Mind is the brain?

[The Grand Nudger]

They're different in the same way that QM particles and the objects that are composed of them are called "stuff" or "matter."  However, I'd say that a spark of mind is still mind-- just a maximally simplistic one.

Then rocks -do- have a mind, a gazillion maximally simplistic ones, in fact.  

That's right.  Down to the most minimal possible exchanges of energy or changes of state.

I wonder what qualia would be to a mind with no sensory, for example?  I'm not even sure we'd be talking about the same thing at the point that rocks or photons experience, I don't think the same term would be suitable for a rocks experience, and a human being's. I think I'll stick with calling what happens in the rock material interaction, and what happens in us, mind. I promise I'll reassess when a rock gives me reason to suspect otherwise (or when you decide to help the poor rock out on that count).

There is nothing of "table" to be found in any of the QM particles of which it is composed.  If you are observing QM particles, you cannot know whether you are looking at part of a table, a chair, or an apple.  I'd say that at that scale, the table doesn't exist, since it cannot be found to exist at that level.

You zoomed in, in the thought experiment, to look at the particles of the table.  You know you're looking at the particles of the table, end of.   It won't matter, in the end, as there's no reason to think the quantum scale is relevant when we discuss comp systems, nor would it change comp theory if it were. A comp system is a comp system - regardless of scale, architecture, or composition.

I'd say in the context of your view, we know it because it's given: processing happens in the brain.

-and again, we don't know that.  It's a given that processing occurs in comp systems, and a specific type of processing.  Representation.  Our mind/brain, however, might achieve "x" -some other way™-.  To use the term processing so generally is to miss out on a world of possibility.

As I said, this is your view: that there's a critical mass at which since the functions you call mind will fail, you'd say there's no mind at all.

I don't actually think mind is a function, but yeah, ofc I think there's a point where mind fails.  There are plenty of seemingly mindless human beings, who once very much seemed to have a mind - by all accounts, laid in the ground.  Something clearly happened there.  

Let's put it this way with a thought experiment.  Let's say you've identified a physical system that processes data in certain ways that you call "mind," and then  you pull out a QM particle.  Is it still "mind"?

So long as the system continues to function, I don't see why it wouldn't be.  If, for whatever circumstance, the loss of that qm particle caused the system to fail, then no.  

Your position is that at a certain point, one more QM particle pulled will break the system-- it will be the straw that broke the camel's back so to speak.  My position is that this is not the case-- that at some point, you will give up on using the system in useful ways-- but that under the hood, there's never a discrete separation between "mind" and "not mind," only a gradually degradation in the nature of the mind until it is traced down to the simplest possible interactions available to the physical universe.

You seemed to make -just- such a separation for rocks and many other objects.  I bring them up from time to time, if you'll recall (lol).  In CTM, if some qualitative change to the system strips it of it's descriptor as a comp system, it loses it's status as a candidate for comp mind.  

My position is that there will be a point at which a system won't meet your definition of a mind, but at which the kind of physical interactions and processes which are the real essence of mind continue on perfectly contentedly.

Not even wrong, still insufficient.  Physical interactions continue regardless of whether some system fits the definition of a comp system, sure, and? I'm not talking about -all- physical interactions. If I were, it would be the Physical Interaction theory of Mind, eh? Neither of us are particularly interested in -all- physical interactions or processes when we discuss an explanation of mind. Plenty of physical interactions and processes occur, we have no reason to suspect that there is mind wherever there is physical interaction or process.