Consciousness

[Alan V]

As always, people using key words in different senses. There's consciousness in the functional sense (where it's basically information processing) and there's consciousness in the phenomenological sense (which is what I believe the OP is centered on).

From Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene.

There are different aspects of consciousness:
* The subcortical conscious state (sleep, dreaming, waking).
* Cortical/thalamic vigilance.
* Attention, which is focusing on specific information. “Attention’s sieve operates largely unconsciously – attention is dissociable from conscious access.”
* Phenomenal awareness, which equals qualia.
* Conscious access, which is the information which enters awareness (genuine consciousness). “At any given time, a massive flow of sensory stimulation reaches our senses, but our conscious mind seems to gain access to only a very small amount of it.” While its potential repertoire is vast, at any given moment its actual repertoire is dramatically limited. It must withdraw from one item in order to gain access to another. Subcortical wakefulness, cortical/thalamic vigilance, and attention “are just enabling conditions for conscious access.” Scientists can study conscious access through a variety of methods, which the book details.

So yes, consciousness is complicated. Both unconscious and conscious brain functions process information. Consciousness in a phenomenal sense, or "fame in the brain" as Dennett called it, enables a certain variety of processing, but it can also be used for aesthetic appreciation as well. However, I doubt it evolved for the latter.

Also from the same book:

Supporting observations:
The functions of consciousness are reflected in brain architecture, in the length of neurons, the numbers of their dendrites/spines, and their extensive connections to other areas. There are 15,000 spines or more on each human prefrontal neuron. “We believe that a special set of neurons diffuses conscious messages throughout the brain: giant cells whose long axons crisscross the cortex, interconnecting it into an integrated whole.” “Neurons with long-distance axons are most abundant in the prefrontal cortex.” “When enough brain regions agree about the importance of incoming sensory information, they synchronize into a large-scale state of global communication. A broad network ignites into a burst of high-level activation – and the nature of this ignition explains our empirical signatures of consciousness.” “Anatomically, bottom-up and top-down pathways are both present throughout the cortex. Most long-distance connections are bi-directional, and the descending top-down projections often vastly outnumber the ascending ones.” “During the consciously perceived trials, we observed a massive increase in bidirectional causality throughout the brain.”

“Not all brain circuits are equally important for conscious experience. Peripheral sensory and motor circuits can be activated without necessarily generating a conscious experience. Higher-order regions of the temporal, parietal, and prefrontal cortexes, on the other hand, are more intimately associated with a reportable conscious experience, since their stimulation can induce purely subjective hallucinations that have no foundation in objective reality.”

[GrandizerII]

As always, people using key words in different senses. There's consciousness in the functional sense (where it's basically information processing) and there's consciousness in the phenomenological sense (which is what I believe the OP is centered on).

From Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene.

Different aspects of consciousness:
The subcortical conscious state (sleep, dreaming, waking).
Cortical/thalamic vigilance.
Attention, which is focusing on specific information. “Attention’s sieve operates largely unconsciously – attention is dissociable from conscious access.”
Phenomenal awareness, which equals qualia.
Conscious access, which is the information which enters awareness (genuine consciousness). “At any given time, a massive flow of sensory stimulation reaches our senses, but our conscious mind seems to gain access to only a very small amount of it.” While its potential repertoire is vast, at any given moment its actual repertoire is dramatically limited. It must withdraw from one item in order to gain access to another. Subcortical wakefulness, cortical/thalamic vigilance, and attention “are just enabling conditions for conscious access.” Scientists can study conscious access through a variety of methods, which the book details.

So yes, consciousness is complicated.

Sure, consciousness is complicated, the same with the human brain, and the same with the human body overall. And the same with a lot of other things in this world.

But there is one aspect of what we are labeling "consciousness" that appears to have a whole other layer of complexity, and it's the one to do with phenomenal awareness.

All these other aspects, as complicated as they may be, are relatively easy to come up with [at least plausible] theoretical/scientific explanations for. Even if neuroscience were still sort of in its infancy, we have already been able to unearth various mechanisms underlying these aspects, and if we haven't yet, we can at least conceptualize potential mechanisms to account for these aspects without needing to invoke something mystical. We can "reverse engineer" these aspects, so to speak, to the underlying physical/biological processes. 

We don't currently have this same luxury when it comes to phenomenological experience, though. The mechanistic explanation for this continues to elude us, even conceptually. Because the experience is nothing like other physical objects/processes we observe or study. It seems to not be physical and yet not be abstract either. When I feel an intense pain, it doesn't feel abstract, it feels real. And it's not real like a physical object is real or a physical process is real, it's real in some different manner. And it feels so contrary to materialism that some have even gone so far to argue it must be an illusion, that we must be mistaken about the one thing that we thought we infallibly knew existed.

[Alan V]

Sure, consciousness is complicated, the same with the human brain, and the same with the human body overall. And the same with a lot of other things in this world.

But there is one aspect of what we are labeling "consciousness" that appears to have a whole other layer of complexity, and it's the one to do with phenomenal awareness.

All these other aspects, as complicated as they may be, are relatively easy to come up with [at least plausible] theoretical/scientific explanations for. Even if neuroscience were still sort of in its infancy, we have already been able to unearth various mechanisms underlying these aspects, and if we haven't yet, we can at least conceptualize potential mechanisms to account for these aspects without needing to invoke something mystical. We can "reverse engineer" these aspects, so to speak, to the underlying physical/biological processes. 

We don't currently have this same luxury when it comes to phenomenological experience, though. The mechanistic explanation for this continues to elude us, even conceptually. Because the experience is nothing like other physical objects/processes we observe or study. It seems to not be physical and yet not be abstract either. When I feel an intense pain, it doesn't feel abstract, it feels real. And it's not real like a physical object is real or a physical process is real, it's real in some different manner. And it feels so contrary to materialism that some have even gone so far to argue it must be an illusion, that we must be mistaken about the one thing that we thought we infallibly knew existed.

This was my answer to that issue in another discussion.  

I think we have misconceptualized the problem as one belonging in consciousness studies when it is one belonging in evolutionary studies.  The human brain is a kluge, made of one system evolved on top of another.  Yet we can be aware of inputs from those earlier-evolved systems, as well as of the more abstract information-processing issues of more recently evolved parts of our brains.

[The Grand Nudger]

Pain intensity can be explained by the various widths and speeds of different transmitting fibers, as well as the activation of more nociceptors - relatively speaking, and before modulation. It is real. It exists. It is material. Made up of mechanical and electrochemical objects with mappable relationships to each other and across our species. That you're/we're not consciously aware of that, and instead believe it/us to be some other thing is what illusionism is (in general) talking about. That we're not what we think we are does not mean that we do not exist. That it doesn't work how it seems doesn't mean nothing is happening. Even phantom pain has an apparent and material cause - and that's as close to "not real" as you're going to get in this sense.

Obviously correct me if I'm wrong, but when we say "just" processing we don't necessarily mean that the experience of pain is other-than or achieved by other means. We think of the experience as an additional step to the counting of signals. Maybe it would be in an intentionally designed machine system. We are no such thing. Perhaps that subjective experience is our counting of signals. It certainly maps to it. Interrupt the processor interrupt (or entirely remove) the experience. Then again, perhaps it is additional, and yet still "just processing". Either way (and even if it is additional and not just processing), from an evolutionary standpoint, take away the subjective experience of pain and we get worse at survival, not better. Drug addicts and the impaired provide a fantastic demonstration of this. This is where it fits into model control theories.

[GrandizerII]

Sure, consciousness is complicated, the same with the human brain, and the same with the human body overall. And the same with a lot of other things in this world.

But there is one aspect of what we are labeling "consciousness" that appears to have a whole other layer of complexity, and it's the one to do with phenomenal awareness.

All these other aspects, as complicated as they may be, are relatively easy to come up with [at least plausible] theoretical/scientific explanations for. Even if neuroscience were still sort of in its infancy, we have already been able to unearth various mechanisms underlying these aspects, and if we haven't yet, we can at least conceptualize potential mechanisms to account for these aspects without needing to invoke something mystical. We can "reverse engineer" these aspects, so to speak, to the underlying physical/biological processes. 

We don't currently have this same luxury when it comes to phenomenological experience, though. The mechanistic explanation for this continues to elude us, even conceptually. Because the experience is nothing like other physical objects/processes we observe or study. It seems to not be physical and yet not be abstract either. When I feel an intense pain, it doesn't feel abstract, it feels real. And it's not real like a physical object is real or a physical process is real, it's real in some different manner. And it feels so contrary to materialism that some have even gone so far to argue it must be an illusion, that we must be mistaken about the one thing that we thought we infallibly knew existed.

This was my answer to that issue in another discussion.  

I think we have misconceptualized the problem as one belonging in consciousness studies when it is one belonging in evolutionary studies.  The human brain is a kluge, made of one system evolved on top of another.  Yet we can be aware of inputs from those earlier-evolved systems, as well as of the more abstract information-processing issues of more recently evolved parts of our brains.

I don't disagree that we're not suffering some framing issue when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness. Maybe it is better considered in the field of study dedicated to biological evolution. But even then, I am not seeing how this isn't just pushing the problem backwards. It's still not really clear, even theoretically/conceptually, how these subjective experiences come about from what are otherwise physical processes.

In that other thread, you said that we experience subjective states because we are subjective lifeforms. Ok, fair enough, but how did we come about to be subjective lifeforms in the first place? How did we come to be "first-person-perspectivists" from a "third-person" world, experiencing things in colors and shapes and sizes and such in a very vivid manner, feeling all sorts of feelings that are surreal or intense (whether pleasurable or otherwise)?

The part about biosemiotics is interesting, but again, I don't see how the study of the effects of signs and symbols on biological life is going to get us closer to addressing the hard problem of consciousness.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Calling people "stupid" because they don't agree with you is pretty arrogant too.

But that's not even what I'm doing?

Sure it is. You're disagreeing with them, and saying that those who don't agree with you are "stupid" and "arrogant." You're certainly not calling them stupid because you've given them an IQ test, after all. The only qualifier for intelligence in your post is whether or not another person sees things your way.

If you can't see that this is the ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from your post, you probably shouldn't be calling others stupid.

[The Grand Nudger]

We use both the first person subjective and the equally subjective third person to great effect. In control theory, these can be described as attention and body models. Would you believe it, our body models are also not an entirely accurate summary of our bodies in reality. Body models do, though, help to navigate a body in reality. How often do you consciously consider whether or not you can fit through a door? Have you ever been wrong? Likewise, being able to ascertain colors and shapes..and lets add smells and tastes... provides us a wide range of function. Like telling the difference between snakes and knowing whether or not a thing is cake.

How we came to be this way (as opposed to other ways, and there are other ways) is an evolutionary question. Because it's advantageous and heritable. That and a little luck, I guess? Has it's drawbacks. We're spoofable.

[Alan V]

I don't disagree that we're not suffering some framing issue when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness. Maybe it is better considered in the field of study dedicated to biological evolution. But even then, I am not seeing how this isn't just pushing the problem backwards. It's still not really clear, even theoretically/conceptually, how these subjective experiences come about from what are otherwise physical processes.

In that other thread, you said that we experience subjective states because we are subjective lifeforms. Ok, fair enough, but how did we come about to be subjective lifeforms in the first place? How did we come to be "first-person-perspectivists" from a "third-person" world, experiencing things in colors and shapes and sizes and such in a very vivid manner, feeling all sorts of feelings that are surreal or intense (whether pleasurable or otherwise)?

The part about biosemiotics is interesting, but again, I don't see how the study of the effects of signs and symbols on biological life is going to get us closer to addressing the hard problem of consciousness.

Our discussion is getting very close to the limits of my own reading on this subject, so I won't be able to offer many suggestions beyond a certain point.  I assume scientists who specialize in consciousness studies could tell you a lot more, but I am not a specialist.

However, my personal perspective is that self-organization necessarily organized selves, in the sense of evolving organisms who selectively responded to certain stimuli and reacted in certain ways.  That is how biosemiotics connects with this.  Life emerged from non-living matter when it internalized and evolved its own sematic rules in addition to the physics that control material objects: RNA, DNA, chemical reactions, reflexes, instincts, directed attention, emotions, habits, consciousness, and finally the self-consciousness of humans.  We experience the whole range of conscious evolution in our own bodies, and much of it served its best purposes long ago (instincts and emotions for instance).  Even the details of our visual and auditory experiences are likely more highly developed than we really need these days, except perhaps for their aesthetic pleasures.

Consciousness may seem all-or-nothing, but it is not.  We experience it both in degrees and on and off.  So like any other part of our body, it is divisible.  It has been accumulative through biological evolution, and started as little more than encoded chemical reactions.

We are our bodies, so of course we have subjective experiences if we have experiences at all.  Subjective states serve their organisms. Perhaps evolution could have taken a different course, but it didn't.

[AFTT47]

Sure, consciousness is complicated, the same with the human brain, and the same with the human body overall. And the same with a lot of other things in this world.

But there is one aspect of what we are labeling "consciousness" that appears to have a whole other layer of complexity, and it's the one to do with phenomenal awareness.

All these other aspects, as complicated as they may be, are relatively easy to come up with [at least plausible] theoretical/scientific explanations for. Even if neuroscience were still sort of in its infancy, we have already been able to unearth various mechanisms underlying these aspects, and if we haven't yet, we can at least conceptualize potential mechanisms to account for these aspects without needing to invoke something mystical. We can "reverse engineer" these aspects, so to speak, to the underlying physical/biological processes. 

We don't currently have this same luxury when it comes to phenomenological experience, though. The mechanistic explanation for this continues to elude us, even conceptually.

My bolds.

This is an excellent explanation. I get frustrated in conversations like this because I have a hard time getting this point across.

It's like there is this realm that we know is there and we know it either interfaces with the material world or is entirely manifested by it yet seems to have properties completely outside the bounds of materialism. There is clearly a bridge between phenomenological experience and the material world but it might as well be made of pixie dust. It looks to me like there is a huge piece of the puzzle that is missing to us and until we fill in this gap in our knowledge, the solution to this problem will be outside our reach.

[Paleophyte]

Is that accurate though?  Is consciousness different from information processing?  Model based control theories would beg to differ.  Perhaps we've mistakenly believed in the uniqueness and separateness of our subjectivity.

Perhaps minds are brains, and brains are processors, and processing is a material reaction.  Perhaps all sorts of seeming bio automata possess it in kind, if not in quality.  Maybe it isn't limited to living things at all.  Would that make it fundamental?  Maybe not, but far more basic than we've supposed, I suspect.

That's what I'm saying, it isn't complex at all, thinking it's complex is arrogant and stupid.

Well, then I guess you're stupid, because "consciousness is just brain stuff and everyone's brain is almost exactly the same."