Trying to simplify my Consciousness hypothesis

[DLJ]

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Qualia is the subjective experience of what things are like: what it's like to drink hot chocolate, what it's like to see something red, and so on.
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Which makes it a variable. For example, hot chocolate will be less sweet if imbibed after eating pancakes with maple syrup.

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Qualia has only ever meant one thing, so far as I know.

In 1988, Dan Dennett attempted to pin it down by proposing that "the root concept of qualia has four conditions. Qualia are:
1) ineffable
2) intrinsic
3) private, and
4) directly apprehensible ways things seem to one.

That is to say, they are
1) somehow atomic to introspection and hence indescribable ("you had to be there");
2) not relational or dispositional or functional (the colour red may be anxiety-provoking to some people but that subjective disposition is not a quale of red);
3) "You had to be there, but you can't be, they're mine and mine alone!"; and
4) your qualia are known to you more intimately than anything else.

In Intuition Pumps he added: "This is still regarded as a good starting place in most circles, but since the point of that essay was to show that nothing could meet these four conditions, there has been ample discussion of revised or improved versions of the concept, with no emerging consensus."