and space inside the brain to develop.  It makes no sense to talk of a 'now' in which you are experiencing something.

It doesn't matter what the mechanics or the structure of it is. See above. I'm merely being a realist about the fact that however consciousnes does appear to be that is how it appears to be. And however it seems to us that is indeed how it seems to us. We can't be mistaken about however it appears to us, we can only be mistaken about our memories of how it did appear, or our expectation about how it will appear or other details like that. If consciousness is however things appear to us then it is however things appear to us.

Things appear to us in a way that is likely distinct from how things appear to say a bat, in terms of the intentional subjects of consciousness.  However our intentionality has properties which are invariant as to whether we are experiencing a dream, or a sunset, or even the contents of our imagination.  It is the seeming to be of these properties which is under dispute, and that seeming to be is inseparable from consciousness qua consciousness.  If you are talking about consciousness, you are talking about those properties (or saying nothing at all).

Yes I agree that consciousness takes both time and space to develop. But all that exists in the present is now. Once again that's something else true by definition that you will have a problem with (do you have a problem with the notion of squares having four sides too?)...

Your sarcasm is neither relevant nor helpful.  Your analogy to a square having four sides is a false one as that is an analytical truth, whereas it is not an analytical truth that the properties of consciousness qua consciousness are as they appear.

You may think it's absurd to speak of consciousness 'now' but it's just as absurd to speak of it existing in the future or past but not in the present.

Your argument from incredulity is rearing its ugly head again.

Obviously consciousness takes many steps to develop but each step is very real and can be divided into smaller steps. Every pulsing moment is relevant. Consciousness is happening now. It will happen in the future and it has happened in the past. This is all true by definition provided that you assume that consciousness isn't going to disappear forever everywhere in the future and that the fact it existed in the past is not merely a false memory. But even if the past is all false memories and never happened, and even if the future never arrives... one thing we do know is that consciousness is happening now. And now. And now. In the present moment. We are experiencing it now. It is ongoing.

It doesn't matter how mistaken we are about the details. I will repeat it again. However consciousness really seems to us that is how it really seems to us. That's just a tautology but have fun banging your head against the equivalent of the fact that a square has four sides.

The details are all we have when it comes to consciousness, but by all means continue mouthing empty predicates that mean nothing, occasionally spicing it with false analogies.

 You can bleat all you want about how it's not an illusion,

I've already repeatedly admitted that those details can be illusory. You still haven't explained how the way things really do subjectively appear to us can't be how they really subjectively appear to us. And do you see how you're never going to do that? You may as well be saying that objects that really have four sides don't really have four sides.

I've explained it several times.  You can't have any "appearing to be" that isn't appearing to be in some particular way.  You keep avoiding that central point because it opens up the possibility that the way things really appear to us subjectively, as a phenomenon having invariant properties, does not really appear to anyone in that specific way.  You keep retreating to empty predicates which say nothing because they leave out the particularity of the phenomenon.  With consciousness, that particularity is all we've got, so you're not addressing anything real, you're just pushing placeholders around.  That's like saying, "It is what it is," without ever specifying what the 'it' is.  It's not philosophy.  It's masturbation.

You make the silly mistake that because everything real is physical and consciousness itself is mental instead of physical then consciousness can't be real. But obviously it's the equivocation fallacy to think that consciousness itself cannot be physical.

That's not the equivocation fallacy.

You ought to know what the term means simply by understanding the words separately, putting them together grammatically and reading them.... I mean... that's what I do

You're doing it wrong.  

As I have said... however consciousness really appears to us that is how it really appears to us. Consciousness experience itself cannot be illusory regardless of us being wrong about any specific details. We KNOW we are experiencing SOMETHING WHEN we DO EXPERIENCE SOMETHING.

The blue sentence does not follow from the red sentence.  The details are what makes it conscious experience, as opposed to say a subconscious event.  You're talking around the subject and not really saying anything.

That's because ontologically subjective doesn't mean anything.  It's a stand-in for Searle's assertions about consciousness.

Doesn't mean anything?



You're bascically saying that the ontology of consciousness isn't subjective because the very idea of any ontology being subjective "doesn't mean anything". You're saying that no one is conscious.

Bullshit.  You come up with the weirdest straw men in your attempt to avoid saying anything.  I nowhere gave any indication that I thought "no one is conscious," so you can just shove that crap.  I'm saying that as a composite term it has no meaning unless you incorporate Searle's absurd distinctions.  His distinctions are incoherent, so the composite term is incoherent.

Let me quote back something of yours I already quoted in this post... and enbolden your most epic fail of all in this thread, which completely betrays your undervaluing of tautological truths and your failure to recognize that words actually mean things... and this really does just show what nonsense you're talking about.

He is the one making a distinction between first and third hand knowledge whereas Dennett acts as if first hand experience isn't real and that all that matters is third person knowledge.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

My bold. [my context restored]

I don't... I don't even.

It isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory? You do realize that an illusory experience is an experience that isn't real and an experience that isn't real is an illusory experience? That's what an illusion means: an experience that isn't real. And yet you say I play word games.....

That's not been the operating definition of what it means for something to be an illusion as it has been used in this thread, nor is it reflective of either my or Rhythm's position on the subject of consciousness.  By bandying about the word 'real' in this careless haphazard manner is nothing but an empty appeal devoid of substance.  (It's also a distortion of context, which I didn't catch on my first pass. That's very dishonest of you. It's misquoting, and that's a form of lying. I was saying that the dichotomy you were attributing to Dennett was false. And what is my reward? You redraw the context leaving out that particular. Tsk. Tsk. Not very sportsmanlike.) What it means for something to be real is not the issue.  Seemings to be are real whether or not they are illusory, so yes, again you're just playing word games.  'Real' or 'not real' isn't the debate.  Whether the seeming that is consciousness is what it appears to be is.  And my "biggest fail" (in your words) ends up being you just jacking off about a straw man.

So you and Dennett can redefine your ass off as much as you like and pretend you're being scientific... but pretending words mean things that they don't mean isn't what science is about. Sure, if it gets the science done. It doesn't change the matter of philosophical truths. Science isn't about philosophical truths. Just because atoms in the scientific sense are splittable doesn't mean atoms in the original sense of the word aren't unsplittable. So if the objective of the study of atoms was to try and prove that atoms in the original sense of the word were splittable... science would fail by definition. The difference between science and the elimativists, is science actually recognizes when it's changing the subject and actually knows its limits and what it can test and can't test. Unlike yourself and Dennett.

You're deluded.  Dennett and Rhythm and myself aren't "redefining" things so much as defining them, in the only language that is available to us, the details and properties of this seeming to be.  That isn't changing the subject, except when your only contribution to the question is the empty platitude, "I yam what I yam."  Well Popeye, consciousness qua consciousness is more than just an empty placeholder which you assure me is identical to itself.  Well, duh.  And schmurm is schmurm, and gorple is gorple.  You haven't said anything about a subject that most assuredly has properties if you're omitting those properties as belonging to the subject.  You haven't addressed the real subject at all, consciousness.  You've just jacked off to your own cleverness in not saying anything at all.

There's that assertion again that experience can't be illusory.  Shame you've got nothing to back it with.

We can experience illusions, yes. But that is not the same thing as all experiences being illusory... because that would include even illusory experiences being illusory. Take note of that. If no experiences are real then experiences that are unreal aren't really unreal. Which makes them real. But keep trying to have your cake and eat it too.

More semantic bullshit.  Arguments from grammar aren't really arguments, or at least it's not philosophically sound.  But keep on making them, and I'll continue to point out that it's just dicking around with words.

[Angrboda]

This is all bullshit anyway, because the original claim made by you was the following:

It appears that of the following three propositions only two can be true:

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.

Perhaps, but it's also quite possible that all three are false.

No it isn't. 1) absolutely cannot be false.

As has been patiently explained to you, there is a very real sense in which consciousness can be an illusion in the sense of not being what it appears to be. You're the one who introduced this claim that consciousness cannot be mistaken that it is conscious. That's a complete devolution from, "Conscious experience is not an illusion," into your own private hell which had nothing to do with whether consciousness can be an illusion and in which you're doing nothing but mouthing empty predicates. Consciousness as a subject has properties, and those properties represent to consciousness exactly what consciousness thinks itself to be. To say that "appearing is appearing, it's tautological" is just sidestepping the point to appear to be saying something unassailable. Your presumed cleverness is nothing but a distortion of the original predicate, which you claimed could not be false. All this "seeming is seeming" is just so much bizarre backpedaling on your part. Now if you're prepared to stop jerking around with your own private definitions, why don't you actually address your claim. It's not in the least tautological or analytical that "conscious experience is not an illusion."

[Amarok]

Well I think  there is one thing Hammy,Jörmungandr,bennyboy and can agree on wooter trilemma isn't as big a deal  as he hypes it too be

[Edwardo Piet]

Everything I am saying backs up what I have said. Conscious experience itself cannot be an illusion because experience is however things seem to be to us and it's just a tautology that however things seem to us is however they seem to us.

I have admitted repeatedly that there are such things as cognitive illusions and we can be mistaken about when and what we can be consccious of in that it may not correspond with objective reality but I have been consistent in explaining that even if absolutely nothing we were conscious of corresponded to objective reality and all we could experience was conscious ilusions of objective reality the conscious experiences themselves really would be whatever they are, by definition, and they really would be however they subjectively seemed to be to us, by definition, and there is absolutely no distinction between how conscious experience subjectively appears to us and how it actually is to us, the subjective seeming is identical to the subjective reality even if none of it corresponds to objective reality so to say that all conscious experience itself is illusory is indeed to make a distinction where no distinction can be made and to equivocate between objective and subjective reality (which, yes, is also objective in a ontological sense but the parts of objective reality that are also subjective are by definition the only parts of objective reality that can be absolutely knowable to be real subjectively, even if we are mistaken about how it corresponds to unsubjective objective reality). To say that conscious experience itself is illusory or unreal when it's the only part of reality we can know to be real directly and subjectively with epistemic certainty is indeed to make this category error I am talking about. It's one thing to say cognitive ilusions and other illusions exist in that our conscious experience doesn't accurately map onto unconscious reality but it's another thing to state that conscious experience itself is illusory or to deny its reality. To say that all conscious experiencening itself is unreal is just completely meaningless. Consciousness really is however things seem to be to us, regardless of whether it corresponds to objective reality.

Far from being mysterious, consciousness is the one thing we can directly know to be real. It's the external world that is mysterious, not the internal world, look at quantum mechanics and how even the experts state that even they don't understand it and that it's not only queerer than they suppose it to be but it's also queerer than they can suppose it to be.

Even if the entire external world is an illusion and we're all in a computer simulation or we're all brains in vats... our internal world cannot be an illusion. Even if the whole external world is an illusion and our conscious experience doesn't map onto real objective external reality beyond that illusory world... we still know that at least our subjective conscious experience itself is real even if it is mistaken about external reality it cannot be distinct from how it appears to be to itself because we're talking about the reality of subjective apparentness here. This is what Strawson means when he says that this is one area where you cannot open up a gap between how things seem to be and how they actually are. Because what would it mean for something that you seems a certain way to you to not really be that way to you? That would mean that it merely seems to seem a certain way to you. And what would that be like? Well, that would be the same as it seeming.

Even if the whole of external reality is an illusion: conscious experience itself is however things really seem to be to us, including all the illusions we do experience. We can not mistaken about the fact that things seem to be to us however they seem to be to us. The one thing that we can know with a certainty is completely real is our own conscious experience even if the whole world is The Matrix. Conscious experience is not and cannot be an illusion. As Strawson has said: with regards to consciousness the having is the knowing. How would a computer ever know what it was like to be conscious? By having conscious experiences.

You say that the term "ontological subjectivity" is only a composite term and that the term makes no sense when you put those two seperate words together but you fail to understand the basic dichotomy that all ontology either has subjectivity or it does not. An alive wakeful human brain is an example of ontology that does. You equivocate inanely when you say that that would refer to "a being". In philosophy the term "ontology" refers to all being itself i.e. existence. Not "a being" in the everyday sense like a living being :facepalm: :facepalm: Next you'll be conflating "intentionality" in the philosophical sense with intention in the everyday sense :facepalm: :facepalm:

You're trying, you're really trying but neither you nor Rhythm is going to get there because you fail to apprehend the logical errors you're making and when either of you fail too hard to address my argument you both fall back on either bare assertions that it's not true by definition that conscious experience itself really does seem to us how it really does seem to us or you make the category error of asking me to provide third person perspective epistemically objective evidence for the reality of first person perspective ontologically subjective conscious experience, or last of all, you merely barely assert that what I am saying is word salad, psychobabble or that a term is meaningless when you don't understand.

And the fact you merely insist that when the elimativists say that consciousness experience is illusory that that doesn't mean that consciousness experience is unreal it is clearly you that is merely talking semantic nonsense. You're simply denying the meanings of words and making shit up there.

I had little hopes for Rhythm understanding this but I'm actually rather sad that you do not understand this, Jor, because I not only like you a lot as a person but I also on occassion admire you as someone who appears to be fairly intelligent and is at the very least rather well educated. And on an irrelevant note: It rather saddens me that you can't even disagree with me about this without thinking that I'm an asshole.

Oh well.

[Edwardo Piet]

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.
2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.
3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

1) is true but I not only consider 2) false but I also consider 3) false if what it means is that the mental reduces to the physical or can be explained by the physical. 3) can be correct if it also includes the option that the mental itself is itself wholly physical as opposed to merely being explained by or reduced to the physical.

[bennyboy]

1) Conscious experience is not an illusion.
2) Conscious experience has an essentially subjective character that purely physical processes do not share.
3) The only acceptable explanation of conscious experience is in terms of physical properties alone.

1) is true but I not only consider 2) false but I also consider 3) false if what it means is that the mental reduces to the physical or can be explained by the physical. 3) can be correct if it also includes the option that the mental itself is itself wholly physical as opposed to merely being explained by or reduced to the physical.

What does "physical" mean if it refers also to subjective experience?  It seems to me that it ceases to be a word that distinguishes between anything and anything else, except perhaps for "spirit," but nobody is talking about that anyway.

What are the physical laws of mind?  What, if mind is physical, are the means by which one may interact or measure it, without resorting to philosophical assumptions that lead one to beg the question?

Either material is intrinsically mindful, or there is some particular property or function of material systems which allows mind to exist. In the former case, panpsychism is true, and I'd describe that as an Idealistic reality. If the latter is true, then how, even hypothetically, would we go about doing science with minds-- or even determining which systems are/aren't mindful?

Here are the assumptions required to move forward given what you've just said: 1) solipsism is not false-- something which can only be assumed, and not proven; 2) there is an objective material reality, more than which cannot be said to exist-- again, which is unprovable, and not even necessary to explain the Universe or the events unfolding within it; 3) in humans, neural correlates of mind must be taken AS mind rather than something causing it or holding some other relationship to it-- but this begs the question, since a science of mind should ESTABLISH whether this is indeed the relationship between subjective experience and objective function.

In short, I'd like to suggest that your view on consciousness isn't actually a theory of mind-- rather, it is an expression of that collection of assumptions that make up your world view: "IF everything I've already decided to believe about reality is true, then definition X of mind is likely correct."