(March 2, 2018 at 1:46 pm)Hammy Wrote:(March 2, 2018 at 1:37 pm)polymath257 Wrote: Yes, I get that. But what I am saying is if they can relate 'experiences' and 'feelings' with coherency, then it is clear they *do* have 'experiences' and 'feelings', otherwise what would elicit those responses?
Well not consciousness.
Remember, I said I am an epiphenomenalist. So asking me that question doesn't make a lot of sense. Consciousness doesn't do anything. Which is exactly why P-Zeds are possible.
Quote:If they are reacting *exactly* the same, that is sufficient evidence of an internal state. In fact, there is nothing that could elicit a consistently coherent set of responses to questions of consciousness except for consciousness itself. Without an internal state, they wouldn't respond as if they had one.
It's evidence of an internal brain state, and a complex one yes. But it's not evidence of a conscious one.
Quote:And it clearly seems to a zombie that it is conscious, so it is.
A conscious P-zed is an oxymoron like a square-circle.
Conscious people know they are conscious/aware because being aware is being aware of awareness. Being conscious is being conscious of consciousness.
There is no seeming to a p-zed. The fact a p-zed seems conscious to other conscious people... doesn't mean anything seems anything to the P-zed. Come on, you'll have to do better than that.
OK, I think we just disagree here. It seems clear to me that this level of complexity is the same as having an internal state that is conscious. They would have *seeming*.
That p-zombies would then be conscious is a proof of their impossibility.
