The afterlife and the soul

[Neo-Scholastic]

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While I think objections to substance dualism are overstated, I am not here advocating that position. Perhaps you missed this line from my previous post in this thread.


This was a reply specifically to Drich. My point to him was that Christianity as a religion isn't committed to substance dualism, although some Christians may be.

Basic theory [hylomorphism]

Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism to living things. He defines a soul as that which makes a living thing alive. Life is a property of living things, just as knowledge and health are. Therefore, a soul is a form—that is, a specifying principle or cause—of a living thing. Furthermore, Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as form to matter.

Hence, Aristotle argues, there is no problem in explaining the unity of body and soul, just as there is no problem in explaining the unity of wax and its shape. Just as a wax object consists of wax with a certain shape, so a living organism consists of a body with the property of life, which is its soul. On the basis of his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation, ridiculing the notion that just any soul could inhabit just any body.

According to Timothy Robinson, it is unclear whether Aristotle identifies the soul with the body's structure. According to one interpretation of Aristotle, a properly organized body is already alive simply by virtue of its structure. However, according to another interpretation, the property of life—that is, the soul—is something in addition to the body's structure. Robinson uses the analogy of a car to explain this second interpretation. A running car is running not only because of its structure but also because of the activity in its engine. Likewise, according to this second interpretation, a living body is alive not only because of its structure but also because of an additional property: the soul is this additional property, which a properly organized body needs in order to be alive. John Vella uses Frankenstein's monster to illustrate the second interpretation: the corpse lying on Frankenstein's table is already a fully organized human body, but it is not yet alive; when Frankenstein activates his machine, the corpse gains a new property, the property of life, which Aristotle would call the soul.

Wikipedia | Hylomorphism

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I fail to see how this distinguishes itself from physicalism without some form of dualism.  If consciousness consists of the [natural] form and activity of the brain, then how is that distinguishable from physicalism? On top of that, this sounds suspiciously like a revival of vitalism.

Following Aquinas, I'm suggesting a kind of essentialism and asking how the idea of an emergent property in a material substance differs from the manifestation of a distinguishable essence.