On naturalism and consciousness

[bennyboy]

. . . resetting a brain isn't really an option, is it?

Not without tequila, anyway.

[The Grand Nudger]

Here's a point to consider-- the brain never reaches the exact same state twice, either. It is in a case of constant flux-- the movement of blood, chemicals, neurotransmitters, etc, the cycle of a neuron firing and the time it takes to "recharge" before it can be stimulated again, etc. I have serious doubts that if you could feed the exact same input into a person (something that's impossible, but let's imagine), that the exact same neurons would fire.

They don't have to, we're looking for the proper abstraction, not the proper sequence leading to any given abstraction(especially) in a NN sort of framework. There are places where my gates break down, cease to be informative. I use them to explain principle, and how mechanical interaction can achieve the effect of that principle. We actually know for a fact that our brains don't work -exactly- the same way as a cpu with our current architecture.

We're basically flirting between two sets of problems, or two ways of designing around a problem. One type of architecture is useful for one set, another, a different set.

This is an important way in which a brain is different than a computer. A computer, given the same inputs, CAN activate the exact same circuits, in the exact same way (on the macro level at least).

-Some- computers can, yes (architecture, as above).

[bennyboy]

Rhythm, I think ANNs are interesting, and I like that you've identified a specific mechanism that you'd call conscious. However, what would you say about qualia? Do you think every time any gate functions, there is a primitive kind of qualia? What exactly is the mechanism of seeing a sunset as a beautiful visual panorama, rather than as a collection of frequencies of light?

[The Grand Nudger]

What exactly is the mechanism of seeing a sunset as a beautiful visual panorama, rather than as a collection of frequencies of light?

I'm having trouble understanding what the difference is between the two? Beyond the presence of an aesthetic qualifier in the one and not the other, obvs.

[bennyboy]

What exactly is the mechanism of seeing a sunset as a beautiful visual panorama, rather than as a collection of frequencies of light?

I'm having trouble understanding what the difference is between the two? Beyond the presence of an aesthetic qualifier in the one and not the other, obvs.

The aesthetic qualifier describes the aesthetic experience, which is not data processing. You may equate them, but I wouldn't-- as you know. This is the essential difference in our philosophical positions, and while it's been fun to talk about, I don't see any non-arbitrary way to resolve the physicalist/dualist/idealistic positions.

[The Grand Nudger]

I've been explaining why I equate them all this time......doesn't seem very arbitrary to me amigo. Interpreting signals from your eyes and then creating a "visual image" based upon that abstraction -is computing-.

It -is- data processing, even if there's "more" to it. That visual field -is- data -being- processed. Our eyes aren't windows, right?

[Mudhammam]

I've been explaining why I equate them all this time......doesn't seem very arbitrary to me amigo. Interpreting signals from your eyes and then creating a "visual image" based upon that abstraction -is computing-.

It -is- data processing, even if there's "more" to it. That visual field -is- data -being- processed. Our eyes aren't windows, right?

Rhythm, on computational theory, are "things" and "thoughts" of the same "substance," say, pure experience, but the former "externally given" while the latter are simply "internal" in origin?

[bennyboy]

@Rhythm

I'ts usually said of someone that doesn't agree with a differing opinion that he doesn't "get" the position. Let me try to paraphrase your view (and to add a compatible narrative for some parts) as well as I can, and you tell me where I've missed the mark (if you don't mind taking the time).

"The most fundamental component of mind is the gate (or at least a mechanism which can be theoretically represented by a collection of gates). So the difference between 'stuff' and 'data' is that the data have served as the input into a gate or gate-like mechanism. A percept is a collection of data which represent a property of a thing being observed: color, shape, etc. An idea is a complex interrelation of processed data which can be said to be 'about' something, involving both symbolized percepts and relationships between them. The mind is the interrelation of new ideas, stored ideas and currently-observed percepts. Any mechanism capable of collecting percepts and forming ideas by filtering data through a collection of logic gates is thinking, and should be said to have a mind."

Is this a fair representation?

[The Grand Nudger]

"The most fundamental component of mind is the gate (or at least a mechanism which can be theoretically represented by a collection of gates).

Pretty much, some architecture that allows for one or more logical functions to be performed.

So the difference between 'stuff' and 'data' is that the data have served as the input into a gate or gate-like mechanism.

With regards to mind, yeah. Stuff can be data, and data is stuff, but mind requires a particular type of stuff, we can call it data.

A percept is a collection of data which represent a property of a thing being observed: color, shape, etc.

Negatron, a percept is a collection of data about the states of the various constituent "gates"

It can only represent the systems function/data (because that's all that's available for the system). The system passes or fails a test based upon how representative it's abstractions are, but it can and will do work even when they aren't.

An idea is a complex interrelation of processed data which can be said to be 'about' something, involving both symbolized percepts and relationships between them.

"About" the above, yes.

The mind is the interrelation of new ideas, stored ideas and currently-observed percepts.

We could probably finesse this one, but again, yeah.

Any mechanism capable of collecting percepts and forming ideas by filtering data through a collection of logic gates is thinking, and should be said to have a mind."

That would depend upon where we put ourselves on the possible scale of thought. If we're a basic model than everything "beneath" us is computing, sure, but doesn't have "mind". If we're the top of the line model, we might reasonably assume that other things also have "mind"

Personally, I'd split the difference between myself and a mollusk and say that somewhere along that continuum lies "mind". To me, "mind" is a designation for a system of computation with a long list of possible logical functions - memory , and to some extent- higher level programming.

Amusingly, given my take on the matter - the resolution is not binary for me. I would be willing to say that any computer is "thinking" (I see no difference between thought and computation) - but I wouldn't be willing to say that any thinking thing has "mind". That's on a good day, mind you, other times I try to imagine ways that a random process could achieve the effect of boolean gates and I say "fuck - am I even thinking? Does all of this "whatever" actually amount to a mind?" Now, if we scrub alot of the things we find compelling in our own "minds" as criteria -for mind-..then some of my objections might fade away. It's all tangled up in architecture imo.

Is this a fair representation?

For the most part, yeah, I'd say so.

@Pickup

are "things" and "thoughts" of the same "substance," say, pure experience, but the former "externally given" while the latter are simply "internal" in origin?

There can be the assumption in a computational system that external objects or "things" -actually are "externally given", but it isn't a requirement. As in "we assume" that the idea we have about what we see in front of us roughly corresponds to what actually -is- in front of us in order to do work. We don't have to (many of us have found ourselves in the horrible position of doubting our eyes, I'm sure), there's good reason not to - but the assumption does seem to be a feature, not a bug.

Assuming that there is an external, I can go you one step further in that. I would say that thoughts -are- the the structure of the "gate". They are just as physical as the "external" thing, and could very well be made -literally- of the same "substance" (we'd just have to put the right jars in front of some poor labrat).

[Neo-Scholastic]

Interpreting signals from your eyes and then creating a "visual image" based upon that abstraction -is computing-.

It -is- data processing, even if there's "more" to it. That visual field -is- data -being- processed....

The key word here is 'interpreting', as in who is doing the interpretation. An abacus is also a data processing device, albeit manually powered. The beads are manipulated according to an algorithm but have no meaning in themselves. The meaning comes from outside the algorithmic system. Likewise, electronic switches and lights have no meaning other than what they get assigned by a knowing subject. And by logical extension, the activity of neurons, firing and not firing, also have no inherent meaning. Yes, they correlate with mental properties. But the beads and switches also correlate with their assigned meanings. As such I see no justification for claiming that the brain, as a physical mechanism, does anything more that produce signs awaiting interpretation by a knowing subject.