Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[Edwardo Piet]

I have made my definitions very clear and since you responded to me, you should have dealt with them properly.

Like I said, waste of time.

[genkaus]

I have made my definitions very clear and since you responded to me, you should have dealt with them properly.

Like I said, waste of time.

And I have made the limitations of your definition's applicability clear as well. I've also made clear how it does not accurately represent the libertarian position and how it fails to apply to any views of free-will not within your narrow scope. I'd say, I've dealt with them properly.

[Edwardo Piet]

If you honestly think the that chance and mere indeterminism=libertarianism then you do not understand so-called "free will". If it's all chance where does the willing come in? Will=willpower=willing=determining something (yourself, in part: your motivation, the part that you will (determine) yourself with).

How can you will something to be if it's all chance? It's a contradiction.

Chance=free in the sense of unrestricted by determinism. It does not mean free in the sense of being able to freely use your own WILLPOWER (free will) which is NOT chance.

Ok, finally, I ask you this: If Libertarianism truly=chance... how do you explain hard incompatabilism/pessimism the view that Arthur Schopenhauer Albert Einstein and myself subscribe(d) to?

*I decided to reply because I felt in the mood and I like changing my mind*.

[genkaus]

If you honestly think the that chance and mere indeterminism=libertarianism then you do not understand so-called "free will". If it's all chance where does the willing come in? Will=willpower=willing=determining something (yourself, in part: your motivation, the part that you will (determine) yourself with).

How can you will something to be if it's all chance? It's a contradiction.

Chance=free in the sense of unrestricted by determinism. It does not mean free in the sense of being able to freely use your own WILLPOWER (free will) which is NOT chance.

Ok, finally, I ask you this: If Libertarianism truly=chance... how do you explain hard incompatabilism/pessimism the view that Arthur Schopenhauer Albert Einstein and myself subscribe(d) to?

*I decided to reply because I felt in the mood and I like changing my mind*.

Its not a question of what I think because I haven't given my own view of free-will. You seem to be taking the close-minded view that somehow you have stumbled onto the right definition of free-will - that you understand what the concept means and that is the only possible view and if that form of free-will does not exist, then no form of free-will can exist.

I'll explain this as simply as possible: In this discussion, we accept the existence of "will", i.e. the mental faculty that directs our actions. For understanding "free-will" the question is what is this mental faculty supposed to be free from? Libertarians, determinists and other assorted incompatibilists give the answer "causal determinism". Basically, if your will is causally determined, then you don't have free-will. If it isn't, then you do.

Once again, this isn't my opinion, it is the libertarian view of free-will. Which means that yes - within the Libertarian view, indeterminism = free will.

Yes, in this sense, chance does not mean "free in the sense of being able to freely use your own WILLPOWER (free will)" - but that is NOT the libertarian definition of free-will. That is your definition. Something you came up with and something that has no place in in a discussion presuming the Libertarian free-will.

As for pessimism - their view is that the Libertarian view of free-will, that is, the view that you have free-will is your will is free from causal determinism, is incorrect. My answer to that is - nothing. I'm not a Libertarian. I do not subscribe to their view of free-will. So I don't need to spend my time defending it.

[Edwardo Piet]

Its not a question of what I think because I haven't given my own view of free-will.

You objected to mine though. Your objection is a question of what you think.

You seem to be taking the close-minded view that somehow you have stumbled onto the right definition of free-will - that you understand what the concept means and that is the only possible view and if that form of free-will does not exist, then no form of free-will can exist.

Where did I say that? And why should I care what "seems to you".

Basically, if your will is causally determined, then you don't have free-will. If it isn't, then you do.

This ignores hard incompatabilism.

Once again, this isn't my opinion, it is the libertarian view of free-will. Which means that yes - within the Libertarian view, indeterminism = free will.

And that is where Libertarianism loses to the arguments of hard incompatabilism.

As for pessimism - their view is that the Libertarian view of free-will, that is, the view that you have free-will is your will is free from causal determinism, is incorrect. My answer to that is - nothing. I'm not a Libertarian. I do not subscribe to their view of free-will. So I don't need to spend my time defending it.

Then you are just wasting my time with pettiness. I guess I subscribe to pessimism and you subscribe to pettyism.

EDIT: Plus, the idea that Libertarianism is merely the view that free will is the absence of determinism and that chance alone is free will is only one version of Libertarianism. Some libertarians believe that ordinary chance is enough for the will to be "free" (even though randomness has zero effect on ultimate responsibility of actions for human beings, which is why many people are so interested in the free will debate in the first place) but many don't. Many believe that mere randomness is just as unfree as determinism (and of course it is, either way we have no more ultimate responsibility of action), and yet we still somehow have "free will".

You know why the free will debate is important in the first place... right?

[bennyboy]

I just want to inject my feelings here about some of the word games academics play. In particular, the "free will" found in compatibilism should never have been accepted as even a viable definition. Words mean what they fucking mean, and redefining them to mean something different does NOT solve the problem-- it constitutes a refusal to accept that one can't solve it.

So: "Free will is the freedom to act." No. Will is the intentional stance of a sentient being, who will RESIST stimulus based on internal ideals, and impose those ideals on the physical world. It necessarily implies that the will cannot be found in a physical monism.

[genkaus]

You objected to mine though. Your objection is a question of what you think.

What I think about the Libertarian view of free-will. Not what I think about free-will myself. Important distinction.

Where did I say that? And why should I care what "seems to you".

You implied it with every statement of your previous post - thus my use of the word "seem".

And that is where Libertarianism loses to the arguments of hard incompatabilism.

Take it up with the Libertarians.

EDIT: Plus, the idea that Libertarianism is merely the view that free will is the absence of determinism and that chance alone is free will is only one version of Libertarianism. Some libertarians believe that ordinary chance is enough for the will to be "free" (even though randomness has zero effect on ultimate responsibility of actions for human beings, which is why many people are so interested in the free will debate in the first place) but many don't. Many believe that mere randomness is just as unfree as determinism (and of course it is, either way we have no more ultimate responsibility of action), and yet we still somehow have "free will".

You know why the free will debate is important in the first place... right?

You seem to have understood a part of it - here's the rest.

Lack of determinism is simply the defining feature of libertarian view of free-will. Inclusion of chance or randomness is not. Lack of determinism is the most comprehensive aspect that applies to all versions of libertarianism. For the purpose of this discussion, I'll elaborate on how this aspect plays out in two of those versions based on separate ontological positions.

The first is substance dualism - where mind and the physical world are considered as two separate, distinct and independent aspects of reality. Here, it is assumed that the mental aspect is not dependent on physical determinism or indeterminism - it is capable of self-determination. And within this context, the definition of free-will becomes "freedom from determinism and ultimate self-determination". This is how you personally view free-will but this definition can apply only if substance dualism is accepted. If you reject substance dualism - and I think you do - then you shouldn't consider this definition of free-will because it makes no sense without it.

The second version is physical monism - where mind and will are emergent properties, ultimately reducible to the physical components. The concept of ultimate self-determination makes no sense within this context. Which is why, the libertarian view of free-will in this case is freedom from determinism and dependence on indeterminism. Why do those libertarian subscribe to that idea of free-will, is something you need to ask them. However, since the very idea of "ultimate self-determination" is ridiculous within this context, choosing that definition of free-will would be begging the question.

Finally, we consider the question of free-will to be significant for determination of moral responsibility - but I'm not sure about that. The same way that the meaning of the phrase "free-will" changes with different ontological premises, so does the meaning of morality.

---

I just want to inject my feelings here about some of the word games academics play. In particular, the "free will" found in compatibilism should never have been accepted as even a viable definition. Words mean what they fucking mean, and redefining them to mean something different does NOT solve the problem-- it constitutes a refusal to accept that one can't solve it.

So: "Free will is the freedom to act." No. Will is the intentional stance of a sentient being, who will RESIST stimulus based on internal ideals, and impose those ideals on the physical world. It necessarily implies that the will cannot be found in a physical monism.

Here's where you get it wrong - words don't just mean what they fucking mean; their meaning changes with context. And changing meaning with changing context is not the same as redefinition.

All the phrase free-will means - all that it can mean without any specified context - is that your will is has an element of freedom to it. That it is free from certain constraints and what those constraints might be is up to the context considered. Which is why if the compatibilists can justify their definition, then it is viable.

Further, even within physical monism, will can be found - such as in reductive physicalism, anomalous monism or functionalism.

[bennyboy]

Here's where you get it wrong - words don't just mean what they fucking mean; their meaning changes with context. And changing meaning with changing context is not the same as redefinition.

Nope.

If a word evolves through changing contexts over hundreds of years, that's one thing. However, when you deliberately define a word AGAINST its salient features, in the course of maybe a single academic discussion or maybe a single generation (like Dennett), it introduces an equivocation that screws up the dialogue.

For example, if you define free will as "an awareness of brain function involving motivational mechanisms," then you are no longer answering the philosophical question about free will vs. determinism. You are begging the question, by defining will as PART of the deterministic process, and then saying "Aha! I knew it all along," as though some clever discovery has been made. You don't get to say that the scientific process is a new context, redefine philosophical terms in terms of a physical monism, and then equivocate on those new definitions. This is because whatever you call things, the philosophical issue is still there, and people need to be able to communicate about it by words "meaning what they fucking mean."

And I mean that.

[genkaus]

Nope.

If a word evolves through changing contexts over hundreds of years, that's one thing. However, when you deliberately define a word AGAINST its salient features, in the course of maybe a single academic discussion or maybe a single generation (like Dennett), it introduces an equivocation that screws up the dialogue.

For example, if you define free will as "an awareness of brain function involving motivational mechanisms," then you are no longer answering the philosophical question about free will vs. determinism. You are begging the question, by defining will as PART of the deterministic process, and then saying "Aha! I knew it all along," as though some clever discovery has been made. You don't get to say that the scientific process is a new context, redefine philosophical terms in terms of a physical monism, and then equivocate on those new definitions. This is because whatever you call things, the philosophical issue is still there, and people need to be able to communicate about it by words "meaning what they fucking mean."

And I mean that.

The fact you are ignoring is that it is NOT being defined against its salient features. Those salient defining features are very much intact. Free-will is not defined as "not-determinism". The determinism vs free-will question is not a part of the definition.

Simply put, you are putting the cart before the horse here. You don't start by considering "free-will" as some absolute philosophical position which by its nature is incompatible with determinism. You don't start by assuming "free will means your will's freedom from determinism". That would be begging the question. Here you have defined free-will as something incompatible with determinism and thus conclude that it could not possibly be compatible with determinism.

If you honestly wish to consider the philosophical issue of free-will, then consider it on its own merits - without any reference to determinism. Figure out what the term "human will" means within the context of your chosen philosophical premises - whether it us substance dualism or monism. Figure out how it plays out and which aspects can be rationally considered free. And then try to decide whether this conceptualization of free-will is compatible/incompatible/partially compatible with determinism. Don't start by assuming that free-will by definition means not-determined will and then go from there.

[bennyboy]

The fact you are ignoring is that it is NOT being defined against its salient features. Those salient defining features are very much intact. Free-will is not defined as "not-determinism". The determinism vs free-will question is not a part of the definition.

Simply put, you are putting the cart before the horse here. You don't start by considering "free-will" as some absolute philosophical position which by its nature is incompatible with determinism. You don't start by assuming "free will means your will's freedom from determinism". That would be begging the question. Here you have defined free-will as something incompatible with determinism and thus conclude that it could not possibly be compatible with determinism.

If you honestly wish to consider the philosophical issue of free-will, then consider it on its own merits - without any reference to determinism. Figure out what the term "human will" means within the context of your chosen philosophical premises - whether it us substance dualism or monism. Figure out how it plays out and which aspects can be rationally considered free. And then try to decide whether this conceptualization of free-will is compatible/incompatible/partially compatible with determinism. Don't start by assuming that free-will by definition means not-determined will and then go from there.

Historically, there are three kinds of non-freedom that I can think of: 1) fate (which implies acceptance of a mythology); 2) physical (or at least causal) determinism; 3) God/gods, specifically a Jewish God who allows free will, and which represent from the human perspective a (partly, at least) random influence.

In order to make the God argument, we have to prove God; that's a non-starter for me (even though it's kind of the OP). Fate also implies acceptance of unseen beings-- historically the Fate sisters.

So we're left with the idea of causal determinism. If the will is free, it is free from causal determinism. And since physical monists (at least here) assert that such a monism is wholly deterministic, then free will implies dualism. As for the idea that free will is an experience of part of brain function-- no. Will is an agency for motivated action, and no experience can be called that. If that is reality, then the reality is that there is no will, not that the will is compatible with brain function determinism.

So there is really only one context in which free will can sensibly considered: mind/matter dualism. If such dualism is false, there is no will to prove or disprove, or to investigate.