Philosophical zombies

[Edwardo Piet]

It's not what we've traditionally described it as...but that would only be a problem if our traditional description were the accurate one.   

But we know that we're conscious in the traditional sense. And the fact science can't touch it doesn't mean by redefining it we're not still conscious in the tradtional sense.

It's one thing for him to create a new definition and say that definition is better.... but he can't use his own definition to argue against the traditional one. That makes no sense.

Qualia is still very real in the traditional sense, things really do seem to us, we really aren't zombies. And everything science studies is the experience of reality in the traditional sense. The one thing in the universe we know for sure exists is consciousness in the traditional sense, and if it were a battle between traditional consciousness and science, traditional consciousness would win every time. Because science studies nothing but it.

His own position on consciousness is based upon his hypothesis.  If you agree with that..you're likely misunderstanding some quote mine by a detractor.  

No we've been through all this before. The fact that you think that he is making any sense when he concludes that consciousness is an illusion or qualia don't exist just shows that you don't understand that he is making non-sequiturs.

His position on the workings of the brain do make sense. Consciousness is the fame in the brain, consciousness is competitive. But no it can't be illusory and no we can't be zombies that makes no sense. What he calls an "illusion" is not an illusion. You can't apply illusoriness or unreality to consciousness because consciousness is the one thing in the universe that we know really exists. Everything else could be an illusion but not consciousness.

In fairness, he doesn't just call it that..he shows how often it is. 

Dennett goes on a huge digression. He shows that the brain works like a bunch of tricks and that we are often tricking ourselves... and he thinks that means that the tricks aren't real. He's really terrible at logic sometimes. It's like yes Dennett that makes sense. Yes Dennett that makes sense. Yes Dennett that makes sense. No, Dennett, that is a non-sequitur.

He's an eliminativist, and that means that he -has- to provide a better description of consciousness than what he considers to be folklore.  He's not looking to explain that thing that people traditionally thought was happening, but what actually is.

He can create his own definitions but he can't redefine the old ones when the old ones describe something that we know is absolutely real more than we know anything scientific is absolutely real.

He can address the brain, he can talk about the workings of the brain that probably lead to consciousness, he can even label that consciousness. But he can't call consciousness an illusion if he hasn't addressed consciousness.

It would be fair enough if he said "Of course remember I'm not talking about actual consciousness I'm talking about something else and calling it consciousness." but he doesn't say it like that.

To call it consciousness when it isn't consciousness is utterly pointless and futile.

He may as well call the universe "God" if he's going to call the absence of free will "free will" or something other than consciousness "consciousness".