The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[Jenny A]

 Oh goody! 

Seriously, if there is a better formulation, let see it.  Please provide definitions for any words not used in a colloquial way.

Actually it is a little technical because it relies on modal logic concepts like possibility and necessity, as well as the S5 axiom.

Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

[*]

That's just where I see the problem.  Omnipotent contains an internal set of contradictions.  Could an omnipotent being create something larger than it can lift or conceive of something more complicated than it could grasp?  Given the lack of objective standards for morality other than what such a being decrees, what would perfect morality be?  It's easy to imagine societies (let alone worlds) in which something is morally perfect which we would not consider morally perfect in this western society that you and I live in.

Nothing is maximally excellent in every world I can imagine (maybe you have a lessor imagination?) and I cannot begin to claim to imagine every  possible world.  Do you think anyone can?

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.

[*]

Again, it is not.  Can the maximally great think greater thoughts than it can understand?  Or create heavier objects than it can lift?  Or be greater at creating than it is at destroying?  Maximally great is a contradiction.

2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

[*]

But 1 fails.

3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

[*]

But there is no such logically possible world.  See above.  A thing cannot be both stronger and weaker than itself.

4. If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.

[*]

No.  Easy to say, but not true.  An infinite number of logically possible worlds include only one singular type of being in which case none would be maximally great.  Instead all would be equally great and deficient by any standard whatsoever.  Imagine a world of all 1s are all clones.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

[*]

See above. The definition of maximally great is logically inconsistent unless it means a finite level that many might achieve in which case it doesn't mean a single god or even a god at all.  Further, what might exist and what does exist are not the same thing.

From a formal-logical analysis, everything is consistent. There aren't any "holes" in the argument.

[*]

see above.

Instead, most atheists who have a problem with it question P4 because it reliexs on the S5 modal axiom. Which, oddly enough, is something atheist philosophers are quite comfortable with outside this context.

[*]


If 4 relies on 5, then a premise or argument relies on the conclusion.  That would be a big logical problem.