Consciousness Trilemma

[bennyboy]

This is especially so in the case of a material monist view, since there's no observation that can be made about the minds of others without begging the question.

This gave me a great way to bring you round to the fold.  You have a penchant for stating that materialism cannot, for example, explain consciousness.  This, in your estimation, is indicative of some problem with materialism.  Eliminative materialists agree that many explanations of consciousness -cannot- explain consciousness, because, from an eliminative materialist's pov..what they describe is not only not happening, it can't happen.  

Where you see a problem with materialism, they see a problem with the description.

I describe consciousness as the awareness of the fact of awareness.  In fact, I don't define it as that-- the word is is a label FOR that. I know that I am conscious in this way, because it's the only way in which a person can be said to be conscious.

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Label it how you like, the fact is that these ideas or impressions occur concurrently with the experience of the intentional subject.  They can be made into ideas when we talk about them or when we introspect, but these ideas are still there while you're experiencing contemplation of an intentional subject.  Introducing a semantic distinction does not in and of itself introduce a phenomenological distinction.  The phenomenological picture is that we are aware of being aware while we are aware of other things.

I don't agree that those ideas ARE intrinsically there. Ideas about self, about physical systems, and even about the nature of consciousness represent the content of conscious experience, not the awareness that one is experiencing.

This consciousness-as-object really isn't consciousness at all.  It's an idea of consciousness, a component of the world view.  As I said to Hammy, this isn't so much a theory of mind as an extension of the other components of one's world view.

Now you're making an empty semantic argument.  The fact that these distinctions can appear as intentional subjects is no evidence that when they appear in the phenomenology of consciousness that they do so as intentional subjects.  They do not.  They appear as qualia having an apparent referent of consciousness itself.  It's not a theory of mind, it's just an observation of what is present in the contents of consciousness at any time.

That "observation of what is present in the contents of the consciousness at any time" is better simply called "world view." And this represents the content of experience, which may be called illusory if it doesn't map well to something in reality.

What I call consciousness, the state of awareness of the fact of awareness, is not contingent on the nature of ideas or experiences.

This is especially so in the case of a material monist view, since there's no observation that can be made about the minds of others without begging the question.

Ho hum.  And this has what to do with the point under discussion?

It demonstrates that proposition (3) is founded on philosophical assumptions which beg the question. (3) may be correct, but it cannot be known to be so.

[The Grand Nudger]

I describe consciousness as the awareness of the fact of awareness.  In fact, I don't define it as that-- the word is is a label FOR that.  I know that I am conscious in this way, because it's the only way in which a person can be said to be conscious.

Except that this isn't true.  You -can't- be aware, in the present tense, of awareness. What you "know", simply is not, and could not be. Maybe you remember being aware of some moment far enough back in time for all pursuant processing to have occurred and you -call- that past moment the present moment, the moment in which you are currently "aware of being aware"....but? You can't be aware of being aware, even in the barest sense as you're describing it here.....for the simple fact that processing takes time - and it pays to remember that this particular comment was aimed at a..shall we say..fuller(?) description of consciousness?

OTOH, it can certainly -seem- as though you are. It seems that way to me too. It's just that this very awareness is misrepresenting itself. Eliminative materialists aren';t disputing the compelling nature of the experience of awareness as it presents itself to us, that you..personally, "know" this. They doubt that this experience will, or even can map to a discrete mental state. They doubt that what you know from your experience is (or can be) any more accurate (or reliable) with regards to itself than the misrepresentation.

[Edwardo Piet]

Except that this isn't true.  You -can't- be aware, in the present tense, of awareness.

I know what you're trying to say... but you're failing to say it.

Consciousness takes time to come into effect so when we experience it we experience it after the corresponding brain areas produce it. That doesn't change the fact that when we experience it we experience it when we experience it. And any given point in time it is present at that time. To say that it is never experienced in present tense is just nonsense. All tenses are experienced in present tense at some time. The future will become present in the future when it reaches what will be the present. The past used to be present but has passed. It's not rocket science.

You may as well say that the present doesn't exist because it would be an indivisible instant ant time requires motion.

But the reality of the matter is that the present is presently moving. It's a pulsating present. There is not just the present in the sense of what "happens" generally but here is also the present in the sense of happening. Present time is presently in motion.

The past and the future are what don't exist now they exist in the past and the future respectively. Presentism is true.

And the ridiculous notion that science supports Eternalism is simply a failure to understand that science can only ever test reality phenomenologically and the experience of time and it can never test reality noumenologically or time itself, by definition that is unverfiiable, unreachable, untestable and unfalsfiable. Science tests how we experience objective reality it doesn't test objective reality itself. Scientists measure what they experience including their experiences of the tools they use to measure, and their observations of those tools (even a telescope requires human eyes to use, for example. Even equations and calculations and computer screens require human eyes and observations of those results, for example). Science deals with phenomenal reality not noumenal reality. Science cannot support an eternalist theory of time it can only support an eternalist theory of the experience of time.

[The Grand Nudger]

I know what you're trying to say... but you're failing to say it.

Consciousness takes time to come into effect so when we experience it we experience it after the corresponding brain areas produce it. That doesn't change the fact that when we experience it we experience it when we experience it.

This would be to equate memory with experience, and, in this case, consciousness.....which I'm fine with (dennet would be fine with that too)...though you might want to rethink it.......

You may as well say that the present doesn't exist because it would be an indivisible instant ant time requires motion.

Why would I say that?  I'm confident that our experience describes -some- moment that was once present...but that doesn't change the fact that my very -experience- of experiencing...as being aware in the moment of awareness, for example, is necesarrily an illusion.  You've agreed to that much already, just in the above.  Yes, whenever we experience something we experience it, whatever that means....but if we have a misapprehension about that it;s not exactly the same as misremembering the time as being 1pm instead of am...it;s a phantom experience of some present moment that no longer exists, a present experience that cannot -be- what oit purports to be. That makes..to take jorgs phrase, the witness highly impeachable.

But the reality of the matter is that the present is presently moving. It's a pulsating present. There is not just the present in the sense of what "happens" generally but here is also the present in the sense of happening. Present time is presently in motion.

What present?  Processing takes time.  You can only possibly have experienced a past moment, and there's no guarantee that whatever you remember experiencing was even -that- .  If you have to spin off into some novel theory of time to rescue your non-criticisms of the eliminativist position I think you might have completely lost the thread.

[bennyboy]

I describe consciousness as the awareness of the fact of awareness.  In fact, I don't define it as that-- the word is is a label FOR that.  I know that I am conscious in this way, because it's the only way in which a person can be said to be conscious.

Except that this isn't true.  You -can't- be aware, in the present tense, of awareness.  What you "know", simply is not, and could not be.  Maybe you remember being aware of some moment far enough back in time for all pursuant processing to have occurred and you -call- that past moment the present moment, the moment in which you are currently "aware of being aware"....but?   You can't be aware of being aware, even in the barest sense as you're describing it here.....for the simple fact that processing takes time - and it pays to remember that this particular comment was aimed at a..shall we say..fuller(?) description of consciousness?

OTOH, it can certainly -seem- as though you are.  It seems that way to me too.  It's just that this very awareness is misrepresenting itself.  Eliminative materialists aren';t disputing the compelling nature of the experience of awareness as it presents itself to us, that you..personally, "know" this.   They doubt that this experience will, or even can map to a discrete mental state.  They doubt that what you know from your experience is (or can be) any more accurate (or reliable) with regards to itself than the misrepresentation.

We can't say that consciousness lags behind brain function and also that it IS brain function, since a thing cannot lag behind itself.  In a monist view, the consciousness must be exactly synchonized with the brain function since they are said to be one and the same, n'est-ce pas?

I think you mean that the things we experience are in the past, not that the consciousness which experiences them is.

[Whateverist]

Wow this certainly has gone on a long time.

Have to say I don't see how one can be directly aware of being aware. If anyone thinks otherwise, perhaps they can provide a 'blow by blow' description of what that would be like.

Even when one becomes self-conscious in the not desirable way, really what is going on is imagining how one appears to another. One could stare at his hand or focus on ones breathing or the pressure of ones weight. But exactly what is it one would focus on to be aware directly of being aware? If it is the thought that one is aware, then is it the language one is focused on or the idea? Lets be generous and say it is the idea. Even so the idea too is a construction and if that is your focus then it isn't your consciousness itself which you are aware of but that construction.

Trying to apprehend one's awareness directly is like trying to bite one's tooth or peer directly into ones eye. With what would you do it?

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We can't say that consciousness lags behind brain function and also that it IS brain function, since a thing cannot lag behind itself.

What's hard about that? Consciousness and brain function aren't an identity. The latter gives rise to the former, so of course it lags behind. There is preconscious processing to be done before consciousness of anything can arise. You can sit there humming your "be here now" or "I am awareness" mantra if you like but the decision to do so will be the result of prior processing too.

In a monist view, the consciousness must be exactly synchonized with the brain function since they are said to be one and the same, n'est-ce pas?

I think you mean that the things we experience are in the past, not that the consciousness which experiences them is.

A monist's problems aren't my problems. Why do you say they are one and the same?

[The Grand Nudger]

Except that this isn't true.  You -can't- be aware, in the present tense, of awareness.  What you "know", simply is not, and could not be.  Maybe you remember being aware of some moment far enough back in time for all pursuant processing to have occurred and you -call- that past moment the present moment, the moment in which you are currently "aware of being aware"....but?   You can't be aware of being aware, even in the barest sense as you're describing it here.....for the simple fact that processing takes time - and it pays to remember that this particular comment was aimed at a..shall we say..fuller(?) description of consciousness?

OTOH, it can certainly -seem- as though you are.  It seems that way to me too.  It's just that this very awareness is misrepresenting itself.  Eliminative materialists aren';t disputing the compelling nature of the experience of awareness as it presents itself to us, that you..personally, "know" this.   They doubt that this experience will, or even can map to a discrete mental state.  They doubt that what you know from your experience is (or can be) any more accurate (or reliable) with regards to itself than the misrepresentation.

We can't say that consciousness lags behind brain function and also that it IS brain function, since a thing cannot lag behind itself.  In a monist view, the consciousness must be exactly synchonized with the brain function since they are said to be one and the same, n'est-ce pas?

I think you mean that the things we experience are in the past, not that the consciousness which experiences them is.

We must say it, or we are saying something self-contradictory.  A person cannot be self aware "in the now" by any coherent materialistic description.  Hence, its' not -just- the content of experience about which we are mistaken.....but the nature of experience itself.  How it feels to feel (x - anything) must be in error, or we're wrong about, literally, everything. We;d have to be wrong about time to be right about the aspects of consciousness, for example.

Obviously, a person can go more than two ways with that.  I'm merely pointing out instances of agreement between two otherwise competing viewpoints, in the above.

[bennyboy]

Wow this certainly has gone on a long time.
Have to say I don't see how one can be directly aware of being aware.  If anyone thinks otherwise, perhaps they can provide a 'blow by blow' description of what that would be like.  

Sure. When I wake up, I begin to have a flood of memories, ideas and sensations, and I'm aware of this fact.

We can't say that consciousness lags behind brain function and also that it IS brain function, since a thing cannot lag behind itself.

What's hard about that?  Consciousness and brain function aren't an identity.  The latter gives rise to the former, so of course it lags behind.  There is preconscious processing to be done before consciousness of anything can arise.  You can sit there humming your "be here now" or "I am awareness" mantra if you like but the decision to do so will be the result of prior processing too.

You are talking about the complex process of building content for the conscious mind to experience. Since this takes time, the content of experience must necessarily lag behind the moment. But unless you are suggesting time travel, that-which-is conscious must be operating in the present.

It is precisely for this reason that the content of experience and the awareness of awareness cannot be conflated.

In a monist view, the consciousness must be exactly synchonized with the brain function since they are said to be one and the same, n'est-ce pas?

I think you mean that the things we experience are in the past, not that the consciousness which experiences them is.

A monist's problems aren't my problems.  Why do you say they are one and the same?

Something must exist in the present, or we are in a serious paradox, indeed. Our experiences might be about the past, but to say we are actually experiencing IN the past is a pretty strange idea, since it means we are biological time machines.

Therefore the experiences and the experiencer cannot be the same-- that-which-experiences cannot compose sensations in a zero amount of time, and the experiences which are presented cannot actually be experienced at any moment except now.

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We must say it, or we are saying something self-contradictory.  A person cannot be self aware "in the now" by any coherent materialistic description.

This is fair enough. The idea of self, if it is to be experienced, must be fed to that which is conscious through a series of memory and other brain functions.

But cut the "self," and I'd argue that all awareness must be in the present-- it's just awareness OF things that happened (or at least were processed) in the past.

[The Grand Nudger]

---

We must say it, or we are saying something self-contradictory.  A person cannot be self aware "in the now" by any coherent materialistic description.

This is fair enough.  The idea of self, if it is to be experienced, must be fed to that which is conscious through a series of memory and other brain functions.

But cut the "self," and I'd argue that all awareness must be in the present-- it's just awareness OF things that happened (or at least were processed) in the past.

Delaying the inevitable reduction, in the view eliminative materialists.  If consciousness is a story told about past processing, you aren't experiencing anything in the moment, not even being presently aware of past moments.  The feeling of being presently aware -is- one of those narratives of past processing.

The self, in that viewpoint, has been described as the center of gravity of that post processing narrative. It;s not an actual thing, or even an event that actually occurred. It's just the binding referent that makes all of the narratives applicable to the viewer. In this way, it's a useful fiction. A beneficial (or at least neutral) user-illusion, as it were.

As to something being fed to that which is conscious, that, in the view of eliminative materialists, is an incoherent proposition from the outset. What is the concious bit, and what is the unconscious bit? What is being fed to what, at what point does information processing become consciousness? An eliminative materialist might say that there is no such point. There is no there in there, and no singular conscious entity being fed non-conscious processing, in there, either. Comments to that effect are an invocation of the cartesian theater, the humonculus. Subtle dualism.

In a monist view, the consciousness must be exactly synchonized with the brain function since they are said to be one and the same, n'est-ce pas?

Hardly? Eliminative materialism is a monist view, and does not require such synchronicity. In fact, it flatly denies that there is or can be any such synchronicity. Instead, it proposes that what we call consciousness is distributed in time and space, only cobbled together afterward (and not all at once even then) in seeming synchronicity. The seeming itself, not just the objects that seem like x or y, is flawed..and this is why consciousness is referred to, in that context, as illusory.

In the eliminative materialist view, consciousness-as-described and brain function -aren't- said to be one and the same. That's the defining proposition of the position..that some mental states that many of us believe in do not, will not, and cannot map to discrete mental states. They're not different things, or the same thing.....one of them is no-thing.....

Ergo, people trying to explain how that no-thing operates are always going to be in error. A giant waste of time, in their opinion. It's the very insistence on the reality of this fiction, and the insistence that this fiction is an unimpeachable object (even though all the other objects are impeachable............?), that inexorably leads to problems, and bad explanations. You, for example, maintain that materialism is wrong...because it can't explain the ghost in the machine (just one of your examples..granted). If there -is- no ghost in the machine to explain...what happens to that claim?

[bennyboy]

Delaying the inevitable reduction, in the view eliminative materialists.  If consciousness is a story told about past processing, you aren't experiencing anything in the moment, not even being presently aware of past moments.  The feeling of being presently aware -is- one of those narratives of past processing.

Even an illusion needs a host, since an illusion is a malformed perception. Tell me, who/what is experiencing the illusion? Does the illusion experience the illusion? This starts to sounds like philosophical Buddhism or Hinduism, and very much not like a material monist view of mind.

As to something being fed to that which is conscious, that, in the view of eliminative materialists, is an incoherent proposition from the outset.  What is the concious bit, and what is the unconscious bit?  What is being fed to what, at what point does information processing become consciousness?  An eliminative materialist might say that there is no such point.  There is no there in there, and no singular conscious entity being fed non-conscious processing, in there, either.  Comments to that effect are an invocation of the cartesian theater, the humonculus.  Subtle dualism.

This feels a bit like an appeal to ignorance-- we don't know exactly what/where that essential element of consciousness is so. . .

If you are saying that we are not conscious OF the past, but rather IN the past, then what does time even mean? Obviously, depending on where various sensations are sourced, they may have been in process for billions of years. Then the mind draws those sensations available to it at a given moment-- however old they may happen to be or how they were arrived that-- into a coordinated experience.

We don't need to know exactly how those sensations are drawn together, and it really only matters if you are trying to fit mind into a particular view of materialism which doesn't easily allow for it.

Hardly? Eliminative materialism is a monist view, and does not require such synchronicity. In fact, it flatly denies that there is or can be any such synchronicity. Instead, it proposes that what we call consciousness is distributed in time and space, only cobbled together afterward (and not all at once even then) in seeming synchronicity. The seeming itself, not just the objects that seem like x or y, is flawed..and this is why consciousness is referred to, in that context, as illusory.

Seeming can't be flawed, when we are talking about something which is defined by the fact of seeming. The fact is that if I experience things together, there is at least one context in which those things are together. You can pull the Monty Python parrot trick for a while, but trying to explain mind by saying that mind has got it all wrong isn't really going to get us very far.

If there -is- no ghost in the machine to explain...what happens to that claim?

Sometimes with enough words, you can obscure even the most basic truths from view, so that you take a world of ink as reality. Then you say-- see, X is nowhere to be seen!

I'm willing to take it as brute fact that mind is real. You can call it illusion if you want, but that's just a word. My response is simply to plug in the word "illusion" to all my interests and questions about the nature of mind. On what does this illusion rest? What is the exact mechanism of this illusion? What is it about the Universe that allows for this illusion? How will a material world view incorporate this illusion into a complete understanding of reality?

The same goes for "seeming," which is perfectly fine for me, because I'd define qualia as experiencing how things seem. Why is there seeming? From what processes does seeming arise, and in what way does the capacity for physical systems to experience "seeming" matter in the way the Universe grinds through its many processes?