Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

The difference between your definition of free will and no free will would be what? The difference between your definition of free will and the illusion of free will would be what? I'm with Faith on this one, hard determinism isn't something that I like, but it isn't something that I can so easily dismiss.

"What one means by an agent or 'I' or self".

If one defines the "I"(the agent) as separate from this neruochemistry, from the experiences, from the thoughts etc - basically, anything that can be shown physically - then the "I" automatically becomes an illusory entity - as does his free will.

[The Grand Nudger]

There we agree, what I'm trying to determine is how this free will that is part of what can be shown physically is different from an illusion produced by those same means. Different somehow from there being no such thing except the illusion (albeit a very compelling and useful one).

[Whateverist]

what I'm trying to determine is how this free will that is part of what can be shown physically is different from an illusion produced by those same means.

Gad! Does everything now have to be argued for against the possibility of an absurd alternative?

How do we know we're not ..

.. brains in vats?

.. characters in a computer simulation?

.. not just dreaming?

.. mindless forces of nature mistaking the actions of a particular body as being somehow being somehow related to your intentions?

[Angrboda]

Yes, you almost got it right! Eliminative materialists like Churchland and myself do subtract the self, placing it into the realm of "possibly non-existent folk psychological concepts". That is exactly my point, as I was noting that compatibilists, whom you appear to dislike as much as I do, are positing that there is an internal thingie, a self, which is the locus of control. My point was that until the compatibilists can demonstrate a self such that their statement that "it" is in control and not merely another link in the causal chain, they have no argument. If the "self" is a folk psychological concept with no empirical substance, then "the self" isn't in control of anything and therefore the compatibilist position is incoherent.

[genkaus]

Apologies, but its because its incomprehensible. It appears to be non-theological compatibilism. I.e. Not supernatural, but the future is not set, and our choices can change it.
This is the position you represented, and I discussed my position contrary to that. Simply because I don't believe compatibilism is defensible. So from my point of view, it appeared to be trying to have the compatibilist cake, but avoiding the problems it causes.

Once again, I'm sure you don't see this as your view, I simply can't get my head around what position you are actually taking. Which is fine, so I think you're right, its time to move the discussion forward, and I'm glad you're part of it, as it really has challenged my noodle, and I love that.

I'm hard determinist as stated, and its not the illusion of free will that frightens me, but the illusion of morality which frightens me more as a direct implication.

At the risk of repeating the discussion all over again, I'd like to clarify my position once again. This time I'll go through the questions I asked myself while considering the issue.

The overall question before me was "Does free-will exist"?


The first question that came to me mind was "What is free-will"?
A simple search gave me the answer "It is the capacity of an agent to make a choice free from alternative choices free from certain kinds of constraints". I accepted it this definition and chose to work on it because it did not seem to imply any particular philosophical position on the matter.


The next question was "What kinds of constraints"?
The nature of the agent - who he is - could be considered to determine his choices and therefore it would be a constraint. The environment he is in could be a constraint. His very desires or "will" would determine his choices and could be a constraint. So, is free-will supposed to be free from itself? That would be just nonsensical and I discarded that line of thought.

The conclusion I came to here was "external or environmental constraints". The will - which is a consequence of the agent's nature - cannot be free from it and would not be required to be.


The next question was "what constitutes an agent"?
Here I struggled with the idea of self-hood. If I looked at it reductionally - taking away pieces of agent's brain, his thoughts, his motivations, his experiences etc. and discarding them if I did not find the "self" within them, I'd be left with nothing in the end and would have no choice but to invoke the supernatural. The logical course in this case was to look at it holistically and determine that the agent would have to be the sum of it all. The "self" of the agent is an emergent entity that is the combination of all these.

I measured this answer against the constraints I'd accepted and found them to be consistent. I had specified which constraints would be included or excluded and determined how they exist with respect to the agent - all without invoking anything supernatural. Therefore, if any version of free-will could be true, this would be it.


Now, having determined what free-will means, the next question was "does it negate causality in any way"?
I saw that both the agent and his environment were a part of the causal chain. I also noticed that the exercise of free-will requires the agent to be the cause of the choice and therefore securing his position in that chain. So, my answer was "no, it does not".


The next question was "what are its implications on the idea that the future is set"?
The chain of causality determines the future (to the extent we ignore any competing randomness or quantum indeterminacy). Free-will, if it exists, would not be separate from the chain of causality, it would be one of the factors used to determine the future.

Is the future already determined? This question is different from the statement "causality determining the future". The former statement suggests a past event and that fore-knowledge of the future is possible. But as soon as that knowledge comes into existence, it becomes one of the causal factors that could affect the future - thus making it indeterminate again. So, while causality (with its subset of free-will) are in a continuous process of determining the future, it is not actually fully determined until it comes to pass, i.e. becomes present.

I'll admit that I find this point a little confusing as well and need to sort it out a bit more.


The next part was "how is this free-will different from the illusion of free-will"?
The answer I found was that it was fundamentally different, even if they seem functionally similar. Those who argue about the illusion of free-will accept the premise that free-will, if it exists, would be free of causation. My argument explicitly rejects that premise.

For example, one atheist may disbelieve in god because he doesn't want god's existence to be true. He fears going to hell and therefore convinces himself that there is no god. Another may disbelieve in god based on evidence (or lack thereof). Now, functionally, both beliefs are similar, fundamentally they could not be more different. The former belief would not hold in a rational argument, while the latter would. Your beliefs should not just be functionally similar to the right beliefs, they should be held with the right justifications as well.


Finally, I asked "if causality, free-will and determinism are all compatible, what is all the fuss about"?
For this I noticed a very common trend among the arguments to not clearly what is meant by an "agent". Understandable, since the notion of self-hood of an agent is still not clearly spelled out. But any progress on the subject without such a definition invariably leads to specifying the constraints which would be a part of the will as apart from the will. This, in turn, leads to the notion of the agent as either non-existent or some supernatural entity independent of causality. Which then leads to the automatic interpretation of free-will as something non-existent or free from causality or illusory.


Some questions I'm still considering

Specifically what would constitute the "internal constraints" of an agent, since not all processes taking place within the body could be classified as such?
I believe the answer lies in greater understanding of how human consciousness, awareness, cognition etc actually work.

How much of the agent's internal constraints dependent or determined by the external constraints?
Depending upon the answer to this, even free-will, as I've specified, would not exist. But absent any specific answer, we cannot preclude the possibility of its existence.

[NoMoreFaith]

Thanks Genkaus, I'm at work, and I'll re-read that a bit more carefully later, but you have clarified your position much more clearly from my initial read through.

As a matter of "considering the choices", what is your opinion on the number of studies that show that the conscious merely rationalises the decisions made by the unconscious (Dr Libet et al and repetitions).

This very much calls into question that we are making conscious choices at all.

[tackattack]

OK, so the first three pages were devoid of this level of conversations. Where would be a good place to start so a substance dualist can jump into the conversation? Perhpas a list of questions or a post number reference?

[NoMoreFaith]

OK, so the first three pages were devoid of this level of conversations. Where would be a good place to start so a substance dualist can jump into the conversation? Perhpas a list of questions or a post number reference?

I don't know much about substance dualism, apart that there is a great deal of difference of opinion even within this.

If you can define what substance dualism means to you (and I've just had to do some light reading on it myself) it would probably give good points to consider.

[genkaus]

Thanks Genkaus, I'm at work, and I'll re-read that a bit more carefully later, but you have clarified your position much more clearly from my initial read through.

As a matter of "considering the choices", what is your opinion on the number of studies that show that the conscious merely rationalises the decisions made by the unconscious (Dr Libet et al and repetitions).

This very much calls into question that we are making conscious choices at all.

I'd have to get back to you regarding specific details, but a cursory reading on Wikipedia implies that Libet's experiments correlate in part to my final unanswered questions.

Firstly, Libet's experiments concern the pre-motor buildup, in layman's terms, the urge to act. With regards to my conceptualization of free-will, the first question would be if these urges would be a part of the agent ? Not all physiological urges can be considered to be the "internal constraints" and not all can be excluded as such either.

Secondly, if these urges are considered as external constraints, how far do they constraint the agent to act according to them? According to Libet,

Libet finds that conscious volition is exercised in the form of 'the power of veto' (sometimes called "free won't"[8][9]); the idea that conscious acquiescence is required to allow the unconscious buildup of the readiness potential to be actualized as a movement. While consciousness plays no part in the instigation of volitional acts, Libet suggested that it may still have a part to play in suppressing or withholding certain acts instigated by the unconscious. Libet noted that everyone has experienced the withholding from performing an unconscious urge.

Which, I think, means "not completely". Until I study more on this topic, I probably shouldn't comment any further.

---

Where would be a good place to start so a substance dualist can jump into the conversation?

To a substance dualist, I'd say - the Empire State Building.

To my knowledge there has been little talk of substance dualism here and monism has been more or less implicitly accepted, though not explicitly stated. Best to start the discussion yourself and we can take it from there.

[twocompulsive]

One does not possess absolute but partial free
will instead : there are fundamentals which cannot
be manipulated such as the laws of physics and biology
There are other restraints which are capable of compromise
though are designed not to such as legal and psychological ones
but beyond that one really should have free will albeit in a limited form

But it is not that straight forward : since starts to get complicated
and this complication manifests itself in the way that the conscious and
subconscious interact : and essentially what happens is that our conscious
mind convinces us that decisions can be taken with us being in absolute control
the aforementioned restraints nothwithstanding : this is a fallacy though as the subtle
but significant interplay of the subconscious is influencing the conscious : given the nature
of the subconscious it is not easy to reference and so which is where the confusion about being
in absolute control arises : may be that all decisions we take no matter how insignificant have some
input from the subconscious or just the important ones : but what is absolutely certain is that we do not
have as much free will as we would like to think given this fact : the subconscious appears therefore to act as a
reinforcer of what ever needs to be done to protect us like some type of hard wired evolutionary psychological buffer
against anything that might compromise our well being : this would debilitate against the taking of spontaneous decisions
for example : it is however not foolproof since otherwise we would never be capable of making such decisions in the first place