Consciousness Trilemma

[The Grand Nudger]

Ummm words and definitions are just made up dude. I KNOW what consciousness is going by the dictionary.

If he wants to redefine consciousness so it doesn't mean subjective experience or qualia, fine, but it's no wonder that I'm not the only intelligent person who realizes he's changing the subject and not even interacting with it.

If consciousness was not actually what people thought it was, would there be any point in adhering to that definition?   

BULLSHIT

What can you possibly mean by bullshit?  Dennet makes the comment explicit in multitudinous ways, that you yourself have quoted.  

I'm a reality about subjective experience. I'm not saying that I'm right about the characterization of my subjective experience. I'm saying that my subjective experience itself is real. It HAS to be. It cannot not be. That's impossible. I'd have no consciousness at all if I wasn't.

Your subjective experience™ is real, OFC it is, it's just not what you think it is?

He's literally just addressing something other than subjective experience and calling that "consciousness" he's playing silly word games and thinks he's being scientific and going against "folk psychology", no he's fighting against the English language. He can call a potato "consciousness" and study that if he likes... and by doing that he certainly wouldn't be trusting folk psychology. But he'd still be being irrelevant as fuck.

He thinks that those traditional definitions of consciousness hinge on a naive understanding of the mind.  He's trying to explain the same thing as those, in his estimation, naive theories of mind are trying to explain...so he uses the shared term.  I guess he could have used a different word, but Ham, cmon...lol?

It's not a matter of what I think it is. Consciousness is defined as subjective experience so if he's going to talk about something other than that then whatever he's talking about it's not consciousness. And many aspects of what we think our subjective expereince is may be illusory by subjective experience/consciousness itself is not and cannot be an illusion.;

Stop trying to defend such a ridiculous position, seriously.

What ridiculous position?  Why can't the specific aspects of specific types of specific descriptions of consciousness....what he is actually and explicitly addressing in that segment...be illusory?  Do you think that the experience you have, of how it feels to be the humonculus, will map to a discrete mental state analogous to the humonculus?  Will we find the little man in the brain region of the brain?  Is there such a region?  This, is what Dennet, in those things specifically, -and explicitly- has been expressing skepticism with regards to.  

Consciousness is subjective experience. So yes it is exactly what everyone thinks it is. Everyone who isn't a complete idiot and who has read the dictionary definition or speaks basic English knows that consciousness is subjective experience and they as a subject knows they experience things and know it exists.

What they think they are conscious of they can be wrong about and may not be what they think it is. But that's a different matter altogether.

Do you understand yet?

I understand that you're trying to have an argument with me about something entirely irrelevant to dennets statements as they regard -our- disagreement (you see, I;m not arguing that dennet is right, I;m suggesting that you are mistaken regarding the contents of dennet's position, for whatever reason).  I also understand that you really, really believe that you're right.  Will we find a discrete mental state of Ham being right, in hams brain?  Or might it be possible, that the feeling you have, ham being right, is not, in fact, any discrete mental state, but a misapprehension of hams brain that, nevertheless...manifests itself as a genuine experience?

I didn't fucking quote mine I said it was from the very podcast that I already posted here. Watch the fucking podcast instead of calling me a quoteminer when I already provided the source of the quote.

Defending a quotemine is worse.

[Edwardo Piet]

If consciousness was not actually what people thought it was, would there be any point in adhering to that definition?   

It is what people think it is. People think consciouisness is subjective experience. It is subjective experience. I already explained all this.

What can you possibly mean by bullshit?  Dennet makes the comment explicit in multitudinous ways, that you yourself have quoted.  

I already explained. That wasn't what I said was bullshit. Read back again. You suggested that the only alternative was for me to believe in Cartesian Dualism but I already explained that I'm a realist about subjective experience and I don't have to believe in Cartesian Dualism to do that.

Your subjective experience™ is real, OFC it is, it's just not what you think it is?

Right, it's not an illusion regardless of how mistaken about the details of it I am. Same with you. Your subjective experience is not an illusion, it's a reality. And yet Dennett claims that consciousness is an illusion because he thinks subjective experience is incompatible with science. Which is an irrelevant conclusion because the reality of subjective experience is much more knowable than science is.

He thinks that those traditional definitions of consciousness hinge on a naive understanding of the mind.  He's trying to explain the same thing as those, in his estimation, naive theories of mind are trying to explain...so he uses the shared term.  I guess he could have used a different word, but Ham, cmon...lol?

Yes he should have used a different word instead of pretending to be talking about consciousness.

Come on, non-Rhythm.

What ridiculous position?

The ridiculous position of pretending to talk about consciousness without talking about consciousness.

Here's a quote from Wikipedia, quoting John Searle

To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain

 

Why can't the specific aspects of specific types of specific descriptions of consciousness....what he is actually and explicitly addressing in that segment...be illusory?

For something to be an illusion it has to seem one way but be another way. Indeed we may seem to be experiencing many things and instead be experiencing many other things.. but the fact we are experiencing something cannot be an illusion. I.e. consciousness cannot be an illusion.

We could actually be dreaming right now. But we are experiencing something even if this is all a dream. The experience is not an illusion even if what we think is happening is. Obviously we really are experiencing this even if 'this' is not realling happening.

It's not rocket science, and I've explained it all before. Come on non-Rhyhtm. Stop being dense.

Do you think that the experience you have, of how it feels to be the humonculus, will map to a discrete mental state analogous to the humonculus?

I don't have to have any theory of consciousness at all, Cartesian or non-Cartensian to be a realist about my subjective experience. All of that is irrelevant.

I know that I am really experiencing something. The fact I really am means it's not an illusion.

What would it mean for me to not really be experiencing anything at all? Do you realize that that's impossible without me being a philosophical zombie yet? Do you realize that Dennett is wrong about us all being zombies yet? Do you realize that not experiencing at all and only SEEMING to experience something is identical to REALLY experiencing something thereby making his whole claim that consciousness is an illusion utter nonsense?

Will we find the little man in the brain region of the brain?  Is there such a region?  This, is what Dennet, in those things specifically, -and explicitly- has been expressing skepticism with regards to.  

All this is irrelevant repetitions of Dennett's shite.

We don't need any theory of consciousness to be a realist about our subjective experience.

I understand that you're trying to have an argument with me about something entirely irrelevant to dennets statements as they regard -our- disagreement (you see, I;m not arguing that dennet is right, I;m suggesting that you are mistaken regarding the contents of dennet's position, for whatever reason).

I am not mistaken about Dennett's position. I am very familar about his position. He has literally said things like you can experience a red stripe that doesn't exist. That's nonsense. Even illusions exist, they just aren't real. He conflates illusoriness with nonexistence which is exactly what you falsely accused me of doing.

 I also understand that you really, really believe that you're right.

I KNOW I'm right. Consciousness isn't an illusion any more than bachelors are married.

Will we find a discrete mental state of Ham being right, in hams brain?

Irrelevant. My subjective experience itself is not an illusion regardless of if we can find specific states.

Dennett talks about all these irrelevant details and talks about what we think about the mind and what we think about our subjective experience but he fails to address the fact that it doesn't matter how many cognitive or phenomenological illusions we experience... we still really experience them. Our consciousness itself must be real.

I will ask you the question again... if ALL your subjective experience is an illusion.... then what is the difference between that and all your subjective experience being real? There's literally no difference. You can't apply the real/illusory distinction to consciousness itself because the very concept of real/illusory depends on it. Nothing is more real than consciousness.

 Or might it be possible, that the feeling you have, ham being right, is not, in fact, any discrete mental state, but a misapprehension of hams brain that, nevertheless...manifests itself as a genuine experience?  

You just proved my point. It still nevertheless manifests itself as a genuine experience. It doesn't matter what mental states I am wrong or right about or whether confused I am or not. I could even be 100% confused... I still get a manifestly genuine experience. I really do. And that's really consciousness.

Defending a quotemine is worse.

I already explained that I didn't quotemine because I provided the source to give full context.

And what I said out of context doesn't change the meaning of what he said at all.

You're such a prick.

[The Grand Nudger]

Excellent, so neither you nor dennet subscribes to the cartesian theater...since you agree on what -dennet- was commenting upon, neither of you thinks that cartesian dualist consciousness exists........what's the fuss?  

I already explained that I didn't quotemine because I provided the source to give full context.

You constructed a sentence to disagree with out of patchwork bolding..........lol.....?

And what I said out of context doesn't change the meaning of what he said at all.

It obviously does, since...in context, you are in full agreement with dennet on the issue he was addressing.........should I put that quote up again for a third time, or do you feel adequate shame right now?

You're such a prick.

That may be true, but so what?

[Angrboda]

If consciousness was not actually what people thought it was, would there be any point in adhering to that definition?   

It is what people think it is. People think consciouisness is subjective experience. It is subjective experience. I already explained all this.

No, that's your claim, which you keep coming back to with little more than ad hominem and appeals to incredulity.  Unless consciousness is an impenetrable mystery, then it can be described.  This is the bone which eliminative materialists have picked with you, that these descriptions do not map to an objective reality.  You bleating about consciousness not being an illusion is sidestepping this point in order to make your own.  You're misrepresenting what the eliminative materialists are saying just so you can make a point.

Your subjective experience™ is real, OFC it is, it's just not what you think it is?

Right, it's not an illusion regardless of how mistaken about the details of it I am. Same with you. Your subjective experience is not an illusion, it's a reality. And yet Dennett claims that consciousness is an illusion because he thinks subjective experience is incompatible with science. Which is an irrelevant conclusion because the reality of subjective experience is much more knowable than science is.

If all the details of your description of something are in error, then are you in fact describing that thing?  This is the point where eliminative materialists diverge from your naive realism.  There is a whole field, phenomenology, devoted to describing what this 'seeming to be' is like, and the question is, does anything objectively real correspond to that description?  The eliminative materialist says no, but your only response has been to change the subject to be about some ineffable 'seeming' that doesn't, apparently, have any description.  It just is.  And to argue that point -- a point that nobody but you is disputing -- you've marshaled nothing but your incredulity.  Despite your inestimable verbiage arguing that some ineffable seeming must exist, that is not the position which the eliminative materialist is disputing.  She is saying that your/our descriptions of that seeming are wrong.  Consciousness is described as a seeming that is located inside the head at a precise point.  That* description of this seeming is in error.  Consciousness is spread across space in the brain, so this pinpoint 'seeming' is necessarily wrong.  Once you get beyond your superficial definition that consciousness is an ineffable seeming, that's where descriptions start and the potential for illusion begins.  The problem is that you're not saying anything by mouthing the label 'consciousness' without a description.  Consciousness is that description.  You're simply using a placeholder for the thing and claiming that your placeholder cannot be in error.  Well, duh.  It's just a placeholder.  If you move beyond that placeholder into describing what consciousness actually is, then you open up the possibility that what you think (describe) consciousness is can be wrong.

He thinks that those traditional definitions of consciousness hinge on a naive understanding of the mind.  He's trying to explain the same thing as those, in his estimation, naive theories of mind are trying to explain...so he uses the shared term.  I guess he could have used a different word, but Ham, cmon...lol?

Yes he should have used a different word instead of pretending to be talking about consciousness.

Given that you're the one who keeps referring to vague and empty predicates about 'consciousness', you're not one to be pointing any fingers.

What ridiculous position?

The ridiculous position of pretending to talk about consciousness without talking about consciousness.

Here's a quote from Wikipedia, quoting John Searle

To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain

Searle is confused.  Dennett is referring to the objective characteristics of brains as being the foundation of the subjective experiences.  Searle is basically straw-manning Dennett in an attempt to make him look foolish.  The only person looking foolish here is Searle.

 

Why can't the specific aspects of specific types of specific descriptions of consciousness....what he is actually and explicitly addressing in that segment...be illusory?

For something to be an illusion it has to seem one way but be another way. Indeed we may seem to be experiencing many things and instead be experiencing many other things.. but the fact we are experiencing something cannot be an illusion. I.e. consciousness cannot be an illusion.

We could actually be dreaming right now. But we are experiencing something even if this is all a dream. The experience is not an illusion even if what we think is happening is. Obviously we really are experiencing this even if 'this' is not realling happening.

More vague and empty predicates.  You've just substituted the word 'experience' for consciousness.  Prove you're not using an empty predicate.  Describe to me what this mysterious 'experiencing' consists of?  You're just using a common phenomenon which is readily recognized as a placeholder for actually saying something concrete about the phenomenon.  And you back up your empty words with nothing but incredulity.  If you actually can manage to say something concrete about consciousness, maybe you'll have actually said something.  But instead, all we get are these appeals to the ineffable.  (Btw, there is some evidence that the 'experience' of dreams is remembered after the fact.  So the idea that you 'experience' a dream would be...  an illusion.)

Do you think that the experience you have, of how it feels to be the humonculus, will map to a discrete mental state analogous to the humonculus?

I don't have to have any theory of consciousness at all, Cartesian or non-Cartensian to be a realist about my subjective experience. All of that is irrelevant.

Of course it is, you'd rather stick to your empty predicates.

I know that I am really experiencing something. The fact I really am means it's not an illusion.

What would it mean for me to not really be experiencing anything at all? Do you realize that that's impossible without me being a philosophical zombie yet? Do you realize that Dennett is wrong about us all being zombies yet? Do you realize that not experiencing at all and only SEEMING to experience something is identical to REALLY experiencing something thereby making his whole claim that consciousness is an illusion utter nonsense?

Citation needed.  I haven't kept up with Dennett, but I doubt he says that we are philosophical zombies.

I understand that you're trying to have an argument with me about something entirely irrelevant to dennets statements as they regard -our- disagreement (you see, I;m not arguing that dennet is right, I;m suggesting that you are mistaken regarding the contents of dennet's position, for whatever reason).

I am not mistaken about Dennett's position. I am very familar about his position. He has literally said things like you can experience a red stripe that doesn't exist. That's nonsense. Even illusions exist, they just aren't real. He conflates illusoriness with nonexistence which is exactly what you falsely accused me of doing.

Citation needed. [emphasis mine]

[Edwardo Piet]

No, that's your claim, which you keep coming back to with little more than ad hominem and appeals to incredulity.

Nonsense. I've pointed out the category error, the fact subjective experience isn't being addressed because Dennett is literally redefining "consciousness" so that a philosophical zombie can be said to be as "conscious" as we are.

 Unless consciousness is an impenetrable mystery, then it can be described.  This is the bone which eliminative materialists have picked with you, that these descriptions do not map to an objective reality.  You bleating about consciousness not being an illusion is sidestepping this point in order to make your own.  You're misrepresenting what the eliminative materialists are saying just so you can make a point.

Yes of course consciousness doesn't map onto ontologically objective reality because consciousness is ontologically subjective. It doesn't have to map onto it. The reality is that subjective experience exists.

If all the details of your description of something are in error, then are you in fact describing that thing?

I can be completely wrong about what I am conscious of but I can't be completely wrong about the fact I am conscious of something

Given that you're the one who keeps referring to vague and empty predicates about 'consciousness', you're not one to be pointing any fingers.

There's nothing vague about being a realist about the fact subjective experience itself cannot be an illusion. We can be mistaken about what we're experiencing but we cannot be mistaken about that we're experiencing.

Searle is confused.  Dennett is referring to the objective characteristics of brains as being the foundation of the subjective experiences.  Searle is basically straw-manning Dennett in an attempt to make him look foolish.  The only person looking foolish here is Searle.

Nonsense. Dennett literally redefines consciousness and pretends to address it. The fact that Dennett thinks he has to be an elimatitvist about consciousness because it's subjective and science is objective betrays the category error he is making that Searle pointed out.

 

More vague and empty predicates.  You've just substituted the word 'experience' for consciousness.

Consciousness is subjective experience.

 Prove you're not using an empty predicate.  Describe to me what this mysterious 'experiencing' consists of?

Irrelevant. It doesn't matter what I'm experiencing or how wrong I am about it. I am still just addressing the fact that I am experiencing something and my experiencing itself cannot be an illusion.

As I have already asked... if all conscious experience is an illusion then what would it mean if it wasn't an illusion? There's literally no distinction if you say it's all an illusion, that's nonsense.

An illusion is something that appears to be some way but in reality is another way. But with subjective experience the way it is is how it appears. Even the illusions themselves still appear in our consciousness. To say they're not 'really' part of our conscious makes no sense whatsoever. We're conscious of illusions. This is all our consciousness. Dennett merely finds it easier to redefine consciousness into something easier for him to tackle. He thinks there is no hard problem because he's defined his way out of it rather than actually addressed it.

 (Btw, there is some evidence that the 'experience' of dreams is remembered after the fact.  So the idea that you 'experience' a dream would be...  an illusion.)

Wrong. It doesn't matter if it's remembered after the fact or not, the memory itself is still an experience. We may not have experienced it when we thought we did, and may not have dreamed it when we think we did, but what we think of is still being experienced. We can be completely wrong about what we are experiencing but we can't be wrong about that we are experiencing. That's literally impossible. Merely thinking or realizing we're wrong about our experience is itself an experience. An illusion of an experience is itself an experience, making the illusion in itself an illusion which means it isn't really an illusion at all. Not really not real=real. Double negative makes a positive you know.

Again, an illusion is something that appears one way but is different in reality. When we're talking about the reality of appearances themselves you can't make that distinction.

Of course it is, you'd rather stick to your empty predicates.

And you'd rather pretend it makes any sense whatsoever to say that your subjective experience is an "illusion" or that your consciousness is not subjective experience.

I am not mistaken about Dennett's position. I am very familar about his position. He has literally said things like you can experience a red stripe that doesn't exist. That's nonsense. Even illusions exist, they just aren't real. He conflates illusoriness with nonexistence which is exactly what you falsely accused me of doing.

Citation needed. [emphasis mine]

Here's your citation. Go to 13:13





He says you are experiencing a red stripe... but there is no red stripe you are experiencing. It only seems that you are experiencing a red stripe.

That makes zero sense. Even though the red stripe is an illusion there's still is a red stripe you are experiencing. It's an illusory red stripe. The red stripe illusion exists in the form of neurons in your brain that produce the illusion of a red stripe that you experience. Duh.

He conflates illustriousness and nonexistence. Exactly as I said. See.

He decides, in his own words, to "quine" the reds stripe and he defines quining as "to deny the existence of something real or important." He literally admits to denying the existence of something real or important. Denying the existence of something important is bad enough... but to deny the existence of something real? That's utterly ridiculous. Denying the existence of something non-illusory? Seriously?

He needs to realize that words mean things and he can't just redefine anything and pretend to still make sense. Sure he can make sense of something but he can't make sense of the thing he is supposed to be addressing if he literally addresses something else and merely labels it with the same word. This isn't rocket science.

He says you can experience something that doesn't exist. That's literally the very definition of conflating nonexistence and illusoriness.

[bennyboy]

OFC you can describe it as such, eliminative materialists take issue with those descriptions, not that you have a feeling.  

In any case, that subtle sort of compatibilist free will isn't really the sort of free will I was touching on.  I'm simply presenting the feeling we have of a classical free will as something that, under specific circumstances (in that case a hard determinist universe), would not only be in error, but be non-existent.  It would be something else that we were experiencing, and then attributing whatever that was to our free will.  As such, we'd never find the "free will" mental state, or the free will neuron, or the free will bundle, or the free will region, because it didn't (and couldn't) exist.  It didn't map to a specific, discrete process or structure.  

How can a label for a feeling be an error? If I felt a sunset was beautiful, and also a statue, but they lit up different neural systems, would you then claim that beauty is an illusion, since there's no definite "beauty state, neuron, bundle or region?"

You mention "classical free will," but could you explain what that means to you? I've found a lot of contradictory ideas but the dominant Christian view (which I guess you're taking as classical) is that God chooses not to directly control the behaviors of man in guiding him toward a fateful end: instead, man is able to control the outcome of his life by making decisions. Is it your view that I don't make decisions, or that they can affect the outcome of my life? Or do you equate determinism with a kind of fatalism-- my end is already writ in stone, because each moment in time can unfold in one and only one way?

[Edwardo Piet]

Classical free will=libertarian contra-causal free will that requires oneself to be causa sui. An incoherent concept. As opposed to the compatabilist conception of free will which is perfectly logically coherent but also perfectly compatible with determinism because it's a trivially true labelling of ordinary willpower that addresses a non-question and non-problem instead of the problem of free will versus determinism which is a very real problem with a very real answer (the answer is that the kind of free will most people believe in doesn't exist. That's a problem for many people. Perhaps it shouldn't be... but labelling what they do have as "free will" doesn't actually do anything. That's just a label (It's like looking at something other than subjective experience and labelling it "consciousness" )).

[Angrboda]

No, that's your claim, which you keep coming back to with little more than ad hominem and appeals to incredulity.

Nonsense. I've pointed out the category error, the fact subjective experience isn't being addressed because Dennett is literally redefining "consciousness" so that a philosophical zombie can be said to be as "conscious" as we are.

What category error? You're just spewing philosophical terms without any substance behind them.

 Unless consciousness is an impenetrable mystery, then it can be described.  This is the bone which eliminative materialists have picked with you, that these descriptions do not map to an objective reality.  You bleating about consciousness not being an illusion is sidestepping this point in order to make your own.  You're misrepresenting what the eliminative materialists are saying just so you can make a point.

Yes of course consciousness doesn't map onto ontologically objective reality because consciousness is ontologically subjective. It doesn't have to map onto it. The reality is that subjective experience exists.

More philosobabble that doesn't mean anything. Ontologically subjective? Wtf does that even mean?

If all the details of your description of something are in error, then are you in fact describing that thing?

I can be completely wrong about what I am conscious of but I can't be completely wrong about the fact I am conscious of something

The real debate has passed you by. Dennett gets into it in the video, but that apparently is beyond you.

Given that you're the one who keeps referring to vague and empty predicates about 'consciousness', you're not one to be pointing any fingers.

There's nothing vague about being a realist about the fact subjective experience itself cannot be an illusion. We can be mistaken about what we're experiencing but we cannot be mistaken about that we're experiencing.

Well, ignoring the straw man for the moment, you've yet to give any reason why this might be so. When you step beyond your empty predicates, it turns out you're not saying anything at all about consciousness and its character.

Searle is confused.  Dennett is referring to the objective characteristics of brains as being the foundation of the subjective experiences.  Searle is basically straw-manning Dennett in an attempt to make him look foolish.  The only person looking foolish here is Searle.

Nonsense. Dennett literally redefines consciousness and pretends to address it. The fact that Dennett thinks he has to be an elimatitvist about consciousness because it's subjective and science is objective betrays the category error he is making that Searle pointed out.

You wouldn't know a category error if it bit you in the ass. Searle did no such thing, he merely unveiled his prejudice against third hand knowledge of subjective experiencing. I really think this entire subject is simply too subtle for you. That's why you keep bleating empty slogans.

 

 Prove you're not using an empty predicate.  Describe to me what this mysterious 'experiencing' consists of?

Irrelevant. It doesn't matter what I'm experiencing or how wrong I am about it. I am still just addressing the fact that I am experiencing something and my experiencing itself cannot be an illusion.

As I have already asked... if all conscious experience is an illusion then what would it mean if it wasn't an illusion? There's literally no distinction if you say it's all an illusion, that's nonsense.

It would mean that the model by which the brain represents its own process to itself is accurate. Since it isn't and cannot be, then the 'what' of conscious experience is an illusion. It's that simple. And your continual redirecting conversation to sentences devoid of any real meaning is just a distraction.

An illusion is something that appears to be some way but in reality is another way. But with subjective experience the way it is is how it appears.

This is unsubstantiated nonsense. We've already discussed ways in which it appears that cannot be the way in which it is.

 (Btw, there is some evidence that the 'experience' of dreams is remembered after the fact.  So the idea that you 'experience' a dream would be...  an illusion.)

Wrong. It doesn't matter if it's remembered after the fact or not, the memory itself is still an experience. We may not have experienced it when we thought we did, and may not have dreamed it when we think we did, but what we think of is still being experienced. We can be completely wrong about what we are experiencing but we can't be wrong about that we are experiencing. That's literally impossible. Merely thinking or realizing we're wrong about our experience is itself an experience. An illusion of an experience is itself an experience, making the illusion in itself an illusion which means it isn't really an illusion at all. Not really not real=real. Double negative makes a positive you know.

Now you're just equivocating. A part of the description of consciousness is that it is occurring in the now. That's obviously not the case if you are experiencing a memory of an event rather than experiencing the event.

I am not mistaken about Dennett's position. I am very familar about his position. He has literally said things like you can experience a red stripe that doesn't exist. That's nonsense. Even illusions exist, they just aren't real. He conflates illusoriness with nonexistence which is exactly what you falsely accused me of doing.

Citation needed. [emphasis mine]

Here's your citation. Go to 13:13





He says you are experiencing a red stripe... but there is no red stripe you are experiencing. It only seems that you are experiencing a red stripe.

That makes zero sense. Even though the red stripe is an illusion there's still is a red stripe you are experiencing. It's an illusory red stripe. The red stripe illusion exists in the form of neurons in your brain that produce the illusion of a red stripe that you experience. Duh.

He conflates illustriousness and nonexistence. Exactly as I said. See.

He decides, in his own words, to "quine" the reds stripe and he defines quining as "to deny the existence of something real or important." He literally admits to denying the existence of something real or important. Denying the existence of something important is bad enough... but to deny the existence of something real? That's utterly ridiculous. Denying the existence of something non-illusory? Seriously?

You're seriously misrepresenting what Dennett was saying. I watched until the 30 minute mark, and he hadn't yet finished the point he started making at 13:13. You took an isolated segment out of a longer explanation and declared your misquote as his meaning. You're being unfair to Dennett and terribly dishonest. If that is what you think he said, in context, I can only conclude that you're incompetent to interpret anything Dennett says. (He makes the same point Rhythm and I have been making between between 45:40 and 49:30.)

He says you can experience something that doesn't exist. That's literally the very definition of conflating nonexistence and illusoriness.

That isn't even close to conflating the two, as he's talking about different levels of description of the experience. The red stripe does not in fact exist in the world at large. Your experience and things in the world at large are two entirely separate subjects. If you mess up something this simple so badly, I have little hope you will ever understand Dennett or eliminative materialism.

[bennyboy]

Classical free will=libertarian contra-causal free will that requires oneself to be causa sui. An incoherent concept.

You might already have given links, but it's a long thread.  Would you mind demonstrating that there's such a definition of free will?

[Edwardo Piet]

What category error?  You're just spewing philosophical terms without any substance behind them.

The category error I pointed out that Searle pointed out where Dennett conflates ontological subjectivity with epistemic subjectivity, thereby thinking that if something isn't objective scientifically then it can't be real and has to be an illusion.

More philosobabble that doesn't mean anything.  Ontologically subjective?  Wtf does that even mean?

You don't know what ontologically subjective means? How is that my problem? You have Google.

The real debate has passed you by.  Dennett gets into it in the video, but that apparently is beyond you.

Arguments from authority and merely spouting that I don't understand and outright assertions that he gets into it but it's "beyond me". I expected better from you than that.

I notice you fail to address the fact it makes zero sense to say that one is experiencing something nonexistent.

Well, ignoring the straw man for the moment, you've yet to give any reason why this might be so.  When you step beyond your empty predicates, it turns out you're not saying anything at all about consciousness and its character.

I don't have to say anything about consciousness to know that I am experiencing something. I have direct first person awareness of my own subjective experience. I can be completely wrong about what I am experiencing but I can't be wrong about the fact that I am experiencing.

You are effectively saying that I haven't shown that a square has four sides.

You wouldn't know a category error if it bit you in the ass.

How utterly absurd. My greatest intellectual strength is in spotting irrelevant equivocations.

It's ironic that you say all I offer is my own incredulity when I make logical arguments and you respond by saying that Dennett gets into it but it's beyond me and I wouldn't know a cateogry error if it bit me in the ass. All you offer is your own incredulity and bare assertions that I can't know that my own consciousness isn't an illusion. Completely ignoring all my arguments about how it makes zero sense to say that consciousness itself is an illusion regardless of the fact that what we are conscious of may not be what we think we are conscious of. Once again, the fact that we are conscious is not an illusion even if what we are conscious of is not what we think we are conscious of.

Being conscious of something else is still really being conscious of something. Even being conscious of an illusion is really being conscious of an illusion.

Searle did no such thing, he merely unveiled his prejudice against third hand knowledge of subjective experiencing.

He is the one making a distinction between first and third hand knowledge whereas Dennett acts as if first hand experience isn't real and that all that matters is third person knowledge.

I really think this entire subject is simply too subtle for you.  That's why you keep bleating empty slogans.

It's not about beating empty slogans it's about repeating basic logical tautologies while you insist that a square can be circular and all you offer in response is saying that Dennett gets into it but it's beyond me and you outright assert that I wouldn't know a category error if it bit me in the ass even though I've pointed them out repeatedly already.

You literally say Dennett gets into it afterwards, without backing up how he gets into it when he's already said that he thinks it's possible to experience something nonexistent (which is as nonsensical an expressiion as something can get)... and I've explained my views on what he's saying but you just say he gets into it but it's beyond me.

Bare assertions that I don't understand or it's too subtle me or I wouldn't know a category error if it bit me in the ass is what I get from you.

Far from the subject being too subtle for me: no wonder you don't understand the category error in question if you ask me what ontologically subjective "even means". That's the category error I'm addressing and you are insiting Searle is wrong when you don't even know what it means? Talk about the argument from ignorance, Jor. It's got your name on it right now.

Don't ask me what something "even means" and yet at the same time tell me it's not a category error. Is it not an error to you because you don't understand it?

 And your continual redirecting conversation to sentences devoid of any real meaning is just a distraction.

Here you go again with merely asserting that I'm talking philosophical babble without any meaning without actually addressing it.

So it's perfectly okay to assert that I'm saying things without any "real meaning" and to assert that it's not a category error when you don't even know what the category error I'm addressing even means, but when I spell out logically repeatedly why the argument that consciousness itself is an illusion is false by definition I'm just asserting empty claims?

This is unsubstantiated nonsense.  We've already discussed ways in which it appears that cannot be the way in which it is.

You're asking for a third-person substantiation of first-person expereince. So it's your position that's nonsense. This is the category error I'm talking about.

The reality of subjective experience doesn't need to be and cannot be substantiated objectively. That's the whole point. You're not going to substantiate it by addressing something else and giving it the same label.

No we haven't discussed ways in which the reality that we expereince things is an illusion. We have only discussed ways in which the reality of what things we experience can be an illusion in the sense that we can be experiencing other things. You prove my point here:

It would mean that the model by which the brain represents its own process to itself is accurate.  Since it isn't and cannot be, then the 'what' of conscious experience is an illusion.  It's that simple.

This is what I have been saying all along. The WHAT is an illusion but not the THAT.

Now you're just equivocating.  A part of the description of consciousness is that it is occurring in the now.  That's obviously not the case if you are experiencing a memory of an event rather than experiencing the event.

My point went right over your head then. The point is it doesn't matter what you are experiencing or when you are experiencing it.... the fact that you experience anything at all at any time cannot be an illusion. If I think I remember something but it's a false memory about something that never even happened... the experience of that false memory about something that didn't happen is itself an experience that I'm really experiencing.

We can be wrong about the when and the what but we can't be wrong about the that. That's the whole point.

You and Dennett are confusing essence with existence and conflating illusoriness with nonexistence. We can be completely wrong about the essence and reality of something but that doesn't mean we're not experiencing something even if what we are experiencing is completely illusory and not what we think it is and didn't happen when we thought it happened. Even if what we think the experience refers to or represents didn't happen at all, the illusion of it at least happens at the time when we experience that illusion. Illusions are experiential by their very nature.

You're seriously misrepresenting what Dennett was saying.  I watched until the 30 minute mark, and he hadn't yet finished the point he started making at 13:13.  You took an isolated segment out of a longer explanation and declared your misquote as his meaning.  You're being unfair to Dennett and terribly dishonest.  If that is what you think he said, in context, I can only conclude that you're incompetent to interpret anything Dennett says.

This is very pathetic of you. Once again you just tell me I need to watch more and I don't understand rather than bother to explain anything like I have. I've watched that whole talk and you merely assert that I do not understand it.

When your arguments really fail you just resort to telling me it's beyond my understanding. And yet you're the one failing intellectually here.

Tell me how the very notion of experiencing something that doesn't exist can make sense in any way at all without conflating illusioriness with nonexistence.

That isn't even close to conflating the two, as he's talking about different levels of description of the experience.  The red stripe does not in fact exist in the world at large.

Wrong he said it doesn't exist in your brain either. Obviously the illusion of the red stripe exists in the form of neurons.

And yes saying that something is experienced that isn't even there to be experienced is indeed exactly conflating illusoriness with nonexistence. it makes no sense to say you're experiencing something that isn't there in the world or in your brain. If there's nothing there to be experienced then nothing is there to be experienced. Duh. You can't even experience the illusion of something that isn't there at least in your brain in illusory form.

Your experience and things in the world at large are two entirely separate subjects.

Of course they are. And yet he says the illusory afterimage of the red stripe doesn't exist in the world or in your brain. And he still says you are experiencing it. That isn't possible if it doesn't even exist as an illusion in your brain. If that's not conflating illustriousness with nonexistence then nothing is.

 If you mess up something this simple so badly, I have little hope you will ever understand Dennett or eliminative materialism.

You don't even know what "ontological subjectivity" means and yet you still claim Dennett isn't making an error you don't even understand.

If you can't grasp modal logic and the absoluteness of the logical absolutes being true in all universes, and you can't grasp the fact that the real/illusory distinction between real appearances and illusory appearances can't be applied to the entirety of the reality of subjective appearance itself to any real subject... and if you above all don't even understand the arguments I am making then I have little hope for you ever understanding the errors Dennett is making.

Seen as you don't know what ontological subjectivity "even means", here you go:

Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective. Thus, "McKinley is prettier than Everest" is "epistemically subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective." In other words, the latter statement is evaluable (in fact, falsifiable) by an understood ('background') criterion for mountain height, like 'the summit is so many meters above sea level'. No such criteria exist for prettiness.

Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena (including all conscious experiences) that are ontologically subjective, i.e. can only exist as subjective experience. For example, although it might be subjective or objective in the epistemic sense, a doctor's note that a patient suffers from back pain is an ontologically objective claim: it counts as a medical diagnosis only because the existence of back pain is "an objective fact of medical science". But the pain itself is ontologically subjective: it is only experienced by the person having it.

Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality". His view that the epistemic and ontological senses of objective/subjective are cleanly separable is crucial to his self-proclaimed biological naturalism.

My bold. But I strongly suspect you will once again just assert that something you don't understand is "psychobabble" or tell me things are beyond my understanding since you've got no actual argument.

To be honest you should be able to work out what "ontologically subjective" 'even means' by simply putting the words "ontologically" and "subjective" together and seeing what that means like when someone says anything else to you, but clearly you somehow aren't capable of doing that.

i.e. You should know what "ontologically subjective" means simply by knowing what each word means and putting them together...

It refers to the ontology of subjects as opposed to the ontology of objects. The ontology of first person experience as opposed to third person facts. As opposed to epistemic subjectivity which refers to something that is epistemically unobjective rather than epistemically objective. Ontology is about the question of existence and being and epistemology is about knowledge and theories of justification. This is basic philosophy we're talking about. Just because something ontologically subjective can't be accessed objectively in an epistemic sense doesn't mean that it doesn't really exist at least subjectively in an ontological sense, that's the whole point. That's the category error.