Theory number 3.

[Mystic]

I am not good at defining things to be honest.

[Darkstar]

What I mean by it, if there is any "feeler" to anything or have any perception to whatever low level, than it's concscious. But what I don't mean by it, is like a computer receiving information but has no living perceiver.

What if a supercomputer were so complex that it was indistinguishable from a human? What if it could feel (physically...okay, assuming said computer was the brain to a humanoid robot) and could display complex emotions? What if it was, in fact, as complex as a human brain. Would it be conscious? What if it was an organic supercomputer genetically engineered to be the same as the non-organic one, what would the difference be? At what point (if ever) could a machine be recognized as having genuine emotions? I have thought about this at times, but I'm not sure what the answer would be.

[Mystic]

What I mean by it, if there is any "feeler" to anything or have any perception to whatever low level, than it's concscious. But what I don't mean by it, is like a computer receiving information but has no living perceiver.

What if a supercomputer were so complex that it was indistinguishable from a human? What if it could feel (physically...okay, assuming said computer was the brain to a humanoid robot) and could display complex emotions? What if it was, in fact, as complex as a human brain. Would it be conscious? What if it was an organic supercomputer genetically engineered to be the same as the non-organic one, what would the difference be? At what point (if ever) could a machine be recognized as having genuine emotions? I have thought about this at times, but I'm not sure what the answer would be.

Ok let's simply it. We are concious and experience it. We know of the definition primarily from our own experience of it. Any low degree of that, no matter how less then us, any perceiver is conscious.

Without any degree of that, it's non-conscious.

[The Grand Nudger]

The simplest cell is still conscious then (at the very least we are incapable of describing our own consciousness in a way that would rule it out except by brute force of -it aint exactly like us!-).

[Edwardo Piet]

How many neurons does it take for them to be significant?

How significant is "significant"? Well, to be like us you obviously need a lot.

Would this be in line with definition #3, or would the brain need to be complex enough to reach definition #2 for it to count?

I don't think definition #2 exists. No one is completely independent from their instincts. Reason is the slave of the passions as David Hume would say. As for definition 3#, if anything with a brain is "conscious" that would mean ants were "conscious" in the sense that they have a brain, but it wouldn't actually mean that they were aware. On the other hand, if we define "conscious" as "has a brain" then, if ants aren't conscious, that would mean that ants don't have brains!

[Darkstar]

I don't think definition #2 exists. No one is completely independent from their instincts. Reason is the slave of the passions as David Hume would say. As for definition 3#, if anything with a brain is "conscious" that would mean ants were "conscious" in the sense that they have a brain, but it wouldn't actually mean that they were aware. On the other hand, if we define "conscious" as "has a brain" then, if ants aren't conscious, that would mean that ants don't have brains!

So we can reasonably reject definition #3, then. However, I did not mean entirely independent of instincts, I meant at all independent of insticts. Even if 95% of their actions are raw instinct, if the other 5% are the result of some sort of thought, then they might meet definition #2. Monkeys do not instinctually use a rock to break open a hard nut; it is a learned skill. Therefore, monkeys are capable of operating independent of instinct at least sometimes. Even humans occasionally act on their instincts, but this does not make them instinct driven by nature. So, if we are willing to add the definition of 'selr-aware' then how would we know if soemthing was self-aware?

[Edwardo Piet]

Even if 95% of their actions are raw instinct, if the other 5% are the result of some sort of thought,

Non-instinctual thought I would call consciousness, I don't see why action would be required. If action was required that would imply that paralysis was incompatible with consciousness.

[...]if we are willing to add the definition of 'selr-aware' then how would we know if soemthing was self-aware?

We wouldn't, unless it was scientifically detectable or logically proved. I don't see how logic would get us there and, as for scientifically detectable, once again, we need to know what to look for, and it has to be detectable.

[Darkstar]

Even if 95% of their actions are raw instinct, if the other 5% are the result of some sort of thought,

Non-instinctual thought I would call consciousness, I don't see why action would be required. If action was required that would imply that paralysis was incompatible with consciousness. then they might meet definition #2.

Okay, if you want to be technical...

[...]if we are willing to add the definition of 'selr-aware' then how would we know if soemthing was self-aware?

We wouldn't, unless it was scientifically detectable or logically proved. I don't see how logic would get us there and, as for scientifically detectable, once again, we need to know what to look for, and it has to be detectable.

Well, I don't think that logic alone could get us there. We would need to use science to find it. The best logic can do is help us think of criteria to look for. However, it seems that it is simply not possible to draw a definitive line as to what is conscious and what isn't, so...perhaps we aren't actually getting anywhere...

[Edwardo Piet]

For the time being, I agree. Imagine a conscious neuron. If it's conscious it would be on such a small scale that it means nothing like what we mean by "conscious" when applied to us. The typical definition of conscious doesn't apply to neurons because their consciousness is scientifically undetectable, but that doesn't mean they're not conscious on an insignificant scale that's undetectable by science. I'm not saying they're conscious, but they may be in some insignificant and undetectable sense. Science wouldn't say they were conscious. If they are they're nothing like us, they have no feelings and they understand nothing of course. Any "senses" they have would be nothing like us, and would be completely undetectable by science.

[Darkstar]

For the time being, I agree. Imagine a conscious neuron. If it's conscious it would be on such a small scale that it means nothing like what we mean by "conscious" when applied to us.

Like you said before; a brain is more than the sum of its parts. Until we can define exactly how many of those parts are required, and in what complexity, we won't be able to figure this one out.