Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[pocaracas]

Does a chimp have "experience of self"?
Does a dolphin?
does an elephant?
does a dog?
does a cat?
does a pigeon?
does a lizard?
does a clown fish?
does a fly?
Does a flea?
Does a dust mite?

I think so, but cannot know for sure.

Does a bacteria?
Does a virus?
Does a water molecule?
Does a hydrogen atom?
does a top quark?


At which point can we say that consciousness is incapable of operating on the physical substrate and why would that be?

[StuW]

Does a chimp have "experience of self"?
Does a dolphin?
does an elephant?
does a dog?
does a cat?
does a pigeon?
does a lizard?
does a clown fish?
does a fly?
Does a flea?
Does a dust mite?

The Elephant certainly does, this has been pretty much proven with mirrors. I seem to recall the same results coming out with great apes and dolphins as well.

[bennyboy]

You are missing the point of the question - I'm not asking you to consider whether or not other entities are capable of subjective experiences (you've stated quite clearly that you cannot know that). I'm asking you to consider the nature of your own subjective experiences.

You take it as a brute fact that you are capable of subjective experiences.

This is indeed a brute fact.

You also accept the fact that your brain is capable of of processing information and that there are many, many forms of information processing going on in there.

I accept this, but only in the context of the assumption that there is in fact a physical world (i.e. we're not in the Matrix or the Mind of God). This leaves us with either physical monism or substance dualism, but excludes idealism (which I also accept as possible). I think for the purposes of this thread, I'm okay doing that.

I'm asking you to consider the hypothesis that "having subjective experiences" is one form of "information processing" going on in your brain. As evidence for this hypothesis, you have neuroscientific research suggesting that changes made in the information processing system changes the nature and quality of subjective experience.

Yes. It's hard to argue that mind is unique from the brain when you can poke a brain and smell smoke, or take drugs and have your whole perceptual experience completely collapse. It would be disengenous not at least to agree that much or all of the content of mind and experience seem to be of and by the brain.

[quote]

The idea of a philosophical zombie rests on the premise that qualia/subjective experiences are not a form of information processing. That is the only way for the so-called zombie to have all the information processing capacities and still not be able to experience subjectivity. Therefore, in order to show any qualitative difference between you and a zombie, you need to show that having subjective experience is not a form of information processing - and the only way for you to do that is start with a dualistic assumption.

Right. It would be like showing "Casablanca" but with no screen to catch the light.

The assumption here is not an "I". Like I said, you can regard the existence of "I" as a self-evident, brute fact. The assumption here is about the nature of "I", i.e. what "I" is. In dualism, the assumption is that the nature of "I" is something different and independent of what you see in the rest of the universe.

I agree. I think the intuitive response that people show in their interactions with their environment is that there's a mental "I" interacting with physical objects, and that when people communicate, two mental "I" entities must interface through their body-objects.

I can't speak for all humanity, but I think whatever people SAY about "I," they generally act as though they think "I" is distinct from the rest of the universe in some way.

That doesn't mean that view is correct, though.

Generic definitions may suffice when when everyone superficially understands the subject matter - but when you intend to study it in depth, a more accurate description is called for. Otherwise, you end up making all sorts of unfounded assumptions - as you demonstrate here. You assume that mind and matter are "unique substances" without actually considering what they are. You pose a difficulty in interaction without understanding their nature. And based on that, you hypothesize a third party which may turn out to be completely unnecessary.

That's the problem I have with duality. It seems to me either a monism or a ternary system would work better.

You made a comment about mind not being an observable property of matter - the implication being that we cannot know whether or not a particular material entity has a mind or not. You epistemological assumption here is that the only way we can know that an entity exists is by direct observational access to it

You've brought up this point before, so I think it's worth spending some effort on. First, I should distinguish between inferred OBJECTS and inferred PROPERTIES. Given an observed property, we can try to infer what type of object or material would be required to arrive at that property. So given fluctuations of bodies in space, we can infer the existence of black holes. Given chemical properties, we can infer the existence of the electron.

But this is not how we arrive at knowledge of the existence of mind. No machine came along and inferred qualia from either brain function or the mechanics of the body (like frowning and smiling). It is because we are already familiar with qualia that we make assumptions by like association: when I smile, people ask what I'm feeling happy about. They seem to recognize my qualia based on my behavior. So when other people smile, I extend that recognition back to them, and believe that they are feeling happy and therefore experience qualia.

I don't think that is a scientific process. It's a mediation between social instincts and philosophical pragmatism. Basically, we accept the consciousness of others because it feels right, and because it's the way things need to be for most of our instinctive behaviors to make any sense at all. And we want them to make sense.

Is it necessary to infer qualia to explain the behavior? I don't think so, since muscular activity traces back through neural activity, not through qualia. Maybe qualia ARE just the experience of certain kinds of neural activity, but if they are not more than that, then referencing them, rather than just the brain function itself, seems redundant at best. What does it really add to an explanation worded purely in the function of neural systems? I think the answer is this: because we already know about qualia, and the subjective experience of a person matters more to us than the biological systems which arrive at a behavior.

---

[quote='bennyboy' pid='535419' dateline='1383217185']
I think so, but cannot know for sure.

Does a bacteria?
Does a virus?
Does a water molecule?
Does a hydrogen atom?
does a top quark?


At which point can we say that consciousness is incapable of operating on the physical substrate and why would that be?

I think this is a semantic question rather than an existential one. For all I know, some primitive mental property could be associated with all matter, and all energetic interactions associated with their respective qualia. If so, would you define this relationship as primitive consciousness, or is there a specific litmus test that you would apply in making that determination?

But how would one determine this, given that one cannot interact with the property of qualia directly?

[Angrboda]

…it is safe to say that the proposition that the mind is a productof the brain is a scientific fact…

Your bias shows. From a scientifically neutral position, the brain could just as easily mediate of facilitate mind. Saying that mind is a product of the brain comes from your philosophical interpretation of the data.

This is simply wrong. You do not know what the foundation of my conclusions was, and for you to claim that you know them and know them to be thus is simply a callous lie on your part, told less to expose the truth than to create foundations for your counter-argument out of the nothingness of bare assertion. These claims here came straight out of your ass, and, if for some reason you should find a legitimate piece of me there, please call a doctor as some dementia has no doubt let me wander into your strange bed chamber. Moreover, your statements about what the brain 'could show' and what is 'scientifically neutral' reveal yourself to be a scientific ignoramus with no sufficient view upon the reality of the science and thus of necessity no means but for you to opine from deep within the cloistered view of your thinly veiled well of religious bias.

Furthermore, you were warned up front that my exposition would be incomplete, and you consciously took it upon yourself to exploit one of those gaps to stuff this bullshit about my reasoning from philosophical bias rather than science inside, with a view to how it would serve your counter-argument. Not only does this result in a straw man of no value, it uncovers a scoundrel, who, when warned of a necessary weakness in an exposition will not honor that admission with charity and due deference, but seek instead to exploit it for his own gain. Very nice, Chad.

…The key point is that dualism itself doesn't actually explain anything either; it's just kicking the can down the road. "A seperate substance is responsible for consciousness." "Well, how does that second substance give rise to consciousness?" "I dunno; it just does." … How does this other substance give rise to mind, qualia, and consciousness?)

This is not a fair criticism, though often repeated. You never ask what is it about matter that allows it to give rise to physical properties, do you?

This is simply a lie. I made considerable effort to point out that neither monistic science nor monistic philosophy had found these others and that it was imperative that they keep working until they find them. For you to imply that I only faulted dualism for this is the grossest of misrepresentation, and given how explicitly I pointed out that this was not the case, I can only conclude this was an intentional, maliciously, self-consciously chosen lie.

Moreover, even if true, it would be little more than a fallacious tu quoque, an attempt to point your finger at a lack in the other to justify excusing a lack in your own. Whether monism answers these questions or not bears no relevance to whether or not dualism in fact bears these burdens, and in fact, it does. So first you lie about what you just read, in order to set up a finger pointing tu quoque, in order to attempt to relieve your position of the burden which it not only has, and has not fulfilled, but which it assumed quite willingly.

Do you wonder why I think so poorly of you?

[MindForgedManacle]

...Damn Apophenia. Don't ask him if he's hurt dawg.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Good luck being a fair moderator, Apo. Oh, and fuck you too.

[pocaracas]

Does a bacteria?
Does a virus?
Does a water molecule?
Does a hydrogen atom?
does a top quark?


At which point can we say that consciousness is incapable of operating on the physical substrate and why would that be?

I think this is a semantic question rather than an existential one. For all I know, some primitive mental property could be associated with all matter, and all energetic interactions associated with their respective qualia. If so, would you define this relationship as primitive consciousness, or is there a specific litmus test that you would apply in making that determination?

But how would one determine this, given that one cannot interact with the property of qualia directly?

Beats me... I'm not the one claiming that qualia is a separate entity from the underlying neurological function.
All I keep saying is "wait and see" until AI produces something that can be described as qualia... and then, you'll have your answer.

[Mister Agenda]

Good luck being a fair moderator, Apo. Oh, and fuck you too.

Because if Apophenia schools you in a thread, it must mean she can't moderate fairly.

What is it with the theists around here bringing mod status into everything?

Your pretentions to high-minded intellect go out the window pretty fast when your feelings are hurt, eh?

[bennyboy]

Beats me... I'm not the one claiming that qualia is a separate entity from the underlying neurological function.
All I keep saying is "wait and see" until AI produces something that can be described as qualia... and then, you'll have your answer.

Have I made this claim? I don't think I've ever made a positive assertion about the nature of things.

As for AI-- genkaus and I have had several long discussions about this. How would you distinguish between an AI system that seems to experience (based on its behavior, for example), or actually experiences?

[pocaracas]

Beats me... I'm not the one claiming that qualia is a separate entity from the underlying neurological function.
All I keep saying is "wait and see" until AI produces something that can be described as qualia... and then, you'll have your answer.

Have I made this claim? I don't think I've ever made a positive assertion about the nature of things.

As for AI-- genkaus and I have had several long discussions about this. How would you distinguish between an AI system that seems to experience (based on its behavior, for example), or actually experiences?

The same way you distinguish it in a biological system.... I guess.