On naturalism and consciousness

[The Grand Nudger]

Interpreting signals from your eyes and then creating a "visual image" based upon that abstraction -is computing-.

It -is- data processing, even if there's "more" to it. That visual field -is- data -being- processed....

The key word here is 'interpreting', as in who is doing the interpretation.

Not "who", -what-, in comp theory (or at least my particular take on it). A "who" is unnecessary. Computation proceeds regardless.

An abacus is also a data processing device, albeit manually powered. The beads are manipulated according to an algorithm but have no meaning in themselves. The meaning comes from outside the algorithmic system. Likewise, electronic switches and lights have no meaning other than what they get assigned by a knowing subject.

That's ridiculous. The "meaning" is described at the level of architecture. It doesn't require any "knowing" or a "subject" , let alone a "knowing subject". The circuit "means" that the light comes on or off when the switch gets flipped - even if the flipper doesn't know how that occurs, and even if the mechanism arose by a process of which we are entirely ignorant (have no knowledge of). That light switch- will still mean what it means, and still do the work - even if there were no "knowing subjects" (humans, in this case) present -anywhere-.

The only requirement that switch has is energy. It's structural composition already grants it opportunity.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The key word here is 'interpreting', as in who is doing the interpretation.

Not "who", -what-, in comp theory (or at least my particular take on it). A "who" is unnecessary. Computation proceeds regardless.

An abacus is also a data processing device, albeit manually powered. The beads are manipulated according to an algorithm but have no meaning in themselves. The meaning comes from outside the algorithmic system. Likewise, electronic switches and lights have no meaning other than what they get assigned by a knowing subject.

That's ridiculous. The "meaning" is described at the level of architecture. It doesn't require any "knowing" or a "subject" , let alone a "knowing subject". The circuit "means" that the light comes on or off when the switch gets flipped - even if the flipper doesn't know how that occurs, and even if the mechanism arose by a process of which we are entirely ignorant (have no knowledge of). That light switch- will still mean what it means, and still do the work - even if there were no "knowing subjects" (humans, in this case) present -anywhere-.

The only requirement that switch has is energy. It's structural composition already grants it opportunity.

The only thing that is ridiculous is your assertion that a physical system, like a switch has meaning apart from a knowing subject. You say that when a light goes on and off that conveys meaning, but what meaning. The light could mean anything from "the bathroom is occupied" to "system overload". Your physical monist theory does not account for the difference between signs and significance.

[FatAndFaithless]

Not "who", -what-, in comp theory (or at least my particular take on it). A "who" is unnecessary. Computation proceeds regardless.

That's ridiculous. The "meaning" is described at the level of architecture. It doesn't require any "knowing" or a "subject" , let alone a "knowing subject". The circuit "means" that the light comes on or off when the switch gets flipped - even if the flipper doesn't know how that occurs, and even if the mechanism arose by a process of which we are entirely ignorant (have no knowledge of). That light switch- will still mean what it means, and still do the work - even if there were no "knowing subjects" (humans, in this case) present -anywhere-.

The only requirement that switch has is energy. It's structural composition already grants it opportunity.

The only thing that is ridiculous is your assertion that a physical system, like a switch has meaning apart from a knowing subject. You say that when a light goes on and off that conveys meaning, but what meaning. The light could mean anything from "the bathroom is occupied" to "system overload". Your physical monist theory does not account for the difference between signs and significance.

(Spoiler: We're the ones who assign significance to signs.)

[Neo-Scholastic]

(Spoiler: We're the ones who assign significance to signs.)

Thank you. My point exactly.

[The Grand Nudger]

Not "who", -what-, in comp theory (or at least my particular take on it). A "who" is unnecessary. Computation proceeds regardless.

That's ridiculous. The "meaning" is described at the level of architecture. It doesn't require any "knowing" or a "subject" , let alone a "knowing subject". The circuit "means" that the light comes on or off when the switch gets flipped - even if the flipper doesn't know how that occurs, and even if the mechanism arose by a process of which we are entirely ignorant (have no knowledge of). That light switch- will still mean what it means, and still do the work - even if there were no "knowing subjects" (humans, in this case) present -anywhere-.

The only requirement that switch has is energy. It's structural composition already grants it opportunity.

The only thing that is ridiculous is your assertion that a physical system, like a switch has meaning apart from a knowing subject.

Think I explained that pretty well Chad. Definitely didn;t leave it hanging as an assertion.

You say that when a light goes on and off that conveys meaning,

There is no conveyance. The light going on and off -is- the meaning.....

but what meaning.

.....of the circuit

The light could mean anything from "the bathroom is occupied" to "system overload".

Then it wouldn't be a light switch we're discussing, would it? Different architecture, different discussion. Data being fed into different gates has different outcome based upon both the inputs and the structure of the gates. You aren;t adding any problem for me to solve, you're asking me to solve the same problem ( which is simple), gates in series.

Your physical monist theory does not account for the difference between signs and significance.

Of course it does, as the gates can abstract either without deviating from whatever language is used by the entirety of the system in question. Not that they need to abstract any difference at all - because "signs" -are- "significance" within that context. If they -needed- to translate this into some other form so that a separate system (one that does attempt to split signs and significance into two distinct groups) could make use of the data we'd need to have a structure or programming language capable of doing so. Like a binary/decimal decoder.

See, this is the reason that I get into these discussions. Not because I think that human beings are suped up PC's - but because people say things like "such and such doesn't/can't account for". Yes, such and such does and can account for it - that's both how and why PC's work. If it didn't they wouldn't. Whether or not these are the principles at play -in our minds- is an open question, but even without "us" around (and even if we were the only things with "mind") those gates would still possess what we refer to as meaning (that's pretty much what they're composed of - from one angle, or it's exactly what they do - from another. The physical structure of the gate is interchangeable with it's meaning, which is interchangeable with it's function -and it's function can be performed on data from a system with entirely dissimilar underpinnings.

What you'd most likely be chipping at with this is the representative value of those abstractions, how well we might expect them to perform. That they are possible and accounted for is simply beyond doubt. You;re going to respond to me leveraging the principles in just a bit. It's not even theoretical, it's practical. That's just considering that you'll be using a computer to respond. Do I think you might be double dipping into my ketchup when you, as a biological entity - go about "deciding" what to type...yeah, I do, but I do know enough to know that it's of an entirely different magnitude than anything going on in your pc..lol.

[Angrboda]

The only thing that is ridiculous is your assertion that a physical system, like a switch has meaning apart from a knowing subject. You say that when a light goes on and off that conveys meaning, but what meaning. The light could mean anything from "the bathroom is occupied" to "system overload". Your physical monist theory does not account for the difference between signs and significance.

I'm guessing you didn't read the excerpt from Churchland early in this thread.

http://atheistforums.org/thread-28092-po...#pid732064

Asked and answered.

[The Grand Nudger]

I could use my PV NAND from earlier to describe this from the start to the beginning, btw Chad, if I'm failing to communicate. We could use a light switch too (could be even simpler - but because of simplicity, it won't give us a whole lot to chew on).

[bennyboy]

The only thing that is ridiculous is your assertion that a physical system, like a switch has meaning apart from a knowing subject. You say that when a light goes on and off that conveys meaning, but what meaning. The light could mean anything from "the bathroom is occupied" to "system overload". Your physical monist theory does not account for the difference between signs and significance.

I'm guessing you didn't read the excerpt from Churchland early in this thread.

http://atheistforums.org/thread-28092-po...#pid732064

Asked and answered.

I took another look at this, and it still seems to me that Churchland is playing a kind of shell game. Yes, the robot's processing can be called thought, and it's behaviors can be said to have meaning, but only in the context of a sentient observer. Otherwise, it's still all just stuff happening. To the credit of the robot, the same goes toward people as well: it is only because sentient observers (the self and others) see meaning in human behaviors that they are said to represent intentionality.

[The Grand Nudger]

Does some specific level of thought and meaning signify "sentient observer" status whereas another, perhaps lesser level signifies "just stuff happening"?

[bennyboy]

Does some specific level of thought and meaning signify "sentient observer" status whereas another, perhaps lesser level signifies "just stuff happening"?

Let me start with sentience. As you know, I don't think sentience has any meaning if its determination requires arbitration: "X complexity means sentient, <X complexisty means not sentient." Therefore, the most primitie building block of sentience has to be rooted in a kind of atomic consciousness (by which I mean an indivisible minimal consciousness, not any relation to a physical atom, which is misnamed anyway)

That being said, there are certain ideas which are probably required to establish meaning at any given level of complexity. Just being minimally conscious, for example, wouldn't allow you to see meaning in people's behaviors. It's definitely possible, through reflection or drug use or meditation, to arrive at a mental state in which you can see light and hear sound, and perceive no deep meaning in any of it.

On the other hand, I'd argue a computer could see "meaning" in Chad's lightswitches. For example, it could process an alarm as a trigger for an escape behavior, or a bathroom light as a trigger for a cleanliness inspection algorithm.

But without the sentient experience of a motivated mind, these kinds of meaning aren't very meaningful, in the sense that people have the experience of meaningfulness. They are just assignations of outputs at one level to behaviors at a new level: the 0-->0, 1-->10, 2-->3 or whatever that I mentioned before. In this case, 0 means "do 0" and 1 means "do 10" and 2 means "do 3," and nothing more.