Subjective Morality?

[bennyboy]

I'm resisting the word "belief" because I find it undefined. What does it mean to believe something? Simply to have an idea, and to suspect that it represents truth in some context?

I read "believe" as "think that an idea represents objective truth." In that sense, I will still have to say that my beliefs are limited to a philosophical context. Or, to put it another way, it is only through arbitrary philosophical choices that a context exists by which any objective truth can be judged "true."

I very much prefer the word "decide" to "believe." For example, I've decided to accept the existence of other people, but for selfish reasons: my interactions with people have little meaning unless I accept their reality. If not for that, I'd be raping, murdering, and jerking off on buses, and whistling a happy ditty while doing it. But my intuition is that without real human beings to affect, I would find little satisfaction in it.

If I've decided (with no real proof mind you) that others are real, and act as such (for example by typing messages to you), would you call it belief? Can you make a decision or definition and then call it a belief?

What if I describe the properties of cats-- furriness, eye shape, meowing sound, selfish behavior. If I see something which matches those properties, do I believe I'm looking at a cat? Can it be said to be true or false that I'm looking at a cat?

[vulcanlogician]

I'm resisting the word "belief" because I find it undefined.  What does it mean to believe something?  Simply to have an idea, and to suspect that it represents truth in some context?

I read "believe" as "think that an idea represents objective truth."  In that sense, I will still have to say that my beliefs are limited to a philosophical context.  Or, to put it another way, it is only through arbitrary philosophical choices that a context exists by which any objective truth can be judged "true."

I very much prefer the word "decide" to "believe."  For example, I've decided to accept the existence of other people, but for selfish reasons: my interactions with people have little meaning unless I accept their reality.  If not for that, I'd be raping, murdering, and jerking off on buses, and whistling a happy ditty while doing it.  But my intuition is that without real human beings to affect, I would find little satisfaction in it.

If I've decided (with no real proof mind you) that others are real, and act as such (for example by typing messages to you), would you call it belief?  Can you make a decision or definition and then call it a belief?

What if I describe the properties of cats-- furriness, eye shape, meowing sound, selfish behavior.  If I see something which matches those properties, do I believe I'm looking at a cat?  Can it be said to be true or false that I'm looking at a cat?

You are overcomplicating this, bennyboy. Although how to define belief is a real rabbit hole to descend if one so wishes, it is not necessary to have this conversation.

Let's try to simplify the matter:

Someone says to you: "I'm looking at a cat."

Is that a belief? If you answer "yes," then we can continue the conversation. If you answer "no" then you must concede that you don't think knowledge of any kind is possible, moral or otherwise. In that case, the conversation is pointless to have in the first place.

[The Grand Nudger]

Ask a person the simplest question in the world, one which they don't need to know anything other than their own mind about, and you get this, lol.

Look, either you have beliefs or you don't..but if you don't know whether or not you have beliefs...how do you know that you believe that you don't know you have beliefs?

---

I'm resisting the word "belief" because I find it undefined.  What does it mean to believe something?  Simply to have an idea, and to suspect that it represents truth in some context?

Yes.

I read "believe" as "think that an idea represents objective truth." 

Subjectivists and error theorists are also cognitivists who also make moral statements and statements about morality that they believe to be true. There is no foot, stop trying to get out from under it before it falls. If you're a subjectivist (or a moral non naturalist) then you're going to hop off the train at some point..but not this point. This is the one thing that literally -everyone- who isn't a non cognitivist agrees on. Points of view with fundamental and intractable differences between them, farther up the chain, mutually assert that we possess moral beliefs, and that our moral propositions express them...and you have categorically closed the non cognitivist door with your own description of morality.

[bennyboy]

I'm perfectly happy saying I believe something, given its context. I do not accept that ANYTHING is true, not given some context.

You ask things like whether I believe rape is wrong. The answer is-- yes, no, undefined. In a purely material context, I'd say no-- massive waves of QM particles are interacting, and as far as I'm concerned, they can do whatever they want. In the context of the largely mythological Western narrative by which we define human characters (purity, liberty, nobility, evil), then I'd say that rape is wrong-- once that fairy tale is corrupted, there's no repairing it.

Now, you can answer some questions for me, if you please. What is wrong with harm, or with inflicting suffering on another? ANY form of harm, or ANY form of suffering. Why should suffering be eliminated, reduced, or prevented at all? I really want your answer to this-- if there's no Skydaddy to set value judgments, then on what other basis are they to be set?

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm perfectly happy saying I believe something, given its context.  I do not accept that ANYTHING is true, not given some context.

You ask things like whether I believe rape is wrong.  The answer is-- yes, no, undefined.  In a purely material context, I'd say no-- massive waves of QM particles are interacting, and as far as I'm concerned, they can do whatever they want.  In the context of the largely mythological Western narrative by which we define human characters (purity, liberty, nobility, evil), then I'd say that rape is wrong-- once that fairy tale is corrupted, there's no repairing it.

Cognitivism is a requirement of everything you just explained to me, and the fact that you are a moral cognitivist isn't threatened by any of it.  Non naturalists (read : people who think that morality doesn't reduce to anything "purely material") are both cognitivists...and realists.

Now, you can answer some questions for me, if you please.  What is wrong with harm, or with inflicting suffering on another?  ANY form of harm, or ANY form of suffering.  Why should suffering be eliminated, reduced, or prevented at all?  I really want your answer to this-- if there's no Skydaddy to set value judgments, then on what other basis are they to be set?

What's healthy about eating, eh?  Nevertheless, if we're talking about health...how/what/when we eat is relevant.  In exactly the same way harm is a relevant metric for what is wrong.  Why would there need to be a skydaddy?  If there is harm, and harm is at least one of the things that we are referring to..what would the presence of a god add to that, and what would it's absence subtract?

Moral realism has absolutely nothing to do with gods.

(I could answer that from a non naturalists point of view, as well...if you'd enjoy hearing me go on about forms and idealism, lol - we've been over this twice, it's a position called intuitivism, and it's shared by natural realists and non natural realists)

-the second question..well, even as a realist I can ask that, and I can decide that in some cases there's no compulsion to care about reducing suffering. However, whether or not we should care about reducing suffering has no bearing on whether or not harm is wrong. Something can be wrong, even if we don't care about it and don't accept that we should..happens all the time. Your moral motivations are a distinct issue from moral ontology.

To that, people might refer to rational self interest, base self interest, blind construction.....but they might also refer to principled or ideal and/or prefered versions -of- self. etc etc etc. Or maybe it's just who you are? You're the kind of person who wants to do the right thing, whatever that means to you. I suppose it would be satisfying to tell you that I ultimately derive my moral motivation from some well thought out and clear academic treatise on the subject...but that wouldn;t be true. I just -do- care about doing the right thing, and doing as little of the wrong things as I can get away with, lol. I feel guilt, I feel shame, etc.
(I still want to do a thread about blind construction..it's an exercise positively -made- for forum participation.)

[DLJ]

...
This is for both of you.  All that's being asked on the issue between cognitivism and con cognitivism, is whether or not some moral proposition expresses a state of belief.  

It doesn't have to be an accurate belief.
There's no mention of what that belief refers to.

Subjectivism, realism, and error theory......are all positions of moral cognitivism.

I've had a butcher's at the Wikipedia entry for both cognitivism and non-cognitivism and neither grab me as sound.

I'm resisting the word "belief" because I find it undefined.  
...

I'm resisting it too.  It's not a term we use in either governance or management theory either colloquially or as an officially defined term.

In searching for a mapping between the 'biologically evolved belief' vs. the 'intelligently designed belief' the best I've got so far is the CMS, the SKMS and the QMS (Configuration Management System, the Service Knowledge Management System and the Quality Management System) that would collectively and congruently form a baseline i.e. current authorised version of the steady state.

But diving into Vulcan's hole, so to speak, (see link)...

...
You are overcomplicating this, bennyboy. Although how to define belief is a real rabbit hole to descend if one so wishes, it is not necessary to have this conversation.
...

... then, Interpretationism looks the most plausible (if a little light on detail).

...
Let's try to simplify the matter:

Someone says to you: "I'm looking at a cat."

Is that a belief?
...

It's not.  It's a statement.

...
If you answer "yes," then we can continue the conversation.
...

Oops!

...
If you answer "no" then you must concede that you don't think knowledge of any kind is possible, moral or otherwise. In that case, the conversation is pointless to have in the first place.

I concede nothing, my good man!  

Belief is not required for knowledge.

[vulcanlogician]

...
Let's try to simplify the matter:

Someone says to you: "I'm looking at a cat."

Is that a belief?
...

It's not.  It's a statement.

It's a statement of belief. "I believe I'm looking at a cat." or "I believe that what I'm looking at is a cat." or (if you like) "I believe the cat is there."

I'm looking at a cat = a belief statement.

The cat is there = a belief statement.

I am logged on to AF.org right now = a belief statement.

...
If you answer "yes," then we can continue the conversation.
...

Oops!

There's no "oops" about it. You answered no. Unless you meant "Oops. I shouldn't have read the first chapter of Descartes' Meditations and adopted it as my epistemological worldview." Because that's what answering "no" to that question suggests.

Belief is not required for knowledge.

Is that what you believe?

[DLJ]

"I'm looking at a cat."
"How do I know you are not lying."
"So what if I am?"

Where are the beliefs in there?

...
Belief is not required for knowledge.

Is that what you believe?

It's what I know.

[bennyboy]

What's healthy about eating, eh?  Nevertheless, if we're talking about health...how/what/when we eat is relevant.  In exactly the same way harm is a relevant metric for what is wrong.  Why would there need to be a skydaddy?  If there is harm, and harm is at least one of the things that we are referring to..what would the presence of a god add to that, and what would it's absence subtract?

Because, Khem, there are one of two conditions
1) Harm is intrinsically wrong
2) We dislike harm and call it wrong


The idea of "harm" means that there's a right or wrong state of things. What is particularly right about survival of the species, or of the planet, or of the Universe itself? By what standard is this rightness or wrongness established?

Ultimately, someone has to say, "I like this, and I don't like that. And I like this so much that I will act to protect it, and I dislike that so much that I will act to prevent or eliminate it."

---

It's not.  It's a statement.

It's a statement of belief. "I believe I'm looking at a cat." or "I believe that what I'm looking at is a cat." or (if you like) "I believe the cat is there."

I'm not so sure that's true. It assumes some archetypal cat-truth ontology that is either true or false. But "I'm looking at a cat" is true if you're having that experience, whether it's in a dream, in the Matrix, or in a material monist Universe.

Where we go wrong is in conflating contexts. If I see a dream cat, and think it's walking down Main Street, I'm still very much seeing a cat. But nobody else is likely to say that they see it.

[The Grand Nudger]

What's healthy about eating, eh?  Nevertheless, if we're talking about health...how/what/when we eat is relevant.  In exactly the same way harm is a relevant metric for what is wrong.  Why would there need to be a skydaddy?  If there is harm, and harm is at least one of the things that we are referring to..what would the presence of a god add to that, and what would it's absence subtract?

Because, Khem, there are one of two conditions
1)  Harm is intrinsically wrong
2)  We dislike harm and call it wrong


The idea of "harm" means that there's a right or wrong state of things.  What is particularly right about survival of the species, or of the planet, or of the Universe itself?  By what standard is this rightness or wrongness established?

Ultimately, someone has to say, "I like this, and I don't like that.  And I like this so much that I will act to protect it, and I dislike that so much that I will act to prevent or eliminate it."

Someone might have to do that..for someone to do something about it - yes.  No one has to care for something to be right or wrong, though, again.  Still not seeing what a god is supposed to add or subtract?  Let's bring back our cat!

Is a cat only a cat if you care?
Is a cat only a cat if there is a god in the room?
If you didn't care, would a cat cease to be a cat?
If a god wasn't in a room, would a cat cease to be a cat?

I actually don't think that there's anything particularly right about the survival of species, or the planet, or the universe itself.  You'd have to ask that question to someone who did (though, I actually care very much about all three...lol..see caring and moral status are discordant again!).  Personally, I use standards of intelligibility, rationality, and objective demonstration.  In order to overcome error theory, I particularly like scientific demonstrations - and so all of this constrains the things I determine to be right or wrong.*

By contrast, the hypothetical god setting standards..isn't moral realism.... isn't natural realism, and is in no way demonstrable.  It's actually the proposition that one subjectivist moral system enjoys primacy over others.  What makes things wrongs in a god setting standards world?  Gods mind dependent judgements combined with it's perceived authority and the assent of the faithful (yet another example of -their- mind dependent judgment). You can argue competently against -that- moral system by asserting that there is no god, but it doesn't affect mine..since mine refers to no gods, since there is harm, and some things are harmful. Ultimately...that's what you'd need to object to in order to make an argument that some moral proposition of mine is false. You can disagree with me all you like about harm being a relevant metric for whats right or wrong...but that's not exactly going to be an argument in good faith..and your disagreement doesn't matter to me (remember, I'm a realist, an opinion and five bucks will buy you a cup of coffee in realism land). I don't need you to agree, and I don't need you to care, for any of my moral propositions to be true. They need only refer to a belief which I hold to be true, which is true, and refers to a natural externality. I believe that harm exists. Harm does exist. Harm can be objectively demonstrated in the natural world. When I tell you that x is wrong, I'm referring to a bunch of things that, together, amount to moral naturalism. You can refer to other things if you like (and harm isn't the only thing I refer to, either)..and all that will mean is that you aren't a moral naturalist.

OFC, religious people have been saying dumb things to the contrary for centuries...but if you're arguing with them - you're categorically not arguing with me, lol. If you think realism is wrong and harm based moral propositions are wrong because there is no skydaddy - the objection is a complete non seq. Realism and harm based moral props are true or false regardless of the existence of a god and have nothing to do with the existence of gods.

(a non naturalist, also not at all a god based position but still realism...could just tell you that if you're incapable of perceiving some moral fact of the sensible world..your faculties are malfunctioning or insufficient. It's nothing more or less than a failure to identify a cat when you see one. It's still a cat, you're just busted. Similarly, your less than credible contention that you have no moral motivation..just another demonstration that you're busted.)