Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[MindForgedManacle]

P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).


P2) God's providence over history is such that he orders things overall to accomplish his divine plan.


P3) If [P2] is true, then God's 'orderings' of history will by necessity transgress on an agent's ability to have done otherwise ([P1]) in at least some capacity.


P4) In the worldview of Abrahamic monotheists, [P2] is true.


C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the libertarian concept of free will's truth at any given point.


Hm, I'm not really sure about this argument. And I don't tend to try to use omniscience to rule out "free will" either.


I'm not sure if I'm progressing through the argument very well. Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?

[Red Celt]

Please go learn what "libertarian" means.

[genkaus]

The problem with this argument is that the concepts involved are too vague and can be interpreted in many ways. For example:

P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).

That depends on the meaning of free will you accept. What exactly is your will supposed to be free from? Your circumstances? Your past? Your own nature and desires? Others humans? God's will? All of the above?

Depending upon the meaning of free-will one accepts, humans may or may not have free will.

P2) God's providence over history is such that he orders things overall to accomplish his divine plan.

Again, debatable. Do you mean here that he set up things a particular way in the beginning or that he interferes for corrections?

P3) If [P2] is true, then God's 'orderings' of history will by necessity transgress on an agent's ability to have done otherwise ([P1]) in at least some capacity.

Maybe, or maybe not. Maybe free will simply means that god won't get into your head to alter your will - thus giving you technical freedom from his will but he can rearrange things around you to make you do something. Maybe god set up the dominoes in the beginning and your will right now is the result of them falling - but it is still free form other influences. Depending upon your understanding of the concepts, this may or may not be true.

P4) In the worldview of Abrahamic monotheists, [P2] is true.


C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the libertarian concept of free will's truth at any given point.


Hm, I'm not really sure about this argument. And I don't tend to try to use omniscience to rule out "free will" either.


I'm not sure if I'm progressing through the argument very well. Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?

The problem here is that the concepts can be used in many ways. That leaves a lot of wiggle-room for theists to rationalize their way out of it. And I don't think it can be improved without a lot of debate establishing a definite meaning of those concepts.


By the way, how long does everyone think it will be before GC pops up shouting "the only free-will you have is in choosing Jesus - nowhere else"? I give it 24 hours.

[MindForgedManacle]

Please go learn what "libertarian" means.

I'm talking about the concept of free will referred to as libertarian, not the political ideology hence the parenthesis with the word 'libertarian' in the first premise.

[MindForgedManacle]

The problem with this argument is that the concepts involved are too vague and can be interpreted in many ways. For example:

[Premise 1]

That depends on the meaning of free will you accept. What exactly is your will supposed to be free from? Your circumstances? Your past? Your own nature and desires? Others humans? God's will? All of the above?

Depending upon the meaning of free-will one accepts, humans may or may not have free will.

I noted that the kind of free will is the so-called libertarian conception of free will, which can be generalized as the ability to have done otherwise than one did. I think it's bullshit - as does most of the philosophical community - but I'm almost certain that most theistic philosophers accept it since, for Christian theists, it is necessary to stop God from being morally responsible for the evil in his creation.

Again, debatable. Do you mean here that he set up things a particular way in the beginning or that he interferes for corrections?

Either works for the argument I think. However, if theists choose the first option you listed then they are accepting the compatibilist view of free will which then necessitates God being morally culpable for evil and thus could have determined the world to not have evil; they can't have that, eh? So they've got to go with the 2nd option you listed: that God makes periodic alterations. But that then means that God's alterations will transgress, by virtue of interference, on some agent's ability to have chosen a different action.

Maybe, or maybe not. Maybe free will simply means that god won't get into your head to alter your will - thus giving you technical freedom from his will but he can rearrange things around you to make you do something. Maybe god set up the dominoes in the beginning and your will right now is the result of them falling - but it is still free form other influences. Depending upon your understanding of the concepts, this may or may not be true.

But then that becomes compatibilism again - or certainly not libertarian free will - then, doesn't it? If God can rearrange the events and circumstances around you to necessitate that you act in some particular way, that's not the libertarian concept of free will that Abrahamic theists so badly need for their theodicies, despite its current conceptual incoherence.

The problem here is that the concepts can be used in many ways. That leaves a lot of wiggle-room for theists to rationalize their way out of it. And I don't think it can be improved without a lot of debate establishing a definite meaning of those concepts.

I think the argument forces the theist to have to reject the libertarian concept of free will for compatibilism, but that then means they lose [their already fallacy-ridden] theodicies like the free-will defense response to the problem of evil.

By the way, how long does everyone think it will be before GC pops up shouting "the only free-will you have is in choosing Jesus - nowhere else"? I give it 24 hours.

He probably hasn't seen the thread due to the other threads. xD As soon as he sees it, he'll probably respond... and we'll laugh.

Thanks for the response.

[genkaus]

I noted that the kind of free will is the so-called libertarian conception of free will, which can be generalized as the ability to have done otherwise than one did. I think it's bullshit - as does most of the philosophical community - but I'm almost certain that most theistic philosophers accept it since, for Christian theists, it is necessary to stop God from being morally responsible for the evil in his creation.

So that's what it means, that "one could have done otherwise". Then that brings a host of other problems with it - such as being based on mind-body dualism. It is also quite vague and leaves quite a lot of wiggle room.

Either works for the argument I think. However, if theists choose the first option you listed then they are accepting the compatibilist view of free will which then necessitates God being morally culpable for evil and thus could have determined the world to not have evil; they can't have that, eh? So they've got to go with the 2nd option you listed: that God makes periodic alterations. But that then means that God's alterations will transgress, by virtue of interference, on some agent's ability to have chosen a different action.

But then that becomes compatibilism again - or certainly not libertarian free will - then, doesn't it? If God can rearrange the events and circumstances around you to necessitate that you act in some particular way, that's not the libertarian concept of free will that Abrahamic theists so badly need for their theodicies, despite its current conceptual incoherence.

I think the argument forces the theist to have to reject the libertarian concept of free will for compatibilism, but that then means they lose [their already fallacy-ridden] theodicies like the free-will defense response to the problem of evil.

The trick here is to regard god as another agent with his own agenda and with a higher capacity to alter events. Like I said, your conception of free-will leaves a lot of wiggle room.

Suppose at my workplace I'm up for promotion against two other guys. I know that one is a recovering alcoholic and the other has anger issues and while the company rules regarding separation of private and work life forbid me from revealing this to my boss, I know that these qualities would result in them being bad managers.

I also know that the angry guy hides a bottle of booze in his desk. So, I set things up as follows. I give the angry guy a file which I tell him that the alcoholic would be collecting later. I send a message to the alcoholic to take the file from the angry guy's desk at around 6. And I conveniently place a crowbar near my desk.

Now, this is how the dominoes fall. The alcoholic goes to the angry guys desk to ask for the file, but the angry guy is not there because he takes a smoke break at 6. So, the alcoholic looks for the file and happens upon the booze in the drawer. Being weak-willed, he steals it. Soon the angry guy comes to me saying that someone stole his booze and do I know anything about it? I tell him, truthfully, that I had sent the alcoholic to him to get that file. He gets real mad, sees the crowbar, takes it and goes on to beat the hell out of the alcoholic. Now, one of my competitors is in the hospital, the other in jail and I get the promotion.

Notice that nowhere along the line did I actually violate their free-will. At every step, they had the option of choosing otherwise than they did. Even if I had intervened in between - for example, if I saw the alcoholic going to the angry guy before 6 and waylaid him to make sure that he didn't get there them - I still haven't transgressed upon their free-will. All their choices were their own, according to their nature and desire.

[MindForgedManacle]

Hm, that's a good analogy. I can't say I can 'refute' it, but I still think that it matches compatibilism because in that case the circumstances are altered so as to bring about a particular conclusion. Under compatibilism, if time could be reversed to right before the fight and all the prior occurrences and setup was exactly the same, then the same outcome would occur.

In that situation, you incline people to do certain actions based on some aspect of their nature. If God's interference is akin to that, he becomes morally blameworthy doesn't he? He would then be part of the causal process of evil's creation, and then would be known to have been able to have determined a different outcome at the onset. And that's not something I see Christians or Muslims agreeing with.

Though I do agree there is definitely wiggle-room. I'll have to read more on free-will.

[Cato]

Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?

P2 is where the argument derails. In P2 you assert that God exists and has certain attributes. This is unsubstantiated. What follows is then nonsense.

[Michael Schubert]

P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).


P2) God's providence over history is such that he orders things overall to accomplish his divine plan.


P3) If [P2] is true, then God's 'orderings' of history will by necessity transgress on an agent's ability to have done otherwise ([P1]) in at least some capacity.


P4) In the worldview of Abrahamic monotheists, [P2] is true.


C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the libertarian concept of free will's truth at any given point.


Hm, I'm not really sure about this argument. And I don't tend to try to use omniscience to rule out "free will" either.


I'm not sure if I'm progressing through the argument very well. Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?

Well, as Chomsky understood, behavior can only be determined within a set of rules. That is, free will is not really free. You can really only act in accordance with your external environment. So, going by these premises, the Abrahamic Monotheist's worldview seems to be correct.

I don't believe in God, of course. So I don't agree with the premises. But confining myself to this particular argument, the logic is consistent.

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Where does the argument go wrong and can it be fixed?

P2 is where the argument derails. In P2 you assert that God exists and has certain attributes. This is unsubstantiated. What follows is then nonsense.

Yes, I agree that God does not exist. But I think you're supposed to put your disbelief aside and only judge the logic within the strictures of the argument.

[Cato]

I'm talking about the concept of free will referred to as libertarian, not the political ideology hence the parenthesis with the word 'libertarian' in the first premise.

Your excuse is to make 'libertarian' and 'free will' synonymous. This means your conclusion would read like this:

" C) Therefore, in the worldview of an Abrahamic monotheist there can be no certainty regarding the 'free will' concept of free will's truth at any given point. "

Sounds a bit silly now, doesn't it?

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Yes, I agree that God does not exist. But I think you're supposed to put your disbelief aside and only judge the logic within the strictures of the argument.

Logic without reason? I may as well sit around at night and do arithmetic with only the aid of my toes (basis for the decimal system????).

Logic is a tool, nothing more. If one of the premises is false, then the conclusion based on the argument can be dismissed (note: the conclusioon may still be true, but not for the reasons given if a premis is untrue).