Mind Over Matter?

[Mudhammam]

Mezmo!
I do believe that (hate to say it but) the Schoolmen took great care to differentiate between the process of abstraction and form isolated by that process. The E=mc^2 formula is most certainly a propositional description, but it would not qualify as either the formal or dispositional properties at play.

Slow down there, bud. You're losing me! Can you clarify the difference between the "process of abstraction" and "form isolated by that process"? What I take you to mean (which is probably incorrect) is that mathematical descriptions involve a process of abstractions but what it is they're actually describing are the forms that material substances prosecute. I'm also not so sure what you mean by the last sentence. I would agree (with you, I think, but maybe not) that no descriptive formula, such as E=MC^2, is anything other than a conceptual representation of material properties as they correlate to our experience of matter, but it is the properties or the principles that define them (which we can only describe with the language we impose, though the rules of the language, such as in the case of numbers, is not our invention) that I doubt can be said to exist in any material sense. I've also not read any of the Scholastics (yet) but in going through the complete works of Plato and being now about halfway through the most important works of Aristotle, I can appreciate the care and thoughtfulness they put into these issues that still seem largely unresolved, even if the perspective from which they constructed their various solutions was largely naive. I imagine much the same can be said in regards to the Scholastics.

---

Perhaps they are commonalities in composition of the particles which you interpret as some abstracted connection. A connection which they don't have.
Example:
You observe a yellow truck in Paris and a yellow truck in London.  These items (by my hypothetical) have no association other than you have observed both to be yellow trucks.  The connection occurs only because of your observation.

While there could be an underlying mind stuff in the universe, I see no evidence of it while I do see evidence connecting the experience of consciousness to the physical organization and chemical operations in the brain.  Only systems of a minimum, apparently necessary, complexity in neuroanatomy exhibit behaviors characteristic of conscious individuals as experienced (me) or granted (to others by comparison with myself.)  We do not yet have bottom up understanding of the design and operation of the wetware involved.  I believe this will be obtained within a century and that once in hand, it will be replicated or simulated.   At that point the question, "Are you there?" will have meaning and the answer must be believed to the same extent that it is when asked of another person.
There arises an interesting situation if the system under observation answers, "No."

The way I see it, to deny the abstract connections with regards to what I'm speaking about as having an independent existence would be tantamount to saying that all of the concepts employed by science in the attempt to formulate an intelligible framework of the world are... subjective illusions. For example, the force of gravity is described mathematically like this: 
This tells quite a bit about how the Universe operates at the macroscopic level, from planetary orbits to colliding billiard balls. Now, the formula is a construct that humans invented to describe the patterns of material phenomena we perceive, but the underlying truth of this description was and is true regardless of our conceptual grasp of it. Planets and baseballs still obeyed this rule before Newton came along. So what is it that forces physical objects, whatever they may be---space or the matter in it---to follow this rigid set of mandates if not something that is abstract, and hence discovered by abstract means? What is this mathematical formula a description of?---matter itself, or the abstract principles that underlie, or coexist with it, in some manner?

I wouldn't want to say that mind or consciousness is in all matter. I agree with you that it is inextricably linked to "the physical organization and chemical operations in the brain." But like physical structures that follow abstract rules and can be described using abstract objects (numbers, their properties, functions, etc.), I wonder if the brain is the physical structure, and mind is the abstract governing rule.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, I'd rather have your non-arbitrary definition.  I know what the word processing means.  I want to know what it means to YOU in the context of this particular debate.

-Except that I don't have my own personal definition.  I'm content with the standard definitions linked.  I neither need to nor desire to redefine processing (and comp mind wouldn't be a very good explanation for mind if I -did- need to redefine it).  If you know what it means...then you know why data transmission is not necessarily processing (and if you didn't you've been given an example).   There is no "in the sense of this debate" for me - either mind is processing writ large,  or it's something else (or many somethings else)...and honestly...there is no debate between you and I that I can see on the issue of comp mind.  

I've mentioned many times that comp mind explicitly invokes the -fact- that comp systems can be built out of a wide variety of "stuff"...and I've even proposed a spirit based aether resistor as a comp system built out of "non-stuff" (still waiting for something like that...anything at all like that...in any of our many conversations on the subject...so I can grasp what it is you think information is doing..and how).  

8. Computers

a. A running software program or other computing operation.
b. A part of a running software program or other computing operation that does a single task.

Why?  I know what a brain does.

Do you?  Then why are we having this conversation?  How about you just give me the answer...and we'll phone it in to whomever needs be notified?

What I don't know is the most elemental particle or particle function that represents a kind of "spark" of consciousness.

Neither do I.  I don't, however, think that consciousness is quite as small as a particle..myself.   You and I find ourselves in precisely opposite situations.  Looks from here like a nueron is the most fundamental unit of our consciousness (a dubious distinction if ever there were one), but how many of those you need...and what sort of arrangement they need to be in before consciousness as we experience it presents itself is beyond me (some really interesting stuff there....apparently you don't need much brain to achieve function)

For me (and for comp mind) figuring out what that mind is doing is the meat and potatoes.  What it's made of is only relevant in determining the capabilities of a comp system constructed from that material (or non-material..if you prefer). Once we've established that any given (non)material -can do comp- ...even if it can only be arranged as a single type of "gate"..provided that this gate is a universal, getting it to actually do comp is just a matter of scale and impetus. Any conceivable logical operation can be achieved by stacking more and more of a single gate in series. You'd only run into trouble at the extremes...such as when you wanted to transmit data across comp as large as the universe. It would end up seeming dumber than a watch regardless of it;s overall processing power...because the clock speed would be too damned slow to return an output. It would, at the speed of light....take every second that's elapsed since the big bang...to get a signal from one side to the other.....so adding 1+1, just once, might get a bit tedious..depending on the bussing.

I elaborated so that you might appreciate this next comment...I'm not so sure there's a "spark" except in the sense of a spark of energy to power the grinding of many...many gears. I call that metabolism....so I guess that I think, in biological comp systems....metabolism would provide that spark. I thought you might enjoy how different a question or statement can seem coming from such different starting points. You're looking for a consciousness particle...I don;t expect to ever find such a thing...I don;t expect to find a "consciousness nueron" either.

I don't see why this elemental pyschum (if I can be permitted to coin the term for this thread) should do anything more than a simple transmission of data.

Ever seen a relay tower make a decision..or compare large numbers of floating variables against an unknown?  I haven't.  I've seen comp systems do both, and I've seen human minds do both.  

Amusingly and succinctly.....why shouldn't it? -

You possess all of the required components to do much more than simply transmit data......don't you?

I still don't understand the difference between processing and any other change of state which has an effect on causality in the universe.  I really have to stop here and ask you for a precise definition of "processing."

You say you don't understand the difference..but I don't believe that this is true.  You don't experience a rock as conscious, or possessing mind any more than I do, -or- as computing.  There's the difference - I'm merely attempting to explain one possible reason for this difference presenting itself in both of our experiences.    You can stop every post and ask for another definition..if you like...the answer will always be the same.  : shrugs :

I want to re-stress here.....not a single one of your questions or objections has ever been an objection to comp mind.....but lets say I accept them?  Lets say that all matter (or whatever else underneath) is capable of comp in relationship to all other matter.  So what?  Is it actually -doing- comp?  Unplug your PC and it won't be doing any comp...so it's demonstrably possible that any given set of stuff (or non-stufff) can be capable of comp....but not actually doing any.  

However...just to make sure we don;t get hung up on the above -It's all information down there at the bottom, matter is secondary...the interactions of material objects are all processing..there's no difference between processing and data transmission....I've given you the entire universe...now explain the difference...that -both- you and I experience...from within that framework?

(for an added bit of levity..I actually do think of the universe in the manner expressed directly above when I'm trying to build an ALU - I consider it an extremely useful deceit...lol. Even if I had knowledge that it was -not true- I would still leverage that concept. It's utility isn't diminished or enhanced by it's accuracy, for my purpose anyway.)

[bennyboy]

-Except that I don't have my own personal definition.  I'm content with the standard definitions linked.  I neither need to nor desire to redefine processing (and comp mind wouldn't be a very good explanation for mind if I -did- need to redefine it).  If you know what it means...then you know why data transmission is not necessarily processing (and if you didn't you've been given an example).   There is no "in the sense of this debate" for me - either mind is processing writ large,  or it's something else (or many somethings else)...and honestly...there is no debate between you and I that I can see on the issue of comp mind.

I ask that you take it at face value that I do NOT have a definition that I think works in this context. Your definition of processing, I think, is too narrow; it involves looking at chunks of information as a single unit, which already implies mind. In other word "mind is mind." It doesn't show how individual data (photons, electrons, neurotransmitters spanning the gap between neurons, etc.) "know" that they are part of a bigger system of thought, thereby allowing a mind to exist.

I believe processing must be defined in purely physical terms, since it is meant to be a physicalist theory of mind. So for now, I say, "Processing is any interaction of particles or their properties which affect causality." Which, of course, is every interaction.

I elaborated so that you might appreciate this next comment...I'm not so sure there's a "spark" except in the sense of a spark of energy to power the grinding of many...many gears.  I call that metabolism....so I guess that I think, in biological comp systems....metabolism would provide that spark.  I thought you might enjoy how different a question or statement can seem coming from such different starting points.  You're looking for a consciousness particle...I don;t expect to ever find such a thing...I don;t expect to find a "consciousness nueron" either.

I view human consciousness as an aggregate-- a collection of tiny little mental events which the brain brings into a kind of form or focus. So human consciousness, I would say, is not the creation of mind, but the bringing into relation a gazillion little sparks of mind: much as a physical object is the bringing into relation a gazillion little particles. But we know what brings the particles in a physical object into relationship in a single object: the atomic forces, gravity, and electromagnetic forces. But your view of mind is very mysterious to me: it doesn't EXIST anywhere except as a ghost in the machinery. It sounds a little bit like a soul.

You say you don't understand the difference..but I don't believe that this is true.  You don't experience a rock as conscious, or possessing mind any more than I do, -or- as computing.  There's the difference - I'm merely attempting to explain one possible reason for this difference presenting itself in both of our experiences.    You can stop every post and ask for another definition..if you like...the answer will always be the same.  : shrugs :

In my view, there are a billion little mental events exploding all over that rock, as electrons move through it, as photons hit it, etc. And the exact same goes for the human brain. The thing you are talking about isn't so much about an ontology explaining the existence of mind, but a description of how human experience forms.

I agree that a rock can't enjoy a Mozart symphony, because it doesn't have the systems which would allow it to do so. However, the data presented to the rock DO represent a kind of primitive processing system: the transmission of heat from the surface to the center, the transmission of energy waves in vibration, etc. Let's say I play Mozart to a rock. The surface facing the speaker will vibrate, the vibration will be carried into the rock and generate friction, and the rock will transmit some of that as infrared radiation. Different songs will produce different amounts of friction and at different times, such that a clever scientist might someday be able to read the heat patterns and know what song was being played. The rock has done a kind of calculation: "What would Mozart's Requiem Mass look like as a heat signature?" You could even go beyond this and consider it more complex calculation: "What would Mozart's Requiem Mass look like as a heat signature at sea level in the dead of summer?"

Now, this isn't a very useful kind of processing, but nobody's arguing for the musical brilliance of rocks. My point is that it can be seen as simple processing, and that by a comp mind theory, I'd expect a marginally non-zero amount of mind to be seen at work in even a rock.

[The Grand Nudger]

I ask that you take it at face value that I do NOT have a definition that I think works in this context.  Your definition of processing, I think, is too narrow; it involves looking at chunks of information as a single unit, which already implies mind.

If by "implies mind" you mean..we're using ours....sure.  If you have some other way...I'm all ears.

  In other word "mind is mind."  It doesn't show how individual data (photons, electrons, neurotransmitters spanning the gap between neurons, etc.) "know" that they are part of a bigger system of thought, thereby allowing a mind to exist.

Mind is mind regardless whether or not mind is also processing, I'm proposing a manner in which it can do what it seems to do.  Not that it's something other than it is.  Red is red...it is also a color.

I believe processing must be defined in purely physical terms, since it is meant to be a physicalist theory of mind.

It isn't meant as any such thing - and I've already offered spirit resistors, so it doesn't have to be defined in that way at all.  If you insist upon defining it as such then that's probably your hangup in our conversations.  You;ve been stuck on this since the word go but I keep explaining to you that I use the material explanations, the physicalist descriptions because they can be demonstrably shown to work. It does not rely on conjecture. If I say " a comp system can do -x-" and then point to an actual machine doing -x- it;s a little more convincing than saying "-everything that a dragon could do". Understand? Comp mind is the notion that mind does comp..that mind is comp. Not what that mind is -made- out of. Sure, Comp mind a physicalist positions go well together (computers are physical systems..brains are physical systems - these are the things we point to as the representatives of their respective class), but they aren't bound by bloodoath. You could be a dualist who prefers comp mind, or a physical monist who thinks it's bullshit.

  So for now, I say, "Processing is any interaction of particles or their properties which affect causality."  Which, of course, is every interaction.

Excellent, now..... pick up a rock (rather than your pc) and post your reply?  

I view human consciousness as an aggregate-- a collection of tiny little mental events which the brain brings into a kind of form or focus. 

as do I.

So human consciousness, I would say, is not the creation of mind,

agreed.

 but the bringing into relation a gazillion little sparks of mind: much as a physical object is the bringing into relation a gazillion little particles.  But we know what brings the particles in a physical object into relationship in a single object: the atomic forces, gravity, and electromagnetic forces.  But your view of mind is very mysterious to me: it doesn't EXIST anywhere except as a ghost in the machinery.  It sounds a little bit like a soul.

Is that a problem..that it sounds like a soul to you?  It exists, plainly enough..as mario exists (we've had this discussion before)...but, it doesn't have to...it could be floating spirit resistors.  Is that a problem for you....do you think that consciousness exists "somewhere"....pretty sure that you don't...so why would it be a problem for you..conceptually?  

In my view, there are a billion little mental events exploding all over that rock,

-and you think computing is mysterious...but these "mental events"..not so much?

 as electrons move through it, as photons hit it, etc.  And the exact same goes for the human brain.  The thing you are talking about isn't so much about an ontology explaining the existence of mind, but a description of how human experience forms.  

And when you're done describing human experience.....what have you described?  The only difference, IMO, between you and I in principle..is that you think there must be "more"...I don't.  

I agree that a rock can't enjoy a Mozart symphony, because it doesn't have the systems which would allow it to do so.  However, the data presented to the rock DO represent a kind of primitive processing system: the transmission of heat from the surface to the center, the transmission of energy waves in vibration, etc.

You need more than transmission for processing.  But that's irrelevant - I'm willing to call everything processing if it means that you provide an explanation of the mechanics..as you see them.

Let's say I play Mozart to a rock.  The surface facing the speaker will vibrate, the vibration will be carried into the rock and generate friction, and the rock will transmit some of that as infrared radiation.

-and?

 Different songs will produce different amounts of friction and at different times, such that a clever scientist might someday be able to read the heat patterns and know what song was being played.  The rock has done a kind of calculation

-huh...sounds to me like a scientist did a calculation.........

"What would Mozart's Requiem Mass look like as a heat signature?"  You could even go beyond this and consider it more complex calculation: "What would Mozart's Requiem Mass look like as a heat signature at sea level in the dead of summer?"

LOL, I hope to god someone with expensive equipment asks this question in an institutional setting someday.  

Now, this isn't a very useful kind of processing, but nobody's arguing for the musical brilliance of rocks.

No, it isn't..in that you failed to describe what processing the rock was doing in the fist place, but as I've already said..who cares?

  My point is that it can be seen as simple processing, and that by a comp mind theory, I'd expect a marginally non-zero amount of mind to be seen at work in even a rock.

I wouldn't.  Any more than I would expect a rock to add 1+1.  But who cares.....I gave you the universe...remember? 

[bennyboy]

You need more than transmission for processing.  But that's irrelevant - I'm willing to call everything processing if it means that you provide an explanation of the mechanics..as you see them.

A rock does more than transmit. It takes the input of sound, converts it to heat energy, and outputs it as infrared radiation.

As for the mechanics, please keep in mind that the thing about photons, electrons, etc. is a response to the physical nature of processing, i.e. looking for the most fundamental "spark" in a physical model of mind. I learn more toward idealism, in which all is mind, or toward a neutral monism. In either of these, mind is intrinsic to the universe, rather than a happenstance "bonus" that pops up when things interact in certain ways.

[The Grand Nudger]

A good start to describing a rock -as- a processor, even if it isn't one...... and since you're clearly not interested in any discussion in which a rock is not processing..then so be it.  So, what logical functions do you think you could achieve with that behavior? What sorts of comp systems do you think I could build out of a "processor" with that/those functions?  

"Mind is intrinsic" doesn't -explain- anything and theres no mechanics whatsoever mentioned in that......and I'm not sure how you would even go about demonstrating that this were true....even if it were.  Meanwhile, comp is explanatory and demonstrable.   I'm not so sure we need to dive down to the "bottom of the universe" to explain mind until we've exhausted what we do see, what we can demonstrate, up here at the "top" - but that's a difference in preferences, I suppose.  Pretty sure that you and I aren;t even having the same diuscussion. I'm trying to explain mind...your just calling it intrinsic -in place of explanation-.

Meanwhile, "all is mind"..okay...then..answer me this...

How does mind mind the mind to minds over mind when minds mind or mind? Where mind is mind if not mind, and mind so? If mind and all are equivalent terms then "mind" means nothing, in particular, to you. To me, the proposition seems completely unworkable....even if true. Course, if mind and all are equivalent terms then processing is mind as well....by your own statements....Comp Minds are just as "mind" as any other...so whats the problem, why are you asking me why you "experience" or why you wouldn't be simple data transmission (rather than whatever else you think you are)...isn't that also mind...mind being all..and all? Somehow....I don't think that you actually think all is mind, because you don't seem to think comps are mind or could be mind (and particularly your own)...and yet they are contained within the set of "all"...wouldn't you agree? Forgive me for offering a very rough summary...but, just between the two of us and our positions mind doesn't seem all that mysterious or difficult to explain..and certainly not your "more"...because maybe mind is intrinsic..so, np...or maybe mind is comp...so np.....there are two ways it might be explained, and both work equally well?

"Why do I experience, why am I not simple data transmission"
-Because Mind is intrinsic
-Because Comp cannot be achieved by simple data transmission.

.....right? So, can I officially consider this long running question of yours answered...in full, and remind you of this (refering to this thread) if at any point you feel the need to revisit?

On the last bit we agree, I don't think that mind is a happenstance "bonus" either, by whatever means it exists. In a very loose sense, I agree that we could -conceive- of anything as a processor, but..like you need more than transmission for processing...you need more than processing for computing.

On and on it goes...you need more than jany old architecture or computing for mind, as we move from the general to the specific "a human mind" the requirements, imo, continue to increase and become more narrow. That's why I don't think that a "spark" as you conceive of it in your framework applies to my own framework....personally. If you try to figure out what that "spark" might be, in my framework..consider that you might be searching for a martian on earth - essentially. If a rock is a processor...if everything is, then I don't feel that the rock has met the minimum threshold of computing power to be called "mind" in any way consistent with our own experience of mind...and as you said..mind is mind (I don't feel that the universe has met that minimum bar either...and for the same reasons that a rock hasn't, again, imo). I simply propose that if mind is mind..and I have mind..a rock does not (or that whatever a rock has should probably get it's own term to differentiate) - even if we're both processors. We may be similar...but not the same. Would you disagree? Are you and a rock, on the subject of mind....interchangeable...as all and mind are interchangeable?

[KichigaiNeko]

I do not mind
Therefore YOU do not mater?

[The Grand Nudger]

(though I wonder if single-celled organisms have anything like a modicum of sensation or if they operate as more sophisticated machinations in the same way as inanimate objects do when forces are at play)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cnidaria  

No brains (no hearts either/..wewt).  They use a net.  Do you think their behaviors imply sensation rather than sophisticated machination (or that there is a difference in any case..as the question carries implicitly)?  I use their example to show that we have reason to ask ourselves the question above in quotes long before we reach the simplicity of single celled organisms....if we think we need to go further "down" than ourselves...that is.  I would call sensation -itself- a sophisticated machination, personally.

[bennyboy]

A good start to describing a rock -as- a processor, even if it isn't one...... and since you're clearly not interested in any discussion in which a rock is not processing..then so be it.  So, what logical functions do you think you could achieve with that behavior?  What sorts of comp systems do you think I could build out of a "processor" with that/those functions?  

Probably nothing. But I think we already agree that we aren't saying something is mind just because we find its particular form of processing useful. That represents an overly arbitrary definition.

"Mind is intrinsic" doesn't -explain- anything and theres no mechanics whatsoever mentioned in that......and I'm not sure how you would even go about demonstrating that this were true....even if it were.  Meanwhile, comp is explanatory and demonstrable.

It's demonstrable that some systems meet your definition of computation. However, it is not demonstrated that simpler systems don't also produce simple minds, or that processing complexity of a particular type leads to the actual experience of qualia outside the context of an organic brain, rather than a machine which behaves AS THOUGH it experiences qualia.

I like the comp idea because you are giving a pretty definite answer to the question "what is mind." That's a leap ahead of most other explanations. However, I want you to refine what processing is, what kind produces mind, and most importantly-- how would we use this idea to locate systems outside of our experiences on Earth (life + computers) which definitely had minds?

[The Grand Nudger]

A designation as a comp system, or a description of a comp systems limitations and abilities by reference to the individual processing units is not defined by it's usefulness - but by it's ability.  If you can make an and gate out of that rock, alone....even if neither I nor the rock have any use for an and gate...it's still capable, it's still an and gate.  

So, supposing neither of us could find a way to make a rock meet the minimum requirements for a comp system - that explains fairly handily why a rock cant comp (regardless of that rocks utility).  That's why, in comp mind...no one expects a rock to have a non-zero amount of mind.  It's not about what a comp system could be used for, it;s usefulness - simply whether or not it -can- do comp.  A rock can't, btw, which is why we don't make computers out of a rock.  

It's demonstrable that some systems meet your definition of computation. However, it is not demonstrated that simpler systems don't also produce simple minds,

Simpler systems may not meet the requirements of a comp system.  Transmission doesn't, a processor doesn't.  Similarly, -if- mind is comp, simpler comp systems may not meet the requirements of mind.

or that processing complexity of a particular type leads to the actual experience of qualia outside the context of an organic brain, rather than a machine which behaves AS THOUGH it experiences qualia.

How could we tell the difference?  Are you sure there is a difference?  How could you demonstrate that this were so?  Do you wish for me to extend the courtesy of acceptence to you..that you experience qualia...based upon your behaviors - and explicitly by their consistency with my own experience, but balk at the notion of extending it to a machine that exhibited identical behaviors - described an identical experience equally consistent with my own? I have no logical grounds from which to do so..and neither do you. Neither of our positions lead to any conclusion that an artificial mind is or should be any less "mind" than our own. I don't think that you're being consistent.

If all is mind..then an artificial mind is mind, is it not? Why do you expect the artificial mind to be different from your own? Why is it a trick when they do it..but the real deal when you do it?

It's conceivable that at some point towards the end of my lifetime we may be able to build comp systems to a scale and magnitude commensurate with the scale and magnitude of a human brain (I think I did the math once, in a thread...projected the year that this might be possible) and it;s conceivable that these systems could "trick me" - to use your flavor- into thinking they were sentient. After all, we've already built systems that can "trick" some. Just as further elaboration of the above...the day a rock tricks me into thinking it has even a non-zero amount of mind is the day I check myself into a facility.

However, I want you to refine what processing is,

I told you that you could ask this question as often as you'd like...and that the answer would remain the same. hanging or altering the definition as we go along would remove it's utility as an indicator...don't you think?

 what kind produces mind,

I don't know - off the cuff...I'd say an -incredibly- robust kind...orders of magnitude or scale greater than what we find in a modern PC. There may be other ways, as well. NN proponents make a decent claim as well.

how would we use this idea to locate systems outside of our experiences on Earth (life + computers) which definitely had minds?

Not sure if I understand the question?   Without specifics on what this extra-terrestrial thing is I wouldn't know how to begin to answer that.  Where is it, what is it made of, what is it doing?