Mind is the brain?

[bennyboy]

................you've -just- confirmed that rocks have a gazillion minds, as the matter-mind proposal -demands- they must.  This is not what the term straw man refers to -at all-.  You're simply uncomfortable with the inescapable conclusions of your proposal.  

That's a strange view. There is mind in my bedroom (mine) but you wouldn't say my bedroom "has" a mind. That would be a strange composition fallacy, and I've specifically dealt with it already, and very recently. Also, stop the metacommentary-- what I am or am not uncomfortable with aren't known by you, and are irrelevant to the philosophical positions we're talking about.

I'm referring only to those physics which fit the definition of a comp system.   Comp theory of mind, not the physics theory of mind.  The latter would be grossly insufficient, not even wrong, for reasons elaborated on at length.

There are no physics which fit the definition of a comp system. There are collections of physical systems which you choose to call a "comp system," but you haven't established the mechanism by which they would allow for subjective experience.

Nothing special needs to happen.  That's kind of the point, no special sauce, just the known, demonstrable, and specific principles of computation to provide a compelling explanation for our experience. What, precisely, do you object to about this?  

I object because you are clearly talking about a supervenient property, but have zero ideas or interest about why/how that property would supervene.

An equally true statement, and completely understandable if someone is looking for an explanation of desks, rather than -all matter-.  There's alot of matter, most of it isn't a desk.   If you want to know why a desk is a desk, you should probably look into the matter that we call a desk, rather than the matter that we call a pencil.  Either you allow for specificity and identity or we cannot have a rational conversation.

The difference is that a table owes its existence to us: it is made by us, for us, and it is whatever we say it is. Mind is not such a thing. Well, I say it's not such a thing, but you seem to be pretty happy to define it in your own terms. However, no matter how much you beg the question in this way, there's still the problem of subjective experience in a physical world, and how the universe "knows" when one system needs to be experienced but another does not.

I'm exactly saying that all physical interactions represent mental events, and that psychogony is not a supervenient property.

It's easy to say something, but that doesn't make it a cogent objection or explanation.  Your statement certainly isn't evident,  it provides no explanation, and you can't remain consistent with it.  So, what am I supposed to do with it?

: shrug :

Your position is that matter configured in a way to perform particular functions is mind. However, your view of mind requires a composite physical system, and you have absolutely no idea how a composite physical system is unified as a single flow of experience. Where/what is that individual mind, physically speaking? Is it a kind of field?