Is nihilism the logical extreme of atheism?

[Tonus]

The singularity is perfectly 'good'. It is functional in that it brings about a universe. God, having produced said singularity, has to be superior to it (see Aquinas). So Good is morally superior to the universe, and needs to be perfectly good.

Doesn't that only mean that he needed to be good enough? We don't know if this is the best possible universe that could have been made, after all. Maybe his older brother Wehyah (their parents were practical jokers) created a universe where all of the planets sustain life and no one ever sinned. Wehyah might need to be perfect to get that particular recipe right, and maybe the reason we never see god is because he's in the middle of receiving a 20,000-year nuggie from his big bro.

[Thumpalumpacus]

The notion that that which creates a thing is always superior to the thing created is not a presumption I'll buy whether Thomas A. said it or not. By what standard would you measure such superiority? Many men have build things stronger, faster, and with greater longevity than themselves.

Not to mention the child who outshines the parents in brilliance.

"The creator must always be superior" is simply argumentum ex culo.

[Neo-Scholastic]

…function of consciousness can assign meaning to itself. Which is why they don't have to be inherent - just emergent.

Anyone can see how structural properties can emerge from more basic mechanical processes, like the way an I-beam distributes applied loads to its extreme fibers. The same can be said for dispositional qualities, like the fragility of glass. As it relates to the mind-body problem, your position allows higher-order structures of the brain to constrain the expression of lower-level brain activities. In theory, someone could fully describe these effects in terms of four physical forces and a handful of constants. That seems reasonable enough, if the only facts under consideration are third-party observable effects. No one can do the same with subjective experiences or concepts. Pride has no mass nor does the sensation red have momentum. We agree that the processes in the brain are physical sequences of events. My question is this: at what point do you believe a sequence of events becomes a function?

[genkaus]

Anyone can see how structural properties can emerge from more basic mechanical processes, like the way an I-beam distributes applied loads to its extreme fibers. The same can be said for dispositional qualities, like the fragility of glass.

Can you see how software emerges from the current flowing through the hardware?

As it relates to the mind-body problem, your position allows higher-order structures of the brain to constrain the expression of lower-level brain activities. In theory, someone could fully describe these effects in terms of four physical forces and a handful of constants. That seems reasonable enough, if the only facts under consideration are third-party observable effects. No one can do the same with subjective experiences or concepts. Pride has no mass nor does the sensation red have momentum. We agree that the processes in the brain are physical sequences of events.

The error here is trying to describe concepts is physical terms - like describing software in terms of hardware.

My question is this: at what point do you believe a sequence of events becomes a function?

Which function? Any function or specific to consciousness?

[The Grand Nudger]

@Chad-
Meh, pride has mass, red has momentum. Why would someone think differently after conceding that "processes in the brain are physical sequences of events." ?

@Genk
There's really no error in describing things this way at all, any more than describing software in terms of hardware...that's what a programming language actually -does-, though often (from the programmers POV), it's backend at worst or shorthand at best. Describing software this way is likely to be more informative (than describing concepts), of course...because we know more about the hardware. That's where the analogy between the two breaks down. Nevertheless, we can indeed describe some concepts and subjective experiences by reference to "hardware".

(more broadly, our experience with emergent algorithms and hueristics -particularly from the POV of hardware- could go a long way in a discussion of concepts and subjective experiences, from the root to the canopy - hardware explains, for example, why these experiences are subjective in the first place)

[Neo-Scholastic]

Can you see how software emerges from the current flowing through the hardware?

Software does emerge naturally from hardware. People insert it. People structure the hardware and software to represent propositional states. Neither the software or the hardware have any meaning except for what has been assigned in advance.

The error here is trying to describe concepts is physical terms - like describing software in terms of hardware.

My point exactly. The relationship between a sign and the signified is assigned and arbitrary, not causal.

My question is this: at what point do you believe a sequence of events becomes a function?

Which function? Any function or specific to consciousness?

Any function.

[The Grand Nudger]

Software does emerge naturally from hardware.

Indeed it does, but I'm guessing that this was a typo.

People insert it.

Needn't be people, nor is there any need for "insertion".

People structure the hardware and software to represent propositional states.

We do, yes...so it's useful -to us-.

Neither the software or the hardware have any meaning except for what has been assigned in advance.

They're both full of meaning, you're conflating utility with a whole host of other things. Computers don't work because we arrange them thus and thus, we arrange them thus and thus -so that they can do work for us-. They'll "do work" and it will "have meaning" even if we (or no sentient being) arranged them any particular way. We might not find it useful, but the cosmos owes us nothing, so meh?

[Angrboda]

Just to be clear, my definition of nihilism is very broad: holding that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated.

You seem to be arguing at cross purposes to yourself. On the one hand, you want atheism to logically entail an all-embracing form of nihilism which extends not just to meaning, but reason and value as well. On the other hand, you seem tied to the notion that atheism implies metaphysical naturalism, if not reductive materialism. These two thrusts seem incompatible. Naturalism emphasizes the notion that, in principle, all of existence is capable of being understood according to naturalistic principles. I fail to see how you can reconcile a requirement that nihilism invalidates reason and knowledge with a position which extends the hope that the universe is knowable. I don’t know exactly how you intend to divide the baby, but I don’t think the result will be good.

Also, your division between atheist and theist seem entirely too crudely drawn. I suspect you have in mind the typical western atheist who believes firmly in the promise of science. However this doesn’t account for the entire pie that is atheism. Yes, many atheists deny the supernatural, but then there are atheists who believe in an after-life, ghosts, reincarnation, or simply hold metaphysical views that aren’t committed to a thoroughgoing naturalism. There are the tribesmen in Africa who may not believe in gods, yet believe that witchcraft is prevalent and may devote many waking hours to understanding the machinations of evil witches. There are Buddhists who don’t believe in gods but yet hold that life is ruled by a metaphysics which is far from naturalism. And there are atheistic Taoists who hold complex and nuanced metaphysical views of their own which don't include gods. And what of theist’s who don’t derive their meaning from above, as seems to be implied by your trio of purpose, lasting value, and significance. For many a Hindu, meaning comes from trying to get off that merry-go-round, not from trying to embrace it. And there are Unitarian Universalists and deists, who, though they believe in a god, are thoroughly humanistic in their values. I think the number of atheists of whom your views are descriptive is entirely too narrow to be considered the essence of atheism, and your emphasis on a specific non-atheist worldview implies too sharp a dichotomy. In short, I think you’ve failed to carve nature at her joints, and have substituted some rough-hewn hacks that benefit your specific theology.

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… I do not think a single line of reasoning leads from atheism (as simply a lack of belief in God or gods) to nihilism, moral or otherwise. As Genkaus correctly points out, failure to find a solution to nihilism doesn’t make it false, which would be an argument from ignorance. At the same time, no one cannot justify saying they have a raison d’etre (if it matters to them) without having some way to ground the meaning of their life …

You acknowledge that the possible strands leading from atheism to nihilism are multiple. However I think you fail to realize the many possible strands which don’t. You seem to want to emphasize how, atheism, if taken in certain directions, must lead to nihilism. You're arguing against the philosophical supports of atheism which you see as necessary for a self-conscious atheism. But not all people’s views are that well thought out, nor need they be for them to be complete atheists. There is a sense in which a good “I don’t know” is a better atheist answer than in some abstruse set of assumptions leading off into a philosophical stance. In a sense, this is a form of practical nihilism, that argues that you don’t need to know the ultimate answers in order to get by without God. You seem entirely too eager to drag “do not know” into “cannot know” and further on into “cannot exist.” That a particular atheist doesn’t have a well thought out ground for their meaning doesn’t lead to concluding that if they did, that worldview would be naturalistic and void of meaning, reason, and knowledge. It’s possible to have a sense of meaning without having an understanding of where that meaning comes from. It’s in this sense that the word emergent might have some valid application, in that a sense of meaning emerges from an atheist living out their beliefs about the world without it being reducible to a set bundle of sources and causes of that meaning. Not knowing is as much a part of atheism as knowing. It’s even possible that, properly understood, atheism even leads to transcendent sources of meaning. Not knowing is not the same as not having.

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At the same time, no one cannot justify saying they have a raison d’etre (if it matters to them) without having some way to ground the meaning of their life with three basic concepts: purpose, lasting value and significance. As I see it, atheism undermines all three. And without that solid foundation, all atheists are tacit nihilists no matter how adamantly they deny it.

Significance refers to the relationship between a signs, or signifiers, and that to which the signs refer (the signified). So when people say that life has significance, then they are essentially claiming that their being and actions are signifiers that point to something external to them.

Purpose, lasting value, and significance. These three seem somewhat arbitrarily drawn, but the common thread appears to be that meaning requires a relationship to something external to yourself. To something greater than yourself perhaps. Purpose is not just direction or a goal, but purpose drawn from a final cause. Lasting value, value that endures as long as everything else does. Significance in the grander scheme of things, not just importance to the person. However are these three relationships the only way to derive meaning? Sartre’s philosophy rested on the notion that we as selves have two primary relationships, one to the self we have been and currently are, and one to the self we are in the process of becoming. We can’t change the past at will, so we are in some sense bound to the meaning of the self that we have been. And we can’t arbitrarily decide what we will become. That relationship has to be acted out by what we do in the present. What we have been and intend to become may give our lives purpose and imbue each act with meaning and significance, even if only to us. Who we have become and who we will be seem external to us if only in the sense that we can’t arbitrarily change either; they're not subjective, either one. They provide an independent ground which defines the significance and meaning of our actions. They’re not transcendent or eternal, but I don’t see why meaning has to be, nor that non-transcendent meaning is of necessity nihilistic. Temporary pleasures are still pleasures. Momentary setbacks are still setbacks. Why does meaning have to be grounded by relationships to something external and eternal for it to be real? Why does ephemeral meaning simply not count, while transcendent meaning is the only kind that does?

[Jenny A]

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Just to be clear, my definition of nihilism is very broad: holding that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated.

You seem to be arguing at cross purposes to yourself. On the one hand, you want atheism to logically entail an all-embracing form of nihilism which extends not just to meaning, but reason and value as well. On the other hand, you seem tied to the notion that atheism implies metaphysical naturalism, if not reductive materialism. These two thrusts seem incompatible. Naturalism emphasizes the notion that, in principle, all of existence is capable of being understood according to naturalistic principles. I fail to see how you can reconcile a requirement that nihilism invalidates reason and knowledge with a position which extends the hope that the universe is knowable. I don’t know exactly how you intend to divide the baby, but I don’t think the result will be good.

Also, your division between atheist and theist seem entirely too crudely drawn. I suspect you have in mind the typical western atheist who believes firmly in the promise of science. However this doesn’t account for the entire pie that is atheism. Yes, many atheists deny the supernatural, but then there are atheists who believe in an after-life, ghosts, reincarnation, or simply hold metaphysical views that aren’t committed to a thoroughgoing naturalism. There are the tribesmen in Africa who may not believe in gods, yet believe that witchcraft is prevalent and may devote many waking hours to understanding the machinations of evil witches. There are Buddhists who don’t believe in gods but yet hold that life is ruled by a metaphysics which is far from naturalism. And there are atheistic Taoists who hold complex and nuanced metaphysical views of their own which don't include gods. And what of theist’s who don’t derive their meaning from above, as seems to be implied by your trio of purpose, lasting value, and significance. For many a Hindu, meaning comes from trying to get off that merry-go-round, not from trying to embrace it. And there are Unitarian Universalists and deists, who, though they believe in a god, are thoroughly humanistic in their values. I think the number of atheists of whom your views are descriptive is entirely too narrow to be considered the essence of atheism, and your emphasis on a specific non-atheist worldview implies too sharp a dichotomy. In short, I think you’ve failed to carve nature at her joints, and have substituted some rough-hewn hacks that benefit your specific theology.

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… I do not think a single line of reasoning leads from atheism (as simply a lack of belief in God or gods) to nihilism, moral or otherwise. As Genkaus correctly points out, failure to find a solution to nihilism doesn’t make it false, which would be an argument from ignorance. At the same time, no one cannot justify saying they have a raison d’etre (if it matters to them) without having some way to ground the meaning of their life …

You acknowledge that the possible strands leading from atheism to nihilism are multiple. However I think you fail to realize the many possible strands which don’t. You seem to want to emphasize how, atheism, if taken in certain directions, must lead to nihilism. You're arguing against the philosophical supports of atheism which you see as necessary for a self-conscious atheism. But not all people’s views are that well thought out, nor need they be for them to be complete atheists. There is a sense in which a good “I don’t know” is a better atheist answer than in some abstruse set of assumptions leading off into a philosophical stance. In a sense, this is a form of practical nihilism, that argues that you don’t need to know the ultimate answers in order to get by without God. You seem entirely too eager to drag “do not know” into “cannot know” and further on into “cannot exist.” That a particular atheist doesn’t have a well thought out ground for their meaning doesn’t lead to concluding that if they did, that worldview would be naturalistic and void of meaning, reason, and knowledge. It’s possible to have a sense of meaning without having an understanding of where that meaning comes from. It’s in this sense that the word emergent might have some valid application, in that a sense of meaning emerges from an atheist living out their beliefs about the world without it being reducible to a set bundle of sources and causes of that meaning. Not knowing is as much a part of atheism as knowing. It’s even possible that, properly understood, atheism even leads to transcendent sources of meaning. Not knowing is not the same as not having.

---

At the same time, no one cannot justify saying they have a raison d’etre (if it matters to them) without having some way to ground the meaning of their life with three basic concepts: purpose, lasting value and significance. As I see it, atheism undermines all three. And without that solid foundation, all atheists are tacit nihilists no matter how adamantly they deny it.

Significance refers to the relationship between a signs, or signifiers, and that to which the signs refer (the signified). So when people say that life has significance, then they are essentially claiming that their being and actions are signifiers that point to something external to them.

Purpose, lasting value, and significance. These three seem somewhat arbitrarily drawn, but the common thread appears to be that meaning requires a relationship to something external to yourself. To something greater than yourself perhaps. Purpose is not just direction or a goal, but purpose drawn from a final cause. Lasting value, value that endures as long as everything else does. Significance in the grander scheme of things, not just importance to the person. However are these three relationships the only way to derive meaning? Sartre’s philosophy rested on the notion that we as selves have two primary relationships, one to the self we have been and currently are, and one to the self we are in the process of becoming. We can’t change the past at will, so we are in some sense bound to the meaning of the self that we have been. And we can’t arbitrarily decide what we will become. That relationship has to be acted out by what we do in the present. What we have been and intend to become may give our lives purpose and imbue each act with meaning and significance, even if only to us. Who we have become and who we will be seem external to us if only in the sense that we can’t arbitrarily change either; they're not subjective, either one. They provide an independent ground which defines the significance and meaning of our actions. They’re not transcendent or eternal, but I don’t see why meaning has to be, nor that non-transcendent meaning is of necessity nihilistic. Temporary pleasures are still pleasures. Momentary setbacks are still setbacks. Why does meaning have to be grounded by relationships to something external and eternal for it to be real? Why does ephemeral meaning simply not count, while transcendent meaning is the only kind that does?

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[Whateverist]

I had tired of this thread until your response, Rasetsu. You have been particularly insightful and wickedly articulate of late, I mean, even more so than usual.