Do you control what you believe?

[Polaris]

Ultimately no, but not in the way an atheist would think. I was exposed to the religion in my youth, but I have to say no to being in control because like a man who finally can see the the earth is round and cannot go back to his old way of thinking the earth as flat, I likewise could not deny my faith when I was filled with the Holy Spirit though I did not fully grasp at the time that would be the moment I actually was a Christian.

[Edwardo Piet]

So long as they are our fears and desires which inform our choices, how is that not free?

If our fears and desires are ultimately determined by entirely external and unconscious sources, how is that free?

Are our fears and desires external to our wills?

I wouldn't say so, at least not particularly. Would you say they were?

If our wills must function completely independently of fears and desires in order to be deemed "free", it is hard to imagine for what purpose we would ever 'will' anything.

Our wills don't function "completely independently of our fears or desires." They are largely influenced by them, but if our fears and desires are ultimately entirely determined by external and unconscious sources, once again, how is that free?

It comes back again to what exactly the 'will' is and is not, a very murky area.

I would say that someone's 'will' is their conscious motivation. Do you have a problem with that definition? If you do, what is it?

[Whateverist]

If our fears and desires are ultimately determined by entirely external and unconscious sources, how is that free?

Are our fears and desires external to our wills?

I wouldn't say so, at least not particularly. Would you say they were?

If our wills must function completely independently of fears and desires in order to be deemed "free", it is hard to imagine for what purpose we would ever 'will' anything.

Our wills don't function "completely independently of our fears or desires." They are largely influenced by them, but if our fears and desires are ultimately entirely determined by external and unconscious sources, once again, how is that free?

It comes back again to what exactly the 'will' is and is not, a very murky area.

I would say that someone's 'will' is their conscious motivation. Do you have a problem with that definition? If you do, what is it?

If we accept the definition of "will" as conscious motivation then we should also accept that there are other sources of volition than willpower on board the totality of oneself. In so far as will as we've defined it is not the sole master of 'our house', then we must concede that the will is not free. To my mind that doesn't mean will is never free, or can never have its way. Very often we do carry out what plans we have made. The question then becomes, do they satisfy?

On the other hand, if we conceptualize our conscious minds as a specialized facility whose purpose is to serve the total organism then it is possible to align ones conscious motivation with a more robust conception of self. Our identification with conscious, deliberate motivation need not form our entire self conception. When it does, the perception will be that our wills are not free. But my self conception is of something deeper and more inclusive than my conscious motivations. One of my conscious motivations is to better understand the knowledge and desires operative in me that are not fully conscious. Einstein said the rational mind should be a faithful servant to intuition. Perhaps in willing servitude, freedom is possible.

I think we have no choice but to accept and work with the fears and desires which we discover inside. It would be curious if we were able to pick and choose consciously which fears and desires we would embrace. If having to contend with fears and desires not of our choosing makes us less free then indeed we are not free. But if I consciously desire to discover and embrace the fears and desires which the environment and my greater self have instilled in me, then perhaps I am free. It would not appeal to me to have no desires or fears other than those I arbitrarily choose. That to me would feel like alienation and meaninglessness.

[Some middle of the night thoughts probably not as coherently expressed as they could be.]

---

[quote='whateverist' pid='353130' dateline='1351032050']
So long as they are our fears and desires which inform our choices, how is that not free?

If our fears and desires are ultimately determined by entirely external and unconscious sources, how is that free?

Are our fears and desires external to our wills?

I wouldn't say so, at least not particularly. Would you say they were?

If our wills must function completely independently of fears and desires in order to be deemed "free", it is hard to imagine for what purpose we would ever 'will' anything.

Our wills don't function "completely independently of our fears or desires." They are largely influenced by them, but if our fears and desires are ultimately entirely determined by external and unconscious sources, once again, how is that free?

It comes back again to what exactly the 'will' is and is not, a very murky area.

I would say that someone's 'will' is their conscious motivation. Do you have a problem with that definition? If you do, what is it?

If we accept the definition of "will" as conscious motivation then we should also accept that there are other sources of volition than willpower on board the totality of oneself. In so far as will as we've defined it is not the sole master of 'our house', then we must concede that the will is not free. To my mind that doesn't mean will is never free, or can never have its way. Very often we do carry out what plans we have made. The question then becomes, do they satisfy?

On the other hand, if we conceptualize our conscious minds as a specialized facility whose purpose is to serve the total organism then it is possible to align ones conscious motivation with a more robust conception of self. Our identification with conscious, deliberate motivation need not form our entire self conception. When it does, the perception will be that our wills are not free. But my self conception is of something deeper and more inclusive than my conscious motivations. One of my conscious motivations is to better understand the knowledge and desires operative in me that are not fully conscious. Einstein said the rational mind should be a faithful servant to intuition. Perhaps in willing servitude, freedom is possible.

I think we have no choice but to accept and work with the fears and desires which we discover inside. It would be curious if we were able to pick and choose consciously which fears and desires we would embrace. If having to contend with fears and desires not of our choosing makes us less free then indeed we are not free. But if I consciously desire to discover and embrace the fears and desires which the environment and my greater self have instilled in me, then perhaps I am free. It would not appeal to me to have no desires or fears other than those I arbitrarily choose. That to me would feel like alienation and meaninglessness.

[Some middle of the night thoughts probably not as coherently expressed as they could be.]

[Edwardo Piet]

If we accept the definition of "will" as conscious motivation then we should also accept that there are other sources of volition than willpower on board the totality of oneself.

I will accept that there is both conscious and unconscious motivation, but I can't understand what you mean by there being other sources of volition other than willpower. Wouldn't volition have to come down to a matter of willpower? By volition don't you either mean 'will' or 'free will'? If so "other sources of volition other than willpower" would imply "other sources of 'will' other than willpower" which seems like a flat-out logical contradiction to me. Unless to you willpower is not the same as 'will'?

In so far as will as we've defined it is not the sole master of 'our house', then we must concede that the will is not free.

I presume you mean that's because our conscious motivation is ultimately predetermined by unconscious motivation?

To my mind that doesn't mean will is never free, or can never have its way.

In what sense do you believe it's 'free' then?

Very often we do carry out what plans we have made.

That is rationally undeniable, to deny that would be full-blown fatalism which is, of course, not the same thing as determinism.

The question then becomes, do they satisfy?

What does the satisfaction of our plans have to do with "free will"?

On the other hand, if we conceptualize our conscious minds as a specialized facility whose purpose is to serve the total organism then it is possible to align ones conscious motivation with a more robust conception of self.

Our conscious motivation can come from more conscious motivation you mean? For example, our desires and fears can come from other desires and fears that we have. We influence and control ourselves to an extent. That is undeniable but not what I'm questioning because it's so obviously undeniable, like I said you'd have to be a full-blown fatalist (which isn't rationally justifiable) to deny that. I'm questioning the libertarian sense of "free will" because many people believe in that concept which is at least as ridiculous as the undeniably extreme ridiculousness of sheer fatalism. I obviously don't question the typical sense of "free will" compatible with determinism. I see that as a red herring you see. Although it's obviously important to avoid fatalism, embracing free will is not the only way to avoid it - understanding that determinism doesn't imply fatalism is another and, I would argue, a better way. I think it's a better way because while I don't deny the typical compatibilistic sense of "free will", I think it's a red herring because, while typical, it's less typical than the libertarian sense of "free will" and, also, less morally significant a matter to address. But anyway, that's then getting a bit off-topic because this is about whether we control what we believe. Free will is indeed relevant to that, but which conceptualization of "free will" to embrace and why (and the matter of morality), are irrelevant to that matter.

Our identification with conscious, deliberate motivation need not form our entire self conception.

Yes, our self-conception can, and does, originate from sources outside of our identification with conscious motivation.

When it does, the perception will be that our wills are not free.

Well, the libertarian sense of "free will" cannot exist assuming that is the case.

But my self conception is of something deeper and more inclusive than my conscious motivations.

It originates from unconscious motivation(s), yes.

One of my conscious motivations is to better understand the knowledge and desires operative in me that are not fully conscious. Einstein said the rational mind should be a faithful servant to intuition. Perhaps in willing servitude, freedom is possible.

There's no denying that freedom is possible, the question is whether libertarian free will is possible and my answer is a resounding "No."

I think we have no choice but to accept and work with the fears and desires which we discover inside.

We can influence them. But they are ultimately entirely determined from factors other than ourselves (or to put it another way, our 'selves').

It would be curious if we were able to pick and choose consciously which fears and desires we would embrace.

We can to an extent. But we ultimately have no choice in the matter. It is, ultimately, entirely determined.

The validity of that argument is all assuming philosophical determinism is true of course, if philosophical indeterminism is true, things are probabilistic. But that leads to the nonexistence of libertarian free will too because if the universe is (philosophically) indeterministic, since we're part of the universe, we can't determine our actions either - or in other words we can't 'will' our actions we're just more likely to do some things than others and, not only doesn't free will exist, the will itself is an illusion in that case. We can't logically use the same argument against free will in an indeterministic universe as in a deterministic one, but the conclusion is the same: (libertarian) free will doesn't exist.

If having to contend with fears and desires not of our choosing makes us less free then indeed we are not free.

I don't see how contending with desires that we choose is "free" either, if that choice is not a free one. Meaning that if that choice is ultimately entirely pretermined, how is it free?

But if I consciously desire to discover and embrace the fears and desires which the environment and my greater self have instilled in me, then perhaps I am free.

Not in the libertarian sense that I'm addressing. If your desires and fears are ultimately entirely predetermined, how are they free?

It would not appeal to me to have no desires or fears other than those I arbitrarily choose.

What appeals to you is not really addressing the existence of free will nor is it addressing whether we control what we believe.

[Some middle of the night thoughts probably not as coherently expressed as they could be.]

Well it's half past two in the afternoon for me but, once again, a bit off-topic

[YASHA]

My OP is that you can affect (not all) what you believe and manipulate it in any way you like but then it won't necessarily be what you originally believed. My example is a Christian who twist the Bible to suit their own needs. On the other hand, what you believe in can control you too.

[Edwardo Piet]

It's rational to believe something that's true, but it's also rational to believe in a falsehood if it's truly more valuable to believe in than truth itself. Since if it's truly "truly more valuable to believe in than truth itself", then it's rational to believe in it because it's truly more valuable than truth itself.

Just some thoughts.

[Mystic]

I agree. This is why I'm inclined to act is if I have a sword of soul even though now I admit I'm Agnostic and don't believe either way. Emotionally I will "believe" in a soul and a sword of soul, even though intellectually I'm not convinced and realize it's generated by the mind.

Belief in a sword of soul feels more enriching, therefore I'm inclined to accept it or act as if it exists.

And this perhaps why most people believe in religion or god. Because they find the belief to be valuable.

They aren't irrational.

I

[Darkstar]

I agree. This is why I'm inclined to act is if I have a sword of soul even though now I admit I'm Agnostic and don't believe either way. Emotionally I will "believe" in a soul and a sword of soul, even though intellectually I'm not convinced and realize it's generated by the mind.

Belief in a sword of soul feels more enriching, therefore I'm inclined to accept it or act as if it exists.

And this perhaps why most people believe in religion or god. Because they find the belief to be valuable.

They aren't irrational.

I

I think that is what would be called pragmatic belief. A belief that, while not necessarily true, can be beneficial to believe in. Religion in general doesn't fall into this category for the most part because of all the doctrinal restrictions on, and manipulation of, behavior. A non-religious belief in god, such as a non-denominational theist or deist, usually removes all of the malignant tendancies created by organized religion, while retaining the 'spirituality' of it. They can be useful for people who want/need 'spitiruality' in their lives, even if they end up not being true. (Note that I put spirituality in quotes because the term is vaguely defined.)

[Whateverist]

Just to be clear, what exactly are you denying when you say you don't think we have free will, DvsF? Are we incapable of making any arbitrary act at all unless it is motivated by a fear or desire which the cosmic dominoes have caused us to possess? Or does having a will mean you can choose to do a thing or not do a thing on a whim?

It seems to me that unless there is some freedom in the system it is scarcely meaningful to say we have any kind of will. I think some people actually think this, that we are scarcely more than marionettes who spin a rationalizing tale after the fact. If this were true then it isn't just free will that we lack, it is will itself.

If I am free to prioritize among my unchosen fears and desires -and to be creative about how I act to maximize my happiness given my understanding of what they are .. why is that not considered free? If I must be free to choose my fears and desires, you may as well say I must be free to choose who I am or will be. On what basis then could I possibly make such a choice?

This is where I get stuck. It doesn't seem to make any sense.

[Edwardo Piet]

Just to be clear, what exactly are you denying when you say you don't think we have free will, DvsF?

The philosophically libertarian sense of "free will" that is incompatible with philosophical determinism and yet requires us to determine things freely ourselves. I say that any sense of free will we can have in an indeterministic world, we can also have in a deterministic world. The sense of "free will" that we can't have in a philosophically deterministic world doesn't exist.

Are we incapable of making any arbitrary act at all unless it is motivated by a fear or desire which the cosmic dominoes have caused us to possess?[quote] I don't know what other conscious motivation we have to act besides our motivational fears and desires. There may be others, there may not. But my point is that our conscious motivation can't be "free" in the philosopically libertarian sense.

[quote]Or does having a will mean you can choose to do a thing or not do a thing on a whim?

As I have said, having a will merely means having conscious motivation. Whether that's just our conscious fears and desires that motivate us or whether it's more than that.

It seems to me that unless there is some freedom in the system it is scarcely meaningful to say we have any kind of will.

I guess that means you are merely definining will as "free will", making the question of "is our will free?" futile.

I think some people actually think this, that we are scarcely more than marionettes who spin a rationalizing tale after the fact. If this were true then it isn't just free will that we lack, it is will itself.

We do have conscious motivation, and that is how I am defining the will remember, and I thought you agreed to that definition so you should agree that the will exists therefore. We are questioning whether the will is free, I thought, not whether it itself exists. Are you denying that we have conscious motivation? Are you denying that our consciousness motivates us at all? It's certainly possible, but I doubt it's true, and if it is that not only results in my conclusion that the libertarian sense of free will does not exist, that also results in the conclusion that no kind of free will exists - that is, of course, assuming we are still defining "will" as "conscous motivation".

If I am free to prioritize among my unchosen fears and desires -and to be creative about how I act to maximize my happiness given my understanding of what they are .. why is that not considered free?

As I said, our fears and desires, and other conscious motivation may be free in the sense they can lead to and influence each other, but they are not free in the sense that they are ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation and/or other unconscious causes. The philosophicaly libertarian sense of free will does not exist, that is the sense of "free will" that I am denying. I am not denying a sense of "free will" that merely means "our fears and desires, and other conscious motivation may be free in the sense that they can lead to and influence each other." That sense of free will is compatible with philosophical determinism, whereas the philosophically libertarian sense of free will is not.

If I must be free to choose my fears and desires, you may as well say I must be free to choose who I am or will be.

You influence who you are and who you will be, because you and your conscious motivation is part of the causal chain, but the fears and desires that you "choose" with your conscious motivation is ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation and/or other unconscious causes. That is why the fears and desires that you "choose" with your conscious motivation are not free. You make a choice, but it is not a free choice. You have a will, but it is not a free will. You use your conscious motivation with other parts of conscious motivation, but you don't do so freely because utlimately those "parts of conscious motivation" are going to be entirely determined by unconscious motivation and/or other unconscious causes.

On what basis then could I possibly make such a choice?

You make choices with your motivational conscious fears and desires and any other kind of conscious motivation, but those choices are not free. Unless you're merely defining "choice" as "free decision" which renders the question as to whether such a decision is free futile in the first place. If you are to say that choices are free decisions then I shall say there are no choices, only decisions. If you are to say that choices are the same as decisons, then I shall say that there are choices, but not free ones, just as there are free decsions, but not free ones. And when I say "not free" remember that I mean not "free" in the libertarian sense of "free" described above.

This is where I get stuck. It doesn't seem to make any sense.

I hope I've made myself at least partly clearer.