Do you believe in free will?

[tackattack]

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1- Perception is just the product of perceiving. That typically comes from sensory input, but if our agent has a means to perceive rather than just cogitate than we can recognize or understand why we are and who we are. We can intuit or reason then why we are deciding. That gives us conscious choice. If the agent can exist without material means than it is independent of the material and that would seperate from physical reality correct?

The "if" being what precludes the possibility. Both the actions of perception and cogitation require material reality to occur. So, your argument prior to the if tells you why that "if" is not true.

3- So what you're saying here is he still can't change who he is, even though he knows who he now perceives himself to be is not truly himself?

You are not making much sense here. He truly is as he perceives himself. Whether he wants to remain so or not and the actionable change resulting from the motivation is irrelevant.

J2-why can't it be both?

Because both would entail a necessary contradiction

Can we not think back to things that were with memory? It's not the reality now, but it's sequential and out of temporal current reality.

No, the memory itself is a part of current temporal reality. The content of the memory is a reference to reality - not reality.

We don't always necessarily feel the way we felt as the observer back then, despite potential ghost sensory inputs giving us a projection. I believe thoughts are categorical not analogical. Let me ask you this: Can you perceive something in any way other than the way you typically expect to perceive it?

My expectation is to perceive it as it is - so no, I cannot perceive it any other way. That says nothing about the projection.

J3- How is there a primacy issue when I state reality can be comprised of phenomena that seem more real than noumena only because of their tangibility. I'm not saying either have the ability to divorce themselves completely from the causal chain, but in fact change its course. This perception of noumena and phenomena with introspection and reasoning , filtered through identity, are what encompasses free- will to me.

That is where you are wrong. I asked you for the justification of noumena. You have no faculty to perceive it.

4- If you can't be anything other than who you are (law of identity) can you be more than more than one you?

No.

I'm fairly certain that there are some multiple personalities I'd like to introduce to you. If each has their own identity and are unaware of the others the whole would be schizophrenic but the parts break the law of identity.

Don't confuse personality with identity. Multiple personalities all would be subsets of the same identity,

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I do have a question for you genkaus. If will is completely under coersion at all times, and the agent is part of the coersion, wouldn't he be affecting the direction of the will? Wouldn't that indicate that will, while influenced by multiple known and unknown influences, if incluenced by the desires of the agent would be under a degree of partial control of the agent?

I think your question is better directed at NoMoreFaith. It is not my position that an agent's will is under coercion all the time and it is my position that the agent being a part of the cause precludes coercion.

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1. Both the actions of perception and cogitation do not require material reality to occur. Unless you believe we only have 5 material senses? Thoughts, desires or mathematics are not a material reality. All factor in to many of my daily cogitations.

3a. Then please allow me to clarify. In the example person A knows objectively and reliably that they’re not acting “like themselves” (A prior). The person desires to return to A prior. Your statements indicate that there is no way for person A to move in the direction of and attain the same perspective once held by person A prior correct?
3b. In the instance I described he would have two images of self, the current and the desired. His desires result in an actionable change and is relevant. The fact that he at one time was person A (even though it was an introduced corruption of his identity) but would hold no sway over future desires or decision by the new person. It would quintessentially be a memory of the self he didn’t want.
J2. You never answered “Can you perceive something in any way other than the way you typically expect to perceive it?” Also, just because something happened sometime that wasn’t in the now of the current timeline, doesn’t divorce it from affecting the causal chain. This is because the perception or cognition of something that has happened or could happen can factor into the though process. Projections, prediction, memories and conditioning even if 100% accurate and observed will still affect the physical though the causal chain.
4. I agree that the physical housing of memory itself is a part of current temporal reality. However the contents of that temporal reality (declarative memories) housed in physical reality (brain) when episodic are in essence illusory time travel sessions. It causes tinting of the now by what was. That to me signifies non-temporal, but we could very well be arguing semantics on this and I don’t realize it.
5. Ok so say for instance a particular fish has developed the ability to sense the electrical field produced by certain other fish through evolution. We don’t have that sense and can’t sense a fishes electrical field. It is a noumena to us. The lack of our perception of a noumena, does not negate the phenomena from occurring, just our realization of its occurrence.

My statement does need a little rephrasing as it was inaccurate so allow me to re attempt.
This perception of phenomena, effect of noumena, desire, introspection and reasoning, all filtered through identity, and acted upon are what encompass free- will to me.

6- Objectively we would see one identity, that of a schizo. However, from each of the different personalities perspectives, they would each have their own identity correct? The question was to anyone then I guess, could you extrapolate what you mean by “the agent being a part of the cause precludes coercion”

Thanks for all your attention on this subject and your patience with me, I thouroughly enjoy these discussions.

[NoMoreFaith]

Note that this would be the fallacy of equivocation. Within some contexts compulsion means to cause by force and within others to simply cause. By ignoring this critical distinction, you are able to equate coercion and causation.

The distinction that we are forced against our will in terms of a discussion on will, it seems to be a tautology. Our created will forces us to against our will to do something is nonsense.
The only logical sense is to use the word in context of being compelled to act.

When you stated, and I quote - "His choices are made for him through the natural processes of his mind" - you assumed distinction between the natural processes of the mind and the person.

And again, use of the word compelled here is incorrect. Within this context "caused" is appropriate.

True, but my arguments are clear that the person is nothing but the sum of the physiological whole reacting to stimuli internal and external.

The quote is discussing choice, and it only makes sense to reify the "self" in this instance as a reference point for whom the choice refers to. It is more than clear that I do not consider the person to be separate from the natural processes. Suggestions for a better way to word it?

To consider long range planning to be fictitious would mean that the actions undertaken towards the achievement of a long-term goal are not a product of conscious consideration.

Only if the mechanical ability to memorise does not exist. Which it clearly does.

For instance, a computer program is resolves an instruction to complete a task. It is an illusion the task is completed instantly (unless you use my computer), merely the byproduct of lots of little instructions to make up the whole. It is the memory which makes it possible for the computer to create small steps leading to the fulfillment of the plan.
However, our choice to "want promotion" was initially a small idea, likely based on a small choice "I want to be more comfortable", memorised, and expanded upon to reach a state of perceived more permanent comfort.

The storage and retrieval of the concept of pie and its ingredients is not automatic or unconscious. In fact, the next action has to be considered before the current action is completed. Your memory and your decisions are a part of your conscious mind.

Precisely. Your concept of Pie was the fleeting thought, memorised, and then minor tasks repeatedly memorised to reach the final concept. You can then act, based upon stored decisions to reach a result.
You're right that evolution does not have a memorised final result, of course, but in that the human is a product of lots of little changes, it bears some parallels.
In trying to explain how a large decision is comprised of little ones it seemed apt.

Now in terms of Neuroscience, your wants and needs are dependent on the chemicals in your body. An interesting case study is Ann Klinestiver, a teacher whom was squeaky clean, whom was medicated with a Dopamine substitute.
She developed an intense gambling addiction brought on by the Dopamine.

I bring this up, and as a layman, I can only describe it in layman terms, but because dopamine affects your "reward prediction" centre in your brain, it has serious effects on your long range motivations.
To cut a long story short, the link between mnemonic processes and the functions of decisions is known. More to the point, it seems likely, thou I don't know of any studies on this yet, merely the brain processes that link mnemonic and decision making, that these processes predate conscious thought in their construction.
However, it does seem to be a logical conclusion, that if the subconscious, which you have no control over, is making split second decisions before your conscious mind rationalises it, that your subconscious is also doing the same thing with steps related to long term goals.
In another words.. your conscious process of planning a long range goal, was constructed, and presented to your conscious to rationalise.

That part is theory, and unproven, but hence my point that neuroscientists would probably be surprised if long range planning was somehow separate and therefore a completely different process from small scale decisions.

That is where you are wrong. If each decision were to be justified after being made, then the series of actions cannot be consistently expected to lead to the same result.

Asserting I am wrong, is not the same as proving it. Your point certainly doesn't succeed in that task.
My previous point about reward prediction comes into play. If the levels of dopamine in your brain are altered, your perception of reward prediction is weighted in a different way. The important point to note in relation to this point is that this is all going on to cause your conscious thoughts, not in response to a conscious thought.

You like using the evolution analogy - consider this. Within evolution, there is not central purpose or goal driving the mechanism. The result are judged beneficial or harmful after occurring. As a result, the process is meandering, unreliable and notoriously inefficient. What if the same thing was occurring with all our actions. Any big decision would be the consequence of lot of small decisions - none of them chosen expressly with the big picture in mind but randomly and justified after selection. How often do you think you'd actually get to the restaurant if that were the case.

Can you honestly argue, that our thought processes are NOT meandering, unreliable and notoriously inefficient?
On your way to the restaurant, you will make a lot of minor mistakes, barely noticeable in the long run, occasionally larger ones, like taking the wrong route. Perception of reward for each given task referred to the memory of the destination. The small tasks are irrelevant to the whole plan, but initiated by the prediction of reward memorised.
As the original premise stated, the idea we control, and construct our plans MAY (not definitely, I don't assert as you do) turn out to be as illusionary as the small scale ones. We rationalise the plan after we have already decided and memorised our WANTS.

The evolution analogy is flawed to the extent that it has no plan, whereas the creation of a long range plan is obviously a planned end result.

Exactly my point. Even the subconscious level commands are being guided by the conscious command - to walk.

Why did you create the command to walk? Did YOU decide to walk?
My argument is that conscious is our unusual mechanism which justifies the action the subconscious has decided upon.
It suits me to call it my free will, but the reality is likely to be nothing close.

If it was "without your knowledge". Consciousness of motivation leads to the knowledge of the decisions required to satisfy it.

Sometimes I'm sure, but your rationalisation doesn't ALWAYS match the reasons.
I need sustenance, body go eat pie, is rationalised, as "gosh, I'm hungry, I think I'll choose to eat that pie". No problem. Your free will in choosing to eat the pie.
More to the point, you fancy an orange. There is no problem in accepting that your body recognises an orange as containing certain vitamins and sugars it particularly needs and compels you to choose that over the pie.

It gets shadier with more complex ideas such as "I am going to marry that girl". Are you absolutely sure your reasons for being attracted to her is the result of conscious decision? I'm willing to bet that you are happy to attribute the complexity of that decision to reasons dictated by your subconscious rather than a decision formed by your conscious. Nebulous concepts such as "I love her therefore" are mostly meaningless to the true requirement of your motivation to wish to partner someone indefinitely. Too complex to comprehend, and simplified into concepts of love etc.

As noted earlier, this is the fallacy of equivocation. Within the context of free-will, compulsion and coercion are equivalent - compulsion and causation are not.

The lack of free will can be defined as the necessity of causation, and the compulsion to act. I defined free will in different ways, but by no means fallaciously equivalent. It is the difference between defining what makes you something, and being made to do something. Different concepts... different words.. BOTH restrict the possibility of free will.

Your point about separate entities is no more relevant than you saying that your consciousness initiates the action. The consciousness is not really a separate entity at all, but in order to discuss coherently, you must talk about the conscious mind and subconscious, even thou there is no real separation between the two holistically, its all one biological process. This illusion we have that we an choose is part of what makes things separate, and most importantly allows us to discuss it in a rational manner.
Separation remains a rhetorical device to explain concepts. If we used the word body instead of "mind" "conscious" "subconscious" "feeling" "emotion".. the conversation would just be nonsense, but that does not apply any reality to the separation, merely a method to talk about the issue and the description of parts that are not really separate, but feel as if they are to us.

The principle is simple - while causation can be achieved with the subject and object being the same (i.e. you can cause yourself to do something), the same is not true for compulsion (you cannot compel yourself to do something). So, in order to apply the principle of compulsion here, you have to treat the neurons and the chemicals as a separate entity from the person - something you yourself admitted not supporting.

Its a method to discuss the issue, not a declaration of metaphysical difference, you should know that, we made the mistake of accusing you of taking that same position much earlier in the conversation.
You got quite angry about it, and rightfully so, as your descriptions made it appear you were describing free will as a separate entity. A confusion we have now rectified.

No, I assume that when my arguments aren't addressed. The fundamental misunderstanding is yours - for the reason given.

I can accept that. However, the fault lies with the description of the concept equally to rise to misunderstanding.
I'm reasonably capable of understanding concepts, although admittedly amateur at philosophy, however, many of your ideas have been inadequately described causing pages of confusion.
The concept of coercion is a good example.

You can keep shouting coerced, it does not make caused and coerced equivalent.

To be honest, I have resisted the urge to accuse you of a similar thing. You have used coercion based upon a meaning of "forced against your will" by "glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time." which is the proper usage of your "compulsion to act". Specifically, your unavoidable compulsion to choose one specific choice.

The term free will, encapsulates many different hypotheses each must be clearly defined in order to empirically disprove.

And my argument is that posteriori justification of the action with a rationalised motivation, with all of the rationalizations leading to one singular coherent goal would be a very rare event indeed. It is not so.

Because you mistakenly interpret that the rationalisation happens upon the completion of the action, rather than completion of the readiness to act.

I have provided evidence of it on a small scale. You have provided none.
However, my extrapolation to larger scale actions may indeed be inaccurate. There is no reason to assume otherwise, apart from the feeling it is counter-intuitive.

An intractable decision to act is separated by the action only by a matter of time. Either the presence of consciousness between the two able to override the "decision" in which case it is not a decision, but an inclination or it is not - in which case, the posteriori justification comes in - leading to problems with long-term goals.

Well, maybe the argument should be, do we have "free won't".

Using Coercion in its sense of being forced into something you don't want to do rather than the compulsion to act fucked things up quite royally.

I which, I'd still claim the correct usage of the words.

Me too. I'm open to someone with more experience to clarify if you are.

[genkaus]

1. Both the actions of perception and cogitation do not require material reality to occur.

Yes they do.

Unless you believe we only have 5 material senses?

No, we've many more of those.

Thoughts, desires or mathematics are not a material reality. All factor in to many of my daily cogitations.

No, they are not material reality, but they cannot occur without a material medium

3a. Then please allow me to clarify. In the example person A knows objectively and reliably that they’re not acting “like themselves” (A prior). The person desires to return to A prior. Your statements indicate that there is no way for person A to move in the direction of and attain the same perspective once held by person A prior correct?

No. Firstly, don't equate A prior with "themselves". Secondly, the desire to return to A prior would be the cause and would determine the actions required for the return.

3b. In the instance I described he would have two images of self, the current and the desired.

Correct, but only the current one is his identity - not the desired one.

His desires result in an actionable change and is relevant.

But it is irrelevant to his perception of his current self.

The fact that he at one time was person A (even though it was an introduced corruption of his identity) but would hold no sway over future desires or decision by the new person. It would quintessentially be a memory of the self he didn’t want.

Ok.

J2. You never answered “Can you perceive something in any way other than the way you typically expect to perceive it?”

I did. No.

Also, just because something happened sometime that wasn’t in the now of the current timeline, doesn’t divorce it from affecting the causal chain.

Why would it? Its a part of the causal chain. Its effects are carried over down the line.

This is because the perception or cognition of something that has happened or could happen can factor into the though process. Projections, prediction, memories and conditioning even if 100% accurate and observed will still affect the physical though the causal chain.

No one is denying that. What is being denied is the atemporal nature of these projections, predictions, memories and conditioning,

4. I agree that the physical housing of memory itself is a part of current temporal reality. However the contents of that temporal reality (declarative memories) housed in physical reality (brain) when episodic are in essence illusory time travel sessions. It causes tinting of the now by what was. That to me signifies non-temporal, but we could very well be arguing semantics on this and I don’t realize it.

We are, but semantics are very important since incorrect semantics can lead to erroneous conclusions.

As you accept here, the episodic nature of these memories is illusory, i.e. the atemporal nature is not real. The fact that these happened in the past and are affecting the present is perfectly in line with the temporal nature of causation.

5. Ok so say for instance a particular fish has developed the ability to sense the electrical field produced by certain other fish through evolution. We don’t have that sense and can’t sense a fishes electrical field. It is a noumena to us. The lack of our perception of a noumena, does not negate the phenomena from occurring, just our realization of its occurrence.

The words noumenon and phenomenon are generally understood to describe the metaphysical nature of an object - referring to what cannot and can be known through the senses. In this case, the electric field is knowable through a sense (that of the fish). The absence of that sense in us does not change its nature from phenomenal to noumenal. So, no - its not noumena to us - unless you are defining noumena differently, in which case you should first specify it.

My statement does need a little rephrasing as it was inaccurate so allow me to re attempt.
This perception of phenomena, effect of noumena, desire, introspection and reasoning, all filtered through identity, and acted upon are what encompass free- will to me.

As noted, I take objection with the use of the word noumena here as I consider desire, introspection, reasoning all to be part of the phenomenal. Apart from that, you are going correctly.

6- Objectively we would see one identity, that of a schizo. However, from each of the different personalities perspectives, they would each have their own identity correct?

The keywords being "from different perspectives". Identity does not depend on perspective. For example, disregard multiple personalities. Any single person is viewed through different perspectives by different people. His identity does not depend or change according to that perspective.

The question was to anyone then I guess, could you extrapolate what you mean by “the agent being a part of the cause precludes coercion”

Coercion refers to the action of causing a party to act against its own motivation. However, the action of coercion is assumed to be consistent with the will of the coercer. Now, if the coercer and the coerced are one and the same, you are essentially saying that it is the person's will to act against his will - a self-refuting position. Thus, my statement, that an agent being part of the cause precludes coercion

[NoMoreFaith]

Here’s a question to put your theory to the test. If you and I agree on what blue looks like does the object it’s describing that make someone else seeing it as gray any less real?

Blue can be measured in wavelengths of light. It can be objectively measured and defined as the property of light at a certain wavelength. How you perceive it is irrelevant, it is still blue, no matter how your brain interprets the signal. Any confusion on the matter is a physical flaw in perception, rather than the concept of blue.

I think you assume that causal determinism is a natural law, and that we’re trying to say we’re apart from those laws. I’m not saying that. I’m saying that part of who we are is our perception and desires. Those desires and perceptions are both outputs and inputs to the causal chain and if they can be shown to be altered, shows we have the ability to not be the sum of physiologically are determined to be.

Beautifully put, and clear. My current discussion with Genkaus (once we finish sniping over definitions) is based upon the concept that our ideas, motivations, plans, originate at a level beyond our perception, which are merely then justified.
An example of which would be the decision to ask someone to marry you. The underlying reasoning for this decision is largely hidden in complexities of conditioning and biological needs, and surrounded in metaphysical, but "unreal" concepts of love.
Sadly, I am not a neuroscientist, so I am willing to accept what the studies indicate. We may not be measuring the right thing, who knows.

Studies show that those who read a document stating determinism is a proven fact show the recipients act in a far less moral manner afterwards, which is why, early on in this thread, that while I believe my views, its best to simply not think about it too much! I don't want to be this way, I simply see no evidence to the contrary beyond private conviction, which I think anyone should be hesitant to trust implicitly.

Going back to your point, since I'm wandering, I do not divorce the psychological from the physiological. XKCD has a great little cartoon about it; http://xkcd.com/435/
In take it to extremes, in the long run, if we were more holistic and a million times more cognitively able, we probably wouldn't have a distinction between psychology and mathematics.

One thing I will say, is that I hope I'm wrong. Its awfully depressing, if true.

EDIT: Judging by the conversation above, this is quickly entering an level of discussion, I'm not too proud to admit goes beyond me. I think I may have to join Norfolk on the sidelines now!!

[The Grand Nudger]

As if the cosmos gave a shit about whether or not human beings acted in "a far less moral manner". One useful illusion supporting another useful illusion. Wouldn't be the first time, guessing it won't be the last. Morality is a great thing to consider, when the subject is morality, but when the subject is existence, it's a non-issue. We seem to be capable of leveraging illusory concepts even when we understand them to be illusory, I haven't hacked anyone to pieces today.

[Whateverist]

But don't you see, you will either cool down or not and agree on the usage of terms or not, exactly as your enviro-/experiential/DNA dictates. There is no need and no possibility of deciding differently. If you'd been born with all the factors that have gone into determining Genkaus' perspective, then you'd have no choice but to argue his side. If you're right about determinism then you can't win. Reasoning is futile. Those thoughts which confirm or undermine your position are just more 'givens'. If you have no free will, you have no reason to give more credence to your thoughts than to Genkaus'. If you can see through the illusion of your apparent free will then why stop there? Why accept the thoughts and opinions that are given to you to think? Why suppose that what seems reasonable or rational to you is any more reliable than the illusion of your free will? In short, if you don't have free will, can you possibly have 'free thought'?

You are talking about the understanding of determinism as a self-refuting idea, which does not stand in face of a compatibilist view.

Yes. Sorry, I should have made it plainer that this was directed to FaithNoMore who seems still to be arguing for hard determinism. My point to him remains that freedom of thought makes no sense without free will. Who is deciding what to think? Who decides what makes sense or is reasonable?

If Libet's delay is supposed to cast doubt on who is the author of our actions, doesn't it even more profoundly cast doubt upon who is the author of our thoughts? A better understanding of Libet is simply that what gets measured before a person acts or decides how to act is simply the effort of squelching immediate response. In the delay the agent has time to factor in the effects of new learning. This factoring in may well happen on an unconscious level. After all, something of this kind would have been going on long before we developed the capacity for language, or does anyone think language predates self awareness?

[Thorham]

Blue can be measured in wavelengths of light. It can be objectively measured and defined as the property of light at a certain wavelength. How you perceive it is irrelevant, it is still blue, no matter how your brain interprets the signal. Any confusion on the matter is a physical flaw in perception, rather than the concept of blue.

Actually, light doesn't have any colors. Colors are an invention of the brain, used to represent the frequencies of light.

[KichigaiNeko]

Blue can be measured in wavelengths of light. It can be objectively measured and defined as the property of light at a certain wavelength. How you perceive it is irrelevant, it is still blue, no matter how your brain interprets the signal. Any confusion on the matter is a physical flaw in perception, rather than the concept of blue.

Actually, light doesn't have any colors. Colors are an invention of the brain, used to represent the frequencies of light.

Crystals seem to have an impact in there some where ?

[The Grand Nudger]

Whateverist, when you ask "who decides" you're assuming a top down model of thought, which is not what we understand our thought processes to be at this time. Bottom up, the decision is an effect. "What is reasonable" has been "decided" by trial and error, by reference to external things. Again, it was a bottom up process. All of those pretty latin words that we call fallacies were at some point considered to be both sound and valid, it was only by attempting to match the conclusions that we came to based upon their use with what we perceive to be reality that we realized something had gone horribly awry.

[Thorham]

Crystals seem to have an impact in there some where ?

Crystals?