Oh jesus you naughty boy. Better luck next time.

[Zidneya]

You may find interesting that our beloved defender of the law Mr. Higgins once had sex with a mistress in his courtroom.

Actually if you read the article that I added to the initial post you'll find out that she claim sexual assault.

The woman, though, now says Mr. Higgins sexually assaulted her the night of July 10. She filed a private criminal complaint against him Friday with District Judge H. Cyril Bingham Jr. of Bedford.

Mr. Higgins, who is 34 and married, said the woman's allegations were "personally and politically motivated."

[vorlon13]

Maybe they were motivated from him being a repulsive creep ???

[HopOnPop]

so, it requires much more than mere "advocacy." You have to be getting ready to unleash the mob.

Yes, in the specific case you cited, this was the principle argument. I got that. but the other cases I cited above were merely in regards to people who attempted to incite "people" to commit violence against judges, jury, and politicians...no mobs unleashed. I have no additional cases to cite (too late + too much beer = too lazy), but I am pretty sure a number of people (i.e. high level syndicated criminals, mob 'bosses', etc) have likely served time for inciting similar forms of violence against police, jury, judges, and perhaps even prison guards by simply being caught placing contracts out on these individuals.

If you don't like my criminal incitement argument, let me take another tack to support my case for criminal prosecution -- various forms of intimidation are also criminalized. For example, while people can display most any kind of thing on their own property for the most part, a burning cross isn't one of them (a case from Florida in 2006 sentenced a guy to 14 months for doing this this exact thing on his own front lawn). He was prosecuted under civil rights laws because this display is so obviously a form of group intimidation. This is perhaps another consideration a court might follow when addressing cases where people pull stunts like the one on display in the OP. It's hard to deny what this kid did wasn't at least a tiny bit intimidating to many who may worship at that location...and thus criminalization might be justified under civil rights violations too.

[Minimalist]

Law works on precedent. It evolves....which annoys the piss out of the jesus freaks.

The way things stand now you can advocate for just about anything...as long as that is all you do.

[genkaus]

In an ideal society, where people all behave rationally, yes, I would agree. But, in the real world where people behave..well, like humans...and there are a lot of different subgroups, each holding intractible sets of ideals that often conflict with other subgroup's intractible ideals -- you either have to 1) regulate what people believe (which is impossible when the ideal in question is intractible) or 2) regulate what people do (through legal governance and law) or 3) simply leave it alone and let violence errupt as it most certainly will. Of the three possibilities (or another that I perhaps failed to think of?), what would you propose a governing body to do when there is a predictably large swath of the population that will riot when they see a national flag burned, or an image of Muhammad degraded as the butt-end of a joke?

Obviously the governing body should 2) regulate what people do (through legal governance and law) and what they should regulate are the rioteers.

---

Agreed, but this is not the legal/social principle I am working from. If all one can muster is, "I'm offended" there is no criminal act to be had. But when one can rightly assume a particular response from a given action of expression (like shouting fire in a crowded theatre), many courts (including SCOTUS) have long upheld the principle of holding the speaker criminally responsible for an outcome. Its also why white supremasist leaders who merely write books and give speeches have been successfully prosecuted for violent crimes committed by others inspired by such writings. It is also the reason why Charles Manson is in jail for murder even though he never committed any murders directly (that we know about).

Similar arguments can be made regarding other forms of speech, like when one burns a flag or desecrates a venerated figures in public in the wrong place at the wrong time (yes, context matters). The act may not be criminal, but the caused criminal actions produced in other people, can thus make the initial act partially punishable for the ensuing damages/crimes -- and I believe rightly so. I totally agree that this kind of legal precedent is a difficult row to hoe, hence why each case must be addressed individually, and hopefully anyone found guilty has a line or two of available appeals courts to re-consider their case.

Now, in the case of face-humping Jesus, clearly we aren't remotely in the same category as the crimes I used to illustrate the legal/social principle I am following, but nonetheless I can understand how a court might see this childish crime worth, at the very least, a slap on the wrist because of this principle.

Read my full post - no criminal charges should be made without there being tangible damages. In the examples you listed, there are actual damages.

As it stands, I don't think one person should be held guilty for the criminal actions of another even when there are actual negative consequences beyond "hurt feelings" - but that is a debate for another time.

In this case, there were no actual damages. Which is why is does not deserve even a literal slap on the wrist.

[HopOnPop]

Read my full post - no criminal charges should be made without there being tangible damages. In the examples you listed, there are actual damages.

In this case, there were no actual damages. Which is why is does not deserve even a literal slap on the wrist.

Sorry, didn't mean to skip over the rest of your reply (I did read it all, and even wrote a long responce....but it getting way too tangential and simply reaching tl/dr proportions, so I settled on a quick and dirty response instead...but then forgot to respond to your other issues. My appologies).

To the two issues you summarily extracted above:

1)CRIMINAL CHARGES: If we assume a crime is commited, even if small, you noted originally that you agree that some form of condemnation or public ostracisation of some minor sort was in line with your sense of liberty, and above you again noted a "literal slap on the wrist" also being fine in your thinking (if one can consider this a crime, that is) -- and that is all I would like to see too (and that is how I view community service). I think your real criticism (to which, if I am assuming correctly, I also agree) is with how the way the American criminal justice system deals with convictions that end in mere community service. This kind of crime should not ever be part of anyones public permanent crimial record (I would go so far as to suggest any punishment that a court finds sufficient to punish with mere "community service" should merely be served and forgotten about by the system, much like parking tickets). Now on to whether it was an actual crime --

2) TANGIBLE DAMAGES: I am not sure what you may actually mean when you say "tangible damages" or "actual damages" here, but in my eyes the were damages in this case that may be rightly considered by our courts -- namely, in the form of intimidation/bullying (which is a civil rights issue) and, secondly, in the form of potentially incitement to violence (in that, if simply ignored, this lack of official notice would predictably be expected to encourage other youths and people to do similar things, and such situations can also predictably escalate to retaliatory actions as well -- thus it behooves the government to nip-it-in-the-bud to help preserve peace by enacting some kind of deterent to the initial act, not as punishment but as a deterrent to others). I think If you wish to argue that such forms of "damage" are too intangible to consider punishable by some form of regulation, then you calling into question a lot settled law founded under the auspices of Civil Rights and Equal Rights statutes (which I personally consider to be a hallmark development to any society that might remotely consider itself to be a "free society").

[genkaus]

1)CRIMINAL CHARGES: If we assume a crime is commited, even if small, you noted originally that you agree that some form of condemnation or public ostracisation of some minor sort was in line with your sense of liberty, and above you again noted a "literal slap on the wrist" also being fine in your thinking (if one can consider this a crime, that is) -- and that is all I would like to see too (and that is how I view community service). I think your real criticism (to which, if I am assuming correctly, I also agree) is with how the way the American criminal justice system deals with convictions that end in mere community service. This kind of crime should not ever be part of anyones public permanent crimial record (I would go so far as to suggest any punishment that a court finds sufficient to punish with mere "community service" should merely be served and forgotten about by the system, much like parking tickets). Now on to whether it was an actual crime --

You got that wrong. My position is that public ostracization and/or condemnation is an appropriate response for offending the public's sentimentalities. Any such condemnation would and should be apart from the legal system. The legal system should not involve itself even to give a literal slap on the wrist. That is my real criticism - retaliating for offending the public is not something the criminal justice system should enter into.
Ofcourse, it goes without saying, I don't think "offending the public" should be regarded as a crime.

2) TANGIBLE DAMAGES: I am not sure what you may actually mean when you say "tangible damages" or "actual damages" here, but in my eyes the were damages in this case that may be rightly considered by our courts -- namely, in the form of intimidation/bullying (which is a civil rights issue) and, secondly, in the form of potentially incitement to violence (in that, if simply ignored, this lack of official notice would predictably be expected to encourage other youths and people to do similar things, and such situations can also predictably escalate to retaliatory actions as well -- thus it behooves the government to nip-it-in-the-bud to help preserve peace by enacting some kind of deterent to the initial act, not as punishment but as a deterrent to others). I think If you wish to argue that such forms of "damage" are too intangible to consider punishable by some form of regulation, then you calling into question a lot settled law founded under the auspices of Civil Rights and Equal Rights statutes (which I personally consider to be a hallmark development to any society that might remotely consider itself to be a "free society").

The only intimidation/bullying done here was by the DA's office.

As for the "potential incitement of violence argument" - that is central to every attempt to curb freedoms. A similar argument is often made that women should not wear revealing clothes or go out at night lest they "incite" men to rape them. Better to nip all that in the bud and prosecute women who are out late or dress immodestly.

Without any actual incitement - meaning "persuading, encouraging, instigating, pressuring, or threatening to commit violence" - the incitement argument doesn't apply.

[HopOnPop]

My position is that public ostracization and/or condemnation is an appropriate response for offending the public's sentimentalities. Any such condemnation would and should be apart from the legal system. The legal system should not involve itself even to give a literal slap on the wrist.

You are contradicting yourself here. Is there a typo? If not, I don't exactly understand what you are saying here? Can you give me a specific example of something you would consider appropriate in this case that demonstrates your own principle at work?

That is my real criticism - retaliating for offending the public is not something the criminal justice system should enter into.
Ofcourse, it goes without saying, I don't think "offending the public" should be regarded as a crime.

I think you are conflating two issues that need to be addressed separately
1) Is the DA retaliating... and
2) did this kid do something worthy of redressment by the legal system.

They need to be treated individually, and just because you (and I) sense that (1) is likely true, it should not cloud our thinking about (2).

I am contending, regardless of the DA's silliness, this kid is doing something wrong that needs some form of very minor legal redressment...and I cannot tell whether you agree with me or disagree with this point alone separate from the DA issue.

(....and getting to the main point you are perhaps getting at -- ultimately, if the alleged misconduct of the DA is provable, I agree that the DA's conduct would, and should, be justification to throw this case out altogether, regardless of whether the kid has done something wrong).

As for the "potential incitement of violence argument" - that is central to every attempt to curb freedoms. A similar argument is often made that women should not wear revealing clothes or go out at night lest they "incite" men to rape them. Better to nip all that in the bud and prosecute women who are out late or dress immodestly.

You paint with too broad of a brush. Simply because a tool can be used in a particular unfair way does not invalidate it use when applied in other ways. As a counter-example where (I think) this principle does work: it remains (generally) illegal for people to burn crosses in public, even if the display is on on their own private property, precisely because of its potential to incite intimidation/violence/etc among, and against, African Americans and other minorities. Do you think that is too much of a "curbing of freedoms" on cross-burners to justify such a regulation?

[genkaus]

...but the legal system *is* how we enforce and fairly adjudicate public ostracisation and/or condemnation (whether it actually accomplishes this task is perhaps another discussion). I don't exactly understand what you are saying here? Can you give me a specific example of something you would consider appropriate in this case that demonstrates your own principle at work?

Certainly - a man offends the prudish values of his community. The community then ortracizes him. He is no longer welcome at the community functions. The benefits of belonging to that community - like people banding together to help him - are denied to him. And he is faced with their moral condemnation every time he tries to talk to them.

However, he isn't fined or sent to jail or forced into community service or even prosecuted. The legal system stays out of it.

If the response to this kid's actions was people posting critical comments on his facebook page or Christian parents telling their kids not to associate with him, that'd be acceptable. The legal system should've stayed out of it.

I think you are conflating two issues that need to be addressed separately
1) Is the DA retaliating... and
2) did this kid do somthing worthy of addressment by the legal system.

They need to be treated individually, and just because you (and I) sense that (1) is likely true, it should not cloud our thinking about (2).

I am contending, regardless of the DA's silliness, this kid is doing something wrong that needs some form of very minor legal addressment...and I cannot tell whether you agree with me or disagree with this point alone separate from the DA issue.

I thought I was being clear - the kid did nothing wrong. There should be no legal addressment.

You paint with too broad of a brush. Simply because a tool can be used in a particular unfair way does not invalidate it use when applied in other ways. As a counter-example where this principle does work: it remains (generally) illegal for people to burn crosses in public, even if the display is on on their own private property, precisely because of its potential to incite intimidation/violence/etc among, and against, African Americans and other minorities. Do you think that is too much of a "curbing of freedoms" on cross-burners to justify such a regulation?

A quick research shows that you are wrong. Burning crosses isn't outlawed because of its potential to incite violence, it is outlawed because it is regarded as actual intimidation.

Wiki:

"In Virginia v. Black (2003), the United States Supreme Court deemed constitutional a statute outlawing the public burning of a cross with intent to intimidate, but held that statutes that did not require additional showing of intent to intimidate (other than the cross itself) were unconstitutional."

Your "potential to incite violence" argument does not work here because it is not used here.

[HopOnPop]

Thanks for the clarification. I keep reading "apart from" as "a part of" for some drunkard reason. My bad.

A quick research shows that you are wrong. Burning crosses isn't outlawed because of its potential to incite violence, it is outlawed because it is regarded as actual intimidation.

Sorry, I am not wrong.

I did say "intimidation/violence/etc" (not merely "volence"). Secondly, the case you cited had nothing to say about 'inciting violence' vis a vis a burning cross, so your odd parsing out of 'violence' above, is entirely irrelevant. And, as you rightly noted, Virgina v. Black did not overturn the Virginia statute that outlaws cross burning, it merely modified its language to require prosecutors to demonstrate, rather than assume, an intent to intimidate. Meaning cross burning is still restricted by law. So I am not sure what this case has to add to our conversation....

BUT you seem to evade my question: Do you find the failure of Viginia v. Black to fully overturn the Virginia ban on Cross Buring disappointing because it still allows the law to infringe upon the rights of cross-burners? Should free-and-unfettered cross burning be allowed for any reason whatsoever regardless of such existential things like "intent to intimidate"?