Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

In fairness, that is EXACTLY why I defined the presuppositions before posing the question. It is not a loaded question because I defined the presuppositions and the logical (to me) conclusions.

The universe can only be changed in a limited number of ways.
1) Changing the current or past state of the universe in this instant we have paused.
2) Changing the fundamental laws of the universe that dictate how the universe progresses from one instant to another.

You ignored these statements in your answer. If these statements contain a logical or scientific fallacy, then the question is loaded. But I see no dismissal of this.

Read the argument again. These statements are not what cause your question to be loaded. Your explicitly given statements only refer to changing the current or past of the universe - which is determined. But in your argument, you talk about changing the future - which is not assumed to be determined.

Precisely. Free Will is an illusion, and a useful one, but no thing is free from causality(maybe quantum mechanics comes back into play again at this point since its known to often be observably an exception), no matter how complex the variations of causation are.

Here's your problem. Your argument is:
1. Free will means will that is free from causation.
2. Nothing is free from causation.
Therefore, free-will cannot exist.

My argument is:
1. Free will means will that is free from certain constraints (not necessarily causation).
2. Nothing is free from causation.
Therefore, free-will may very well exist.

You see the problem?

To prove free will, you must show how the universe changes from one state to another through our will. However, I am happy to accept "I Don't Know" as an answer, I'm not a theist after all

Me writing this post is an example. The universe external to me is not causally sufficient for this. Writing these statements is a result of my will and it is changing the state of the universe (from one where this post does not exist to one where it does).

So the formation of the ego actually separates us from causal chains?
While I don't dismiss your argument, since we are both bordering on the unfalsifiable, I see no reason to believe this is a possibility.

NO.

Formation of ego does not separate your from causal chain. It creates "you" as a separate entity within the causal chain - separate from the rest of the chain.

In order to do so, the ego much be an agent of change, to amend your will, between two separate states of existence. I.e. the ego must be able to decide between alternatives outside of the control, thou influenced by, biological causations.

By being an agent of change, the ego would automatically be a part of causal chain. It seems that your understanding of free-will asks for a contradiction - for ego to be separate from the causal chain and still remain a part of it.

The second part of your statement assumes ego to be independent and separate from one's biology. Again, that is not something I accept.

It just does is unsatisfying obviously, so we have choice A and choice B. If there is a chain of reasoning which leads to preferenace A, then it is clearly determined. In order for free will in this instance to exist, it must be made in each 'instant' rather than recourse to any previous 'instant' of the universe.

Again, this applies only when free-will is equated to will free from all causation. If free will is required only to be free from external causation, then there is not dichotomy between free-will and determinism.

---

This I think is a fundamental error. Neither determinists nor free will theorists are proposing that determinism is in error. Both accept determinism fully. Where free will comes in is assuming that decisions and choices are determined by a law or laws that are not in the currently accepted set of natural laws. A free will is every bit a part of determinism, it's just that these specific choices are determined by something whose behavior and laws, for lack of a better term, are "free" — meaning certain departures from the other natural laws, whose behaviors seem not to possess this trait. The problem for the free will theorist is not to refute determinism — determinism is necessary for both — the problem is to demonstrate the existence of these heretofore unknown laws, and the entities which are ruled by them. (Pineal gland?)

The bolded part does seem to be the most commonly accepted meaning of free-will, even though there is nothing in its actual definition to suggest that. That is the misconception I'm trying to correct.

If something is not determined, either by current natural laws, or whatever additions are required to understand our will as free, then its behavior is essentially random, as nothing, free or not, determines its course. And this, as noted, is not free will. (As Rhythm hinted and I agree, compatibilism, the notion that determinism as defined by current natural laws does not preclude free will, usually by changing the definition of free will, is attempting to solve the problem by defining away the hard bits. But the hard bits are the part we find interesting. If a used car salesman offered you a tired old but truly free will, or a shiny new compatibilist free will, most of us would opt for real free will.)

If the current understanding of free-will (as being free from natural law), is based on a misconception (that the agent can exist independently of the natural law), then, in light of modern knowledge, it bears correction. Correcting one's understanding of what something means is not redefinition.

Just as we would not consider a human being to essentially be a "soul" or a "spirit" or something equally supernatural, similarly we should not have to invoke supernatural laws in a discussion of free-will.

A stickier question, at least for the compatibilist, is what is meant by "I". It's a shortcut to say that whatever is in the brain is the I, because it's not — there are many things in the brain that are not the I, and some, Buddhists, contend there isn't even an I. Equating the brain with the I is largely handwaving, albeit handwaving which many materialists have fought hard to sell.

That question, in my opinion, is the crucial point which must be settles before the discussion of free-will even begins. But this is not a question that can be resolved by looking at things reductionally, but holistically.

Drawing an analogy - what is a computer? Is it the CPU? The RAM? The motherboard? The keyboard? Mouse? Monitor? The hard-disk? Or is it the operating system?

None of these things can be singly pointed out to represent a "computer". Even if they are simply put together - in a bag - they still wouldn't be a computer. We need to put these component entities in a specific arrangement, make them capable of performing specific functions. Only then the emergent entity called "computer" can come into existence.

Similarly, we cannot keep pointing to parts of oneself and keep asking "Is that me?", when what "you" are, is the sum of it all, in a particular arrangement. So, no, you are not your brain. Atleast, you are not just your brain.

[genkaus]

In fairness, that is EXACTLY why I defined the presuppositions before posing the question. It is not a loaded question because I defined the presuppositions and the logical (to me) conclusions.

The universe can only be changed in a limited number of ways.
1) Changing the current or past state of the universe in this instant we have paused.
2) Changing the fundamental laws of the universe that dictate how the universe progresses from one instant to another.

You ignored these statements in your answer. If these statements contain a logical or scientific fallacy, then the question is loaded. But I see no dismissal of this.

Read the argument again. These statements are not what cause your question to be loaded. Your explicitly given statements only refer to changing the current or past of the universe - which is determined. But in your argument, you talk about changing the future - which is not assumed to be determined.

Upon further reading, I think it bears greater clarification.

For future to be determined -
1. The past and current state must be determined (your point 1).
2. The fundamental laws should be able to determine the next instant - not just dictate how the next instant is determined. (Some amount of ambiguity in your second statement).

For example, consider this line of reasoning.

- The consequence of an action changes state of the universe from one instant to the next.
- The consequence of an action is not determined until the action is determined.
- Therefore, the future is not determined unless the action is determined.
- So, in order for future to be determined, the fundamental laws should be able to determine the action, not just how the action is determined.

If free will (as you conceptualize it) is one of the fundamental laws, then they would only be able to dictate how the next instant is determined (by the exercise of free-will) - not determine the next instant as well. Therefore, for these statements to conclude that the future is determined as well, you've already presumed that free-will is not a part of the natural law - thus making it a loaded question.

[The Grand Nudger]

Very simply Genk, you only need a half or full adder and you have a computer. You don't need the cpu, the ram, the rom, multiplexers or any circuit in between, nothing. What you're talking about are the varying degrees of complexity to a computer. Hell, you could just build a simple latch, a single bit memory cell with 1 input connected to two outputs (or itself and a reset line) and you have a computer with both function and memory. As such, your analogy has literally no bearing whatsoever on "I", or "the self", only degrees of complexity to "I" or "self". You don't even need a user...to have a computer. This whole thread has been a long list of non-starters, poor analogies, and redefinition. Perhaps my frustration with this isn't very difficult to understand? It's gone from "is there free will" to "I am not my brain, really really really, please believe me". If one has to argue against the mind being an effect of the brain before they can argue for a redefinition of free will, well, seems to me we're reaching for something because we very much want it, regardless of whether or not it's actually there.

[NoMoreFaith]

Upon further reading, I think it bears greater clarification.

For future to be determined -
1. The past and current state must be determined (your point 1).
2. The fundamental laws should be able to determine the next instant - not just dictate how the next instant is determined. (Some amount of ambiguity in your second statement).

My position is very much that if you understand all the factors, you CAN determine the next instant.
This is where we fundamentally disagree. You believe there are factors which cannot be determined which allow for a choice which is free from all causal factors.
I see no reason to see that our brains are able to transcend causation.

For example, consider this line of reasoning.

- The consequence of an action changes state of the universe from one instant to the next.
- The consequence of an action is not determined until the action is determined.
- Therefore, the future is not determined unless the action is determined.
- So, in order for future to be determined, the fundamental laws should be able to determine the action, not just how the action is determined.

If free will (as you conceptualize it) is one of the fundamental laws, then they would only be able to dictate how the next instant is determined (by the exercise of free-will) - not determine the next instant as well. Therefore, for these statements to conclude that the future is determined as well, you've already presumed that free-will is not a part of the natural law - thus making it a loaded question.

Incorrect, I do not conceptualise free will as a fundamental law, I conceptualise as a rationalisation of our inability to calculate the determining factors. There is no law of free will, and no free will, is my position. This should be clarified immediately.
In this I presume that free-will is not part of natural law? That is a presumption it exists at all, which is the entire discussion.
I can simply show, rationally and logically that the universe moves on in a stately fashion, including your biological body, no matter what this conceptual illusion of free will may trick you into believing.
There is no presumption of free will because the premise of argument is that there is no reason for it to exist. You are adding "Woo" to something that does not require it. You may WANT free will in the agents of change for the states of the universe in one instant to the next, but its pure speculation which contradicts what we DO know about the universe.

In order for you to show free will, you have to presume it exists equally. As is clear, it depends on our presumptions, and neither is a scientifically provable point. In my favour however, is that we can prove how we come to decisions, and it is nothing more than neuron activity and electrochemical memories and their reactions to external AND internal stimuli. There is nothing separate at all (and I tire of you claiming I am.. its obvious to anyone, I am not saying anything of the sort).

Without free will, the next instant in any given situation is wholly predictable.
I describe how I see the universe as working, and you have not refuted those assumptions. You have not refuted any description of how the mind works, the firing of neurons, recollection from electrochemical memories, and the reaction of such from external stimuli. All Natural. All incapable of being "willed" differently than you can will a ball from rolling down a hill.

There are exceptions when it comes to extreme macro and micro versions of fundamental laws, which shows we don't know everything, and I can quite easily be wrong. I don't claim to have the answers.
But your version states free will as a an agent which can redirect natural law down different avenues.

Which I do not accept at this point in time.

That is a loaded question, presuming there exists an agent which is capable of this, and egotistical to believe that you are such an agent.

[The Grand Nudger]

Which is precisely why they argue against the brain between their ears Faith. What we do know conflicts with the magic they wish to be present, and so rather than attempt to explain the unknown by reference to the known, they attempt to remove what is known from the discussion. It's complete bullshit. This is exceedingly simple. No one has ever demonstrated such a thing as free will, the very concept runs counter to a great deal that we do know about both ourselves and the universe which we live in. Not only this, we have demonstrated that the mind is capable of forming very effective illusions, and that we use these illusions as part of our very human, very natural, very material OS. So, what to do? Redefine, wriggle, make comments about relative worth or value, and at all times....argue anything else. I'm wondering, do single celled organisms have free will? They would seem to meet every "qualification" put forward by the pro free will camp. So do plants.

[genkaus]

Very simply Genk, you only need a half or full adder and you have a computer. You don't need the cpu, the ram, the rom, multiplexers or any circuit in between, nothing. What you're talking about are the varying degrees of complexity to a computer. Hell, you could just build a simple latch, a single bit memory cell with 1 input connected to two outputs (or itself and a reset line) and you have a computer with both function and memory. As such, your analogy has literally no bearing whatsoever on "I", or "the self", only degrees of complexity to "I" or "self".

Complexity is irrelevant to the point I was making - which, as it stands - applies to the adder or the latch as well.

My point is that for emergent entities such as a computer, you cannot consider it reductionally and search for the entity within its components. For example, in you simple latch, the "computer" is not the memory cell or the input/output lines. Similarly, it would be incorrect to reductionally consider a human being - dividing him up into his brains, nerves etc - and try to find which part hold the "self" or the essence of the human being. The "self" or the "I" is the emergent entity that exists as a result of combination of all these factors.

Incidentally, I think it is this reductionist approach that caused us to come up with the idea of a soul or a spirit. If you start looking for the essence of a human being - his self - by dividing him up and discarding parts of him - something like - "No, I'm not my body, I'm more than that. No, I'm not my mind - I'm more than that. No, I'm not my thoughts - I'm more than that. No, I'm not my emotions - I'm more than that" - you'd end up with nothing. Then the only recourse would be to come up with the imaginary non-physical "soul" as the essence of a "self".

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm not searching for entity within, am I? I am accepting that the adder is the entity. Again, this sort of argument is precisely why I am frustrated. "You" are all of the things which comprise you (speaking generally). Toenails to split ends. They are all natural, all material, and in each and every part, completely in thrall to determinism as far as we can tell in every particular. Now what? Is there some particular that you feel has been left out, has some part of us escaped what no other part of us has, is some part of us, this "entity" separate from the rest? Over, above, or around those processes which constrain the rest. Care to demonstrate which part? How this might be accomplished? Perhaps even though each and every part can be shown to act in accordance to these laws that we have described, the whole is somehow able to transcend these laws? Where? When? How?

The idea of the brain being the "self", specifically when we refer to our thoughts is not the product of fuzzy thinking, and definitely doesn't lead us to souls or spirits. It is the product of observation, experimentation, and replication. It is one of the largest factors that went into making the idea of a soul, or spirit untenable, so I'm not entirely sure why you would choose to blather on about such a hard won insight as being essentially interchangeable with superstition. I'm guessing that there is something else attached that you would like to believe in which would severely compromised by these, demonstrable, insights.

[NoMoreFaith]

Incidentally, I think it is this reductionist approach that caused us to come up with the idea of a soul or a spirit. If you start looking for the essence of a human being - his self - by dividing him up and discarding parts of him - something like - "No, I'm not my body, I'm more than that. No, I'm not my mind - I'm more than that. No, I'm not my thoughts - I'm more than that. No, I'm not my emotions - I'm more than that" - you'd end up with nothing. Then the only recourse would be to come up with the imaginary non-physical "soul" as the essence of a "self".

Your argument appears to state;

You have a triangle.

Take away one side, is that the triangle? No?
Take away another side, is that the triangle? No?
Take away the last side, is that the triangle? No?

Then you now have nothing left, THEREFORE the triangle transcends its sides.

Which is obvious bullshit.

My (maybe presume our) position is that the triangle is the whole thing, and nothing you can do can change it from being a triangle without adding the supernatural.

[genkaus]

You mistake my position on the matter. This argument serves only to show why your question was a loaded question - not my position on free-will.

My position is very much that if you understand all the factors, you CAN determine the next instant.
This is where we fundamentally disagree. You believe there are factors which cannot be determined which allow for a choice which is free from all causal factors.
I see no reason to see that our brains are able to transcend causation.

I've said time and again that I do NOT equate free-will with freedom from causality. As such, I see no reason fro our brains to transcend causality. My argument here goes only towards your question - which presupposes determinism in a discussion about free-will vs determinism.

Playing the devil's advocate once again - if your position is that "if you understand all the factors, you CAN determine the next instant", you have already accepted a deterministic position. Any argument for a logically sound and yet causation-free free-will cannot follow from this premise.

Incorrect, I do not conceptualise free will as a fundamental law, I conceptualise as a rationalisation of our inability to calculate the determining factors. There is no law of free will, and no free will, is my position. This should be clarified immediately.

That is exactly what I said. In order to conclude that "the future is determined", you have already discarded free-will as a part of natural law and superceded it with determinism. To begin a discussion of free-will vs determinism with this position is asking your opponent to first accept all your premises and then show how his arguments follow from those.

In this I presume that free-will is not part of natural law? That is a presumption it exists at all, which is the entire discussion.
I can simply show, rationally and logically that the universe moves on in a stately fashion, including your biological body, no matter what this conceptual illusion of free will may trick you into believing.
There is no presumption of free will because the premise of argument is that there is no reason for it to exist. You are adding "Woo" to something that does not require it. You may WANT free will in the agents of change for the states of the universe in one instant to the next, but its pure speculation which contradicts what we DO know about the universe.

Yes, free-will - as you have understood it is not real, since you have already assumed it to mean freedom from causation. To clarify once more - it has never been my position that free-will must be free from causation or find its source in something supernatural.

In order for you to show free will, you have to presume it exists equally. As is clear, it depends on our presumptions, and neither is a scientifically provable point. In my favour however, is that we can prove how we come to decisions, and it is nothing more than neuron activity and electrochemical memories and their reactions to external AND internal stimuli. There is nothing separate at all (and I tire of you claiming I am.. its obvious to anyone, I am not saying anything of the sort).

That is - in fact - all that it is. And I never said that you said that there was anything separate. I say that you assume - "In order for free-will to exist, there must be something separate".

Without free will, the next instant in any given situation is wholly predictable.

And that is the presumption you made prior to framing your question about free-will.

I describe how I see the universe as working, and you have not refuted those assumptions. You have not refuted any description of how the mind works, the firing of neurons, recollection from electrochemical memories, and the reaction of such from external stimuli. All Natural. All incapable of being "willed" differently than you can will a ball from rolling down a hill.

That's because I accept them. I'm saying that posing a question about a supernatural interpretation of free-will, while ruling out the supernatural altogether is intellectually dishonest.

There are exceptions when it comes to extreme macro and micro versions of fundamental laws, which shows we don't know everything, and I can quite easily be wrong. I don't claim to have the answers.
But your version states free will as a an agent which can redirect natural law down different avenues.

Nonsense. I've - time and again - expressly discarded that version.

That is a loaded question, presuming there exists an agent which is capable of this, and egotistical to believe that you are such an agent.

Between a dichotomized discussion of free-will vs determinism, it would be loading the discussion in either way to presume such an agent does or does not exist. That is my argument. Since you assumed one way in your stated presumptions, you loaded the argument in your favor.

Since, as it happens, I accept those presumptions as well, while not accepting your interpretation of free-will - I went ahead and answered your question, while pointing out your mistake.

[The Grand Nudger]

Is there a problem with discarding free will as natural law? I've never heard of the Law of Free Will. I didn't realize that there was such a thing? You keep claiming that you are arguing for a completely "natural" free will compliant with causation, Faith has been trying to show you that you haven't been.