Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[I_am_not_mafia]

What about if the computer was a 100% perfect simulation of all the neurons, dendrites, synapses and neurotransmitters in a real brain, and you then plugged it into a real body with senses?

Why wouldn't it have an equal experience of dust or blue skies?

Why would it?

Why would an organic system have an experience and an artificial system not have one? You say organic systems do have experiences. Tell me why a perfect computer simulation in a body would not.

What about instead of using a computer, you created an agent controller using cells and put that in a body? Would that then be able to experience? If so, why? Or why not?

The key requirement here is that the agent controller needs to be embodied in an environment and be able to sense and act within it.

Is that the key requirement?  If you had a non-organic system, and it could do the things you say are key, would you know that it was really experiencing, rather than just seeming to?

Let's view this as a hypothesis: "Systems with requirements X and Y have the capacity to subjectively experience what things are like (i.e. qualia)."  How would you go about proving this hypothesis?  Ask it, "Siri. . . are you conscious?"  "Yes, Dave, I am.  Super-duper, fully aware."

Well I don't believe that qualia exists. I think it's an utterly useless bullshit term. You're the one who claims that it does exist. I am trying to point out that you are making assumptions that you cannot support, that qualia exists for natural agents and cannot exist for artificial ones. You are assuming that there is something inherent about natural systems that allow them to experience qualia, even though you have no idea what the feature in natural systems would allow for this, you do not know what qualia is, how to define it, how to recognise it or what would make it appear in natural systems and not artificial ones. And the only reason you are in this position is because of your philosophy rather than any evidence.

I am claiming that the only thing inherent about the artificial system you proposed that could not feel would be that it was not embodied so cannot sense and act within an environment. All your claims of qualia come from being embodied in an environment.

Assumptions that you have to have reached a certain level of mental development in order to experience things can lead to really immoral acts. The medical profession used to only give anaesthesia to adults for this very reason. My dad for example remembers having his tonsils cut out of him without anaesthetic when he was a young boy. It's the same mentality that leads to animal or cruelty or abuse of children.

Eh?  Are you saying all of this for a reason?  I don't see the connection to anything I said.  It seems to be an attempt to support a philosophical position with an emotional appeal: "Yes, but what about the CHILDREN?" and eventually maybe, "Well. . . YOU say the bennotron 3000 isn't really alive. . . but what if you're WRONG?"

I am saying that you are falling into the same trap as the medical profession and industries who farm animals. Just because they cannot communicate that they are experiencing something that you doubt whether they actually are experiencing it.

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Apparently, it fits into brains.  ...........?

Fine.  Pull out your Qualiometer 3000, and demonstrate that a brain, or ANY other physical system, has qualia.

First tell us what qualia is, how to recognise it and give us reason to suspect that it exists.

Or stop using the word qualia. Your whole position relies upon equivocation about qualia means.