Mind is the brain?

[bennyboy]

Then rocks -do- have a mind, a gazillion maximally simplistic ones, in fact.  

That kind of abuses the word "have," but okay.

I wonder what qualia would be to a mind with no sensory, for example?  I'm not even sure we'd be talking about the same thing at the point that rocks or photons experience, I don't think the same term would be suitable for a rocks experience, and a human being's.  I think I'll stick with calling what happens in the rock material interaction, and what happens in us, mind.  I promise I'll reassess when a rock gives me reason to suspect otherwise (or when you decide to help the poor rock out on that count).

Your strawman continues.  Nobody said a rock has a mind.

Let's put it this way with a thought experiment.  Let's say you've identified a physical system that processes data in certain ways that you call "mind," and then  you pull out a QM particle.  Is it still "mind"?

So long as the system continues to function, I don't see why it wouldn't be.  If, for whatever circumstance, the loss of that qm particle caused the system to fail, then no.  

Right.  That's your position.  My position is that you are drawing an arbitrary line in the sand of physics, and labeling the function on one side "mind," and that on the other "not mind."  But this isn't really a theory of mind-- it's just an expression of the human tendency to define terms.

Not even wrong, still insufficient.  Physical interactions continue regardless of whether some system fits the definition of a comp system, sure, and?

. . . and I believe there's no non-arbitrary line between those systems you accept to be mindful and those that are.  In short, nothing special happens in data retention, or in certain kinds of processing that you are talking about.  No field is generated, no new physical property supervenes, no unifying principle coalesces.

 I'm not talking about -all- physical interactions.  If I were, it would be the Physical Interaction theory of Mind, eh?  Neither of us are particularly interested in -all- physical interactions or processes when we discuss mind, plenty occur, mind seems rarer in comparison.

That's like saying you're not interested in all matter, desks seem rarer in comparison.  I'm exactly saying that all physical interactions represent mental events, and that psychogony is not a supervenient property.

[The Grand Nudger]

Then rocks -do- have a mind, a gazillion maximally simplistic ones, in fact.  
That kind of abuses the word "have," but okay.

..............

Your strawman continues.  Nobody said a rock has a mind.

................you've -just- confirmed that rocks have a gazillion minds, as the matter-mind proposal -demands- they must. This is not what the term straw man refers to -at all-. You're simply uncomfortable with the inescapable conclusions of your proposal.

Right.  That's your position.  My position is that you are drawing an arbitrary line in the sand of physics, and labeling the function on one side "mind," and that on the other "not mind."  But this isn't really a theory of mind-- it's just an expression of the human tendency to define terms.

I'm referring only to those physics which fit the definition of a comp system.   Comp theory of mind, not the physics theory of mind.  The latter would be grossly insufficient, not even wrong, for reasons elaborated on at length.

. . . and I believe there's no non-arbitrary line between those systems you accept to be mindful and those that are.  In short, nothing special happens in data retention, or in certain kinds of processing that you are talking about.  No field is generated, no new physical property supervenes, no unifying principle coalesces.

Nothing special needs to happen.  That's kind of the point, no special sauce, just the known, demonstrable, and specific principles of computation to provide a compelling explanation for our experience. What, precisely, do you object to about this?  

That's like saying you're not interested in all matter, desks seem rarer in comparison. 

An equally true statement, and completely understandable if someone is looking for an explanation of desks, rather than -all matter-.  There's alot of matter, most of it isn't a desk.   If you want to know why a desk is a desk, you should probably look into the matter that we call a desk, rather than the matter that we call a pencil. Either you allow for specificity and identity or we cannot have a rational conversation.

I'm exactly saying that all physical interactions represent mental events, and that psychogony is not a supervenient property.

It's easy to say something, but that doesn't make it a cogent objection or explanation. Your statement certainly isn't evident, it provides no explanation, and you can't remain consistent with it. So, what am I supposed to do with it?

: shrug :

[Pat Mustard]

What little monkey said.  You can be hooked up to a number of machines now that can show the electrical activity of just about any process you can name, PET scans,  QEEG scans, CT scans - - they can see which parts are active when you speak, when you see a pictures of food vs. a pretty woman . . . we can watch the brain drive action and cognition and emotion.  It's a physical process.

This sort of reasoning has been addressed. Read the paper. It's by an atheist  philosopher.

A paper written by a philosopher doesn't trump the physical evidence revealed by neuroscience.

[bennyboy]

................you've -just- confirmed that rocks have a gazillion minds, as the matter-mind proposal -demands- they must.  This is not what the term straw man refers to -at all-.  You're simply uncomfortable with the inescapable conclusions of your proposal.  

That's a strange view. There is mind in my bedroom (mine) but you wouldn't say my bedroom "has" a mind. That would be a strange composition fallacy, and I've specifically dealt with it already, and very recently. Also, stop the metacommentary-- what I am or am not uncomfortable with aren't known by you, and are irrelevant to the philosophical positions we're talking about.

I'm referring only to those physics which fit the definition of a comp system.   Comp theory of mind, not the physics theory of mind.  The latter would be grossly insufficient, not even wrong, for reasons elaborated on at length.

There are no physics which fit the definition of a comp system. There are collections of physical systems which you choose to call a "comp system," but you haven't established the mechanism by which they would allow for subjective experience.

Nothing special needs to happen.  That's kind of the point, no special sauce, just the known, demonstrable, and specific principles of computation to provide a compelling explanation for our experience. What, precisely, do you object to about this?  

I object because you are clearly talking about a supervenient property, but have zero ideas or interest about why/how that property would supervene.

An equally true statement, and completely understandable if someone is looking for an explanation of desks, rather than -all matter-.  There's alot of matter, most of it isn't a desk.   If you want to know why a desk is a desk, you should probably look into the matter that we call a desk, rather than the matter that we call a pencil.  Either you allow for specificity and identity or we cannot have a rational conversation.

The difference is that a table owes its existence to us: it is made by us, for us, and it is whatever we say it is. Mind is not such a thing. Well, I say it's not such a thing, but you seem to be pretty happy to define it in your own terms. However, no matter how much you beg the question in this way, there's still the problem of subjective experience in a physical world, and how the universe "knows" when one system needs to be experienced but another does not.

I'm exactly saying that all physical interactions represent mental events, and that psychogony is not a supervenient property.

It's easy to say something, but that doesn't make it a cogent objection or explanation.  Your statement certainly isn't evident,  it provides no explanation, and you can't remain consistent with it.  So, what am I supposed to do with it?

: shrug :

Your position is that matter configured in a way to perform particular functions is mind. However, your view of mind requires a composite physical system, and you have absolutely no idea how a composite physical system is unified as a single flow of experience. Where/what is that individual mind, physically speaking? Is it a kind of field?

[The Grand Nudger]

That's a strange view.  There is mind in my bedroom (mine) but you wouldn't say my bedroom "has" a mind.  That would be a strange composition fallacy, and I've specifically dealt with it already, and very recently.  Also, stop the metacommentary-- what I am or am not uncomfortable with aren't known by you, and are irrelevant to the philosophical positions we're talking about.

Now you're just tossing out fallacies hoping one sticks.  

There are no physics which fit the definition of a comp system.  There are collections of physical systems which you choose to call a "comp system," but you haven't established the mechanism by which they would allow for subjective experience.

You are arguing, again, against the existence of computers.  The proposed mechanism is computation of representations based upon sense data.  The experience of an isolated system (connected to it's own sensory, rather than that of another) would be necessarily subjective, though we could probably engineer that out in a machine mind.  At least, it would be easier to give it some other type of experience than it would be to alter our own, at present.  

I object because you are clearly talking about a supervenient property, but have zero ideas or interest about why/how that property would supervene.

I'd point to material interaction and computation, both known and demonstrable, as to the possible why/how (ignoring that I don't think the term applies).   I have zero interest in the why and how, as I attempt to explain to you a theory concerned with nothing -other- than the why or how?   What sort of objection is that?

The difference is that a table owes its existence to us: it is made by us, for us, and it is whatever we say it is.  Mind is not such a thing.  Well, I say it's not such a thing, but you seem to be pretty happy to define it in your own terms.  However, no matter how much you beg the question in this way, there's still the problem of subjective experience in a physical world, and how the universe "knows" when one system needs to be experienced but another does not.

-Everything- is what we say it is Benny.  We're the only ones coming up with words.   We use the word table to describe things we didn't make as well. What's the problem of subjective experience in context, and why -would- the universe know anything?  

Your position is that matter configured in a way to perform particular functions is mind.  However, your view of mind requires a composite physical system, and you have absolutely no idea how a composite physical system is unified as a single flow of experience.  Where/what is that individual mind, physically speaking?  Is it a kind of field?

Fields....lol.  Benny, why on earth would you state, from a computer...to a person advocating comp mind, that we have no idea how a composite physical system is unified?  We obviously do have -some- idea as to how to accomplish that. Personally, I think that our mind is our brain, as I've repeatedly stated, so the question of where/what seems odd.

[bennyboy]

Now you're just tossing out fallacies hoping one sticks.  

You're claiming a fallacy fallacy? What color pot are you, then?

You are arguing, again, against the existence of computers.  The proposed mechanism is computation of representations based upon sense data.  The experience of an isolated system (connected to it's own sensory, rather than that of another) would be necessarily subjective, though we could probably engineer that out in a machine mind.  At least, it would be easier to give it some other type of experience than it would be to alter our own, at present.  

I'm arguing against your composition fallacy, and have always been. You need to identify, physically speaking, exactly what constitutes a computer, and why you think it can experience anything subjectively. So far you have: computers store data 'n' stuff, therefore. . . mind! This really isn't much of a step up from theism, IMO. Your system needs some actual physical details, or it's as woo a philosophy as any other woo philosophy.

I'd point to material interaction and computation, both known and demonstrable, as to the possible why/how (ignoring that I don't think the term applies).   I have zero interest in the why and how, as I attempt to explain to you a theory concerned with nothing -other- than the why or how?   What sort of objection is that?

You have explained neither. All you've done is begged the question and proclaimed an ontology.

-Everything- is what we say it is Benny.  We're the only ones coming up with words.   We use the word table to describe things we didn't make as well.  What's the problem of subjective experience in context, and why -would- the universe know anything?  

No. Some things are our constructions, and some things aren't. You can choose whatever word you want to represent mind, but you don't get to define mind other than as it is-- at least not if you want to talk about anything important.

Fields....lol.  Benny, why on earth would you state, from a computer...to a person advocating comp mind, that we have no idea how a composite physical system is unified?  We obviously do have -some- idea as to how to accomplish that.   Personally, I think that our mind is our brain, as I've repeatedly stated, so the question of where/what seems odd.

Okay, you have an idea. Great. Say what it is, and I will be suitably enlightened, and we can move on to other discussions.

*beings holding breath*

[Angrboda]

Those are the real essence of mind?  I thought the real essence of mind was qualia.  Regardless, this seems to have little if anything to do with the essence of mind.  It appears little more than an equivocation.

If mind isn't elemental, then how do non-mental systems when put together allow for mind?  How does the universe "know" that system X is just stuff happening, and system Y is a mind?

Shifting the burden of proof doesn't make your position any more coherent. It simply creates an argument from ignorance. If I don't know the specifics of how stuff happening creates mind, that doesn't offer any more support to your own view. I believe that mind is a result of a specific set of processes in the brain. That I can't name those specific processes isn't evidence against them.

[ohreally]

The strawman is that you keep talking about physical objects and sayng they don't have mind.  I've never said they do.

As for the rest: look, if I ask how an engine converts chemical energy to motion, you won't just wave at the engine, and say "There it is."  You'll explain about the burning process, show how fuel is regulated, show how the pistons work.  You'll show how the sparkplugs ignite the fuel, and how a feedback loop continually charges the battery to allow the process to continue, for the most part, indefinitely.  You'll identify what part of the engine does exactly what role in the process, and will do so happily and with ease.

My question for you is very simple: what brain systems and functions are you calling "comp mind," and how do they work, even vaguely?  How do they allow for mind?  And, specifically, do parts of the brain not really involved in processing, like the blood in the veins or the cerebral spinal fluide, get called part of "mind" or not?

I don't get how your analogy of an engine is any better.  It seems like every argument you make against a comp mind can be applied here as well just as effectively.

[bennyboy]

If mind isn't elemental, then how do non-mental systems when put together allow for mind?  How does the universe "know" that system X is just stuff happening, and system Y is a mind?

Shifting the burden of proof doesn't make your position any more coherent.  It simply creates an argument from ignorance.   If I don't know the specifics of how stuff happening creates mind, that doesn't offer any more support to your own view.  I believe that mind is a result of a specific set of processes in the brain.  That I can't name those specific processes isn't evidence against them.

You don't get to claim "argument from ignorance" when someone claims you haven't established your idea.  I've already stipulated that in a material monism, the mind has something to do with the brain.  The question is whether at its most essential, the mind supervenes on structures, systems or processes that are unique only to brain-like structures, or whether they are more general.

If you agree with Rhythm, and you seem to, then it is a particular kind of complexity of information flow upon which mind supervenes.  If you agree with me, and as usual nobody does (), then the existence of mind isn't a supervenient property at all-- what supervenes on the brain is the particular organization of perceptions and experiences which is unique to human being.

[bennyboy]

The strawman is that you keep talking about physical objects and sayng they don't have mind.  I've never said they do.

As for the rest: look, if I ask how an engine converts chemical energy to motion, you won't just wave at the engine, and say "There it is."  You'll explain about the burning process, show how fuel is regulated, show how the pistons work.  You'll show how the sparkplugs ignite the fuel, and how a feedback loop continually charges the battery to allow the process to continue, for the most part, indefinitely.  You'll identify what part of the engine does exactly what role in the process, and will do so happily and with ease.

My question for you is very simple: what brain systems and functions are you calling "comp mind," and how do they work, even vaguely?  How do they allow for mind?  And, specifically, do parts of the brain not really involved in processing, like the blood in the veins or the cerebral spinal fluide, get called part of "mind" or not?

I don't get how your analogy of an engine is any better.  It seems like every argument you make against a comp mind can be applied here as well just as effectively.

What you said isn't in accord with what you quoted.