Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[LadyForCamus]

For fuck’s sake; “common experience” tells us literally nothing about any possible objective features of reality that we have no access to. It might not even be accurate to talk as though such conditions ‘outside of the universe’ are possible, let alone have the confidence to say with any degree certainty which principles those possible conditions do or do not adhere to. This is absolutely silly.

[Jenny A]

I remember no such thing.  And I'm going to start here, because I find this statement flabergasting.   

We are rehashing things already discussed. I cannot possibly know what posts you have read. Here is the very first paragraph under the article of Inductive Reasoning:

Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

More likely than not is not the standard for premises in syllogisms.   (I'll get to whether your premises exceed that standard in minute). If your standard is, "more likely than not," then you are obliged to add more likely than not to each conclusion following from that premise.  If more than one of your premises is merely "more likely than not" the chances of  the conclusion following from those premises will fall below 50%.  For example, if the chance premise A is correct is 51% and the chance premise B is correct is also 51%, then the chances that they are both correct is just 26%. Even if the chances that each premise is correct are 70% the chances of both premises being correct drops to 49% and thus becomes less likely than not.

Just about everything in that paragraph is wrong--starting with your requirements about premises in a syllogism. Read the link above to learn more about an inductive argument. 

As to the percentage question, you do NOT multiply probabilities together to come up with a net probability in a syllogism. The conclusion's probability is equal to the lowest of the premise probabilities. Think about it--the more premises you have that are likely true would reduce the net probability if you multiplied them together. 

The proposition you have stated is:

All things that begin to exist have a cause
The universe began to exist
Therefore the universe had a cause

That is a syllogism.  Syllogisms use deductive reasoning from two or more propositions to reach a conclusion.  If the logic is sound, and all of the propositions are true, the the conclusion follows.  If any proposition is false the  syllogism  fails.  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/syllogism  http://philosophyterms.com/syllogism/  https://www.britannica.com/topic/syllogism  Look it up.

To determine the probability of two or more things all being true you multiply to probability of each thing together.  And yes the probability of both propositions being true will be the same if all chances are 100% nd lower if they are not.  https://www.mathplanet.com/education/pre...-of-events.  Look it up.  It's Pre Calc 101.

If you roll a pair of dice the chance of rolling a six is one in six for each die.  If you want to know what the chances are that at least on of the die will come up six, you add the probabilities together.  So, 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3. But, if you want to know what the chances are of both die rolling 6, you multiply the probabilites.p 1/6 × 1/6 = 1/36. 

Since both proposition 1 and two must be true for the conclusion to follow, it is correct to multiply the probability of the propositions together to determine the probability that the conclusion is proved as stated by the syllogism. 

The probability that your syllogism proves that the universe has a cause is dependant on both (1) everything that begins to exist having a cause, and  (2) the universe beginning to exist.  So to determine the likelihood that the syllogism proves that the universe has a cause we multiply the probability of the first two propositions together.

[Edit: Polymath correctly notes that the computation of the probability of the two propositions both being true would be affected if the the truth of one proposition makes the other proposition more or less likely. I agree. ]

Notice that I did not say that that gives us the absolute probability of whether the universe has a cause because there might other evidence besides your syllogism, that the universe has a cause.  Perhaps you might have inductive evidence that the universe has a cause?



I'll get to the rest of your response later.

[The Grand Nudger]

He thinks the kca -is- his inductive evidence that the universe has a cause...and that this cause is god.

[polymath257]

If you roll a pair of dice the chance of rolling a six is one in six for each die.  If you want to know what the chances are that at least on of the die will come up six, you add the probabilities together.  So, 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3. But, if you want to know what the chances are of both die rolling 6, you multiply the probabilites.p 1/6 × 1/6 = 1/36. 

Just a quibble:  if you roll two dice, the probability that at least one will be a 6 is 1-(5/6)*(5/6)=1-25/36=11/36. This is NOT 1/3. To correctly compute this probability, you have to first find the probability that *neither* got a 6 (i.e, both got 1 to 5) and then subtract that from 1 (the negation).

Alternatively, you can compute it via 1/6 + 1/6 - (1/6)*(1/6) = 1/3 - 1/36 =11/36. In your calculation, you neglected the probability of both getting a 6, thereby overestimating the probability slightly.

[SteveII]

Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

Do you or Craig have any evidence that the creation event did not occur immediately upon the necessary prior conditions being fulfilled?  Some theologians posit that there is no separation between God being and God creating.

If someone says there is no separation from God being to God creating our universe, they are claiming that God has not done anything else. I don't think such a limit is justified or even probable.

[Angrboda]

Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings...-argument/

Do you or Craig have any evidence that the creation event did not occur immediately upon the necessary prior conditions being fulfilled?  Some theologians posit that there is no separation between God being and God creating.

If someone says there is no separation from God being to God creating our universe, they are claiming that God has not done anything else. I don't think such a limit is justified or even probable.

I don't agree with your supposition here, but it doesn't matter anyway. Having had some time to think about Craig/Ghazali's argument, it's plain that it's a load of crap. By 'eternal' here, Craig/Ghazali are implying that God has existed for an endless or infinite amount of time. Thus the relevance of pointing out that the universe has existed a finite time. But that's not what it means to be timeless. This argument is nothing more than a bunch of confusion caused by an incoherent concept of God existing timelessly. If God exists timelessly, then there is no paradox between the universe being finite and the conditions for the creation of the universe existing because these things do not occur in time. God is and God creates. Those two events occur together in timeless existence, so Craig/Ghazali's argument about water freezing simply doesn't apply. What I find remarkable is that a philosopher who specializes in the theory of time could make such a boneheaded argument. Either Craig is demonstrating sheer incompetence or he is simply dishonestly making an argument of convenience here. Regardless, Craig/Ghazali's argument doesn't hold water, and so it can't be used as justification for the belief that the conclusion of the KCA is necessarily a 'personal' god.

[SteveII]

We are rehashing things already discussed. I cannot possibly know what posts you have read. Here is the very first paragraph under the article of Inductive Reasoning:



Just about everything in that paragraph is wrong--starting with your requirements about premises in a syllogism. Read the link above to learn more about an inductive argument. 

As to the percentage question, you do NOT multiply probabilities together to come up with a net probability in a syllogism. The conclusion's probability is equal to the lowest of the premise probabilities. Think about it--the more premises you have that are likely true would reduce the net probability if you multiplied them together. 

Actually, Jenny is more correct that you are here. If a premise is 100% certain, the multiplication (by 1.0) doesn't change the overall probability. If it is less than 100%, it does and should reduce the overall probability from that.
That said,the simple multiplication is only correct when the premises are probabilistically independent of each other. Otherwise, you multiply the *conditional* probabilities of each based on the previous ones to get the overall probability. The conditional probabilities can be very different than the non-conditional probability of each event.

That's simply not true with inductive premises and demonstrably so. 

For example, say you have 2 premises that make it likely that x is the case. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market. (actually, this is not an inductive premise, so there is not probability to assign. However you can assign 100% if you want). 
3. Therefore Today is Wednesday. (95%)

Now say we add premises to that. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market.
3. The street cleaners usually run on Wednesday (80%)
4. The street cleaner just went around the corner 
5. The garbage is picked up on Tuesday evening (80%)
6. The garbage cans in the alley are empty
7. Therefore today is Wednesday. 

According to your reasoning, the probability of today being Wednesday is 95% x 80% x 80% = 61%. What do you think the probability is that it is Wednesday? 

Baynes Theorem is more applicable to this type of reasoning.

[GrandizerII]

Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

If someone says there is no separation from God being to God creating our universe, they are claiming that God has not done anything else. I don't think such a limit is justified or even probable.

I don't agree with your supposition here, but it doesn't matter anyway.  Having had some time to think about Craig/Ghazali's argument, it's plain that it's a load of crap.   By 'eternal' here, Craig/Ghazali are implying that God has existed for an endless or infinite amount of time.  Thus the relevance of pointing out that the universe has existed a finite time.  But that's not what it means to be timeless.  This argument is nothing more than a bunch of confusion caused by an incoherent concept of God existing timelessly.  If God exists timelessly, then there is no paradox between the universe being finite and the conditions for the creation of the universe existing because these things do not occur in time.  God is and God creates.  Those two events occur together in timeless existence, so Craig/Ghazali's argument about water freezing simply doesn't apply.  What I find remarkable is that a philosopher who specializes in the theory of time could make such a boneheaded argument.  Either Craig is demonstrating sheer incompetence or he is simply dishonestly making an argument of convenience here.  Regardless, Craig/Ghazali's argument doesn't hold water, and so it can't be used as justification for the belief that the conclusion of the KCA is necessarily a 'personal' god.

Just to supplement what you're saying here, a relevant link:

http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=10746

Craig’s argument only works because he slides back and forth between the two different senses of eternity. If he is forced to stick with one, the argument falls apart.

Yeah, WLC is full of shit as always. And his beloved argument fails from the very beginning anyway.

---

Actually, Jenny is more correct that you are here. If a premise is 100% certain, the multiplication (by 1.0) doesn't change the overall probability. If it is less than 100%, it does and should reduce the overall probability from that.
That said,the simple multiplication is only correct when the premises are probabilistically independent of each other. Otherwise, you multiply the *conditional* probabilities of each based on the previous ones to get the overall probability. The conditional probabilities can be very different than the non-conditional probability of each event.

That's simply not true with inductive premises and demonstrably so. 

For example, say you have 2 premises that make it likely that x is the case. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market. (actually, this is not an inductive premise, so there is not probability to assign. However you can assign 100% if you want). 
3. Therefore Today is Wednesday. (95%)

Now say we add premises to that. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market.
3. The street cleaners usually run on Wednesday (80%)
4. The street cleaner just went around the corner 
5. The garbage is picked up on Tuesday evening (80%)
6. The garbage cans in the alley are empty
7. Therefore today is Wednesday. 

According to your reasoning, the probability of today being Wednesday is 95% x 80% x 80% = 61%. What do you think the probability is that it is Wednesday? 

Baynes Theorem is more applicable to this type of reasoning.

He clearly said that you don't just simply multiply probabilities together when the premises aren't independent of each other.

Here's a fun link for you to check out on conditional probabilities:
https://www.mathsisfun.com/data/probabil...ional.html

P(A&B) = P(A) * P(B|A)

Finally, where there are probabilities less than 100%, when you multiply probabilities together, the product is naturally going to be less than 100%.

[polymath257]

Actually, Jenny is more correct that you are here. If a premise is 100% certain, the multiplication (by 1.0) doesn't change the overall probability. If it is less than 100%, it does and should reduce the overall probability from that.
That said,the simple multiplication is only correct when the premises are probabilistically independent of each other. Otherwise, you multiply the *conditional* probabilities of each based on the previous ones to get the overall probability. The conditional probabilities can be very different than the non-conditional probability of each event.

That's simply not true with inductive premises and demonstrably so. 

For example, say you have 2 premises that make it likely that x is the case. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market. (actually, this is not an inductive premise, so there is not probability to assign. However you can assign 100% if you want). 
3. Therefore Today is Wednesday. (95%)

Now say we add premises to that. 

1. We can't remember a time when Mary did not go to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary is at the market.
3. The street cleaners usually run on Wednesday (80%)
4. The street cleaner just went around the corner 
5. The garbage is picked up on Tuesday evening (80%)
6. The garbage cans in the alley are empty
7. Therefore today is Wednesday. 

According to your reasoning, the probability of today being Wednesday is 95% x 80% x 80% = 61%. What do you think the probability is that it is Wednesday? 

Baynes Theorem is more applicable to this type of reasoning.

Yikes. First of all, the first premise would be of the form

1. If it is Wednesday, Mary will go to the market.

But you are using it to go from

2. Mary went to the Market.
To
3. It is Wednesday.

That is a faulty conclusion, using the converse.

What you need to get a correct conclusion from 1 is
1'. I don't recall a time Mary went to the Market when it is not Wednesday. (95%).

NOW, the conclusion from Mary being at the market is that today is Wednesday with 95% confidence.

The other hypotheses given are not used in your conclusion. So they have no effect on the resulting probability at all.

However, suppose we have the following:

1. I don't recall a time when Mary went to the market that wasn't a Wednesday. (95%)
2. I don't recall a Wednesday when the street cleaners didn't run (80%).
3. Mary went to the market. (100%).

This can now be used to conclude that the street cleaners are running with (.95*.8=) 76% confidence.

In your example, going from
1. Mary generally goes to the market on Wednesday (95%)
2. Mary went to the market.

you need the probability of the converse 1' above, which cannot be derived from the probability of 1 without additional information (how often Mary goes on other days, for example).

[Mister Agenda]

Let's say:

1. Mary always goes to the market on Wednesday (100%)
2. Mary is at the Market right now (100%)
3. Therefore, it must be Wednesday (at least about 14.3%)

There are seven days of the week, for all we know Mary goes every Wednesday and Sunday, every Wednesday and additional day if needed, or even every day. The odds would be at least 1/7 (we definitely know Wednesday is a day she goes to the market), but the information given doesn't take us to 95%, even with both premises at 100%.