RE: William Lane Craig unmasked.
December 5, 2016 at 2:36 am
(This post was last modified: December 5, 2016 at 3:21 am by Edwardo Piet.)
Moral epistemology is regarding the fact that once a definition of morality is made... i.e. harming is bad, helping is good, then there may be objective answers in principle to that even if never in practice.
Moral ontology is regarding an absolute morality with the existence of absolute morals that require a foundaton. Craig kept asking for that but Shelly was arguing for an objective morality with an epistemic argument, not an absolutist one with an ontological argument.
All the debate was about was if atheists can be moral too. Nowhere was moral ontology specified or required. So Shelly didn't have to argue for that. Craig was asking specifically for absolutist moral ontology which was a red herring to the debate in question.
Absolute morality and the existence of absolute moral values and moral ontology is utter bullshit. Can there be objective answers to a version of morality in principle if not in practice once a definition has been specified (like harm=bad help=good?). Yes in an epistemic way. The same way that there can be objective answers in principle to what is healthy or unhealthy once we establish a definition of health. Doesn't mean there's ontological values existing absolutely in the universe that provide foundation for what's absolutely healthy or unhealthy. Yes we do need a definition first, and then objective answers in principle are given.
That's moral ontology again. No morals or values have to "exist" in nature or anywhere else. Moral epistemology isn't about existence. It's about knowing that there are objective answers in principle to morality once a definition is given. Objective =/= absolute. It's the same way that there are objective answers in principle to health once the definition is given. There aren't any values about what's healthy or healthy that "exist" in nature either. There's no foundation to look for. Health is arbitrary but science works by practice once a model is given. We can't draw the line between what is exactly healthy or unhealthy either but that doesn't mean there isn't answers in principle to what we mean by "healthy" or "unhealthy" and whether there are answers in practice is of course irrelevant. An objective morality doesn't have to be universal either. There just has to be objective right and wrong answers in principle to a definition of morality like there is with health. No ontology or values that "exist" required. No foundation required besides semantic one. It's like Shelly said... there are objective reasons that something is harmful or helpful to us. He doesn't have to prove why "harm" = immoral or why "help"= moral..... that would be arguing for moral ontology which is what Craig is obsessed with but which isn't actually necessary for the subject of the debate. It's a red herring. There seems to be this whole thing that morality is only TRULY objective if it's an absolute morality grounded in moral ontology. Something which isn't possible and is a huge misnomer and rather an example of the NTS fallacy even perhaps. There's no reason whatsoever that morality is only objective if we're talking moral ontology. Science isn't even objective that way.
Well of course because morality is by definition what we should do. Saying that we should be moral is the same as saying that we should do whatever we should do.
So what is morality.
Shelly offers the commonsensical idea that what's moral is what helps and what's immoral is what harms. Does he have to absolutetly prove why that specific definition is the right one? No because he doesn't have to argue for absolutist moral ontology or the "existence" of moral values (whatever that would even mean) to address the question of the debate. That's a red herring. Objective answers in principle to a definition of morality is still objective answers in principle to that definition. There are clear answers in principle to what is harmful and what is helpful regardless of if there are in practice. Again, even science doesn't have an absolutist ontological foundation. Can we prove that health should mean being well as opposed to sick and shouldn't instead mean something completely different? No we can't... people pick a definition of what something means and then there can be objective answers in principle to that. Ontology and absolutist foundations are just silly (unless it's something like the logical absolutes because of course it's absolutely true that a thing is whatever that thing is whether we're there to conceptualize that or not). There is no reason to expect special pleading for morality. There is nothing magical about the word "should" the so-called is-ought gap is bullshit. Once a definition of what morality means or what "should" and "shouldn't" are about then that can go from prescriptive to descriptive (and why that definition should be selected isn't required because I'm talking moral epistemology here, not moral ontology). To ask "why should we be moral?" makes no sense at all. It's like asking "Why should we do what we should do?" errrrmmmm because we should. Ya know... tautology?
Moral ontology is regarding an absolute morality with the existence of absolute morals that require a foundaton. Craig kept asking for that but Shelly was arguing for an objective morality with an epistemic argument, not an absolutist one with an ontological argument.
All the debate was about was if atheists can be moral too. Nowhere was moral ontology specified or required. So Shelly didn't have to argue for that. Craig was asking specifically for absolutist moral ontology which was a red herring to the debate in question.
Absolute morality and the existence of absolute moral values and moral ontology is utter bullshit. Can there be objective answers to a version of morality in principle if not in practice once a definition has been specified (like harm=bad help=good?). Yes in an epistemic way. The same way that there can be objective answers in principle to what is healthy or unhealthy once we establish a definition of health. Doesn't mean there's ontological values existing absolutely in the universe that provide foundation for what's absolutely healthy or unhealthy. Yes we do need a definition first, and then objective answers in principle are given.
(December 4, 2016 at 9:48 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Morality is made up of should's and shouldn't's. These do not appear to be natural categories as there are no such norms in nature. [...]
That's moral ontology again. No morals or values have to "exist" in nature or anywhere else. Moral epistemology isn't about existence. It's about knowing that there are objective answers in principle to morality once a definition is given. Objective =/= absolute. It's the same way that there are objective answers in principle to health once the definition is given. There aren't any values about what's healthy or healthy that "exist" in nature either. There's no foundation to look for. Health is arbitrary but science works by practice once a model is given. We can't draw the line between what is exactly healthy or unhealthy either but that doesn't mean there isn't answers in principle to what we mean by "healthy" or "unhealthy" and whether there are answers in practice is of course irrelevant. An objective morality doesn't have to be universal either. There just has to be objective right and wrong answers in principle to a definition of morality like there is with health. No ontology or values that "exist" required. No foundation required besides semantic one. It's like Shelly said... there are objective reasons that something is harmful or helpful to us. He doesn't have to prove why "harm" = immoral or why "help"= moral..... that would be arguing for moral ontology which is what Craig is obsessed with but which isn't actually necessary for the subject of the debate. It's a red herring. There seems to be this whole thing that morality is only TRULY objective if it's an absolute morality grounded in moral ontology. Something which isn't possible and is a huge misnomer and rather an example of the NTS fallacy even perhaps. There's no reason whatsoever that morality is only objective if we're talking moral ontology. Science isn't even objective that way.
(December 4, 2016 at 9:48 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: [...]Is it just a brute fact that we 'should' be moral, whatever that means?
[...]
Well of course because morality is by definition what we should do. Saying that we should be moral is the same as saying that we should do whatever we should do.
So what is morality.
Shelly offers the commonsensical idea that what's moral is what helps and what's immoral is what harms. Does he have to absolutetly prove why that specific definition is the right one? No because he doesn't have to argue for absolutist moral ontology or the "existence" of moral values (whatever that would even mean) to address the question of the debate. That's a red herring. Objective answers in principle to a definition of morality is still objective answers in principle to that definition. There are clear answers in principle to what is harmful and what is helpful regardless of if there are in practice. Again, even science doesn't have an absolutist ontological foundation. Can we prove that health should mean being well as opposed to sick and shouldn't instead mean something completely different? No we can't... people pick a definition of what something means and then there can be objective answers in principle to that. Ontology and absolutist foundations are just silly (unless it's something like the logical absolutes because of course it's absolutely true that a thing is whatever that thing is whether we're there to conceptualize that or not). There is no reason to expect special pleading for morality. There is nothing magical about the word "should" the so-called is-ought gap is bullshit. Once a definition of what morality means or what "should" and "shouldn't" are about then that can go from prescriptive to descriptive (and why that definition should be selected isn't required because I'm talking moral epistemology here, not moral ontology). To ask "why should we be moral?" makes no sense at all. It's like asking "Why should we do what we should do?" errrrmmmm because we should. Ya know... tautology?
