Do you believe in free will?

[The Grand Nudger]

You very much seem to be seperating your will and your choices from "you". Somehow you are "making" these things, controlling your will. Is it possible that you are these things, that you don't make choices, you don't make your will, that they make you. By what mechanism are you "changing" your will, "making choices"? You say you can show the practical application of free will, well, so can I, but I have strong suspsicions that it is the practical application of a useful illusion. It would be more convincing if you could show us your free will, or the mechanism by which you achieve free will. Some part of you that escapes processes which we find to be very deterministic, in short, how have "you" escaped biology.

[genkaus]

Genetics is only a very tiny part of the equation, I wouldn't highlight it as much as that.

I also included experiences and conditioning.

I don't see the implications either, however, I freely admit, my views are based more upon my own thoughts rather than bodies of literature, so I am likely to be missing out on a lot of prior thinking.

I think I can show the implications in your following arguments.

Frankly, I think these discussions boil down to an even simpler question - can I deal with the consequences of being determined, if not, for sake of sanity, I must invent a non-naturalistic reason for my actions.

Two things. First, if determinism is true, then wouldn't the question be pointless? Whether you can deal with it or not is simply not up to you.

Secondly, why would you think that free-will is a "non-naturalistic reason"?

More to the point, whilst we are the author of our actions, is it possible to author them in any other way. Its untestable sadly, but I my prediliction is that no, we are not. Fortunately our brains are capable of create grand illusions to help us cope with day to day life. In many ways free will shares a lot with religion.

My answer to this is yes, because if it wasn't the case, we would not be the authors of our actions.

It does not exist. However, you as a human, lack even a millionth of the ability to comprehend and calculate the factors which come into play in every facial tick, and movement you make.
An inability to factor in the complexities merely makes it appear 'magic'. Thus illusion.

Here's one of the implications of the free-will-determinism dichotomy that I consider incorrect. Why do you think that the millions of factors in play preclude free-will? Or more to the point, what is it that the will is supposed to be "free" from?

You assume that since a person's will cannot exist independently from reality, i.e. all the millions of little factors that come into play in any action, it cannot be free. But is free-will actually supposed to be free from causation itself? Is it supposed to be essentially causeless? Is your will supposed to be free from you as well? To put it more simply, do you think that if you have a reason to choose one course of action over another, that was the only course of action you could have chosen?

I don't think anyone would consider "free-will" to be some reality-independent, causality-independent supernatural entity. (And to anyone who does, you are wrong). Removing the supernatural crap from consideration, the closest we come to a functional definition of free-will is - the ability of an agent to make a choice. All the bio-chemical processes taking place in the agent's brain is the process by which it makes the choice. Since his mind is the concrete representing the agent, it being a part of a causal chain does not preclude the choice being an exercise of his will.

One thing I would say however, is that the illusion of free will is such, that it is indistinguishable from the real thing.

I didn't address this before, but as per your description of free-will, it is an illusion created to deal with lack of comprehension regarding the mechanism of the action. My contention is that even with the requisite comprehension, the action would still be the result of free-will. It is indistinguishable from the real thing because it is the real thing and not an illusion.

Our mind can be changed, but only by and external or independent internal force changing the causations. In another words, "you" are not the author of your actions, unless we define "you" as a product of your electrochemical memories and a million other factors that cause your decisions. But that simply indicates an illusion that you can choose an action.

How else do you define "you"? That is what or who you are - the sum total of your memories, your thoughts, your emotions etc. This is why I consider free-will-determinism dichotomy to be a false dilemma. It requires that "you" be defined as something other - something supernatural - such as a spirit or a ghost.

[The Grand Nudger]

-It is indistinguishable from the real thing because it is the real thing and not an illusion. -

Not unless you can demonstrate that this is so. Until then, you're simply arguing that the illusion is so complete that it transcends illusion, somehow. IE, magic.

[genkaus]

So the question is thus; At what point were you able to exert a force upon the universe that changes the future. Was it at conception? The sensory development in the womb? The formation of the ego?

I think there is a critical error in this statement which gives it a form of a loaded question. You use the term "changing the future", which means that the future is in some sense predetermined - that there is a set course from which it may or may not deviate. In a question regarding free-will vs determinism, you are already presupposing determinism.

Now, as to the question itself, we can consider the timeline as a causal chain of events of which the person himself is a part. This causal chain plays the part in creating the person and therefore his "will" cannot be free from causality. Which, as I've maintained, it is not required to be. And since he too is a part of the causal chain, it cannot be independent of the person's will either. At this level of consideration, it makes no sense to discuss free-will, since the only thing here it can be free from is causality and nothing is free from causality.

The question of free-will becomes relevant when we consider the person as a separate section of the causal chain and seek to evaluate his role in it. At that point, free-will means relative freedom from rest of the causal chain. Here's where the question of free-will holds any relevance and where I consider it to be very real. Since the separation requires the agent to be an independent entity, I would say that the answer to your question is "at the formation of the ego."

[The Grand Nudger]

Your free will is not required to be free? Why call it "free" will then? You believe yourself to be an independant entity from causality? Let's ask your mother if she agrees.

[genkaus]

You very much seem to be seperating your will and your choices from "you". Somehow you are "making" these things, controlling your will. Is it possible that you are these things, that you don't make choices, you don't make your will, that they make you. By what mechanism are you "changing" your will, "making choices"? You say you can show the practical application of free will, well, so can I, but I have strong suspsicions that it is the practical application of a useful illusion. It would be more convincing if you could show us your free will, or the mechanism by which you achieve free will. Some part of you that escapes processes which we find to be very deterministic, in short, how have "you" escaped biology.

To be clear, I do not separate my will and my choices from "me". They are instantiations of "me". To ask whether you control your will or whether your will controls you is simply nonsensical, because they are one and the same. One does not "cause" a change in other, they change simultaneously. My contention was that one can initiate a change in oneself which would end up changing both oneself and one's will.

Secondly, you display a strong assumption that free-will requires escape from causality. That freedom of will means freedom from any causation. I consider that position nonsensical. If that position were true, then anyone who acts according to reason is not practicing "free-will". So no, I do not consider free-will to require "me" escaping biology, since that would mean that the "me" should be separate from my biology. That is the dichotomy that has given rise to the argument in the first place.

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Not unless you can demonstrate that this is so. Until then, you're simply arguing that the illusion is so complete that it transcends illusion, somehow. IE, magic.

A complete illusion would still not be reality.

What exactly are you asking me to demonstrate here?

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Your free will is not required to be free? Why call it "free" will then? You believe yourself to be an independant entity from causality? Let's ask your mother if she agrees.

My free-will is not required to be free from causality. It is still required to be free from external forces and dependent upon me.

I'm not independent from causality and neither is my will. I, however, do exist independently (of rather separately) from the rest of the universe that is not me and so does my will (to the extent that I do).

[The Grand Nudger]

I also consider that position to be non-sensical, that's why I consider free will to be non-sensical.

I'm asking if anyone can demonstrate control over their selves, or differentiate themselves from that which is under control. In short, I'm asking for a demonstration of free will, not a redefinition of the words free or will. If we're redefining these things to be more in accordance with what can be demonstrated, do we not run the risk of redefining them so drastically that they no longer have any bearing on the original concept. IOW, if we drastically redefine free will, we're essentially removing free will from consideration and instead considering something else under an assumed name.

So, if you are not free from causality, and your free will only requires that it be independent of external factors and dependent on you, then your free will would be dependent on causality, would it not? Again, how is this "free"? How is this different, btw, from simply stating, "My free will is not dependent on causality (external, specifically, in your case), it is dependent on my free will (which is internal, but still not free from causality, as per your own remarks on the subject)"? Are we forming a non-cognitive statement?

If your "free will" is an expression or effect of biochemistry, and if we can coerce or alter this expression by leveraging biochemistry (which we can) how free is your will?

[NoMoreFaith]

I think there is a critical error in this statement which gives it a form of a loaded question. You use the term "changing the future", which means that the future is in some sense predetermined - that there is a set course from which it may or may not deviate. In a question regarding free-will vs determinism, you are already presupposing determinism.

In fairness, that is EXACTLY why I defined the presuppositions before posing the question. It is not a loaded question because I defined the presuppositions and the logical (to me) conclusions.

The universe can only be changed in a limited number of ways.
1) Changing the current or past state of the universe in this instant we have paused.
2) Changing the fundamental laws of the universe that dictate how the universe progresses from one instant to another.

You ignored these statements in your answer. If these statements contain a logical or scientific fallacy, then the question is loaded. But I see no dismissal of this.

At this level of consideration, it makes no sense to discuss free-will, since the only thing here it can be free from is causality and nothing is free from causality.

Precisely. Free Will is an illusion, and a useful one, but no thing is free from causality(maybe quantum mechanics comes back into play again at this point since its known to often be observably an exception), no matter how complex the variations of causation are.
To prove free will, you must show how the universe changes from one state to another through our will. However, I am happy to accept "I Don't Know" as an answer, I'm not a theist after all

The question of free-will becomes relevant when we consider the person as a separate section of the causal chain and seek to evaluate his role in it. At that point, free-will means relative freedom from rest of the causal chain. Here's where the question of free-will holds any relevance and where I consider it to be very real. Since the separation requires the agent to be an independent entity, I would say that the answer to your question is "at the formation of the ego."

So the formation of the ego actually separates us from causal chains?
While I don't dismiss your argument, since we are both bordering on the unfalsifiable, I see no reason to believe this is a possibility.

In order to do so, the ego much be an agent of change, to amend your will, between two separate states of existence. I.e. the ego must be able to decide between alternatives outside of the control, thou influenced by, biological causations.
It just does is unsatisfying obviously, so we have choice A and choice B. If there is a chain of reasoning which leads to preferenace A, then it is clearly determined. In order for free will in this instance to exist, it must be made in each 'instant' rather than recourse to any previous 'instant' of the universe.

Who knows, free will, like the universe may well be queerer than we can suppose. I simply see no reason for it to be.

[Whateverist]

I wonder to what degree any of us would think we are determined. Does a hard core determinist imagine that the exact timing and direction of every movement is inevitable? A particular new born colt had no choice but to jump up after a set number of seconds and bolt awkwardly away in a South-southeast direction for a distance of a 103 feet before returning to look for the teat? Or, in arguing for free will I thrust my arm in the air to demonstrate my liberty to do so, only to be told that given a complete understanding of the universe and me, my making that argument and the timing of that thrust could have been precisely predicted? Is this what we free willers are arguing against?

If so, intuitively I feel as though I am right back in the same position arguing against something that is not falsifiable against people who claim to know way more than I do about what is going on 'beneath the surface'. This is about as appealing as arguing against the existence of God. Time to play my "whatever" card and get to hell out of there fast.

Study the expression of instinct and learning in other species. Watch the way wolf who was skunked as a pup skulks away from the next one it sees. There is no doubt more liquidity in the choice of which need/drive to act on than the determinist would grant. But add to that the complications inherent when a drive runs up against new learning. The creature is torn but ultimately goes for the skunk again or backs away. Anyone who says they or the 'universe' knows exactly how any particular creature will respond given opposition between drives is once again laying claim to knowledge which I at least don't have and which is not falsifiable anyway, whatever.

Then you come to us where the many competing attractions and prohibitions imposed by culture make the resolution of competing drives all the more complex and hard to predict. Anyone who thinks the ultimate outcome is absolutely predestined down to the last detail has got a faith based belief, not a reasoned position. Unless it was inevitable that I write these exact words in response to the last several posts which you gentlemen too were compelled to write just as you did. (Bullshit.)

[The Grand Nudger]

I think you might be reading more into determinism than what we know about it. See, I don't "know" anything about free will except that I have never seen it demonstrated (and that this lack of demonstration is completely void in the world, it being a subject largely relegated to philosophy, and not experiment)..which is precisely why I am skeptical of anyone who makes claims to knowledge of the existence of "free will". What I do know, is that our behavior very much appears to be an effect of biochemistry, which appears to be a very deterministic process (even though we cant always predict the results in every particular). What I do know, is that the arguments presented thusfar, and here on these forums, have not found a way to escape these sorts of determinism for which we do have evidence. It may very well be that free will does exist, as described, but I have trouble accepting that it does on the grounds of the explanations offered. In the end, this is just a conversation, exploring our own thoughts and the thoughts of others. Flexing the noodle, if you will. Use it or lose it, right? While you may feel that we are discussing something unfalsifiable, I do not. I am only approaching this from the angle of what is falsifiable, what has been experimented upon, what has or has not been demonstrated. I do not assume that there is anything more to us than what we can demonstrate (there may be, but if I start assuming this then why not assume other, equally undemonstrated or undemonstrable things?).