How is a personal god different from an anthropomorphic god?

[Delicate]

You need to draw a distinction between justified and unjustified anthropomorphism.

Clearly there are justified cases, such as when we anthropomorphize blobs of meat and bones, calling them persons.

Other times, we look at objects around us and anthropomorphize their causes, believing people designed them, and not rainfall and erosion.

So not all anthropomorphism is bad, right?

How would one be justified in the precision by which they draw a line between the anthropomorphism that Xenophanes mocked in the tales of the Homeric gods and that which the Muslims abhor in the tales of the Incarnated God of Christianity or that one may find objectionable in its incipient temple cult of the Israelites? Of course, "not all anthropomorphism is bad," but the point of the OP, I think, is that it is always unjustified when one is relating a metaphysical entity said to include the concept of infinity, of which ratiocination does not extend to such particulars as deities possessing analogous human characteristics, and the same suspicion that occasions egocentric or anthropocentric thought in other cases is most applicable here as well.

How would you show that it is always unjustified? How would you demonstrate that your position is credible?