Arguments Against Thomistic philosophy

[Neo-Scholastic]

Let me first say that even Thomists disagree about exactly what Thomas Aquinas meant at every step of the way. This is not unusual. Kantians have internecine debates with other Kantians, as do existentialists, etc. I have had a chance to correspond with Feser about some finer points of his approach and have to say that I take issue with some finer points, such as the example he used (cup of water on a table) for the 2W.

1. Change involves a potential being actualized
2. A potential must be actualized by something already actual
3. Some things do not exist necessarily and require their potential for existence to be actualized
4. If the thing doing this actualizing has potentials, it would also require another actual thing to actualize it
5. Therefore the chain of actualization must conclude in some purely actual thing
6. Since this thing would be purely actual it would be unchanging and eternal
7. There could only be one such being as there would be no unactualized potentials to differentiate one such being from another
8. Since it caused all non purely actual things it would be omnipotent
9. (EDIT Forgot to include.) Since all non purely actual things, including intelligent beings, came from this Pure Actuality, it would neccessarily be both intelligent, since a cause cannot give something it does not at least possess virtually, and all knowing since the attributes of all things flow from it
10. And that is basically the monotheistic God

Okay, I will critique this formulation. I see a couple of interesting places where, I believe, he diverges significantly from Aquinas. For example, Feser appears to have blended discrete demonstrations by Aquinas into one demonstration. Line 3 belongs in the demonstration for a necessary being, not the unchanged changer. Line 7 isn’t in the 5W at all; it comes from Question 3 regarding the simplicity of God. For me, Line 9, doesn’t clearly follow any of the prior and seems, in some ways at odds with Aquinas in two important ways.

First, these demonstrations are not about attributes of God as such; but rather, His effects used in place of a definition. (Question 1, Article 7, Reply to Objection 1). So while we call God the ‘Prime Mover’ that is actually an effect of our God who is Himself incomprehensible. It’s a very subtle but important thing to keep in mind. Similarly, to say that God is intelligent is easily misunderstood since His intellect is completely unlike ours and we can ponder it only by comparing it with the deficiencies of our own.

Secondly, line 9 is also just restating a general principle of Scholasticism, i.e. that a thing cannot give what it does not have. While I agree with the principle, it takes a lot to unpack for people who are not familiar with what it’s all about. Throwing it into the mix seems more confusing than clarifying.
In Feser’s defense, I would say that Ways 1, 2, and 3 are very closely related and mutually supporting. I fully understand the impulse to make those connections explicit. Thomistic philosophy is much bigger than the 5 Ways and rests in an even bigger classical tradition. Often time the so-called refutation of one of the 5W is dispensed with in another or is dealt with elsewhere in the Summa.

Anyway, enough prologue…

I can only restate that a "prime mover" does not require the attibutes the faithful insist upon, and that no amount of positing a "first event" that then becomes the antecedent for all subsequent events is tantamount to your..or any, "god".

As noted earlier, the demonstrations of the 5Ws tacitly assume Aristotelian notions of causality (material, efficient, formal, and final). The common charge is that modern theories of causality have replaced them or at least rendered them irrelevant. That simply is not true. They are complimentary at best or at least parallel.
Khem’s objection 1W & 2W are based on the causal theory of Hume, i.e. that causality consists of temporal sequences of events that habitually one after the other. But none of the first 4 Ways have anything to do with time, only the 5W does, and then only incidentally to it.

Here's the thing: at best, Aquinas argues for a god

Yes and so what. Aquinas demonstrates the existence of to the extent it can be revealed by natural reason. For him, and for me, showing that a perfect correspondence exists between the nature of the God of the Philosophers and the God of Christian faith, as revealed by special revelation, is sufficient.

The 4th way, for example, is about the nature of degrees.  That, in order to be able to use qualitative statements, there must be some ultimate standard with which to compare to…But, why isn't the epitome of evil also god?  And, aren't a lot of qualities - including good and evil - subjective?  Yes, a circle has an area of pi*(r*r), but what is the perfect value of r?  What is the perfect line thickness/boundary for this circle?  Or color of the stroke

Basically, Kevin is arguing against the intelligibility of reality with a naïve understanding of Neo-Platonism. Then he throws out a bunch of red herrings – having a specific area is not essential to the perfection of circles, nor its color, etc. The whole notion of positive evil is just silly. It’s like saying there is a perfect kind of non-circle. There are an infinite number of ways to be a non-circle but only one way to be circular.

The 5th way seems to be about deriving purpose, and thus intelligence, from results.  The purpose of an acorn is to grow into an oak tree, not sea lion.  But what about emergent phenomena?  Why must intention be the cause of movement?  There are non-sentient causes all over the place... why must the first be different?

Not exactly. The 5W is about dispositional properties and positing a reason for the regularity of changes, e.g. when struck glass shatters instead of folding or turning into butterflies. Hume, from whom modern notions causality come, believed that nothing essentially links prior events to a subsequent ones. To me such a universe is an absurd cartoon universe that only has the appearance of order.

Well, for one, Aristotle thought that any movement (which he regarded as any change at all) requires a force. We now know that isn't true: motion thorugh space doesn't require a force--a *change* of direction or speed does.

Talk about straw man! Philosophy 101, my friend. The 1W has nothing to do with Newtonian physics. It’s about change.

As for contingency, a unicorn isn't something that 'possibly exists' but simply fails to do so. It is something that *doesn't* exist. There is no modifier on existence. Something either exists or not.[/i]

&

…change is just that: change. It isn't a 'potential' that is 'actualized', it is simply a change… Things either exist or they do not. A non-existent thing doens't have properties like potentiality.

It is quite possibly the case that unicorns cannot possibly exist in all possible worlds. Things either exist or they don’t. Sure. But both points are irrelevant.

The distinction between act and potency is necessary to resolve the dilemma between Parmenides and Heraclitus of how things can change while preserving their being. It’s difficult to argue that things don’t have a range of potentials into which they could change. An acorn has the potential to grow into a mature tree, but no potential to become a puppy. At the same time, the acorn is the same oak as the mature tree. It’s an actual thing manifesting its potential.

I don't believe in any First Cause or Prime Mover. I don't think anything was/is ultimately caused. Everything is just is.

Grandizer says it’s a brute fact so it must be…not. The principle of sufficient reason applies.

Anyways, that’s enough for today.