Mind Over Matter?

[The Grand Nudger]

In my framework, as in the operation of any demonstrable computational system, yes - the processing takes place in the system that exists and is capable of performing computation, but that has little to do with the next bit about free will, on it's own.  



The second option, as elaborated upon, would be some sort of dualism, a mind/body seperation.  Even then, I'd still refer to comp mind - that "cponsciousness stuff" is still doing computation somehow...and we have a long list of principles by which that can be achieved in a variety of implementations.  The questions regarding the operation of consciousness, to me, are the same regardless of which way we approach it.  The only difference between dualism and monism, for me...is that I can accept the burden of proof and arrange for a convincing demonstration of the monist stuff (rather than flap my jaws), and it's demonstrably capable of doing what we call computation regardless of whether or not there is any "other non-stuff" or "other stuff".

While there may be a more elaborate explanation.....I don't seem to need to invoke it in order to explain a wide range of observations. Find me something that needs other stuff, I tell dualists, and I'll have to refer to other stuff to explain it. Until then, meh.

[emjay]

In my framework, as in the operation of any demonstrable computational system, yes - the processing takes place in the system that exists and is capable of performing computation, but that has little to do with the next bit about free will, on it's own.  



The second option, as elaborated upon, would be some sort of dualism, a mind/body seperation.  Even then, I'd still refer to comp mind - that "cponsciousness stuff" is still doing computation somehow...and we have a long list of principles by which that can be achieved in a variety of implementations.  The questions regarding the operation of consciousness, to me, are the same regardless of which way we approach it.  The only difference between dualism and monism, for me...is that I can accept the burden of proof and arrange for a convincing demonstration  of the monist stuff (rather than flap my jaws), and it's demonstrably capable of doing what we call computation regardless of whether or not there is any "other non-stuff" or "other stuff".

While there may be a more elaborate explanation.....I don't seem to need to invoke it in order to explain a wide range of observations.  Find me something that needs other stuff, I tell dualists, and I'll have to refer to other stuff to explain it. Until then, meh.

So do I gather then that my #1 is what you would call 'monism' and roughly speaking you'd call yourself a monist? I think then I am also a monist but sometimes dualist ideas slip in to my thinking. So how can you envisage a free will that is not based on computation if you believe in computation? And what is this 'long list of principles...' of how consciousness stuff is computing - that sounds very interesting.

Anyway I've been looking at this forum for about eight hours and I need a bit of a break, so if it's OK I'll catch up with you later

[The Grand Nudger]

LOL, I'll be here if you take a week between responses.  I understand.  

I would, yeah.

I think that free will, as generally elaborated upon...is folklore.  I know that it's -something- aftr all...I experience it as well...but I'm also pretty sure it isn't what we've thought it was all this time that we've been in ignorance of the basic operations (and we still are, to a large part).  We'd have to have been pretty damned lucky to get that right by accident.   So, I guess the short answer is that I don't conceive of such a free will myself, at all.

The principles of computation - essentially, describe interactions and relationships which we leverage to build computational systems (like computers, clearly).  You looking for a booklist or weblink for resources?  The principles of computation would apply to any "stuff" that satisfied the conditions of, for example, a NOR gate.  Whether that gate is made of toilet papers rolls, digital components - or pixie knuckles.....they will all have one thing in common - they are capable of functioning as a NOR gate.  So, if some says "well, I don't think the material brain is doing the computation, i think -immaterial stuff- is doing it" -fine, okay, and this is how material stuff does that, so we know of at least some possible ways that immaterial stuff could achieve the same effect.

If spirits impeded the flow of the aether then they could function as ghostly resistors...which we can build phantom gates out of- which we can build disembodied computational systems out of, in principle. - for example. And what do I think a mind is, again?..... :wink: Try to get a dualist to give you that kind of explanation though...lol - god those hookers are huge on the yappity yap and not so big on building miracle engines...........

[Angrboda]

I think of consciousness as a kind of "fly-by-wire" system for the body. In an airplane, the pilot moves the stick left, and the plane banks left. In reality though, computers are calculating out precise movements of control surfaces in order to bank the plane. Consciousness is somewhat similar. We have a simple representation of us as physical beings, 'seeing' a world, and consciousness coordinates simple commands of this physical being. When we choose to walk forward, it's a simple choice; we know we can (thanks to the model) and so we just do. In reality, the subconscious parts of the brain are figuring out complex symphonies of muscle flexing in our legs to accomplish the command. So consciousness is something of a simulation "of us" (our physical existence).

I think the real bender came when we added language resources to the repertoire of this system.

[bennyboy]

Pretty confident statement of material monism you have there.  And yet we are talking about something you can't see, interact with directly, or even prove conclusively that it exists anywhere. 

You (or the opponents of monism) seem to be claiming the separate existence of this thing called consciousness, not me. Burden of proof not on my side

The BOP is on anyone making a positive assertion about the nature of reality.  You don't get to claim the default position just because you've made philosophical assumptions that necessitate your being right.  That's begging the question.

Fine.  What's this "thing" called consciousness, do you believe it exists outside yourself, and if so why?

Material monists don't normally spend time writing posts about things that they can neither see, nor are required to explain what can be seen.  That you do talk about it seems to indicate that YOU think it's pretty special, too.

It is sufficient reason to talk about it that we all seem to share a pervasive illusion that it's special in a metaphysical sense. It's not necessary to actually be special in order to talk about it. Skeptics talk about ghosts because people believe they exist. That's not a tacit admission that they really do exist. That's a very stupid argument.

You are the one who started making assertions about how "special" consciousness was or wasn't, not I.  You are the one who keeps making the assertions about the nature of mind (It "is simply what a brain with such skills looks like to itself."), and then claiming that others should carry the BOP.  What you haven't done is show any understanding of why mind exists at all, or a plausible mechanism of how it's created in the brain, or any method by which anyone could establish whether any given physical system is or is not actually experiencing qualia.  There are some definitions of the mind which imply that it's inherently related to the mechanism of the brain, and some which don't, and you haven't identified any useful tools in determining between them.

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Are you talking about Panpsychism? I have read a few books on that and the jury's still out for me but I have to say I am a biased against it for the reason that the particular form of consciousness in an animal (not that I can do anything but guess what other species experience) is very highly correlated with the brain and its functions. In other words it seems too brain/body specific to be universal.

I didn't mean panpsychism exactly, but let's look at that, starting with the assumption that the brain, and only the brain so far as we know right now, allows the existence of consciousness, and see where it goes.
 
So we have a brain, and we start pulling out those neurons involved in conscious experience, one by one, in a search for a "quantum" of consciousness-- the most primitive system which we would say has some sense of subjective experience.  Would the quality of experience gradually degrade as each of billions of neurons was removed from the "neural network," right down to the last neuron, or would there be a kind of critical mass, where fewer than exactly "n" number of neurons would not be capable of anything called consciousness?  I believe that the experience would degrade gradually, and that you'd have a harder and harder time calling it "conscious," not because you've crossed a critical mass, but because what is going on is so primitive that you are unable to conceive of it as conscious.  In other words, it's not thinking about taxes or getting laid, can't see colors, can't understand sounds, etc.  But so long as you have at least one neuron, you have the capability to process (kind of) information and produce an output.  You could map a fairly complex neuron from a hardware input to a hardware output, and have it perform a simple processing task, hypothetically.

At this level, does it matter that the neuron is organic?  What if it was silicon-based?  Is there something magic about organic processing that makes consciousness, or is it just about the information?  Well, without a good theory of the mechanism of mind, I would assume no magic, and that consciousness is about information processing.  Then the simplest form of processing would be called the simplest form of mind.

Okay, now let's take out our silicon chip and replace it with mostly empty space-- using laser light to transmit information across a distance.  Could this qualify as a "thinking" structure?  What if you had a few billion of them?

Until someone has a good enough explanation of the physical mechanism of mind, then I would assume that ALL interchanges of information, no matter how simple, represent simple manifestations of mind-- in other words, that the simplest physical particles represent the simplest mechanisms of "mind" as well, and that all interactions among them can be seen as processing information.  A photon leaving an atom in one galaxy and being absorbed into another involves a very small change of state in both systems which can involve a subtle causal cascade which could reasonably be defined as a "behavior," even though it doesn't involve someone scratching their nose or something.

This is not what is normally meant by panpsychism, but at least it eliminates the need for an evolving mechanism to magically figure out how to turn data processing into the rich subjective experience that we call mind.

[emjay]

Are you talking about Panpsychism? I have read a few books on that and the jury's still out for me but I have to say I am a biased against it for the reason that the particular form of consciousness in an animal (not that I can do anything but guess what other species experience) is very highly correlated with the brain and its functions. In other words it seems too brain/body specific to be universal.

I didn't mean panpsychism exactly, but let's look at that, starting with the assumption that the brain, and only the brain so far as we know right now, allows the existence of consciousness, and see where it goes.
 
So we have a brain, and we start pulling out those neurons involved in conscious experience, one by one, in a search for a "quantum" of consciousness-- the most primitive system which we would say has some sense of subjective experience.  Would the quality of experience gradually degrade as each of billions of neurons was removed from the "neural network," right down to the last neuron, or would there be a kind of critical mass, where fewer than exactly "n" number of neurons would not be capable of anything called consciousness?  I believe that the experience would degrade gradually, and that you'd have a harder and harder time calling it "conscious," not because you've crossed a critical mass, but because what is going on is so primitive that you are unable to conceive of it as conscious.  In other words, it's not thinking about taxes or getting laid, can't see colors, can't understand sounds, etc.  But so long as you have at least one neuron, you have the capability to process (kind of) information and produce an output.  You could map a fairly complex neuron from a hardware input to a hardware output, and have it perform a simple processing task, hypothetically.

At this level, does it matter that the neuron is organic?  What if it was silicon-based?  Is there something magic about organic processing that makes consciousness, or is it just about the information?  Well, without a good theory of the mechanism of mind, I would assume no magic, and that consciousness is about information processing.  Then the simplest form of processing would be called the simplest form of mind.

Okay, now let's take out our silicon chip and replace it with mostly empty space-- using laser light to transmit information across a distance.  Could this qualify as a "thinking" structure?  What if you had a few billion of them?

Until someone has a good enough explanation of the physical mechanism of mind, then I would assume that ALL interchanges of information, no matter how simple, represent simple manifestations of mind-- in other words, that the simplest physical particles represent the simplest mechanisms of "mind" as well, and that all interactions among them can be seen as processing information.  A photon leaving an atom in one galaxy and being absorbed into another involves a very small change of state in both systems which can involve a subtle causal cascade which could reasonably be defined as a "behavior," even though it doesn't involve someone scratching their nose or something.

This is not what is normally meant by panpsychism, but at least it eliminates the need for an evolving mechanism to magically figure out how to turn data processing into the rich subjective experience that we call mind.

That is uncannily similar to what I was thinking of replying to Rhythm as what seems one logical consequence of the "Computational Mind" theory he supports - that if anything can act as a processing element in a system provided it can perform the function (such as NOR) then if you take it further there could be all manner of systems in the universe made up of all sorts of different things, even operating over vast distances or at the quantum level. I certainly don't think there's anything special about neurons in the sense that they couldn't be replaced by something else... I agree with you totally on that point (and all the others actually  ) - it is all about information and the material used to build the system doesn't matter. It also fits in perfectly with another theory I subscribe to and which I mentioned in an earlier post but couldn't remember the name but now I've looked it up - it's called the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness which basically says that the more information is integrated in the system, the richer the conscious experience will be. That ties in with your thought experiment of removing neurons and the quality of consciousness deteriorating (depending of course on which neurons you remove not the quantity per se).

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LOL, I'll be here if you take a week between responses.  I understand.  

I would, yeah.

I think that free will, as generally elaborated upon...is folklore.  I know that it's -something- aftr all...I experience it as well...but I'm also pretty sure it isn't what we've thought it was all this time that we've been in ignorance of the basic operations (and we still are, to a large part).  We'd have to have been pretty damned lucky to get that right by accident.   So, I guess the short answer is that I don't conceive of such a free will myself, at all.

The principles of computation - essentially, describe interactions and relationships which we leverage to build computational systems (like computers, clearly).  You looking for a booklist or weblink for resources?  The principles of computation would apply to any "stuff" that satisfied the conditions of, for example, a NOR gate.  Whether that gate is made of toilet papers rolls, digital components - or pixie knuckles.....they will all have one thing in common - they are capable of functioning as a NOR gate.  So, if some says "well, I don't think the material brain is doing the computation, i think -immaterial stuff- is doing it" -fine, okay, and this is how material stuff does that, so we know of at least some possible ways that immaterial stuff could achieve the same effect.

If spirits impeded the flow of the aether then they could function as ghostly resistors...which we can build phantom gates out of- which we can build disembodied computational systems out of, in principle. - for example.  And what do I think a mind is, again?..... :wink:  Try to get a dualist to give you that kind of explanation though...lol - god those hookers are huge on the yappity yap and not so big on building miracle engines...........

Thanks Rhythm that's much appreciated  I always overdo it on forums and think it only polite to reply to as many people as possible, though it can be tiring.

See my post to bennyboy: I think his theory fits in with yours, and mine, perfectly. What do you think?

I love your ghostly resistors idea as well, classic. 

[bennyboy]

@emjay

Okay here's a question for you. If every thing carries information, and consciousness is integrated information, then how would you define the substance of the universe? Would you call it all mental? All physical? All neutral monist (neither physical nor mental but something else)? Would the universe itself, which includes all information, be thought of as conscious?

[emjay]

@emjay

Okay here's a question for you.  If every thing carries information, and consciousness is integrated information, then how would you define the substance of the universe?  Would you call it all mental?  All physical?  All neutral monist (neither physical nor mental but something else)?  Would the universe itself, which includes all information, be thought of as conscious?

I can't even hazard a guess about your first question I'm afraid. As for the second, the only way I can wrap my head around such ideas is to look at in terms of software and ask whether a simulation can run within another simulation. And the answer to that for me is a resounding yes - think of emulators if nothing else. But that's probably not what you mean. Whether there was a universal consciousness would I guess depend on whether all the information of the universe formed a coherent system, but even then consciousness, intelligence, and self-awareness are (IMO) different things - I would strongly doubt that if there were such a consciousness that it would be intelligent and self-aware like us unless there was an intergalactic 'evolutionary' reason for it to develop that way. But just because the universe contains all information doesn't seem to me to imply that it would necessarily be conscious - just as a list of data doesn't make a program. It depends whether you class all interactions in the universe as 'information exchanges' - for instance is a chemical reaction an exchange of information or is gravity? That's where the 'system' is in the universe, in its physical laws, but is that data interchange?

[The Grand Nudger]

@emjay

Yeah, Benny and I have had this convo a bunch.  Unfortunately our positions (and our standards of explanation) differ on some pretty hard sticking points.  Until I get some clarity on how information does information to information sans some structure or arrangement capable of doing so....they aren't really compatible.   Essentially, until he describes how an unstructured, disjointed system interacts...or some possible means of that interaction..the similarity is only superficial - or provides some explanation of the structure of immaterial stuff that is both capable of and engaged in computation..at which point we'd know one way or another if our two positions were compatible.  One certainly -could- hold to both. I think he and I approach it from different angles.  He's more focused on "what the stuff" is....I'm more focused on "how the stuff"...no matter what, accomplishes the observed effect.

Mostly, my main gripe in Benny and I's convos on the subject..isn't so much that he's wrong about mind (how would I know...lol?)...as he is wrong about the problems presented by any given explanation of mind. He, like you, for example...wonders "why consciousness". It has been (and obviously Benny correct me if I'm wrong or you've made alterations) his position that consciousness is somehow a problem from the standpoint of material monism - mine is that it isn't a problem for monism any more than it would be for dualism - specifically in the context of computation. If mind is comp, then any stufff...no matter what the stuff is made of...and no matter how many different kinds of stuff there are...which is capable of acting as a computational system is in the range of "mind". All that's left, then, is to determine how robust a system is required to satisfy "mind" however we choose to set the standard (perhaps using our own..whatevs) and how we might manufacture this "mind" business out of any material one chooses (again, provided it is capable...wet paper doesn't work so well, for example). Benny would need to explain this light based information mind in a similar manner as I described the spirit resistor mind, for me to be able to have further opinions - or for me to accept that even the slightest attempt at an actual explanation has been made. :winks at Benny:

To tie it in with your response....not all data exchange is computation...so, to me, not all data exchange should be expected to yield a mind (and so I'm not surprised when things exchange vast amounts of data without presenting consciousness, or something we would recognize -as- consciousness.

[emjay]

@emjay

Yeah, Benny and I have had this convo a bunch.  Unfortunately our positions (and our standards of explanation) differ on some pretty hard sticking points.  Until I get some clarity on how information does information to information sans some structure or arrangement capable of doing so....they aren't really compatible.   Essentially, until he describes how an unstructured, disjointed system interacts...or some possible means of that interaction..the similarity is only superficial - or provides some explanation of the structure of immaterial stuff that is both capable of and engaged in computation..at which point we'd know one way or another if our two positions were compatible.  One certainly -could- hold to both.   I think he and I approach it from different angles.  He's more focused on "what the stuff" is....I'm more focused on "how the stuff"...no matter what, accomplishes the observed effect.  

Mostly, my main gripe in Benny and I's convos on the subject..isn't so much that he's wrong about mind (how would I know...lol?)...as he is wrong about the problems presented by any given explanation of mind.  He, like you, for example...wonders "why consciousness".   It has been (and obviously Benny correct me if I'm wrong or you've made alterations) his position that consciousness is somehow a problem from the standpoint of material monism - mine is that it isn't a problem for monism any more than it would be for dualism - specifically in the context of computation.  If mind is comp, then any stufff...no matter what the stuff is made of...and no matter how many different kinds of stuff there are...which is capable of acting as a computational system is in the range of "mind".  All that's left, then, is to determine how robust a system is required to satisfy "mind" however we choose to set the standard (perhaps using our own..whatevs) and how we might manufacture this "mind" business out of any material one chooses (again, provided it is capable...wet paper doesn't work so well, for example).  Benny would need to explain this light based information mind in a similar manner as I described the spirit resistor mind, for me to be able to have further opinions - or for me to accept that even the slightest attempt at an actual explanation has been made.  :winks at Benny:

To tie it in with your response....not all data exchange is computation...so, to me, not all data exchange should be expected to yield a mind (and so I'm not surprised when things exchange vast amounts of data without presenting consciousness, or something we would recognize -as- consciousness.

Hi Rhythm, I'm sorry I've taken so long to reply (though I know you don't mind  ) but I was just hoping that bennyboy would reply first so I'd have a bit more to go on because as it stands I think I've possibly misunderstood some of his argument, due probably but ashamedly to the fact that since I thought his idea seemed 'uncannily' similar to mine in most of its arguments I might have seen what I expected to see and not read it properly. Sorry about that bennyboy. I certainly misread his penultimate paragraph about photons and atoms and therefore missed the crux of his argument, hence asking him a redundant question about the physical laws of the universe and whether they counted as information. So having read it more carefully now it seems to be essentially Panpsychism but perhaps with the subtle difference that it is the change in state between systems - a photon leaving here and arriving there - that defines information and ultimately leads to consciousness. So in his theory it looks like anything that stayed static would not have consciousness which is perhaps different from Panpsychism. Though if I'm still wrong in my understanding of his theory, my apologies to all concerned.

Anyway I quite like that theory because it deals with the question of where the boundaries lie for a given system i.e. there seem to be no boundaries. For instance the brain is what we'd call a robust system that produces consciousness but where are the boundaries of that system? The obvious answer is that it is the physical limits of the brain (and nervous system)  structure but why should it be? If something else affected the brain from outside it - in the sense of changing its state - would that not become part of the system - at least for that moment in time? That external influence could be something subtle like radio waves or it could be something catastrophic like the brain being impaled by a foreign object. In the latter case it would most certainly cause a disruption if not the total destruction of consciousness, suggesting that it still needs to be a robust system - or have a particular design - to sustain consciousness as we know it. That's where the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness I talked about before could come in handy - though I have only read an article on it, not read anything in depth. It means to 'measure' how integrated the information is before and after the injury. I won't say any more on that until I've read a bit more about it, but somehow IIT looks like it would fit in perfectly with these theories.