(December 15, 2015 at 6:25 pm)Delicate Wrote: Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with
[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.
Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:
1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
Two doesn't follow from one. One only states that the concept of a maximally great being is coherent, not that it is instantiated in one or more possible worlds. I can only assume you've misstated the argument as I can't imagine Plantinga making such a bonehead mistake. You go on to state that there are no "holes" in the argument, despite this glaring one. Nice try but bluster doesn't substitute for logic.